c05253f732d910579a68d7a666b0aed4e6766927
[exim.git] / src / src / tls-openssl.c
1 /*************************************************
2 * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
3 *************************************************/
4
5 /* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2014 */
6 /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
7
8 /* Portions Copyright (c) The OpenSSL Project 1999 */
9
10 /* This module provides the TLS (aka SSL) support for Exim using the OpenSSL
11 library. It is #included into the tls.c file when that library is used. The
12 code herein is based on a patch that was originally contributed by Steve
13 Haslam. It was adapted from stunnel, a GPL program by Michal Trojnara.
14
15 No cryptographic code is included in Exim. All this module does is to call
16 functions from the OpenSSL library. */
17
18
19 /* Heading stuff */
20
21 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
22 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
23 #include <openssl/err.h>
24 #include <openssl/rand.h>
25 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
26 # include <openssl/ocsp.h>
27 #endif
28
29 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
30 # define EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS (300L)
31 # define EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE (-1L)
32 #endif
33
34 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090806fL && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
35 # define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
36 #endif
37
38 #if !defined(EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT) && !defined(DISABLE_OCSP)
39 # warning "OpenSSL library version too old; define DISABLE_OCSP in Makefile"
40 # define DISABLE_OCSP
41 #endif
42
43 /* Structure for collecting random data for seeding. */
44
45 typedef struct randstuff {
46 struct timeval tv;
47 pid_t p;
48 } randstuff;
49
50 /* Local static variables */
51
52 static BOOL client_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
53 static BOOL server_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
54 static const uschar *sid_ctx = US"exim";
55
56 /* We have three different contexts to care about.
57
58 Simple case: client, `client_ctx`
59 As a client, we can be doing a callout or cut-through delivery while receiving
60 a message. So we have a client context, which should have options initialised
61 from the SMTP Transport.
62
63 Server:
64 There are two cases: with and without ServerNameIndication from the client.
65 Given TLS SNI, we can be using different keys, certs and various other
66 configuration settings, because they're re-expanded with $tls_sni set. This
67 allows vhosting with TLS. This SNI is sent in the handshake.
68 A client might not send SNI, so we need a fallback, and an initial setup too.
69 So as a server, we start out using `server_ctx`.
70 If SNI is sent by the client, then we as server, mid-negotiation, try to clone
71 `server_sni` from `server_ctx` and then initialise settings by re-expanding
72 configuration.
73 */
74
75 static SSL_CTX *client_ctx = NULL;
76 static SSL_CTX *server_ctx = NULL;
77 static SSL *client_ssl = NULL;
78 static SSL *server_ssl = NULL;
79
80 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
81 static SSL_CTX *server_sni = NULL;
82 #endif
83
84 static char ssl_errstring[256];
85
86 static int ssl_session_timeout = 200;
87 static BOOL client_verify_optional = FALSE;
88 static BOOL server_verify_optional = FALSE;
89
90 static BOOL reexpand_tls_files_for_sni = FALSE;
91
92
93 typedef struct tls_ext_ctx_cb {
94 uschar *certificate;
95 uschar *privatekey;
96 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
97 BOOL is_server;
98 union {
99 struct {
100 uschar *file;
101 uschar *file_expanded;
102 OCSP_RESPONSE *response;
103 } server;
104 struct {
105 X509_STORE *verify_store; /* non-null if status requested */
106 BOOL verify_required;
107 } client;
108 } u_ocsp;
109 #endif
110 uschar *dhparam;
111 /* these are cached from first expand */
112 uschar *server_cipher_list;
113 /* only passed down to tls_error: */
114 host_item *host;
115
116 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
117 uschar * verify_cert_hostnames;
118 #endif
119 } tls_ext_ctx_cb;
120
121 /* should figure out a cleanup of API to handle state preserved per
122 implementation, for various reasons, which can be void * in the APIs.
123 For now, we hack around it. */
124 tls_ext_ctx_cb *client_static_cbinfo = NULL;
125 tls_ext_ctx_cb *server_static_cbinfo = NULL;
126
127 static int
128 setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host, BOOL optional,
129 int (*cert_vfy_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) );
130
131 /* Callbacks */
132 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
133 static int tls_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad ARG_UNUSED, void *arg);
134 #endif
135 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
136 static int tls_server_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg);
137 #endif
138
139
140 /*************************************************
141 * Handle TLS error *
142 *************************************************/
143
144 /* Called from lots of places when errors occur before actually starting to do
145 the TLS handshake, that is, while the session is still in clear. Always returns
146 DEFER for a server and FAIL for a client so that most calls can use "return
147 tls_error(...)" to do this processing and then give an appropriate return. A
148 single function is used for both server and client, because it is called from
149 some shared functions.
150
151 Argument:
152 prefix text to include in the logged error
153 host NULL if setting up a server;
154 the connected host if setting up a client
155 msg error message or NULL if we should ask OpenSSL
156
157 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
158 */
159
160 static int
161 tls_error(uschar *prefix, host_item *host, uschar *msg)
162 {
163 if (msg == NULL)
164 {
165 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
166 msg = (uschar *)ssl_errstring;
167 }
168
169 if (host == NULL)
170 {
171 uschar *conn_info = smtp_get_connection_info();
172 if (Ustrncmp(conn_info, US"SMTP ", 5) == 0)
173 conn_info += 5;
174 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error on %s (%s): %s",
175 conn_info, prefix, msg);
176 return DEFER;
177 }
178 else
179 {
180 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error on connection to %s [%s] (%s): %s",
181 host->name, host->address, prefix, msg);
182 return FAIL;
183 }
184 }
185
186
187
188 /*************************************************
189 * Callback to generate RSA key *
190 *************************************************/
191
192 /*
193 Arguments:
194 s SSL connection
195 export not used
196 keylength keylength
197
198 Returns: pointer to generated key
199 */
200
201 static RSA *
202 rsa_callback(SSL *s, int export, int keylength)
203 {
204 RSA *rsa_key;
205 export = export; /* Shut picky compilers up */
206 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Generating %d bit RSA key...\n", keylength);
207 rsa_key = RSA_generate_key(keylength, RSA_F4, NULL, NULL);
208 if (rsa_key == NULL)
209 {
210 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
211 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "TLS error (RSA_generate_key): %s",
212 ssl_errstring);
213 return NULL;
214 }
215 return rsa_key;
216 }
217
218
219
220 /* Extreme debug
221 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
222 void
223 x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(X509_STORE * store)
224 {
225 STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) * roots= store->objs;
226 int i;
227 static uschar name[256];
228
229 for(i= 0; i<sk_X509_OBJECT_num(roots); i++)
230 {
231 X509_OBJECT * tmp_obj= sk_X509_OBJECT_value(roots, i);
232 if(tmp_obj->type == X509_LU_X509)
233 {
234 X509 * current_cert= tmp_obj->data.x509;
235 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(current_cert), CS name, sizeof(name));
236 debug_printf(" %s\n", name);
237 }
238 }
239 }
240 #endif
241 */
242
243
244 /*************************************************
245 * Callback for verification *
246 *************************************************/
247
248 /* The SSL library does certificate verification if set up to do so. This
249 callback has the current yes/no state is in "state". If verification succeeded,
250 we set up the tls_peerdn string. If verification failed, what happens depends
251 on whether the client is required to present a verifiable certificate or not.
252
253 If verification is optional, we change the state to yes, but still log the
254 verification error. For some reason (it really would help to have proper
255 documentation of OpenSSL), this callback function then gets called again, this
256 time with state = 1. In fact, that's useful, because we can set up the peerdn
257 value, but we must take care not to set the private verified flag on the second
258 time through.
259
260 Note: this function is not called if the client fails to present a certificate
261 when asked. We get here only if a certificate has been received. Handling of
262 optional verification for this case is done when requesting SSL to verify, by
263 setting SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT in the non-optional case.
264
265 Arguments:
266 state current yes/no state as 1/0
267 x509ctx certificate information.
268 client TRUE for client startup, FALSE for server startup
269
270 Returns: 1 if verified, 0 if not
271 */
272
273 static int
274 verify_callback(int state, X509_STORE_CTX *x509ctx,
275 tls_support *tlsp, BOOL *calledp, BOOL *optionalp)
276 {
277 X509 * cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(x509ctx);
278 static uschar txt[256];
279
280 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS txt, sizeof(txt));
281
282 if (state == 0)
283 {
284 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL verify error: depth=%d error=%s cert=%s",
285 X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx),
286 X509_verify_cert_error_string(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(x509ctx)),
287 txt);
288 tlsp->certificate_verified = FALSE;
289 *calledp = TRUE;
290 if (!*optionalp)
291 {
292 tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert);
293 return 0; /* reject */
294 }
295 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify failure overridden (host in "
296 "tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
297 }
298
299 else if (X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx) != 0)
300 {
301 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify ok: depth=%d SN=%s\n",
302 X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx), txt);
303 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
304 if (tlsp == &tls_out && client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store)
305 { /* client, wanting stapling */
306 /* Add the server cert's signing chain as the one
307 for the verification of the OCSP stapled information. */
308
309 if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store,
310 cert))
311 ERR_clear_error();
312 }
313 #endif
314 }
315 else
316 {
317 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
318 uschar * verify_cert_hostnames;
319 #endif
320
321 tlsp->peerdn = txt;
322 tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert);
323
324 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
325 if ( tlsp == &tls_out
326 && ((verify_cert_hostnames = client_static_cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames)))
327 /* client, wanting hostname check */
328
329 # if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010100000L || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010002000L
330 # ifndef X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS
331 # define X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS 0
332 # endif
333 {
334 int sep = 0;
335 uschar * list = verify_cert_hostnames;
336 uschar * name;
337 int rc;
338 while ((name = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
339 if ((rc = X509_check_host(cert, name, 0,
340 X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS)))
341 {
342 if (rc < 0)
343 {
344 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL verify error: internal error\n");
345 name = NULL;
346 }
347 break;
348 }
349 if (!name)
350 {
351 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
352 "SSL verify error: certificate name mismatch: \"%s\"\n", txt);
353 return 0; /* reject */
354 }
355 }
356 # else
357 if (!tls_is_name_for_cert(verify_cert_hostnames, cert))
358 {
359 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
360 "SSL verify error: certificate name mismatch: \"%s\"\n", txt);
361 return 0; /* reject */
362 }
363 # endif
364 #endif /*EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES*/
365
366 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL%s verify ok: depth=0 SN=%s\n",
367 *calledp ? "" : " authenticated", txt);
368 if (!*calledp) tlsp->certificate_verified = TRUE;
369 *calledp = TRUE;
370 }
371
372 return 1; /* accept */
373 }
374
375 static int
376 verify_callback_client(int state, X509_STORE_CTX *x509ctx)
377 {
378 return verify_callback(state, x509ctx, &tls_out, &client_verify_callback_called, &client_verify_optional);
379 }
380
381 static int
382 verify_callback_server(int state, X509_STORE_CTX *x509ctx)
383 {
384 return verify_callback(state, x509ctx, &tls_in, &server_verify_callback_called, &server_verify_optional);
385 }
386
387
388 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
389
390 /* This gets called *by* the dane library verify callback, which interposes
391 itself.
392 */
393 static int
394 verify_callback_client_dane(int state, X509_STORE_CTX * x509ctx)
395 {
396 X509 * cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(x509ctx);
397 static uschar txt[256];
398
399 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS txt, sizeof(txt));
400
401 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("verify_callback_client_dane: %s\n", txt);
402 tls_out.peerdn = txt;
403 tls_out.peercert = X509_dup(cert);
404
405 if (state == 1)
406 tls_out.dane_verified =
407 tls_out.certificate_verified = TRUE;
408 return 1;
409 }
410
411 #endif /*EXPERIMENTAL_DANE*/
412
413
414 /*************************************************
415 * Information callback *
416 *************************************************/
417
418 /* The SSL library functions call this from time to time to indicate what they
419 are doing. We copy the string to the debugging output when TLS debugging has
420 been requested.
421
422 Arguments:
423 s the SSL connection
424 where
425 ret
426
427 Returns: nothing
428 */
429
430 static void
431 info_callback(SSL *s, int where, int ret)
432 {
433 where = where;
434 ret = ret;
435 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL info: %s\n", SSL_state_string_long(s));
436 }
437
438
439
440 /*************************************************
441 * Initialize for DH *
442 *************************************************/
443
444 /* If dhparam is set, expand it, and load up the parameters for DH encryption.
445
446 Arguments:
447 dhparam DH parameter file or fixed parameter identity string
448 host connected host, if client; NULL if server
449
450 Returns: TRUE if OK (nothing to set up, or setup worked)
451 */
452
453 static BOOL
454 init_dh(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *dhparam, host_item *host)
455 {
456 BIO *bio;
457 DH *dh;
458 uschar *dhexpanded;
459 const char *pem;
460
461 if (!expand_check(dhparam, US"tls_dhparam", &dhexpanded))
462 return FALSE;
463
464 if (!dhexpanded || !*dhexpanded)
465 bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(CS std_dh_prime_default(), -1);
466 else if (dhexpanded[0] == '/')
467 {
468 if (!(bio = BIO_new_file(CS dhexpanded, "r")))
469 {
470 tls_error(string_sprintf("could not read dhparams file %s", dhexpanded),
471 host, US strerror(errno));
472 return FALSE;
473 }
474 }
475 else
476 {
477 if (Ustrcmp(dhexpanded, "none") == 0)
478 {
479 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Requested no DH parameters.\n");
480 return TRUE;
481 }
482
483 if (!(pem = std_dh_prime_named(dhexpanded)))
484 {
485 tls_error(string_sprintf("Unknown standard DH prime \"%s\"", dhexpanded),
486 host, US strerror(errno));
487 return FALSE;
488 }
489 bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(CS pem, -1);
490 }
491
492 if (!(dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL)))
493 {
494 BIO_free(bio);
495 tls_error(string_sprintf("Could not read tls_dhparams \"%s\"", dhexpanded),
496 host, NULL);
497 return FALSE;
498 }
499
500 /* Even if it is larger, we silently return success rather than cause things
501 * to fail out, so that a too-large DH will not knock out all TLS; it's a
502 * debatable choice. */
503 if ((8*DH_size(dh)) > tls_dh_max_bits)
504 {
505 DEBUG(D_tls)
506 debug_printf("dhparams file %d bits, is > tls_dh_max_bits limit of %d",
507 8*DH_size(dh), tls_dh_max_bits);
508 }
509 else
510 {
511 SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(sctx, dh);
512 DEBUG(D_tls)
513 debug_printf("Diffie-Hellman initialized from %s with %d-bit prime\n",
514 dhexpanded ? dhexpanded : US"default", 8*DH_size(dh));
515 }
516
517 DH_free(dh);
518 BIO_free(bio);
519
520 return TRUE;
521 }
522
523
524
525
526 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
527 /*************************************************
528 * Load OCSP information into state *
529 *************************************************/
530
531 /* Called to load the server OCSP response from the given file into memory, once
532 caller has determined this is needed. Checks validity. Debugs a message
533 if invalid.
534
535 ASSUMES: single response, for single cert.
536
537 Arguments:
538 sctx the SSL_CTX* to update
539 cbinfo various parts of session state
540 expanded the filename putatively holding an OCSP response
541
542 */
543
544 static void
545 ocsp_load_response(SSL_CTX *sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo, const uschar *expanded)
546 {
547 BIO *bio;
548 OCSP_RESPONSE *resp;
549 OCSP_BASICRESP *basic_response;
550 OCSP_SINGLERESP *single_response;
551 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
552 X509_STORE *store;
553 unsigned long verify_flags;
554 int status, reason, i;
555
556 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded = string_copy(expanded);
557 if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response)
558 {
559 OCSP_RESPONSE_free(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response);
560 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = NULL;
561 }
562
563 bio = BIO_new_file(CS cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded, "rb");
564 if (!bio)
565 {
566 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Failed to open OCSP response file \"%s\"\n",
567 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded);
568 return;
569 }
570
571 resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(bio, NULL);
572 BIO_free(bio);
573 if (!resp)
574 {
575 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Error reading OCSP response.\n");
576 return;
577 }
578
579 status = OCSP_response_status(resp);
580 if (status != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL)
581 {
582 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response not valid: %s (%d)\n",
583 OCSP_response_status_str(status), status);
584 goto bad;
585 }
586
587 basic_response = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp);
588 if (!basic_response)
589 {
590 DEBUG(D_tls)
591 debug_printf("OCSP response parse error: unable to extract basic response.\n");
592 goto bad;
593 }
594
595 store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(sctx);
596 verify_flags = OCSP_NOVERIFY; /* check sigs, but not purpose */
597
598 /* May need to expose ability to adjust those flags?
599 OCSP_NOSIGS OCSP_NOVERIFY OCSP_NOCHAIN OCSP_NOCHECKS OCSP_NOEXPLICIT
600 OCSP_TRUSTOTHER OCSP_NOINTERN */
601
602 i = OCSP_basic_verify(basic_response, NULL, store, verify_flags);
603 if (i <= 0)
604 {
605 DEBUG(D_tls) {
606 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
607 debug_printf("OCSP response verify failure: %s\n", US ssl_errstring);
608 }
609 goto bad;
610 }
611
612 /* Here's the simplifying assumption: there's only one response, for the
613 one certificate we use, and nothing for anything else in a chain. If this
614 proves false, we need to extract a cert id from our issued cert
615 (tls_certificate) and use that for OCSP_resp_find_status() (which finds the
616 right cert in the stack and then calls OCSP_single_get0_status()).
617
618 I'm hoping to avoid reworking a bunch more of how we handle state here. */
619 single_response = OCSP_resp_get0(basic_response, 0);
620 if (!single_response)
621 {
622 DEBUG(D_tls)
623 debug_printf("Unable to get first response from OCSP basic response.\n");
624 goto bad;
625 }
626
627 status = OCSP_single_get0_status(single_response, &reason, &rev, &thisupd, &nextupd);
628 if (status != V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD)
629 {
630 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response bad cert status: %s (%d) %s (%d)\n",
631 OCSP_cert_status_str(status), status,
632 OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason), reason);
633 goto bad;
634 }
635
636 if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE))
637 {
638 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP status invalid times.\n");
639 goto bad;
640 }
641
642 supply_response:
643 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = resp;
644 return;
645
646 bad:
647 if (running_in_test_harness)
648 {
649 extern char ** environ;
650 uschar ** p;
651 for (p = USS environ; *p != NULL; p++)
652 if (Ustrncmp(*p, "EXIM_TESTHARNESS_DISABLE_OCSPVALIDITYCHECK", 42) == 0)
653 {
654 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Supplying known bad OCSP response\n");
655 goto supply_response;
656 }
657 }
658 return;
659 }
660 #endif /*!DISABLE_OCSP*/
661
662
663
664
665 /*************************************************
666 * Expand key and cert file specs *
667 *************************************************/
668
669 /* Called once during tls_init and possibly again during TLS setup, for a
670 new context, if Server Name Indication was used and tls_sni was seen in
671 the certificate string.
672
673 Arguments:
674 sctx the SSL_CTX* to update
675 cbinfo various parts of session state
676
677 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
678 */
679
680 static int
681 tls_expand_session_files(SSL_CTX *sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo)
682 {
683 uschar *expanded;
684
685 if (cbinfo->certificate == NULL)
686 return OK;
687
688 if (Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_sni") ||
689 Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_in_sni") ||
690 Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_out_sni")
691 )
692 reexpand_tls_files_for_sni = TRUE;
693
694 if (!expand_check(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_certificate", &expanded))
695 return DEFER;
696
697 if (expanded != NULL)
698 {
699 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_certificate file %s\n", expanded);
700 if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(sctx, CS expanded))
701 return tls_error(string_sprintf(
702 "SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file file=%s", expanded),
703 cbinfo->host, NULL);
704 }
705
706 if (cbinfo->privatekey != NULL &&
707 !expand_check(cbinfo->privatekey, US"tls_privatekey", &expanded))
708 return DEFER;
709
710 /* If expansion was forced to fail, key_expanded will be NULL. If the result
711 of the expansion is an empty string, ignore it also, and assume the private
712 key is in the same file as the certificate. */
713
714 if (expanded != NULL && *expanded != 0)
715 {
716 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_privatekey file %s\n", expanded);
717 if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(sctx, CS expanded, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM))
718 return tls_error(string_sprintf(
719 "SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file file=%s", expanded), cbinfo->host, NULL);
720 }
721
722 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
723 if (cbinfo->is_server && cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file != NULL)
724 {
725 if (!expand_check(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file, US"tls_ocsp_file", &expanded))
726 return DEFER;
727
728 if (expanded != NULL && *expanded != 0)
729 {
730 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_ocsp_file %s\n", expanded);
731 if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded &&
732 (Ustrcmp(expanded, cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded) == 0))
733 {
734 DEBUG(D_tls)
735 debug_printf("tls_ocsp_file value unchanged, using existing values.\n");
736 } else {
737 ocsp_load_response(sctx, cbinfo, expanded);
738 }
739 }
740 }
741 #endif
742
743 return OK;
744 }
745
746
747
748
749 /*************************************************
750 * Callback to handle SNI *
751 *************************************************/
752
753 /* Called when acting as server during the TLS session setup if a Server Name
754 Indication extension was sent by the client.
755
756 API documentation is OpenSSL s_server.c implementation.
757
758 Arguments:
759 s SSL* of the current session
760 ad unknown (part of OpenSSL API) (unused)
761 arg Callback of "our" registered data
762
763 Returns: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_{OK,ALERT_WARNING,ALERT_FATAL,NOACK}
764 */
765
766 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
767 static int
768 tls_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad ARG_UNUSED, void *arg)
769 {
770 const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
771 tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo = (tls_ext_ctx_cb *) arg;
772 int rc;
773 int old_pool = store_pool;
774
775 if (!servername)
776 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
777
778 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS SNI \"%s\"%s\n", servername,
779 reexpand_tls_files_for_sni ? "" : " (unused for certificate selection)");
780
781 /* Make the extension value available for expansion */
782 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
783 tls_in.sni = string_copy(US servername);
784 store_pool = old_pool;
785
786 if (!reexpand_tls_files_for_sni)
787 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
788
789 /* Can't find an SSL_CTX_clone() or equivalent, so we do it manually;
790 not confident that memcpy wouldn't break some internal reference counting.
791 Especially since there's a references struct member, which would be off. */
792
793 if (!(server_sni = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method())))
794 {
795 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
796 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_CTX_new() failed: %s\n", ssl_errstring);
797 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
798 }
799
800 /* Not sure how many of these are actually needed, since SSL object
801 already exists. Might even need this selfsame callback, for reneg? */
802
803 SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(server_ctx));
804 SSL_CTX_set_mode(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_mode(server_ctx));
805 SSL_CTX_set_options(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_options(server_ctx));
806 SSL_CTX_set_timeout(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_timeout(server_ctx));
807 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_sni, tls_servername_cb);
808 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_sni, cbinfo);
809 if (cbinfo->server_cipher_list)
810 SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(server_sni, CS cbinfo->server_cipher_list);
811 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
812 if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file)
813 {
814 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(server_sni, tls_server_stapling_cb);
815 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(server_sni, cbinfo);
816 }
817 #endif
818
819 rc = setup_certs(server_sni, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, FALSE, verify_callback_server);
820 if (rc != OK) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
821
822 /* do this after setup_certs, because this can require the certs for verifying
823 OCSP information. */
824 rc = tls_expand_session_files(server_sni, cbinfo);
825 if (rc != OK) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
826
827 if (!init_dh(server_sni, cbinfo->dhparam, NULL))
828 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
829
830 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Switching SSL context.\n");
831 SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, server_sni);
832
833 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
834 }
835 #endif /* EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT */
836
837
838
839
840 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
841
842 /*************************************************
843 * Callback to handle OCSP Stapling *
844 *************************************************/
845
846 /* Called when acting as server during the TLS session setup if the client
847 requests OCSP information with a Certificate Status Request.
848
849 Documentation via openssl s_server.c and the Apache patch from the OpenSSL
850 project.
851
852 */
853
854 static int
855 tls_server_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
856 {
857 const tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo = (tls_ext_ctx_cb *) arg;
858 uschar *response_der;
859 int response_der_len;
860
861 DEBUG(D_tls)
862 debug_printf("Received TLS status request (OCSP stapling); %s response.",
863 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response ? "have" : "lack");
864
865 tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
866 if (!cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response)
867 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
868
869 response_der = NULL;
870 response_der_len = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response,
871 &response_der);
872 if (response_der_len <= 0)
873 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
874
875 SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(server_ssl, response_der, response_der_len);
876 tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
877 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
878 }
879
880
881 static void
882 time_print(BIO * bp, const char * str, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME * time)
883 {
884 BIO_printf(bp, "\t%s: ", str);
885 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, time);
886 BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
887 }
888
889 static int
890 tls_client_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
891 {
892 tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo = arg;
893 const unsigned char * p;
894 int len;
895 OCSP_RESPONSE * rsp;
896 OCSP_BASICRESP * bs;
897 int i;
898
899 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS status response (OCSP stapling):");
900 len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &p);
901 if(!p)
902 {
903 /* Expect this when we requested ocsp but got none */
904 if ( cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required
905 && log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
906 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS status callback, null content");
907 else
908 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" null\n");
909 return cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
910 }
911
912 if(!(rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len)))
913 {
914 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
915 if (log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
916 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS status response, parse error");
917 else
918 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" parse error\n");
919 return 0;
920 }
921
922 if(!(bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp)))
923 {
924 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
925 if (log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
926 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS status response, error parsing response");
927 else
928 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" error parsing response\n");
929 OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
930 return 0;
931 }
932
933 /* We'd check the nonce here if we'd put one in the request. */
934 /* However that would defeat cacheability on the server so we don't. */
935
936 /* This section of code reworked from OpenSSL apps source;
937 The OpenSSL Project retains copyright:
938 Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
939 */
940 {
941 BIO * bp = NULL;
942 int status, reason;
943 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
944
945 DEBUG(D_tls) bp = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
946
947 /*OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, rsp, 0); extreme debug: stapling content */
948
949 /* Use the chain that verified the server cert to verify the stapled info */
950 /* DEBUG(D_tls) x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store); */
951
952 if ((i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, NULL,
953 cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store, 0)) <= 0)
954 {
955 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
956 BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response verify failure\n");
957 ERR_print_errors(bp);
958 i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
959 goto out;
960 }
961
962 BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response well-formed and signed OK\n");
963
964 {
965 STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) * sresp = bs->tbsResponseData->responses;
966 OCSP_SINGLERESP * single;
967
968 if (sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp) != 1)
969 {
970 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
971 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "OCSP stapling "
972 "with multiple responses not handled");
973 i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
974 goto out;
975 }
976 single = OCSP_resp_get0(bs, 0);
977 status = OCSP_single_get0_status(single, &reason, &rev,
978 &thisupd, &nextupd);
979 }
980
981 DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "This OCSP Update", thisupd);
982 DEBUG(D_tls) if(nextupd) time_print(bp, "Next OCSP Update", nextupd);
983 if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd,
984 EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE))
985 {
986 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
987 DEBUG(D_tls) ERR_print_errors(bp);
988 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server OSCP dates invalid");
989 i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
990 }
991 else
992 {
993 DEBUG(D_tls) BIO_printf(bp, "Certificate status: %s\n",
994 OCSP_cert_status_str(status));
995 switch(status)
996 {
997 case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD:
998 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
999 i = 1;
1000 break;
1001 case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED:
1002 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
1003 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server certificate revoked%s%s",
1004 reason != -1 ? "; reason: " : "",
1005 reason != -1 ? OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason) : "");
1006 DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "Revocation Time", rev);
1007 i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
1008 break;
1009 default:
1010 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
1011 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
1012 "Server certificate status unknown, in OCSP stapling");
1013 i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
1014 break;
1015 }
1016 }
1017 out:
1018 BIO_free(bp);
1019 }
1020
1021 OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
1022 return i;
1023 }
1024 #endif /*!DISABLE_OCSP*/
1025
1026
1027 /*************************************************
1028 * Initialize for TLS *
1029 *************************************************/
1030
1031 /* Called from both server and client code, to do preliminary initialization
1032 of the library. We allocate and return a context structure.
1033
1034 Arguments:
1035 ctxp returned SSL context
1036 host connected host, if client; NULL if server
1037 dhparam DH parameter file
1038 certificate certificate file
1039 privatekey private key
1040 ocsp_file file of stapling info (server); flag for require ocsp (client)
1041 addr address if client; NULL if server (for some randomness)
1042 cbp place to put allocated callback context
1043
1044 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
1045 */
1046
1047 static int
1048 tls_init(SSL_CTX **ctxp, host_item *host, uschar *dhparam, uschar *certificate,
1049 uschar *privatekey,
1050 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1051 uschar *ocsp_file,
1052 #endif
1053 address_item *addr, tls_ext_ctx_cb ** cbp)
1054 {
1055 long init_options;
1056 int rc;
1057 BOOL okay;
1058 tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo;
1059
1060 cbinfo = store_malloc(sizeof(tls_ext_ctx_cb));
1061 cbinfo->certificate = certificate;
1062 cbinfo->privatekey = privatekey;
1063 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1064 if ((cbinfo->is_server = host==NULL))
1065 {
1066 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file = ocsp_file;
1067 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded = NULL;
1068 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = NULL;
1069 }
1070 else
1071 cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store = NULL;
1072 #endif
1073 cbinfo->dhparam = dhparam;
1074 cbinfo->server_cipher_list = NULL;
1075 cbinfo->host = host;
1076
1077 SSL_load_error_strings(); /* basic set up */
1078 OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
1079
1080 #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256)
1081 /* SHA256 is becoming ever more popular. This makes sure it gets added to the
1082 list of available digests. */
1083 EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
1084 #endif
1085
1086 /* Create a context.
1087 The OpenSSL docs in 1.0.1b have not been updated to clarify TLS variant
1088 negotiation in the different methods; as far as I can tell, the only
1089 *_{server,client}_method which allows negotiation is SSLv23, which exists even
1090 when OpenSSL is built without SSLv2 support.
1091 By disabling with openssl_options, we can let admins re-enable with the
1092 existing knob. */
1093
1094 *ctxp = SSL_CTX_new((host == NULL)?
1095 SSLv23_server_method() : SSLv23_client_method());
1096
1097 if (*ctxp == NULL) return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_new", host, NULL);
1098
1099 /* It turns out that we need to seed the random number generator this early in
1100 order to get the full complement of ciphers to work. It took me roughly a day
1101 of work to discover this by experiment.
1102
1103 On systems that have /dev/urandom, SSL may automatically seed itself from
1104 there. Otherwise, we have to make something up as best we can. Double check
1105 afterwards. */
1106
1107 if (!RAND_status())
1108 {
1109 randstuff r;
1110 gettimeofday(&r.tv, NULL);
1111 r.p = getpid();
1112
1113 RAND_seed((uschar *)(&r), sizeof(r));
1114 RAND_seed((uschar *)big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
1115 if (addr != NULL) RAND_seed((uschar *)addr, sizeof(addr));
1116
1117 if (!RAND_status())
1118 return tls_error(US"RAND_status", host,
1119 US"unable to seed random number generator");
1120 }
1121
1122 /* Set up the information callback, which outputs if debugging is at a suitable
1123 level. */
1124
1125 SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(*ctxp, (void (*)())info_callback);
1126
1127 /* Automatically re-try reads/writes after renegotiation. */
1128 (void) SSL_CTX_set_mode(*ctxp, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
1129
1130 /* Apply administrator-supplied work-arounds.
1131 Historically we applied just one requested option,
1132 SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS, but when bug 994 requested a second, we
1133 moved to an administrator-controlled list of options to specify and
1134 grandfathered in the first one as the default value for "openssl_options".
1135
1136 No OpenSSL version number checks: the options we accept depend upon the
1137 availability of the option value macros from OpenSSL. */
1138
1139 okay = tls_openssl_options_parse(openssl_options, &init_options);
1140 if (!okay)
1141 return tls_error(US"openssl_options parsing failed", host, NULL);
1142
1143 if (init_options)
1144 {
1145 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("setting SSL CTX options: %#lx\n", init_options);
1146 if (!(SSL_CTX_set_options(*ctxp, init_options)))
1147 return tls_error(string_sprintf(
1148 "SSL_CTX_set_option(%#lx)", init_options), host, NULL);
1149 }
1150 else
1151 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("no SSL CTX options to set\n");
1152
1153 /* Initialize with DH parameters if supplied */
1154
1155 if (!init_dh(*ctxp, dhparam, host)) return DEFER;
1156
1157 /* Set up certificate and key (and perhaps OCSP info) */
1158
1159 rc = tls_expand_session_files(*ctxp, cbinfo);
1160 if (rc != OK) return rc;
1161
1162 /* If we need to handle SNI, do so */
1163 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
1164 if (host == NULL) /* server */
1165 {
1166 # ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1167 /* We check u_ocsp.server.file, not server.response, because we care about if
1168 the option exists, not what the current expansion might be, as SNI might
1169 change the certificate and OCSP file in use between now and the time the
1170 callback is invoked. */
1171 if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file)
1172 {
1173 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(server_ctx, tls_server_stapling_cb);
1174 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(server_ctx, cbinfo);
1175 }
1176 # endif
1177 /* We always do this, so that $tls_sni is available even if not used in
1178 tls_certificate */
1179 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(*ctxp, tls_servername_cb);
1180 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(*ctxp, cbinfo);
1181 }
1182 # ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1183 else /* client */
1184 if(ocsp_file) /* wanting stapling */
1185 {
1186 if (!(cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store = X509_STORE_new()))
1187 {
1188 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("failed to create store for stapling verify\n");
1189 return FAIL;
1190 }
1191 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(*ctxp, tls_client_stapling_cb);
1192 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(*ctxp, cbinfo);
1193 }
1194 # endif
1195 #endif
1196
1197 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
1198 cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames = NULL;
1199 #endif
1200
1201 /* Set up the RSA callback */
1202
1203 SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(*ctxp, rsa_callback);
1204
1205 /* Finally, set the timeout, and we are done */
1206
1207 SSL_CTX_set_timeout(*ctxp, ssl_session_timeout);
1208 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Initialized TLS\n");
1209
1210 *cbp = cbinfo;
1211
1212 return OK;
1213 }
1214
1215
1216
1217
1218 /*************************************************
1219 * Get name of cipher in use *
1220 *************************************************/
1221
1222 /*
1223 Argument: pointer to an SSL structure for the connection
1224 buffer to use for answer
1225 size of buffer
1226 pointer to number of bits for cipher
1227 Returns: nothing
1228 */
1229
1230 static void
1231 construct_cipher_name(SSL *ssl, uschar *cipherbuf, int bsize, int *bits)
1232 {
1233 /* With OpenSSL 1.0.0a, this needs to be const but the documentation doesn't
1234 yet reflect that. It should be a safe change anyway, even 0.9.8 versions have
1235 the accessor functions use const in the prototype. */
1236 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1237 const uschar *ver;
1238
1239 ver = (const uschar *)SSL_get_version(ssl);
1240
1241 c = (const SSL_CIPHER *) SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
1242 SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(c, bits);
1243
1244 string_format(cipherbuf, bsize, "%s:%s:%u", ver,
1245 SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c), *bits);
1246
1247 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Cipher: %s\n", cipherbuf);
1248 }
1249
1250
1251
1252
1253
1254 /*************************************************
1255 * Set up for verifying certificates *
1256 *************************************************/
1257
1258 /* Called by both client and server startup
1259
1260 Arguments:
1261 sctx SSL_CTX* to initialise
1262 certs certs file or NULL
1263 crl CRL file or NULL
1264 host NULL in a server; the remote host in a client
1265 optional TRUE if called from a server for a host in tls_try_verify_hosts;
1266 otherwise passed as FALSE
1267 cert_vfy_cb Callback function for certificate verification
1268
1269 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
1270 */
1271
1272 static int
1273 setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host, BOOL optional,
1274 int (*cert_vfy_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) )
1275 {
1276 uschar *expcerts, *expcrl;
1277
1278 if (!expand_check(certs, US"tls_verify_certificates", &expcerts))
1279 return DEFER;
1280
1281 if (expcerts != NULL && *expcerts != '\0')
1282 {
1283 struct stat statbuf;
1284 if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(sctx))
1285 return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths", host, NULL);
1286
1287 if (Ustat(expcerts, &statbuf) < 0)
1288 {
1289 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
1290 "failed to stat %s for certificates", expcerts);
1291 return DEFER;
1292 }
1293 else
1294 {
1295 uschar *file, *dir;
1296 if ((statbuf.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
1297 { file = NULL; dir = expcerts; }
1298 else
1299 { file = expcerts; dir = NULL; }
1300
1301 /* If a certificate file is empty, the next function fails with an
1302 unhelpful error message. If we skip it, we get the correct behaviour (no
1303 certificates are recognized, but the error message is still misleading (it
1304 says no certificate was supplied.) But this is better. */
1305
1306 if ((file == NULL || statbuf.st_size > 0) &&
1307 !SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(sctx, CS file, CS dir))
1308 return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations", host, NULL);
1309
1310 if (file != NULL)
1311 {
1312 SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(sctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(CS file));
1313 }
1314 }
1315
1316 /* Handle a certificate revocation list. */
1317
1318 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L
1319
1320 /* This bit of code is now the version supplied by Lars Mainka. (I have
1321 * merely reformatted it into the Exim code style.)
1322
1323 * "From here I changed the code to add support for multiple crl's
1324 * in pem format in one file or to support hashed directory entries in
1325 * pem format instead of a file. This method now uses the library function
1326 * X509_STORE_load_locations to add the CRL location to the SSL context.
1327 * OpenSSL will then handle the verify against CA certs and CRLs by
1328 * itself in the verify callback." */
1329
1330 if (!expand_check(crl, US"tls_crl", &expcrl)) return DEFER;
1331 if (expcrl != NULL && *expcrl != 0)
1332 {
1333 struct stat statbufcrl;
1334 if (Ustat(expcrl, &statbufcrl) < 0)
1335 {
1336 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
1337 "failed to stat %s for certificates revocation lists", expcrl);
1338 return DEFER;
1339 }
1340 else
1341 {
1342 /* is it a file or directory? */
1343 uschar *file, *dir;
1344 X509_STORE *cvstore = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(sctx);
1345 if ((statbufcrl.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
1346 {
1347 file = NULL;
1348 dir = expcrl;
1349 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL CRL value is a directory %s\n", dir);
1350 }
1351 else
1352 {
1353 file = expcrl;
1354 dir = NULL;
1355 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL CRL value is a file %s\n", file);
1356 }
1357 if (X509_STORE_load_locations(cvstore, CS file, CS dir) == 0)
1358 return tls_error(US"X509_STORE_load_locations", host, NULL);
1359
1360 /* setting the flags to check against the complete crl chain */
1361
1362 X509_STORE_set_flags(cvstore,
1363 X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
1364 }
1365 }
1366
1367 #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */
1368
1369 /* If verification is optional, don't fail if no certificate */
1370
1371 SSL_CTX_set_verify(sctx,
1372 SSL_VERIFY_PEER | (optional? 0 : SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT),
1373 cert_vfy_cb);
1374 }
1375
1376 return OK;
1377 }
1378
1379
1380
1381 /*************************************************
1382 * Start a TLS session in a server *
1383 *************************************************/
1384
1385 /* This is called when Exim is running as a server, after having received
1386 the STARTTLS command. It must respond to that command, and then negotiate
1387 a TLS session.
1388
1389 Arguments:
1390 require_ciphers allowed ciphers
1391
1392 Returns: OK on success
1393 DEFER for errors before the start of the negotiation
1394 FAIL for errors during the negotation; the server can't
1395 continue running.
1396 */
1397
1398 int
1399 tls_server_start(const uschar *require_ciphers)
1400 {
1401 int rc;
1402 uschar *expciphers;
1403 tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo;
1404 static uschar cipherbuf[256];
1405
1406 /* Check for previous activation */
1407
1408 if (tls_in.active >= 0)
1409 {
1410 tls_error(US"STARTTLS received after TLS started", NULL, US"");
1411 smtp_printf("554 Already in TLS\r\n");
1412 return FAIL;
1413 }
1414
1415 /* Initialize the SSL library. If it fails, it will already have logged
1416 the error. */
1417
1418 rc = tls_init(&server_ctx, NULL, tls_dhparam, tls_certificate, tls_privatekey,
1419 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1420 tls_ocsp_file,
1421 #endif
1422 NULL, &server_static_cbinfo);
1423 if (rc != OK) return rc;
1424 cbinfo = server_static_cbinfo;
1425
1426 if (!expand_check(require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers))
1427 return FAIL;
1428
1429 /* In OpenSSL, cipher components are separated by hyphens. In GnuTLS, they
1430 were historically separated by underscores. So that I can use either form in my
1431 tests, and also for general convenience, we turn underscores into hyphens here.
1432 */
1433
1434 if (expciphers != NULL)
1435 {
1436 uschar *s = expciphers;
1437 while (*s != 0) { if (*s == '_') *s = '-'; s++; }
1438 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("required ciphers: %s\n", expciphers);
1439 if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(server_ctx, CS expciphers))
1440 return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list", NULL, NULL);
1441 cbinfo->server_cipher_list = expciphers;
1442 }
1443
1444 /* If this is a host for which certificate verification is mandatory or
1445 optional, set up appropriately. */
1446
1447 tls_in.certificate_verified = FALSE;
1448 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1449 tls_in.dane_verified = FALSE;
1450 #endif
1451 server_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
1452
1453 if (verify_check_host(&tls_verify_hosts) == OK)
1454 {
1455 rc = setup_certs(server_ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL,
1456 FALSE, verify_callback_server);
1457 if (rc != OK) return rc;
1458 server_verify_optional = FALSE;
1459 }
1460 else if (verify_check_host(&tls_try_verify_hosts) == OK)
1461 {
1462 rc = setup_certs(server_ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL,
1463 TRUE, verify_callback_server);
1464 if (rc != OK) return rc;
1465 server_verify_optional = TRUE;
1466 }
1467
1468 /* Prepare for new connection */
1469
1470 if ((server_ssl = SSL_new(server_ctx)) == NULL) return tls_error(US"SSL_new", NULL, NULL);
1471
1472 /* Warning: we used to SSL_clear(ssl) here, it was removed.
1473 *
1474 * With the SSL_clear(), we get strange interoperability bugs with
1475 * OpenSSL 1.0.1b and TLS1.1/1.2. It looks as though this may be a bug in
1476 * OpenSSL itself, as a clear should not lead to inability to follow protocols.
1477 *
1478 * The SSL_clear() call is to let an existing SSL* be reused, typically after
1479 * session shutdown. In this case, we have a brand new object and there's no
1480 * obvious reason to immediately clear it. I'm guessing that this was
1481 * originally added because of incomplete initialisation which the clear fixed,
1482 * in some historic release.
1483 */
1484
1485 /* Set context and tell client to go ahead, except in the case of TLS startup
1486 on connection, where outputting anything now upsets the clients and tends to
1487 make them disconnect. We need to have an explicit fflush() here, to force out
1488 the response. Other smtp_printf() calls do not need it, because in non-TLS
1489 mode, the fflush() happens when smtp_getc() is called. */
1490
1491 SSL_set_session_id_context(server_ssl, sid_ctx, Ustrlen(sid_ctx));
1492 if (!tls_in.on_connect)
1493 {
1494 smtp_printf("220 TLS go ahead\r\n");
1495 fflush(smtp_out);
1496 }
1497
1498 /* Now negotiate the TLS session. We put our own timer on it, since it seems
1499 that the OpenSSL library doesn't. */
1500
1501 SSL_set_wfd(server_ssl, fileno(smtp_out));
1502 SSL_set_rfd(server_ssl, fileno(smtp_in));
1503 SSL_set_accept_state(server_ssl);
1504
1505 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_accept\n");
1506
1507 sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
1508 if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout);
1509 rc = SSL_accept(server_ssl);
1510 alarm(0);
1511
1512 if (rc <= 0)
1513 {
1514 tls_error(US"SSL_accept", NULL, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL);
1515 if (ERR_get_error() == 0)
1516 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
1517 "TLS client disconnected cleanly (rejected our certificate?)");
1518 return FAIL;
1519 }
1520
1521 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_accept was successful\n");
1522
1523 /* TLS has been set up. Adjust the input functions to read via TLS,
1524 and initialize things. */
1525
1526 construct_cipher_name(server_ssl, cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf), &tls_in.bits);
1527 tls_in.cipher = cipherbuf;
1528
1529 DEBUG(D_tls)
1530 {
1531 uschar buf[2048];
1532 if (SSL_get_shared_ciphers(server_ssl, CS buf, sizeof(buf)) != NULL)
1533 debug_printf("Shared ciphers: %s\n", buf);
1534 }
1535
1536 /* Record the certificate we presented */
1537 {
1538 X509 * crt = SSL_get_certificate(server_ssl);
1539 tls_in.ourcert = crt ? X509_dup(crt) : NULL;
1540 }
1541
1542 /* Only used by the server-side tls (tls_in), including tls_getc.
1543 Client-side (tls_out) reads (seem to?) go via
1544 smtp_read_response()/ip_recv().
1545 Hence no need to duplicate for _in and _out.
1546 */
1547 ssl_xfer_buffer = store_malloc(ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
1548 ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm = ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm = 0;
1549 ssl_xfer_eof = ssl_xfer_error = 0;
1550
1551 receive_getc = tls_getc;
1552 receive_ungetc = tls_ungetc;
1553 receive_feof = tls_feof;
1554 receive_ferror = tls_ferror;
1555 receive_smtp_buffered = tls_smtp_buffered;
1556
1557 tls_in.active = fileno(smtp_out);
1558 return OK;
1559 }
1560
1561
1562
1563
1564 static int
1565 tls_client_basic_ctx_init(SSL_CTX * ctx,
1566 host_item * host, smtp_transport_options_block * ob
1567 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
1568 , tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo
1569 #endif
1570 )
1571 {
1572 int rc;
1573 /* stick to the old behaviour for compatibility if tls_verify_certificates is
1574 set but both tls_verify_hosts and tls_try_verify_hosts is not set. Check only
1575 the specified host patterns if one of them is defined */
1576
1577 if ((!ob->tls_verify_hosts && !ob->tls_try_verify_hosts) ||
1578 (verify_check_host(&ob->tls_verify_hosts) == OK))
1579 {
1580 if ((rc = setup_certs(ctx, ob->tls_verify_certificates,
1581 ob->tls_crl, host, FALSE, verify_callback_client)) != OK)
1582 return rc;
1583 client_verify_optional = FALSE;
1584
1585 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
1586 if (ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames)
1587 {
1588 if (!expand_check(ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames,
1589 US"tls_verify_cert_hostnames",
1590 &cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames))
1591 return FAIL;
1592 if (cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames)
1593 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Cert hostname to check: \"%s\"\n",
1594 cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames);
1595 }
1596 #endif
1597 }
1598 else if (verify_check_host(&ob->tls_try_verify_hosts) == OK)
1599 {
1600 if ((rc = setup_certs(ctx, ob->tls_verify_certificates,
1601 ob->tls_crl, host, TRUE, verify_callback_client)) != OK)
1602 return rc;
1603 client_verify_optional = TRUE;
1604 }
1605
1606 return OK;
1607 }
1608
1609 /*************************************************
1610 * Start a TLS session in a client *
1611 *************************************************/
1612
1613 /* Called from the smtp transport after STARTTLS has been accepted.
1614
1615 Argument:
1616 fd the fd of the connection
1617 host connected host (for messages)
1618 addr the first address
1619 ob smtp transport options
1620
1621 Returns: OK on success
1622 FAIL otherwise - note that tls_error() will not give DEFER
1623 because this is not a server
1624 */
1625
1626 int
1627 tls_client_start(int fd, host_item *host, address_item *addr,
1628 void *v_ob)
1629 {
1630 smtp_transport_options_block * ob = v_ob;
1631 static uschar txt[256];
1632 uschar * expciphers;
1633 X509 * server_cert;
1634 int rc;
1635 static uschar cipherbuf[256];
1636
1637 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1638 BOOL request_ocsp = FALSE;
1639 BOOL require_ocsp = FALSE;
1640 #endif
1641 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1642 dns_answer tlsa_dnsa;
1643 BOOL dane = FALSE;
1644 BOOL dane_required;
1645 #endif
1646
1647 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1648 dane_required = verify_check_this_host(&ob->hosts_require_dane, NULL,
1649 host->name, host->address, NULL) == OK;
1650
1651 if (host->dnssec == DS_YES)
1652 {
1653 if( dane_required
1654 || verify_check_this_host(&ob->hosts_try_dane, NULL,
1655 host->name, host->address, NULL) == OK
1656 )
1657 {
1658 /* move this out to host.c given the similarity to dns_lookup() ? */
1659 uschar buffer[300];
1660 uschar * fullname = buffer;
1661
1662 /* TLSA lookup string */
1663 (void)sprintf(CS buffer, "_%d._tcp.%.256s", host->port,
1664 host->name);
1665
1666 switch (rc = dns_lookup(&tlsa_dnsa, buffer, T_TLSA, &fullname))
1667 {
1668 case DNS_AGAIN:
1669 return DEFER; /* just defer this TLS'd conn */
1670
1671 default:
1672 case DNS_FAIL:
1673 if (dane_required)
1674 {
1675 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DANE error: TLSA lookup failed");
1676 return FAIL;
1677 }
1678 break;
1679
1680 case DNS_SUCCEED:
1681 if (!dns_is_secure(&tlsa_dnsa))
1682 {
1683 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DANE error: TLSA lookup not DNSSEC");
1684 return DEFER;
1685 }
1686 dane = TRUE;
1687 break;
1688 }
1689 }
1690 }
1691 else if (dane_required)
1692 {
1693 /*XXX a shame we only find this after making tcp & smtp connection */
1694 /* move the test earlier? */
1695 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DANE error: previous lookup not DNSSEC");
1696 return FAIL;
1697 }
1698
1699 if (!dane) /*XXX todo: enable ocsp with dane */
1700 #endif
1701
1702 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1703 {
1704 require_ocsp = verify_check_this_host(&ob->hosts_require_ocsp,
1705 NULL, host->name, host->address, NULL) == OK;
1706 request_ocsp = require_ocsp ? TRUE
1707 : verify_check_this_host(&ob->hosts_request_ocsp,
1708 NULL, host->name, host->address, NULL) == OK;
1709 }
1710 #endif
1711
1712 rc = tls_init(&client_ctx, host, NULL,
1713 ob->tls_certificate, ob->tls_privatekey,
1714 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1715 (void *)(long)request_ocsp,
1716 #endif
1717 addr, &client_static_cbinfo);
1718 if (rc != OK) return rc;
1719
1720 tls_out.certificate_verified = FALSE;
1721 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1722 tls_out.dane_verified = FALSE;
1723 #endif
1724 client_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
1725
1726 if (!expand_check(ob->tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers",
1727 &expciphers))
1728 return FAIL;
1729
1730 /* In OpenSSL, cipher components are separated by hyphens. In GnuTLS, they
1731 are separated by underscores. So that I can use either form in my tests, and
1732 also for general convenience, we turn underscores into hyphens here. */
1733
1734 if (expciphers != NULL)
1735 {
1736 uschar *s = expciphers;
1737 while (*s != 0) { if (*s == '_') *s = '-'; s++; }
1738 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("required ciphers: %s\n", expciphers);
1739 if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(client_ctx, CS expciphers))
1740 return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list", host, NULL);
1741 }
1742
1743 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1744 if (dane)
1745 {
1746 SSL_CTX_set_verify(client_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, verify_callback_client_dane);
1747
1748 if (!DANESSL_library_init())
1749 return tls_error(US"library init", host, NULL);
1750 if (DANESSL_CTX_init(client_ctx) <= 0)
1751 return tls_error(US"context init", host, NULL);
1752 }
1753 else
1754
1755 #endif
1756
1757 if ((rc = tls_client_basic_ctx_init(client_ctx, host, ob
1758 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES
1759 , client_static_cbinfo
1760 #endif
1761 )) != OK)
1762 return rc;
1763
1764 if ((client_ssl = SSL_new(client_ctx)) == NULL)
1765 return tls_error(US"SSL_new", host, NULL);
1766 SSL_set_session_id_context(client_ssl, sid_ctx, Ustrlen(sid_ctx));
1767 SSL_set_fd(client_ssl, fd);
1768 SSL_set_connect_state(client_ssl);
1769
1770 if (ob->tls_sni)
1771 {
1772 if (!expand_check(ob->tls_sni, US"tls_sni", &tls_out.sni))
1773 return FAIL;
1774 if (tls_out.sni == NULL)
1775 {
1776 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS SNI forced to fail, not sending\n");
1777 }
1778 else if (!Ustrlen(tls_out.sni))
1779 tls_out.sni = NULL;
1780 else
1781 {
1782 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
1783 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS SNI \"%s\"\n", tls_out.sni);
1784 SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(client_ssl, tls_out.sni);
1785 #else
1786 DEBUG(D_tls)
1787 debug_printf("OpenSSL at build-time lacked SNI support, ignoring \"%s\"\n",
1788 tls_out.sni);
1789 #endif
1790 }
1791 }
1792
1793 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1794 /* Request certificate status at connection-time. If the server
1795 does OCSP stapling we will get the callback (set in tls_init()) */
1796 if (request_ocsp)
1797 {
1798 SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(client_ssl, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
1799 client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required = require_ocsp;
1800 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
1801 }
1802 #endif
1803
1804 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1805 if (dane)
1806 {
1807 dns_record * rr;
1808 dns_scan dnss;
1809 uschar * hostnames[2] = { host->name, NULL };
1810
1811 if (DANESSL_init(client_ssl, NULL, hostnames) != 1)
1812 return tls_error(US"hostnames load", host, NULL);
1813
1814 for (rr = dns_next_rr(&tlsa_dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
1815 rr;
1816 rr = dns_next_rr(&tlsa_dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT)
1817 ) if (rr->type == T_TLSA)
1818 {
1819 uschar * p = rr->data;
1820 int usage, selector, mtype;
1821 const char * mdname;
1822
1823 GETSHORT(usage, p);
1824 GETSHORT(selector, p);
1825 GETSHORT(mtype, p);
1826
1827 switch (mtype)
1828 {
1829 default: /* log bad */ return FAIL;
1830 case 0: mdname = NULL; break;
1831 case 1: mdname = "sha256"; break;
1832 case 2: mdname = "sha512"; break;
1833 }
1834
1835 switch (DANESSL_add_tlsa(client_ssl,
1836 (uint8_t) usage, (uint8_t) selector,
1837 mdname, p, rr->size - (p - rr->data)))
1838 {
1839 default:
1840 case 0: /* action not taken */
1841 return tls_error(US"tlsa load", host, NULL);
1842 case 1: break;
1843 }
1844 }
1845 }
1846 #endif
1847
1848
1849 /* There doesn't seem to be a built-in timeout on connection. */
1850
1851 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_connect\n");
1852 sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
1853 alarm(ob->command_timeout);
1854 rc = SSL_connect(client_ssl);
1855 alarm(0);
1856
1857 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1858 if (dane)
1859 DANESSL_cleanup(client_ssl); /*XXX earliest possible callpoint. Too early? */
1860 #endif
1861
1862 if (rc <= 0)
1863 return tls_error(US"SSL_connect", host, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL);
1864
1865 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_connect succeeded\n");
1866
1867 /* Beware anonymous ciphers which lead to server_cert being NULL */
1868 /*XXX server_cert is never freed... use X509_free() */
1869 server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate (client_ssl);
1870 if (server_cert)
1871 {
1872 tls_out.peerdn = US X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(server_cert),
1873 CS txt, sizeof(txt));
1874 tls_out.peerdn = txt; /*XXX a static buffer... */
1875 }
1876 else
1877 tls_out.peerdn = NULL;
1878
1879 construct_cipher_name(client_ssl, cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf), &tls_out.bits);
1880 tls_out.cipher = cipherbuf;
1881
1882 /* Record the certificate we presented */
1883 {
1884 X509 * crt = SSL_get_certificate(client_ssl);
1885 tls_out.ourcert = crt ? X509_dup(crt) : NULL;
1886 }
1887
1888 tls_out.active = fd;
1889 return OK;
1890 }
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896 /*************************************************
1897 * TLS version of getc *
1898 *************************************************/
1899
1900 /* This gets the next byte from the TLS input buffer. If the buffer is empty,
1901 it refills the buffer via the SSL reading function.
1902
1903 Arguments: none
1904 Returns: the next character or EOF
1905
1906 Only used by the server-side TLS.
1907 */
1908
1909 int
1910 tls_getc(void)
1911 {
1912 if (ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm >= ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm)
1913 {
1914 int error;
1915 int inbytes;
1916
1917 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_read(%p, %p, %u)\n", server_ssl,
1918 ssl_xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
1919
1920 if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout);
1921 inbytes = SSL_read(server_ssl, CS ssl_xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
1922 error = SSL_get_error(server_ssl, inbytes);
1923 alarm(0);
1924
1925 /* SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN appears to mean that the SSL session has been
1926 closed down, not that the socket itself has been closed down. Revert to
1927 non-SSL handling. */
1928
1929 if (error == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN)
1930 {
1931 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN\n");
1932
1933 receive_getc = smtp_getc;
1934 receive_ungetc = smtp_ungetc;
1935 receive_feof = smtp_feof;
1936 receive_ferror = smtp_ferror;
1937 receive_smtp_buffered = smtp_buffered;
1938
1939 SSL_free(server_ssl);
1940 server_ssl = NULL;
1941 tls_in.active = -1;
1942 tls_in.bits = 0;
1943 tls_in.cipher = NULL;
1944 tls_in.peerdn = NULL;
1945 tls_in.sni = NULL;
1946
1947 return smtp_getc();
1948 }
1949
1950 /* Handle genuine errors */
1951
1952 else if (error == SSL_ERROR_SSL)
1953 {
1954 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
1955 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error (SSL_read): %s", ssl_errstring);
1956 ssl_xfer_error = 1;
1957 return EOF;
1958 }
1959
1960 else if (error != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
1961 {
1962 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL error %d\n", error);
1963 ssl_xfer_error = 1;
1964 return EOF;
1965 }
1966
1967 #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
1968 dkim_exim_verify_feed(ssl_xfer_buffer, inbytes);
1969 #endif
1970 ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm = inbytes;
1971 ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm = 0;
1972 }
1973
1974 /* Something in the buffer; return next uschar */
1975
1976 return ssl_xfer_buffer[ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm++];
1977 }
1978
1979
1980
1981 /*************************************************
1982 * Read bytes from TLS channel *
1983 *************************************************/
1984
1985 /*
1986 Arguments:
1987 buff buffer of data
1988 len size of buffer
1989
1990 Returns: the number of bytes read
1991 -1 after a failed read
1992
1993 Only used by the client-side TLS.
1994 */
1995
1996 int
1997 tls_read(BOOL is_server, uschar *buff, size_t len)
1998 {
1999 SSL *ssl = is_server ? server_ssl : client_ssl;
2000 int inbytes;
2001 int error;
2002
2003 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_read(%p, %p, %u)\n", ssl,
2004 buff, (unsigned int)len);
2005
2006 inbytes = SSL_read(ssl, CS buff, len);
2007 error = SSL_get_error(ssl, inbytes);
2008
2009 if (error == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN)
2010 {
2011 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN\n");
2012 return -1;
2013 }
2014 else if (error != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
2015 {
2016 return -1;
2017 }
2018
2019 return inbytes;
2020 }
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026 /*************************************************
2027 * Write bytes down TLS channel *
2028 *************************************************/
2029
2030 /*
2031 Arguments:
2032 is_server channel specifier
2033 buff buffer of data
2034 len number of bytes
2035
2036 Returns: the number of bytes after a successful write,
2037 -1 after a failed write
2038
2039 Used by both server-side and client-side TLS.
2040 */
2041
2042 int
2043 tls_write(BOOL is_server, const uschar *buff, size_t len)
2044 {
2045 int outbytes;
2046 int error;
2047 int left = len;
2048 SSL *ssl = is_server ? server_ssl : client_ssl;
2049
2050 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_do_write(%p, %d)\n", buff, left);
2051 while (left > 0)
2052 {
2053 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_write(SSL, %p, %d)\n", buff, left);
2054 outbytes = SSL_write(ssl, CS buff, left);
2055 error = SSL_get_error(ssl, outbytes);
2056 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("outbytes=%d error=%d\n", outbytes, error);
2057 switch (error)
2058 {
2059 case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
2060 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
2061 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error (SSL_write): %s", ssl_errstring);
2062 return -1;
2063
2064 case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
2065 left -= outbytes;
2066 buff += outbytes;
2067 break;
2068
2069 case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
2070 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL channel closed on write");
2071 return -1;
2072
2073 case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
2074 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL_write: (from %s) syscall: %s",
2075 sender_fullhost ? sender_fullhost : US"<unknown>",
2076 strerror(errno));
2077
2078 default:
2079 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL_write error %d", error);
2080 return -1;
2081 }
2082 }
2083 return len;
2084 }
2085
2086
2087
2088 /*************************************************
2089 * Close down a TLS session *
2090 *************************************************/
2091
2092 /* This is also called from within a delivery subprocess forked from the
2093 daemon, to shut down the TLS library, without actually doing a shutdown (which
2094 would tamper with the SSL session in the parent process).
2095
2096 Arguments: TRUE if SSL_shutdown is to be called
2097 Returns: nothing
2098
2099 Used by both server-side and client-side TLS.
2100 */
2101
2102 void
2103 tls_close(BOOL is_server, BOOL shutdown)
2104 {
2105 SSL **sslp = is_server ? &server_ssl : &client_ssl;
2106 int *fdp = is_server ? &tls_in.active : &tls_out.active;
2107
2108 if (*fdp < 0) return; /* TLS was not active */
2109
2110 if (shutdown)
2111 {
2112 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_close(): shutting down SSL\n");
2113 SSL_shutdown(*sslp);
2114 }
2115
2116 SSL_free(*sslp);
2117 *sslp = NULL;
2118
2119 *fdp = -1;
2120 }
2121
2122
2123
2124
2125 /*************************************************
2126 * Let tls_require_ciphers be checked at startup *
2127 *************************************************/
2128
2129 /* The tls_require_ciphers option, if set, must be something which the
2130 library can parse.
2131
2132 Returns: NULL on success, or error message
2133 */
2134
2135 uschar *
2136 tls_validate_require_cipher(void)
2137 {
2138 SSL_CTX *ctx;
2139 uschar *s, *expciphers, *err;
2140
2141 /* this duplicates from tls_init(), we need a better "init just global
2142 state, for no specific purpose" singleton function of our own */
2143
2144 SSL_load_error_strings();
2145 OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
2146 #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256)
2147 /* SHA256 is becoming ever more popular. This makes sure it gets added to the
2148 list of available digests. */
2149 EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
2150 #endif
2151
2152 if (!(tls_require_ciphers && *tls_require_ciphers))
2153 return NULL;
2154
2155 if (!expand_check(tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers))
2156 return US"failed to expand tls_require_ciphers";
2157
2158 if (!(expciphers && *expciphers))
2159 return NULL;
2160
2161 /* normalisation ripped from above */
2162 s = expciphers;
2163 while (*s != 0) { if (*s == '_') *s = '-'; s++; }
2164
2165 err = NULL;
2166
2167 ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method());
2168 if (!ctx)
2169 {
2170 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
2171 return string_sprintf("SSL_CTX_new() failed: %s", ssl_errstring);
2172 }
2173
2174 DEBUG(D_tls)
2175 debug_printf("tls_require_ciphers expands to \"%s\"\n", expciphers);
2176
2177 if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, CS expciphers))
2178 {
2179 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
2180 err = string_sprintf("SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(%s) failed", expciphers);
2181 }
2182
2183 SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
2184
2185 return err;
2186 }
2187
2188
2189
2190
2191 /*************************************************
2192 * Report the library versions. *
2193 *************************************************/
2194
2195 /* There have historically been some issues with binary compatibility in
2196 OpenSSL libraries; if Exim (like many other applications) is built against
2197 one version of OpenSSL but the run-time linker picks up another version,
2198 it can result in serious failures, including crashing with a SIGSEGV. So
2199 report the version found by the compiler and the run-time version.
2200
2201 Note: some OS vendors backport security fixes without changing the version
2202 number/string, and the version date remains unchanged. The _build_ date
2203 will change, so we can more usefully assist with version diagnosis by also
2204 reporting the build date.
2205
2206 Arguments: a FILE* to print the results to
2207 Returns: nothing
2208 */
2209
2210 void
2211 tls_version_report(FILE *f)
2212 {
2213 fprintf(f, "Library version: OpenSSL: Compile: %s\n"
2214 " Runtime: %s\n"
2215 " : %s\n",
2216 OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT,
2217 SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION),
2218 SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_BUILT_ON));
2219 /* third line is 38 characters for the %s and the line is 73 chars long;
2220 the OpenSSL output includes a "built on: " prefix already. */
2221 }
2222
2223
2224
2225
2226 /*************************************************
2227 * Random number generation *
2228 *************************************************/
2229
2230 /* Pseudo-random number generation. The result is not expected to be
2231 cryptographically strong but not so weak that someone will shoot themselves
2232 in the foot using it as a nonce in input in some email header scheme or
2233 whatever weirdness they'll twist this into. The result should handle fork()
2234 and avoid repeating sequences. OpenSSL handles that for us.
2235
2236 Arguments:
2237 max range maximum
2238 Returns a random number in range [0, max-1]
2239 */
2240
2241 int
2242 vaguely_random_number(int max)
2243 {
2244 unsigned int r;
2245 int i, needed_len;
2246 static pid_t pidlast = 0;
2247 pid_t pidnow;
2248 uschar *p;
2249 uschar smallbuf[sizeof(r)];
2250
2251 if (max <= 1)
2252 return 0;
2253
2254 pidnow = getpid();
2255 if (pidnow != pidlast)
2256 {
2257 /* Although OpenSSL documents that "OpenSSL makes sure that the PRNG state
2258 is unique for each thread", this doesn't apparently apply across processes,
2259 so our own warning from vaguely_random_number_fallback() applies here too.
2260 Fix per PostgreSQL. */
2261 if (pidlast != 0)
2262 RAND_cleanup();
2263 pidlast = pidnow;
2264 }
2265
2266 /* OpenSSL auto-seeds from /dev/random, etc, but this a double-check. */
2267 if (!RAND_status())
2268 {
2269 randstuff r;
2270 gettimeofday(&r.tv, NULL);
2271 r.p = getpid();
2272
2273 RAND_seed((uschar *)(&r), sizeof(r));
2274 }
2275 /* We're after pseudo-random, not random; if we still don't have enough data
2276 in the internal PRNG then our options are limited. We could sleep and hope
2277 for entropy to come along (prayer technique) but if the system is so depleted
2278 in the first place then something is likely to just keep taking it. Instead,
2279 we'll just take whatever little bit of pseudo-random we can still manage to
2280 get. */
2281
2282 needed_len = sizeof(r);
2283 /* Don't take 8 times more entropy than needed if int is 8 octets and we were
2284 asked for a number less than 10. */
2285 for (r = max, i = 0; r; ++i)
2286 r >>= 1;
2287 i = (i + 7) / 8;
2288 if (i < needed_len)
2289 needed_len = i;
2290
2291 /* We do not care if crypto-strong */
2292 i = RAND_pseudo_bytes(smallbuf, needed_len);
2293 if (i < 0)
2294 {
2295 DEBUG(D_all)
2296 debug_printf("OpenSSL RAND_pseudo_bytes() not supported by RAND method, using fallback.\n");
2297 return vaguely_random_number_fallback(max);
2298 }
2299
2300 r = 0;
2301 for (p = smallbuf; needed_len; --needed_len, ++p)
2302 {
2303 r *= 256;
2304 r += *p;
2305 }
2306
2307 /* We don't particularly care about weighted results; if someone wants
2308 smooth distribution and cares enough then they should submit a patch then. */
2309 return r % max;
2310 }
2311
2312
2313
2314
2315 /*************************************************
2316 * OpenSSL option parse *
2317 *************************************************/
2318
2319 /* Parse one option for tls_openssl_options_parse below
2320
2321 Arguments:
2322 name one option name
2323 value place to store a value for it
2324 Returns success or failure in parsing
2325 */
2326
2327 struct exim_openssl_option {
2328 uschar *name;
2329 long value;
2330 };
2331 /* We could use a macro to expand, but we need the ifdef and not all the
2332 options document which version they were introduced in. Policylet: include
2333 all options unless explicitly for DTLS, let the administrator choose which
2334 to apply.
2335
2336 This list is current as of:
2337 ==> 1.0.1b <==
2338 Plus SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG from 2013-June patch/discussion on openssl-dev
2339 */
2340 static struct exim_openssl_option exim_openssl_options[] = {
2341 /* KEEP SORTED ALPHABETICALLY! */
2342 #ifdef SSL_OP_ALL
2343 { US"all", SSL_OP_ALL },
2344 #endif
2345 #ifdef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
2346 { US"allow_unsafe_legacy_renegotiation", SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION },
2347 #endif
2348 #ifdef SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
2349 { US"cipher_server_preference", SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE },
2350 #endif
2351 #ifdef SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
2352 { US"dont_insert_empty_fragments", SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS },
2353 #endif
2354 #ifdef SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
2355 { US"ephemeral_rsa", SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA },
2356 #endif
2357 #ifdef SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT
2358 { US"legacy_server_connect", SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT },
2359 #endif
2360 #ifdef SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
2361 { US"microsoft_big_sslv3_buffer", SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER },
2362 #endif
2363 #ifdef SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG
2364 { US"microsoft_sess_id_bug", SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG },
2365 #endif
2366 #ifdef SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
2367 { US"msie_sslv2_rsa_padding", SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING },
2368 #endif
2369 #ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG
2370 { US"netscape_challenge_bug", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG },
2371 #endif
2372 #ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
2373 { US"netscape_reuse_cipher_change_bug", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG },
2374 #endif
2375 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
2376 { US"no_compression", SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION },
2377 #endif
2378 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2379 { US"no_session_resumption_on_renegotiation", SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION },
2380 #endif
2381 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
2382 { US"no_sslv2", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 },
2383 #endif
2384 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
2385 { US"no_sslv3", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 },
2386 #endif
2387 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
2388 { US"no_ticket", SSL_OP_NO_TICKET },
2389 #endif
2390 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
2391 { US"no_tlsv1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 },
2392 #endif
2393 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
2394 #if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 == 0x00000400L
2395 /* Error in chosen value in 1.0.1a; see first item in CHANGES for 1.0.1b */
2396 #warning OpenSSL 1.0.1a uses a bad value for SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, ignoring
2397 #else
2398 { US"no_tlsv1_1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 },
2399 #endif
2400 #endif
2401 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
2402 { US"no_tlsv1_2", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 },
2403 #endif
2404 #ifdef SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
2405 { US"safari_ecdhe_ecdsa_bug", SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG },
2406 #endif
2407 #ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
2408 { US"single_dh_use", SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE },
2409 #endif
2410 #ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
2411 { US"single_ecdh_use", SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE },
2412 #endif
2413 #ifdef SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
2414 { US"ssleay_080_client_dh_bug", SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG },
2415 #endif
2416 #ifdef SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
2417 { US"sslref2_reuse_cert_type_bug", SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG },
2418 #endif
2419 #ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
2420 { US"tls_block_padding_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG },
2421 #endif
2422 #ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
2423 { US"tls_d5_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG },
2424 #endif
2425 #ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
2426 { US"tls_rollback_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG },
2427 #endif
2428 };
2429 static int exim_openssl_options_size =
2430 sizeof(exim_openssl_options)/sizeof(struct exim_openssl_option);
2431
2432
2433 static BOOL
2434 tls_openssl_one_option_parse(uschar *name, long *value)
2435 {
2436 int first = 0;
2437 int last = exim_openssl_options_size;
2438 while (last > first)
2439 {
2440 int middle = (first + last)/2;
2441 int c = Ustrcmp(name, exim_openssl_options[middle].name);
2442 if (c == 0)
2443 {
2444 *value = exim_openssl_options[middle].value;
2445 return TRUE;
2446 }
2447 else if (c > 0)
2448 first = middle + 1;
2449 else
2450 last = middle;
2451 }
2452 return FALSE;
2453 }
2454
2455
2456
2457
2458 /*************************************************
2459 * OpenSSL option parsing logic *
2460 *************************************************/
2461
2462 /* OpenSSL has a number of compatibility options which an administrator might
2463 reasonably wish to set. Interpret a list similarly to decode_bits(), so that
2464 we look like log_selector.
2465
2466 Arguments:
2467 option_spec the administrator-supplied string of options
2468 results ptr to long storage for the options bitmap
2469 Returns success or failure
2470 */
2471
2472 BOOL
2473 tls_openssl_options_parse(uschar *option_spec, long *results)
2474 {
2475 long result, item;
2476 uschar *s, *end;
2477 uschar keep_c;
2478 BOOL adding, item_parsed;
2479
2480 result = 0L;
2481 /* Prior to 4.80 we or'd in SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS; removed
2482 * from default because it increases BEAST susceptibility. */
2483 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
2484 result |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
2485 #endif
2486
2487 if (option_spec == NULL)
2488 {
2489 *results = result;
2490 return TRUE;
2491 }
2492
2493 for (s=option_spec; *s != '\0'; /**/)
2494 {
2495 while (isspace(*s)) ++s;
2496 if (*s == '\0')
2497 break;
2498 if (*s != '+' && *s != '-')
2499 {
2500 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("malformed openssl option setting: "
2501 "+ or - expected but found \"%s\"\n", s);
2502 return FALSE;
2503 }
2504 adding = *s++ == '+';
2505 for (end = s; (*end != '\0') && !isspace(*end); ++end) /**/ ;
2506 keep_c = *end;
2507 *end = '\0';
2508 item_parsed = tls_openssl_one_option_parse(s, &item);
2509 if (!item_parsed)
2510 {
2511 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("openssl option setting unrecognised: \"%s\"\n", s);
2512 return FALSE;
2513 }
2514 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("openssl option, %s from %lx: %lx (%s)\n",
2515 adding ? "adding" : "removing", result, item, s);
2516 if (adding)
2517 result |= item;
2518 else
2519 result &= ~item;
2520 *end = keep_c;
2521 s = end;
2522 }
2523
2524 *results = result;
2525 return TRUE;
2526 }
2527
2528 /* vi: aw ai sw=2
2529 */
2530 /* End of tls-openssl.c */