Change the result of the ratelimit ACL condition when clients are sending
[exim.git] / src / src / acl.c
1 /* $Cambridge: exim/src/src/acl.c,v 1.35 2005/05/25 09:58:16 fanf2 Exp $ */
2
3 /*************************************************
4 * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
5 *************************************************/
6
7 /* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2005 */
8 /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
9
10 /* Code for handling Access Control Lists (ACLs) */
11
12 #include "exim.h"
13
14
15 /* Default callout timeout */
16
17 #define CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT 30
18
19 /* ACL verb codes - keep in step with the table of verbs that follows */
20
21 enum { ACL_ACCEPT, ACL_DEFER, ACL_DENY, ACL_DISCARD, ACL_DROP, ACL_REQUIRE,
22 ACL_WARN };
23
24 /* ACL verbs */
25
26 static uschar *verbs[] =
27 { US"accept", US"defer", US"deny", US"discard", US"drop", US"require",
28 US"warn" };
29
30 /* For each verb, the condition for which "message" is used */
31
32 static int msgcond[] = { FAIL, OK, OK, FAIL, OK, FAIL, OK };
33
34 /* ACL condition and modifier codes - keep in step with the table that
35 follows. */
36
37 enum { ACLC_ACL, ACLC_AUTHENTICATED,
38 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
39 ACLC_BMI_OPTIN,
40 #endif
41 ACLC_CONDITION, ACLC_CONTROL,
42 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
43 ACLC_DECODE,
44 #endif
45 ACLC_DELAY,
46 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
47 ACLC_DEMIME,
48 #endif
49 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
50 ACLC_DK_DOMAIN_SOURCE,
51 ACLC_DK_POLICY,
52 ACLC_DK_SENDER_DOMAINS,
53 ACLC_DK_SENDER_LOCAL_PARTS,
54 ACLC_DK_SENDERS,
55 ACLC_DK_STATUS,
56 #endif
57 ACLC_DNSLISTS, ACLC_DOMAINS, ACLC_ENCRYPTED, ACLC_ENDPASS,
58 ACLC_HOSTS, ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS, ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE, ACLC_LOGWRITE,
59 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
60 ACLC_MALWARE,
61 #endif
62 ACLC_MESSAGE,
63 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
64 ACLC_MIME_REGEX,
65 #endif
66 ACLC_RATELIMIT,
67 ACLC_RECIPIENTS,
68 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
69 ACLC_REGEX,
70 #endif
71 ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS, ACLC_SENDERS, ACLC_SET,
72 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
73 ACLC_SPAM,
74 #endif
75 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
76 ACLC_SPF,
77 #endif
78 ACLC_VERIFY };
79
80 /* ACL conditions/modifiers: "delay", "control", "endpass", "message",
81 "log_message", "logwrite", and "set" are modifiers that look like conditions
82 but always return TRUE. They are used for their side effects. */
83
84 static uschar *conditions[] = { US"acl", US"authenticated",
85 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
86 US"bmi_optin",
87 #endif
88 US"condition",
89 US"control",
90 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
91 US"decode",
92 #endif
93 US"delay",
94 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
95 US"demime",
96 #endif
97 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
98 US"dk_domain_source",
99 US"dk_policy",
100 US"dk_sender_domains",
101 US"dk_sender_local_parts",
102 US"dk_senders",
103 US"dk_status",
104 #endif
105 US"dnslists", US"domains", US"encrypted",
106 US"endpass", US"hosts", US"local_parts", US"log_message", US"logwrite",
107 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
108 US"malware",
109 #endif
110 US"message",
111 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
112 US"mime_regex",
113 #endif
114 US"ratelimit",
115 US"recipients",
116 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
117 US"regex",
118 #endif
119 US"sender_domains", US"senders", US"set",
120 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
121 US"spam",
122 #endif
123 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
124 US"spf",
125 #endif
126 US"verify" };
127
128 /* ACL control names */
129
130 static uschar *controls[] = { US"error", US"caseful_local_part",
131 US"caselower_local_part", US"enforce_sync", US"no_enforce_sync", US"freeze",
132 US"queue_only", US"submission", US"no_multiline"};
133
134 /* Flags to indicate for which conditions /modifiers a string expansion is done
135 at the outer level. In the other cases, expansion already occurs in the
136 checking functions. */
137
138 static uschar cond_expand_at_top[] = {
139 TRUE, /* acl */
140 FALSE, /* authenticated */
141 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
142 TRUE, /* bmi_optin */
143 #endif
144 TRUE, /* condition */
145 TRUE, /* control */
146 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
147 TRUE, /* decode */
148 #endif
149 TRUE, /* delay */
150 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
151 TRUE, /* demime */
152 #endif
153 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
154 TRUE, /* dk_domain_source */
155 TRUE, /* dk_policy */
156 TRUE, /* dk_sender_domains */
157 TRUE, /* dk_sender_local_parts */
158 TRUE, /* dk_senders */
159 TRUE, /* dk_status */
160 #endif
161 TRUE, /* dnslists */
162 FALSE, /* domains */
163 FALSE, /* encrypted */
164 TRUE, /* endpass */
165 FALSE, /* hosts */
166 FALSE, /* local_parts */
167 TRUE, /* log_message */
168 TRUE, /* logwrite */
169 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
170 TRUE, /* malware */
171 #endif
172 TRUE, /* message */
173 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
174 TRUE, /* mime_regex */
175 #endif
176 TRUE, /* ratelimit */
177 FALSE, /* recipients */
178 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
179 TRUE, /* regex */
180 #endif
181 FALSE, /* sender_domains */
182 FALSE, /* senders */
183 TRUE, /* set */
184 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
185 TRUE, /* spam */
186 #endif
187 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
188 TRUE, /* spf */
189 #endif
190 TRUE /* verify */
191 };
192
193 /* Flags to identify the modifiers */
194
195 static uschar cond_modifiers[] = {
196 FALSE, /* acl */
197 FALSE, /* authenticated */
198 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
199 TRUE, /* bmi_optin */
200 #endif
201 FALSE, /* condition */
202 TRUE, /* control */
203 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
204 FALSE, /* decode */
205 #endif
206 TRUE, /* delay */
207 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
208 FALSE, /* demime */
209 #endif
210 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
211 FALSE, /* dk_domain_source */
212 FALSE, /* dk_policy */
213 FALSE, /* dk_sender_domains */
214 FALSE, /* dk_sender_local_parts */
215 FALSE, /* dk_senders */
216 FALSE, /* dk_status */
217 #endif
218 FALSE, /* dnslists */
219 FALSE, /* domains */
220 FALSE, /* encrypted */
221 TRUE, /* endpass */
222 FALSE, /* hosts */
223 FALSE, /* local_parts */
224 TRUE, /* log_message */
225 TRUE, /* logwrite */
226 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
227 FALSE, /* malware */
228 #endif
229 TRUE, /* message */
230 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
231 FALSE, /* mime_regex */
232 #endif
233 FALSE, /* ratelimit */
234 FALSE, /* recipients */
235 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
236 FALSE, /* regex */
237 #endif
238 FALSE, /* sender_domains */
239 FALSE, /* senders */
240 TRUE, /* set */
241 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
242 FALSE, /* spam */
243 #endif
244 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
245 FALSE, /* spf */
246 #endif
247 FALSE /* verify */
248 };
249
250 /* Bit map vector of which conditions are not allowed at certain times. For
251 each condition, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier
252 to specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
253
254 static unsigned int cond_forbids[] = {
255 0, /* acl */
256
257 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* authenticated */
258 (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO),
259
260 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
261 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* bmi_optin */
262 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
263 (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)|
264 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
265 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
266 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
267 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA),
268 #endif
269
270 0, /* condition */
271
272 /* Certain types of control are always allowed, so we let it through
273 always and check in the control processing itself. */
274
275 0, /* control */
276
277 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
278 (unsigned int)
279 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* decode */
280 #endif
281
282 0, /* delay */
283
284 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
285 (unsigned int)
286 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* demime */
287 #endif
288
289 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
290 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_domain_source */
291 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
292 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
293 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
294 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
295 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
296 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
297
298 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_policy */
299 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
300 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
301 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
302 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
303 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
304 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
305
306 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_sender_domains */
307 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
308 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
309 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
310 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
311 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
312 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
313
314 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_sender_local_parts */
315 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
316 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
317 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
318 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
319 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
320 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
321
322 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_senders */
323 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
324 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
325 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
326 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
327 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
328 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
329
330 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_status */
331 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
332 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
333 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
334 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
335 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
336 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
337 #endif
338
339 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* dnslists */
340
341 (unsigned int)
342 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* domains */
343
344 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* encrypted */
345 (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO),
346
347 0, /* endpass */
348
349 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* hosts */
350
351 (unsigned int)
352 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* local_parts */
353
354 0, /* log_message */
355
356 0, /* logwrite */
357
358 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
359 (unsigned int)
360 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* malware */
361 #endif
362
363 0, /* message */
364
365 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
366 (unsigned int)
367 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* mime_regex */
368 #endif
369
370 0, /* ratelimit */
371
372 (unsigned int)
373 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* recipients */
374
375 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
376 (unsigned int)
377 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* regex */
378 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
379 #endif
380
381 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* sender_domains */
382 (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
383 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
384 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
385 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
386
387 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* senders */
388 (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
389 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
390 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
391 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
392
393 0, /* set */
394
395 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
396 (unsigned int)
397 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* spam */
398 #endif
399
400 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
401 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* spf */
402 (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
403 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
404 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
405 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
406 #endif
407
408 /* Certain types of verify are always allowed, so we let it through
409 always and check in the verify function itself */
410
411 0 /* verify */
412 };
413
414
415 /* Return values from decode_control() */
416
417 enum {
418 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
419 CONTROL_BMI_RUN,
420 #endif
421 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
422 CONTROL_DK_VERIFY,
423 #endif
424 CONTROL_ERROR, CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART,
425 CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, CONTROL_FREEZE,
426 CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY, CONTROL_SUBMISSION,
427 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
428 CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL,
429 #endif
430 CONTROL_FAKEDEFER, CONTROL_FAKEREJECT, CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE };
431
432 /* Bit map vector of which controls are not allowed at certain times. For
433 each control, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier to
434 specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
435
436 static unsigned int control_forbids[] = {
437 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
438 0, /* bmi_run */
439 #endif
440 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
441 (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* dk_verify */
442 #endif
443
444 0, /* error */
445
446 (unsigned int)
447 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* caseful_local_part */
448
449 (unsigned int)
450 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* caselower_local_part */
451
452 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* enforce_sync */
453
454 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* no_enforce_sync */
455
456 (unsigned int)
457 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* freeze */
458 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
459 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
460
461 (unsigned int)
462 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* queue_only */
463 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
464 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
465
466 (unsigned int)
467 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* submission */
468 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)),
469
470 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
471 (unsigned int)
472 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* no_mbox_unspool */
473 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
474 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
475 #endif
476
477 (unsigned int)
478 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakedefer */
479 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
480 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
481
482 (unsigned int)
483 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakereject */
484 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
485 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
486
487 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) /* no_multiline */
488 };
489
490 /* Structure listing various control arguments, with their characteristics. */
491
492 typedef struct control_def {
493 uschar *name;
494 int value; /* CONTROL_xxx value */
495 BOOL has_option; /* Has /option(s) following */
496 } control_def;
497
498 static control_def controls_list[] = {
499 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
500 { US"bmi_run", CONTROL_BMI_RUN, FALSE},
501 #endif
502 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
503 { US"dk_verify", CONTROL_DK_VERIFY, FALSE},
504 #endif
505 { US"caseful_local_part", CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, FALSE},
506 { US"caselower_local_part", CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART, FALSE},
507 { US"enforce_sync", CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE},
508 { US"freeze", CONTROL_FREEZE, FALSE},
509 { US"no_enforce_sync", CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE},
510 { US"no_multiline_responses", CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE, FALSE},
511 { US"queue_only", CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY, FALSE},
512 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
513 { US"no_mbox_unspool", CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL, FALSE},
514 #endif
515 { US"fakedefer", CONTROL_FAKEDEFER, TRUE},
516 { US"fakereject", CONTROL_FAKEREJECT, TRUE},
517 { US"submission", CONTROL_SUBMISSION, TRUE}
518 };
519
520 /* Support data structures for Client SMTP Authorization. acl_verify_csa()
521 caches its result in a tree to avoid repeated DNS queries. The result is an
522 integer code which is used as an index into the following tables of
523 explanatory strings and verification return codes. */
524
525 static tree_node *csa_cache = NULL;
526
527 enum { CSA_UNKNOWN, CSA_OK, CSA_DEFER_SRV, CSA_DEFER_ADDR,
528 CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT, CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN, CSA_FAIL_NOADDR, CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH };
529
530 /* The acl_verify_csa() return code is translated into an acl_verify() return
531 code using the following table. It is OK unless the client is definitely not
532 authorized. This is because CSA is supposed to be optional for sending sites,
533 so recipients should not be too strict about checking it - especially because
534 DNS problems are quite likely to occur. It's possible to use $csa_status in
535 further ACL conditions to distinguish ok, unknown, and defer if required, but
536 the aim is to make the usual configuration simple. */
537
538 static int csa_return_code[] = {
539 OK, OK, OK, OK,
540 FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL
541 };
542
543 static uschar *csa_status_string[] = {
544 US"unknown", US"ok", US"defer", US"defer",
545 US"fail", US"fail", US"fail", US"fail"
546 };
547
548 static uschar *csa_reason_string[] = {
549 US"unknown",
550 US"ok",
551 US"deferred (SRV lookup failed)",
552 US"deferred (target address lookup failed)",
553 US"failed (explicit authorization required)",
554 US"failed (host name not authorized)",
555 US"failed (no authorized addresses)",
556 US"failed (client address mismatch)"
557 };
558
559 /* Enable recursion between acl_check_internal() and acl_check_condition() */
560
561 static int acl_check_internal(int, address_item *, uschar *, int, uschar **,
562 uschar **);
563
564
565 /*************************************************
566 * Pick out name from list *
567 *************************************************/
568
569 /* Use a binary chop method
570
571 Arguments:
572 name name to find
573 list list of names
574 end size of list
575
576 Returns: offset in list, or -1 if not found
577 */
578
579 static int
580 acl_checkname(uschar *name, uschar **list, int end)
581 {
582 int start = 0;
583
584 while (start < end)
585 {
586 int mid = (start + end)/2;
587 int c = Ustrcmp(name, list[mid]);
588 if (c == 0) return mid;
589 if (c < 0) end = mid; else start = mid + 1;
590 }
591
592 return -1;
593 }
594
595
596 /*************************************************
597 * Read and parse one ACL *
598 *************************************************/
599
600 /* This function is called both from readconf in order to parse the ACLs in the
601 configuration file, and also when an ACL is encountered dynamically (e.g. as
602 the result of an expansion). It is given a function to call in order to
603 retrieve the lines of the ACL. This function handles skipping comments and
604 blank lines (where relevant).
605
606 Arguments:
607 func function to get next line of ACL
608 error where to put an error message
609
610 Returns: pointer to ACL, or NULL
611 NULL can be legal (empty ACL); in this case error will be NULL
612 */
613
614 acl_block *
615 acl_read(uschar *(*func)(void), uschar **error)
616 {
617 acl_block *yield = NULL;
618 acl_block **lastp = &yield;
619 acl_block *this = NULL;
620 acl_condition_block *cond;
621 acl_condition_block **condp = NULL;
622 uschar *s;
623
624 *error = NULL;
625
626 while ((s = (*func)()) != NULL)
627 {
628 int v, c;
629 BOOL negated = FALSE;
630 uschar *saveline = s;
631 uschar name[64];
632
633 /* Conditions (but not verbs) are allowed to be negated by an initial
634 exclamation mark. */
635
636 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
637 if (*s == '!')
638 {
639 negated = TRUE;
640 s++;
641 }
642
643 /* Read the name of a verb or a condition, or the start of a new ACL, which
644 can be started by a name, or by a macro definition. */
645
646 s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s);
647 if (*s == ':' || isupper(name[0] && *s == '=')) return yield;
648
649 /* If a verb is unrecognized, it may be another condition or modifier that
650 continues the previous verb. */
651
652 v = acl_checkname(name, verbs, sizeof(verbs)/sizeof(char *));
653 if (v < 0)
654 {
655 if (this == NULL)
656 {
657 *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL verb in \"%s\"", saveline);
658 return NULL;
659 }
660 }
661
662 /* New verb */
663
664 else
665 {
666 if (negated)
667 {
668 *error = string_sprintf("malformed ACL line \"%s\"", saveline);
669 return NULL;
670 }
671 this = store_get(sizeof(acl_block));
672 *lastp = this;
673 lastp = &(this->next);
674 this->next = NULL;
675 this->verb = v;
676 this->condition = NULL;
677 condp = &(this->condition);
678 if (*s == 0) continue; /* No condition on this line */
679 if (*s == '!')
680 {
681 negated = TRUE;
682 s++;
683 }
684 s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s); /* Condition name */
685 }
686
687 /* Handle a condition or modifier. */
688
689 c = acl_checkname(name, conditions, sizeof(conditions)/sizeof(char *));
690 if (c < 0)
691 {
692 *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL condition/modifier in \"%s\"",
693 saveline);
694 return NULL;
695 }
696
697 /* The modifiers may not be negated */
698
699 if (negated && cond_modifiers[c])
700 {
701 *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: negation is not allowed with "
702 "\"%s\"", conditions[c]);
703 return NULL;
704 }
705
706 /* ENDPASS may occur only with ACCEPT or DISCARD. */
707
708 if (c == ACLC_ENDPASS &&
709 this->verb != ACL_ACCEPT &&
710 this->verb != ACL_DISCARD)
711 {
712 *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: \"%s\" is not allowed with \"%s\"",
713 conditions[c], verbs[this->verb]);
714 return NULL;
715 }
716
717 cond = store_get(sizeof(acl_condition_block));
718 cond->next = NULL;
719 cond->type = c;
720 cond->u.negated = negated;
721
722 *condp = cond;
723 condp = &(cond->next);
724
725 /* The "set" modifier is different in that its argument is "name=value"
726 rather than just a value, and we can check the validity of the name, which
727 gives us a variable number to insert into the data block. */
728
729 if (c == ACLC_SET)
730 {
731 if (Ustrncmp(s, "acl_", 4) != 0 || (s[4] != 'c' && s[4] != 'm') ||
732 !isdigit(s[5]) || (!isspace(s[6]) && s[6] != '='))
733 {
734 *error = string_sprintf("unrecognized name after \"set\" in ACL "
735 "modifier \"set %s\"", s);
736 return NULL;
737 }
738
739 cond->u.varnumber = s[5] - '0';
740 if (s[4] == 'm') cond->u.varnumber += ACL_C_MAX;
741 s += 6;
742 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
743 }
744
745 /* For "set", we are now positioned for the data. For the others, only
746 "endpass" has no data */
747
748 if (c != ACLC_ENDPASS)
749 {
750 if (*s++ != '=')
751 {
752 *error = string_sprintf("\"=\" missing after ACL \"%s\" %s", name,
753 cond_modifiers[c]? US"modifier" : US"condition");
754 return NULL;
755 }
756 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
757 cond->arg = string_copy(s);
758 }
759 }
760
761 return yield;
762 }
763
764
765
766 /*************************************************
767 * Handle warnings *
768 *************************************************/
769
770 /* This function is called when a WARN verb's conditions are true. It adds to
771 the message's headers, and/or writes information to the log. In each case, this
772 only happens once (per message for headers, per connection for log).
773
774 Arguments:
775 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
776 user_message message for adding to headers
777 log_message message for logging, if different
778
779 Returns: nothing
780 */
781
782 static void
783 acl_warn(int where, uschar *user_message, uschar *log_message)
784 {
785 int hlen;
786
787 if (log_message != NULL && log_message != user_message)
788 {
789 uschar *text;
790 string_item *logged;
791
792 text = string_sprintf("%s Warning: %s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
793 string_printing(log_message));
794
795 /* If a sender verification has failed, and the log message is "sender verify
796 failed", add the failure message. */
797
798 if (sender_verified_failed != NULL &&
799 sender_verified_failed->message != NULL &&
800 strcmpic(log_message, US"sender verify failed") == 0)
801 text = string_sprintf("%s: %s", text, sender_verified_failed->message);
802
803 /* Search previously logged warnings. They are kept in malloc
804 store so they can be freed at the start of a new message. */
805
806 for (logged = acl_warn_logged; logged != NULL; logged = logged->next)
807 if (Ustrcmp(logged->text, text) == 0) break;
808
809 if (logged == NULL)
810 {
811 int length = Ustrlen(text) + 1;
812 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s", text);
813 logged = store_malloc(sizeof(string_item) + length);
814 logged->text = (uschar *)logged + sizeof(string_item);
815 memcpy(logged->text, text, length);
816 logged->next = acl_warn_logged;
817 acl_warn_logged = logged;
818 }
819 }
820
821 /* If there's no user message, we are done. */
822
823 if (user_message == NULL) return;
824
825 /* If this isn't a message ACL, we can't do anything with a user message.
826 Log an error. */
827
828 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
829 {
830 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "ACL \"warn\" with \"message\" setting "
831 "found in a non-message (%s) ACL: cannot specify header lines here: "
832 "message ignored", acl_wherenames[where]);
833 return;
834 }
835
836 /* Treat the user message as a sequence of one or more header lines. */
837
838 hlen = Ustrlen(user_message);
839 if (hlen > 0)
840 {
841 uschar *text, *p, *q;
842
843 /* Add a final newline if not present */
844
845 text = ((user_message)[hlen-1] == '\n')? user_message :
846 string_sprintf("%s\n", user_message);
847
848 /* Loop for multiple header lines, taking care about continuations */
849
850 for (p = q = text; *p != 0; )
851 {
852 uschar *s;
853 int newtype = htype_add_bot;
854 header_line **hptr = &acl_warn_headers;
855
856 /* Find next header line within the string */
857
858 for (;;)
859 {
860 q = Ustrchr(q, '\n');
861 if (*(++q) != ' ' && *q != '\t') break;
862 }
863
864 /* If the line starts with a colon, interpret the instruction for where to
865 add it. This temporarily sets up a new type. */
866
867 if (*p == ':')
868 {
869 if (strncmpic(p, US":after_received:", 16) == 0)
870 {
871 newtype = htype_add_rec;
872 p += 16;
873 }
874 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start_rfc:", 14) == 0)
875 {
876 newtype = htype_add_rfc;
877 p += 14;
878 }
879 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start:", 10) == 0)
880 {
881 newtype = htype_add_top;
882 p += 10;
883 }
884 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_end:", 8) == 0)
885 {
886 newtype = htype_add_bot;
887 p += 8;
888 }
889 while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') p++;
890 }
891
892 /* See if this line starts with a header name, and if not, add X-ACL-Warn:
893 to the front of it. */
894
895 for (s = p; s < q - 1; s++)
896 {
897 if (*s == ':' || !isgraph(*s)) break;
898 }
899
900 s = string_sprintf("%s%.*s", (*s == ':')? "" : "X-ACL-Warn: ", q - p, p);
901 hlen = Ustrlen(s);
902
903 /* See if this line has already been added */
904
905 while (*hptr != NULL)
906 {
907 if (Ustrncmp((*hptr)->text, s, hlen) == 0) break;
908 hptr = &((*hptr)->next);
909 }
910
911 /* Add if not previously present */
912
913 if (*hptr == NULL)
914 {
915 header_line *h = store_get(sizeof(header_line));
916 h->text = s;
917 h->next = NULL;
918 h->type = newtype;
919 h->slen = hlen;
920 *hptr = h;
921 hptr = &(h->next);
922 }
923
924 /* Advance for next header line within the string */
925
926 p = q;
927 }
928 }
929 }
930
931
932
933 /*************************************************
934 * Verify and check reverse DNS *
935 *************************************************/
936
937 /* Called from acl_verify() below. We look up the host name(s) of the client IP
938 address if this has not yet been done. The host_name_lookup() function checks
939 that one of these names resolves to an address list that contains the client IP
940 address, so we don't actually have to do the check here.
941
942 Arguments:
943 user_msgptr pointer for user message
944 log_msgptr pointer for log message
945
946 Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
947 FAIL verification failed
948 DEFER there was a problem verifying
949 */
950
951 static int
952 acl_verify_reverse(uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
953 {
954 int rc;
955
956 user_msgptr = user_msgptr; /* stop compiler warning */
957
958 /* Previous success */
959
960 if (sender_host_name != NULL) return OK;
961
962 /* Previous failure */
963
964 if (host_lookup_failed)
965 {
966 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("host lookup failed%s", host_lookup_msg);
967 return FAIL;
968 }
969
970 /* Need to do a lookup */
971
972 HDEBUG(D_acl)
973 debug_printf("looking up host name to force name/address consistency check\n");
974
975 if ((rc = host_name_lookup()) != OK)
976 {
977 *log_msgptr = (rc == DEFER)?
978 US"host lookup deferred for reverse lookup check"
979 :
980 string_sprintf("host lookup failed for reverse lookup check%s",
981 host_lookup_msg);
982 return rc; /* DEFER or FAIL */
983 }
984
985 host_build_sender_fullhost();
986 return OK;
987 }
988
989
990
991 /*************************************************
992 * Check client IP address matches CSA target *
993 *************************************************/
994
995 /* Called from acl_verify_csa() below. This routine scans a section of a DNS
996 response for address records belonging to the CSA target hostname. The section
997 is specified by the reset argument, either RESET_ADDITIONAL or RESET_ANSWERS.
998 If one of the addresses matches the client's IP address, then the client is
999 authorized by CSA. If there are target IP addresses but none of them match
1000 then the client is using an unauthorized IP address. If there are no target IP
1001 addresses then the client cannot be using an authorized IP address. (This is
1002 an odd configuration - why didn't the SRV record have a weight of 1 instead?)
1003
1004 Arguments:
1005 dnsa the DNS answer block
1006 dnss a DNS scan block for us to use
1007 reset option specifing what portion to scan, as described above
1008 target the target hostname to use for matching RR names
1009
1010 Returns: CSA_OK successfully authorized
1011 CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH addresses found but none matched
1012 CSA_FAIL_NOADDR no target addresses found
1013 */
1014
1015 static int
1016 acl_verify_csa_address(dns_answer *dnsa, dns_scan *dnss, int reset,
1017 uschar *target)
1018 {
1019 dns_record *rr;
1020 dns_address *da;
1021
1022 BOOL target_found = FALSE;
1023
1024 for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, reset);
1025 rr != NULL;
1026 rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, RESET_NEXT))
1027 {
1028 /* Check this is an address RR for the target hostname. */
1029
1030 if (rr->type != T_A
1031 #if HAVE_IPV6
1032 && rr->type != T_AAAA
1033 #ifdef SUPPORT_A6
1034 && rr->type != T_A6
1035 #endif
1036 #endif
1037 ) continue;
1038
1039 if (strcmpic(target, rr->name) != 0) continue;
1040
1041 target_found = TRUE;
1042
1043 /* Turn the target address RR into a list of textual IP addresses and scan
1044 the list. There may be more than one if it is an A6 RR. */
1045
1046 for (da = dns_address_from_rr(dnsa, rr); da != NULL; da = da->next)
1047 {
1048 /* If the client IP address matches the target IP address, it's good! */
1049
1050 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target address is %s\n", da->address);
1051
1052 if (strcmpic(sender_host_address, da->address) == 0) return CSA_OK;
1053 }
1054 }
1055
1056 /* If we found some target addresses but none of them matched, the client is
1057 using an unauthorized IP address, otherwise the target has no authorized IP
1058 addresses. */
1059
1060 if (target_found) return CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH;
1061 else return CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1062 }
1063
1064
1065
1066 /*************************************************
1067 * Verify Client SMTP Authorization *
1068 *************************************************/
1069
1070 /* Called from acl_verify() below. This routine calls dns_lookup_special()
1071 to find the CSA SRV record corresponding to the domain argument, or
1072 $sender_helo_name if no argument is provided. It then checks that the
1073 client is authorized, and that its IP address corresponds to the SRV
1074 target's address by calling acl_verify_csa_address() above. The address
1075 should have been returned in the DNS response's ADDITIONAL section, but if
1076 not we perform another DNS lookup to get it.
1077
1078 Arguments:
1079 domain pointer to optional parameter following verify = csa
1080
1081 Returns: CSA_UNKNOWN no valid CSA record found
1082 CSA_OK successfully authorized
1083 CSA_FAIL_* client is definitely not authorized
1084 CSA_DEFER_* there was a DNS problem
1085 */
1086
1087 static int
1088 acl_verify_csa(uschar *domain)
1089 {
1090 tree_node *t;
1091 uschar *found, *p;
1092 int priority, weight, port;
1093 dns_answer dnsa;
1094 dns_scan dnss;
1095 dns_record *rr;
1096 int rc, type;
1097 uschar target[256];
1098
1099 /* Work out the domain we are using for the CSA lookup. The default is the
1100 client's HELO domain. If the client has not said HELO, use its IP address
1101 instead. If it's a local client (exim -bs), CSA isn't applicable. */
1102
1103 while (isspace(*domain) && *domain != '\0') ++domain;
1104 if (*domain == '\0') domain = sender_helo_name;
1105 if (domain == NULL) domain = sender_host_address;
1106 if (sender_host_address == NULL) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
1107
1108 /* If we have an address literal, strip off the framing ready for turning it
1109 into a domain. The framing consists of matched square brackets possibly
1110 containing a keyword and a colon before the actual IP address. */
1111
1112 if (domain[0] == '[')
1113 {
1114 uschar *start = Ustrchr(domain, ':');
1115 if (start == NULL) start = domain;
1116 domain = string_copyn(start + 1, Ustrlen(start) - 2);
1117 }
1118
1119 /* Turn domains that look like bare IP addresses into domains in the reverse
1120 DNS. This code also deals with address literals and $sender_host_address. It's
1121 not quite kosher to treat bare domains such as EHLO 192.0.2.57 the same as
1122 address literals, but it's probably the most friendly thing to do. This is an
1123 extension to CSA, so we allow it to be turned off for proper conformance. */
1124
1125 if (string_is_ip_address(domain, NULL))
1126 {
1127 if (!dns_csa_use_reverse) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
1128 dns_build_reverse(domain, target);
1129 domain = target;
1130 }
1131
1132 /* Find out if we've already done the CSA check for this domain. If we have,
1133 return the same result again. Otherwise build a new cached result structure
1134 for this domain. The name is filled in now, and the value is filled in when
1135 we return from this function. */
1136
1137 t = tree_search(csa_cache, domain);
1138 if (t != NULL) return t->data.val;
1139
1140 t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(domain));
1141 Ustrcpy(t->name, domain);
1142 (void)tree_insertnode(&csa_cache, t);
1143
1144 /* Now we are ready to do the actual DNS lookup(s). */
1145
1146 switch (dns_special_lookup(&dnsa, domain, T_CSA, &found))
1147 {
1148 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1149
1150 default:
1151 return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_SRV;
1152
1153 /* If we found nothing, the client's authorization is unknown. */
1154
1155 case DNS_NOMATCH:
1156 case DNS_NODATA:
1157 return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1158
1159 /* We got something! Go on to look at the reply in more detail. */
1160
1161 case DNS_SUCCEED:
1162 break;
1163 }
1164
1165 /* Scan the reply for well-formed CSA SRV records. */
1166
1167 for (rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
1168 rr != NULL;
1169 rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT))
1170 {
1171 if (rr->type != T_SRV) continue;
1172
1173 /* Extract the numerical SRV fields (p is incremented) */
1174
1175 p = rr->data;
1176 GETSHORT(priority, p);
1177 GETSHORT(weight, p);
1178 GETSHORT(port, p);
1179
1180 DEBUG(D_acl)
1181 debug_printf("CSA priority=%d weight=%d port=%d\n", priority, weight, port);
1182
1183 /* Check the CSA version number */
1184
1185 if (priority != 1) continue;
1186
1187 /* If the domain does not have a CSA SRV record of its own (i.e. the domain
1188 found by dns_special_lookup() is a parent of the one we asked for), we check
1189 the subdomain assertions in the port field. At the moment there's only one
1190 assertion: legitimate SMTP clients are all explicitly authorized with CSA
1191 SRV records of their own. */
1192
1193 if (found != domain)
1194 {
1195 if (port & 1)
1196 return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT;
1197 else
1198 return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1199 }
1200
1201 /* This CSA SRV record refers directly to our domain, so we check the value
1202 in the weight field to work out the domain's authorization. 0 and 1 are
1203 unauthorized; 3 means the client is authorized but we can't check the IP
1204 address in order to authenticate it, so we treat it as unknown; values
1205 greater than 3 are undefined. */
1206
1207 if (weight < 2) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN;
1208
1209 if (weight > 2) continue;
1210
1211 /* Weight == 2, which means the domain is authorized. We must check that the
1212 client's IP address is listed as one of the SRV target addresses. Save the
1213 target hostname then break to scan the additional data for its addresses. */
1214
1215 (void)dn_expand(dnsa.answer, dnsa.answer + dnsa.answerlen, p,
1216 (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)target, sizeof(target));
1217
1218 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target is %s\n", target);
1219
1220 break;
1221 }
1222
1223 /* If we didn't break the loop then no appropriate records were found. */
1224
1225 if (rr == NULL) return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1226
1227 /* Do not check addresses if the target is ".", in accordance with RFC 2782.
1228 A target of "." indicates there are no valid addresses, so the client cannot
1229 be authorized. (This is an odd configuration because weight=2 target=. is
1230 equivalent to weight=1, but we check for it in order to keep load off the
1231 root name servers.) Note that dn_expand() turns "." into "". */
1232
1233 if (Ustrcmp(target, "") == 0) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1234
1235 /* Scan the additional section of the CSA SRV reply for addresses belonging
1236 to the target. If the name server didn't return any additional data (e.g.
1237 because it does not fully support SRV records), we need to do another lookup
1238 to obtain the target addresses; otherwise we have a definitive result. */
1239
1240 rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ADDITIONAL, target);
1241 if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
1242
1243 /* The DNS lookup type corresponds to the IP version used by the client. */
1244
1245 #if HAVE_IPV6
1246 if (Ustrchr(sender_host_address, ':') != NULL)
1247 type = T_AAAA;
1248 else
1249 #endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */
1250 type = T_A;
1251
1252
1253 #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
1254 DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN:
1255 #endif
1256
1257 switch (dns_lookup(&dnsa, target, type, NULL))
1258 {
1259 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1260
1261 default:
1262 return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_ADDR;
1263
1264 /* If the query succeeded, scan the addresses and return the result. */
1265
1266 case DNS_SUCCEED:
1267 rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS, target);
1268 if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
1269 /* else fall through */
1270
1271 /* If the target has no IP addresses, the client cannot have an authorized
1272 IP address. However, if the target site uses A6 records (not AAAA records)
1273 we have to do yet another lookup in order to check them. */
1274
1275 case DNS_NOMATCH:
1276 case DNS_NODATA:
1277
1278 #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
1279 if (type == T_AAAA) { type = T_A6; goto DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN; }
1280 #endif
1281
1282 return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1283 }
1284 }
1285
1286
1287
1288 /*************************************************
1289 * Handle verification (address & other) *
1290 *************************************************/
1291
1292 /* This function implements the "verify" condition. It is called when
1293 encountered in any ACL, because some tests are almost always permitted. Some
1294 just don't make sense, and always fail (for example, an attempt to test a host
1295 lookup for a non-TCP/IP message). Others are restricted to certain ACLs.
1296
1297 Arguments:
1298 where where called from
1299 addr the recipient address that the ACL is handling, or NULL
1300 arg the argument of "verify"
1301 user_msgptr pointer for user message
1302 log_msgptr pointer for log message
1303 basic_errno where to put verify errno
1304
1305 Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
1306 FAIL verification failed
1307 DEFER there was a problem verifying
1308 ERROR syntax error
1309 */
1310
1311 static int
1312 acl_verify(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *arg,
1313 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
1314 {
1315 int sep = '/';
1316 int callout = -1;
1317 int callout_overall = -1;
1318 int callout_connect = -1;
1319 int verify_options = 0;
1320 int rc;
1321 BOOL verify_header_sender = FALSE;
1322 BOOL defer_ok = FALSE;
1323 BOOL callout_defer_ok = FALSE;
1324 BOOL no_details = FALSE;
1325 address_item *sender_vaddr = NULL;
1326 uschar *verify_sender_address = NULL;
1327 uschar *pm_mailfrom = NULL;
1328 uschar *se_mailfrom = NULL;
1329
1330 /* Some of the verify items have slash-separated options; some do not. Diagnose
1331 an error if options are given for items that don't expect them. This code has
1332 now got very message. Refactoring to use a table would be a good idea one day.
1333 */
1334
1335 uschar *slash = Ustrchr(arg, '/');
1336 uschar *list = arg;
1337 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
1338
1339 if (ss == NULL) goto BAD_VERIFY;
1340
1341 /* Handle name/address consistency verification in a separate function. */
1342
1343 if (strcmpic(ss, US"reverse_host_lookup") == 0)
1344 {
1345 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1346 if (sender_host_address == NULL) return OK;
1347 return acl_verify_reverse(user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
1348 }
1349
1350 /* TLS certificate verification is done at STARTTLS time; here we just
1351 test whether it was successful or not. (This is for optional verification; for
1352 mandatory verification, the connection doesn't last this long.) */
1353
1354 if (strcmpic(ss, US"certificate") == 0)
1355 {
1356 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1357 if (tls_certificate_verified) return OK;
1358 *user_msgptr = US"no verified certificate";
1359 return FAIL;
1360 }
1361
1362 /* We can test the result of optional HELO verification */
1363
1364 if (strcmpic(ss, US"helo") == 0)
1365 {
1366 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1367 return helo_verified? OK : FAIL;
1368 }
1369
1370 /* Do Client SMTP Authorization checks in a separate function, and turn the
1371 result code into user-friendly strings. */
1372
1373 if (strcmpic(ss, US"csa") == 0)
1374 {
1375 rc = acl_verify_csa(list);
1376 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("client SMTP authorization %s",
1377 csa_reason_string[rc]);
1378 csa_status = csa_status_string[rc];
1379 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA result %s\n", csa_status);
1380 return csa_return_code[rc];
1381 }
1382
1383 /* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct syntax. If there is
1384 a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to
1385 send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as
1386 always). */
1387
1388 if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_syntax") == 0)
1389 {
1390 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1391 if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
1392 {
1393 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s "
1394 "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames[where]);
1395 return ERROR;
1396 }
1397 rc = verify_check_headers(log_msgptr);
1398 if (rc != OK && smtp_return_error_details && *log_msgptr != NULL)
1399 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1400 return rc;
1401 }
1402
1403
1404 /* The remaining verification tests check recipient and sender addresses,
1405 either from the envelope or from the header. There are a number of
1406 slash-separated options that are common to all of them. */
1407
1408
1409 /* Check that there is at least one verifiable sender address in the relevant
1410 header lines. This can be followed by callout and defer options, just like
1411 sender and recipient. */
1412
1413 if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_sender") == 0)
1414 {
1415 if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
1416 {
1417 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s "
1418 "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames[where]);
1419 return ERROR;
1420 }
1421 verify_header_sender = TRUE;
1422 }
1423
1424 /* Otherwise, first item in verify argument must be "sender" or "recipient".
1425 In the case of a sender, this can optionally be followed by an address to use
1426 in place of the actual sender (rare special-case requirement). */
1427
1428 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"sender", 6) == 0)
1429 {
1430 uschar *s = ss + 6;
1431 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
1432 {
1433 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify sender in ACL for %s "
1434 "(only possible for MAIL, RCPT, PREDATA, or DATA)",
1435 acl_wherenames[where]);
1436 return ERROR;
1437 }
1438 if (*s == 0)
1439 verify_sender_address = sender_address;
1440 else
1441 {
1442 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1443 if (*s++ != '=') goto BAD_VERIFY;
1444 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1445 verify_sender_address = string_copy(s);
1446 }
1447 }
1448 else
1449 {
1450 if (strcmpic(ss, US"recipient") != 0) goto BAD_VERIFY;
1451 if (addr == NULL)
1452 {
1453 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify recipient in ACL for %s "
1454 "(only possible for RCPT)", acl_wherenames[where]);
1455 return ERROR;
1456 }
1457 }
1458
1459 /* Remaining items are optional; they apply to sender and recipient
1460 verification, including "header sender" verification. */
1461
1462 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
1463 != NULL)
1464 {
1465 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0) defer_ok = TRUE;
1466 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"no_details") == 0) no_details = TRUE;
1467
1468 /* These two old options are left for backwards compatibility */
1469
1470 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"callout_defer_ok") == 0)
1471 {
1472 callout_defer_ok = TRUE;
1473 if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1474 }
1475
1476 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"check_postmaster") == 0)
1477 {
1478 pm_mailfrom = US"";
1479 if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1480 }
1481
1482 /* The callout option has a number of sub-options, comma separated */
1483
1484 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"callout", 7) == 0)
1485 {
1486 callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1487 ss += 7;
1488 if (*ss != 0)
1489 {
1490 while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
1491 if (*ss++ == '=')
1492 {
1493 int optsep = ',';
1494 uschar *opt;
1495 uschar buffer[256];
1496 while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
1497
1498 /* This callout option handling code has become a mess as new options
1499 have been added in an ad hoc manner. It should be tidied up into some
1500 kind of table-driven thing. */
1501
1502 while ((opt = string_nextinlist(&ss, &optsep, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
1503 != NULL)
1504 {
1505 if (strcmpic(opt, US"defer_ok") == 0) callout_defer_ok = TRUE;
1506 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"no_cache") == 0)
1507 verify_options |= vopt_callout_no_cache;
1508 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"random") == 0)
1509 verify_options |= vopt_callout_random;
1510 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"use_sender") == 0)
1511 verify_options |= vopt_callout_recipsender;
1512 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"use_postmaster") == 0)
1513 verify_options |= vopt_callout_recippmaster;
1514 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"postmaster") == 0) pm_mailfrom = US"";
1515
1516 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"mailfrom", 8) == 0)
1517 {
1518 if (!verify_header_sender)
1519 {
1520 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"mailfrom\" is allowed as a "
1521 "callout option only for verify=header_sender (detected in ACL "
1522 "condition \"%s\")", arg);
1523 return ERROR;
1524 }
1525 opt += 8;
1526 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1527 if (*opt++ != '=')
1528 {
1529 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1530 "\"mailfrom\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1531 return ERROR;
1532 }
1533 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1534 se_mailfrom = string_copy(opt);
1535 }
1536
1537 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"postmaster_mailfrom", 19) == 0)
1538 {
1539 opt += 19;
1540 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1541 if (*opt++ != '=')
1542 {
1543 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1544 "\"postmaster_mailfrom\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1545 return ERROR;
1546 }
1547 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1548 pm_mailfrom = string_copy(opt);
1549 }
1550
1551 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"maxwait", 7) == 0)
1552 {
1553 opt += 7;
1554 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1555 if (*opt++ != '=')
1556 {
1557 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"maxwait\" in "
1558 "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1559 return ERROR;
1560 }
1561 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1562 callout_overall = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1563 if (callout_overall < 0)
1564 {
1565 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1566 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1567 return ERROR;
1568 }
1569 }
1570 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"connect", 7) == 0)
1571 {
1572 opt += 7;
1573 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1574 if (*opt++ != '=')
1575 {
1576 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1577 "\"callout_overaall\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1578 return ERROR;
1579 }
1580 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1581 callout_connect = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1582 if (callout_connect < 0)
1583 {
1584 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1585 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1586 return ERROR;
1587 }
1588 }
1589 else /* Plain time is callout connect/command timeout */
1590 {
1591 callout = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1592 if (callout < 0)
1593 {
1594 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1595 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1596 return ERROR;
1597 }
1598 }
1599 }
1600 }
1601 else
1602 {
1603 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"callout\" in "
1604 "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1605 return ERROR;
1606 }
1607 }
1608 }
1609
1610 /* Option not recognized */
1611
1612 else
1613 {
1614 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unknown option \"%s\" in ACL "
1615 "condition \"verify %s\"", ss, arg);
1616 return ERROR;
1617 }
1618 }
1619
1620 if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster)) ==
1621 (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster))
1622 {
1623 *log_msgptr = US"only one of use_sender and use_postmaster can be set "
1624 "for a recipient callout";
1625 return ERROR;
1626 }
1627
1628 /* Handle sender-in-header verification. Default the user message to the log
1629 message if giving out verification details. */
1630
1631 if (verify_header_sender)
1632 {
1633 int verrno;
1634 rc = verify_check_header_address(user_msgptr, log_msgptr, callout,
1635 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, verify_options,
1636 &verrno);
1637 if (rc != OK)
1638 {
1639 *basic_errno = verrno;
1640 if (smtp_return_error_details)
1641 {
1642 if (*user_msgptr == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL)
1643 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1644 if (rc == DEFER) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
1645 }
1646 }
1647 }
1648
1649 /* Handle a sender address. The default is to verify *the* sender address, but
1650 optionally a different address can be given, for special requirements. If the
1651 address is empty, we are dealing with a bounce message that has no sender, so
1652 we cannot do any checking. If the real sender address gets rewritten during
1653 verification (e.g. DNS widening), set the flag to stop it being rewritten again
1654 during message reception.
1655
1656 A list of verified "sender" addresses is kept to try to avoid doing to much
1657 work repetitively when there are multiple recipients in a message and they all
1658 require sender verification. However, when callouts are involved, it gets too
1659 complicated because different recipients may require different callout options.
1660 Therefore, we always do a full sender verify when any kind of callout is
1661 specified. Caching elsewhere, for instance in the DNS resolver and in the
1662 callout handling, should ensure that this is not terribly inefficient. */
1663
1664 else if (verify_sender_address != NULL)
1665 {
1666 if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster))
1667 != 0)
1668 {
1669 *log_msgptr = US"use_sender or use_postmaster cannot be used for a "
1670 "sender verify callout";
1671 return ERROR;
1672 }
1673
1674 sender_vaddr = verify_checked_sender(verify_sender_address);
1675 if (sender_vaddr != NULL && /* Previously checked */
1676 callout <= 0) /* No callout needed this time */
1677 {
1678 /* If the "routed" flag is set, it means that routing worked before, so
1679 this check can give OK (the saved return code value, if set, belongs to a
1680 callout that was done previously). If the "routed" flag is not set, routing
1681 must have failed, so we use the saved return code. */
1682
1683 if (testflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed)) rc = OK; else
1684 {
1685 rc = sender_vaddr->special_action;
1686 *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
1687 }
1688 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("using cached sender verify result\n");
1689 }
1690
1691 /* Do a new verification, and cache the result. The cache is used to avoid
1692 verifying the sender multiple times for multiple RCPTs when callouts are not
1693 specified (see comments above).
1694
1695 The cache is also used on failure to give details in response to the first
1696 RCPT that gets bounced for this reason. However, this can be suppressed by
1697 the no_details option, which sets the flag that says "this detail has already
1698 been sent". The cache normally contains just one address, but there may be
1699 more in esoteric circumstances. */
1700
1701 else
1702 {
1703 BOOL routed = TRUE;
1704 uschar *save_address_data = deliver_address_data;
1705
1706 sender_vaddr = deliver_make_addr(verify_sender_address, TRUE);
1707 if (no_details) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_sverify_told);
1708 if (verify_sender_address[0] != 0)
1709 {
1710 /* If this is the real sender address, save the unrewritten version
1711 for use later in receive. Otherwise, set a flag so that rewriting the
1712 sender in verify_address() does not update sender_address. */
1713
1714 if (verify_sender_address == sender_address)
1715 sender_address_unrewritten = sender_address;
1716 else
1717 verify_options |= vopt_fake_sender;
1718
1719 /* The recipient, qualify, and expn options are never set in
1720 verify_options. */
1721
1722 rc = verify_address(sender_vaddr, NULL, verify_options, callout,
1723 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, &routed);
1724
1725 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
1726
1727 if (rc == OK)
1728 {
1729 if (Ustrcmp(sender_vaddr->address, verify_sender_address) != 0)
1730 {
1731 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("sender %s verified ok as %s\n",
1732 verify_sender_address, sender_vaddr->address);
1733 }
1734 else
1735 {
1736 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("sender %s verified ok\n",
1737 verify_sender_address);
1738 }
1739 }
1740 else *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
1741 }
1742 else rc = OK; /* Null sender */
1743
1744 /* Cache the result code */
1745
1746 if (routed) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed);
1747 if (callout > 0) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_callout);
1748 sender_vaddr->special_action = rc;
1749 sender_vaddr->next = sender_verified_list;
1750 sender_verified_list = sender_vaddr;
1751
1752 /* Restore the recipient address data, which might have been clobbered by
1753 the sender verification. */
1754
1755 deliver_address_data = save_address_data;
1756 }
1757
1758 /* Put the sender address_data value into $sender_address_data */
1759
1760 sender_address_data = sender_vaddr->p.address_data;
1761 }
1762
1763 /* A recipient address just gets a straightforward verify; again we must handle
1764 the DEFER overrides. */
1765
1766 else
1767 {
1768 address_item addr2;
1769
1770 /* We must use a copy of the address for verification, because it might
1771 get rewritten. */
1772
1773 addr2 = *addr;
1774 rc = verify_address(&addr2, NULL, verify_options|vopt_is_recipient, callout,
1775 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, NULL);
1776 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
1777
1778 *log_msgptr = addr2.message;
1779 *user_msgptr = (addr2.user_message != NULL)?
1780 addr2.user_message : addr2.message;
1781 *basic_errno = addr2.basic_errno;
1782
1783 /* Make $address_data visible */
1784 deliver_address_data = addr2.p.address_data;
1785 }
1786
1787 /* We have a result from the relevant test. Handle defer overrides first. */
1788
1789 if (rc == DEFER && (defer_ok ||
1790 (callout_defer_ok && *basic_errno == ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)))
1791 {
1792 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("verify defer overridden by %s\n",
1793 defer_ok? "defer_ok" : "callout_defer_ok");
1794 rc = OK;
1795 }
1796
1797 /* If we've failed a sender, set up a recipient message, and point
1798 sender_verified_failed to the address item that actually failed. */
1799
1800 if (rc != OK && verify_sender_address != NULL)
1801 {
1802 if (rc != DEFER)
1803 {
1804 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Sender verify failed";
1805 }
1806 else if (*basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
1807 {
1808 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify";
1809 }
1810 else
1811 {
1812 *log_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify callout";
1813 *user_msgptr = smtp_return_error_details? sender_vaddr->user_message :
1814 *log_msgptr;
1815 }
1816
1817 sender_verified_failed = sender_vaddr;
1818 }
1819
1820 /* Verifying an address messes up the values of $domain and $local_part,
1821 so reset them before returning if this is a RCPT ACL. */
1822
1823 if (addr != NULL)
1824 {
1825 deliver_domain = addr->domain;
1826 deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
1827 }
1828 return rc;
1829
1830 /* Syntax errors in the verify argument come here. */
1831
1832 BAD_VERIFY:
1833 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("expected \"sender[=address]\", \"recipient\", "
1834 "\"helo\", \"header_syntax\", \"header_sender\" or "
1835 "\"reverse_host_lookup\" at start of ACL condition "
1836 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1837 return ERROR;
1838
1839 /* Options supplied when not allowed come here */
1840
1841 NO_OPTIONS:
1842 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unexpected '/' found in \"%s\" "
1843 "(this verify item has no options)", arg);
1844 return ERROR;
1845 }
1846
1847
1848
1849
1850 /*************************************************
1851 * Check argument for control= modifier *
1852 *************************************************/
1853
1854 /* Called from acl_check_condition() below
1855
1856 Arguments:
1857 arg the argument string for control=
1858 pptr set to point to the terminating character
1859 where which ACL we are in
1860 log_msgptr for error messages
1861
1862 Returns: CONTROL_xxx value
1863 */
1864
1865 static int
1866 decode_control(uschar *arg, uschar **pptr, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
1867 {
1868 int len;
1869 control_def *d;
1870
1871 for (d = controls_list;
1872 d < controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def);
1873 d++)
1874 {
1875 len = Ustrlen(d->name);
1876 if (Ustrncmp(d->name, arg, len) == 0) break;
1877 }
1878
1879 if (d >= controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def) ||
1880 (arg[len] != 0 && (!d->has_option || arg[len] != '/')))
1881 {
1882 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
1883 return CONTROL_ERROR;
1884 }
1885
1886 *pptr = arg + len;
1887 return d->value;
1888 }
1889
1890
1891
1892 /*************************************************
1893 * Handle rate limiting *
1894 *************************************************/
1895
1896 /* Called by acl_check_condition() below to calculate the result
1897 of the ACL ratelimit condition.
1898
1899 Note that the return value might be slightly unexpected: if the
1900 sender's rate is above the limit then the result is OK. This is
1901 similar to the dnslists condition, and is so that you can write
1902 ACL clauses like: defer ratelimit = 15 / 1h
1903
1904 Arguments:
1905 arg the option string for ratelimit=
1906 log_msgptr for error messages
1907
1908 Returns: OK - Sender's rate is above limit
1909 FAIL - Sender's rate is below limit
1910 DEFER - Problem opening ratelimit database
1911 ERROR - Syntax error in options.
1912 */
1913
1914 static int
1915 acl_ratelimit(uschar *arg, uschar **log_msgptr)
1916 {
1917 double limit, period;
1918 uschar *ss, *key = arg;
1919 int sep = '/';
1920 BOOL have_key = FALSE, leaky = FALSE, strict = FALSE;
1921 BOOL per_byte = FALSE, per_cmd = FALSE, per_conn = FALSE, per_mail = FALSE;
1922 int old_pool, rc;
1923 tree_node **anchor, *t;
1924 open_db dbblock, *dbm;
1925 dbdata_ratelimit *dbd;
1926 struct timeval tv;
1927
1928 /* Parse the first two options and record their values in expansion
1929 variables. These variables allow the configuration to have informative
1930 error messages based on rate limits obtained from a table lookup. */
1931
1932 /* First is the maximum number of messages per period and maximum burst
1933 size, which must be greater than or equal to zero. Zero is useful for
1934 rate measurement as opposed to rate limiting. */
1935
1936 sender_rate_limit = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
1937 if (sender_rate_limit == NULL)
1938 limit = -1.0;
1939 else
1940 {
1941 limit = Ustrtod(sender_rate_limit, &ss);
1942 if (tolower(*ss) == 'k') { limit *= 1024.0; ss++; }
1943 else if (tolower(*ss) == 'm') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
1944 else if (tolower(*ss) == 'g') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
1945 }
1946 if (limit < 0.0 || *ss != 0)
1947 {
1948 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for "
1949 "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a positive number",
1950 sender_rate_limit);
1951 return ERROR;
1952 }
1953
1954 /* Second is the rate measurement period and exponential smoothing time
1955 constant. This must be strictly greater than zero, because zero leads to
1956 run-time division errors. */
1957
1958 sender_rate_period = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
1959 if (sender_rate_period == NULL) period = -1.0;
1960 else period = readconf_readtime(sender_rate_period, 0, FALSE);
1961 if (period <= 0.0)
1962 {
1963 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for "
1964 "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a time value",
1965 sender_rate_period);
1966 return ERROR;
1967 }
1968
1969 /* Parse the other options. Should we check if the per_* options are being
1970 used in ACLs where they don't make sense, e.g. per_mail in the connect ACL? */
1971
1972 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
1973 != NULL)
1974 {
1975 if (strcmpic(ss, US"leaky") == 0) leaky = TRUE;
1976 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"strict") == 0) strict = TRUE;
1977 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_byte") == 0) per_byte = TRUE;
1978 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_cmd") == 0) per_cmd = TRUE;
1979 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_conn") == 0) per_conn = TRUE;
1980 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_mail") == 0) per_mail = TRUE;
1981 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_rcpt") == 0) per_cmd = TRUE; /* alias */
1982 else have_key = TRUE;
1983 }
1984 if (leaky + strict > 1 || per_byte + per_cmd + per_conn + per_mail > 1)
1985 {
1986 *log_msgptr = US"conflicting options for \"ratelimit\" condition";
1987 return ERROR;
1988 }
1989
1990 /* Default option values */
1991 if (!strict) leaky = TRUE;
1992 if (!per_byte && !per_cmd && !per_conn) per_mail = TRUE;
1993
1994 /* We use the whole of the argument list as the lookup key, because it doesn't
1995 make sense to use the same stored data if any of the arguments are different.
1996 If there is no explicit key, use the sender_host_address. If there is no
1997 sender_host_address (e.g. -bs or acl_not_smtp) then we simply omit it. */
1998
1999 if (!have_key && sender_host_address != NULL)
2000 key = string_sprintf("%s / %s", key, sender_host_address);
2001
2002 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit condition limit=%.0f period=%.0f key=%s\n",
2003 limit, period, key);
2004
2005 /* If we are dealing with rate limits per connection, per message, or per byte,
2006 see if we have already computed the rate by looking in the relevant tree. For
2007 per-connection rate limiting, store tree nodes and dbdata in the permanent pool
2008 so that they survive across resets. */
2009
2010 anchor = NULL;
2011 old_pool = store_pool;
2012
2013 if (per_conn)
2014 {
2015 anchor = &ratelimiters_conn;
2016 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2017 }
2018 if (per_mail || per_byte)
2019 anchor = &ratelimiters_mail;
2020
2021 if (anchor != NULL && (t = tree_search(*anchor, key)) != NULL)
2022 {
2023 dbd = t->data.ptr;
2024 /* The following few lines duplicate some of the code below. */
2025 if (dbd->rate < limit) rc = FAIL;
2026 else rc = OK;
2027 store_pool = old_pool;
2028 sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
2029 HDEBUG(D_acl)
2030 debug_printf("ratelimit found pre-computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
2031 return rc;
2032 }
2033
2034 /* We aren't using a pre-computed rate, so get a previously recorded
2035 rate from the database, update it, and write it back. If there's no
2036 previous rate for this key, create one. */
2037
2038 dbm = dbfn_open(US"ratelimit", O_RDWR, &dbblock, TRUE);
2039 if (dbm == NULL)
2040 {
2041 store_pool = old_pool;
2042 sender_rate = NULL;
2043 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit database not available\n");
2044 *log_msgptr = US"ratelimit database not available";
2045 return DEFER;
2046 }
2047 dbd = dbfn_read(dbm, key);
2048
2049 gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
2050
2051 if (dbd == NULL)
2052 {
2053 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit initializing new key's data\n");
2054 dbd = store_get(sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit));
2055 dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
2056 dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
2057 dbd->rate = 0.0;
2058 }
2059 else
2060 {
2061 /* The smoothed rate is computed using an exponentially weighted moving
2062 average adjusted for variable sampling intervals. The standard EWMA for
2063 a fixed sampling interval is: f'(t) = (1 - a) * f(t) + a * f'(t - 1)
2064 where f() is the measured value and f'() is the smoothed value.
2065
2066 Old data decays out of the smoothed value exponentially, such that data n
2067 samples old is multiplied by a^n. The exponential decay time constant p
2068 is defined such that data p samples old is multiplied by 1/e, which means
2069 that a = exp(-1/p). We can maintain the same time constant for a variable
2070 sampling interval i by using a = exp(-i/p).
2071
2072 The rate we are measuring is messages per period, suitable for directly
2073 comparing with the limit. The average rate between now and the previous
2074 message is period / interval, which we feed into the EWMA as the sample.
2075
2076 It turns out that the number of messages required for the smoothed rate
2077 to reach the limit when they are sent in a burst is equal to the limit.
2078 This can be seen by analysing the value of the smoothed rate after N
2079 messages sent at even intervals. Let k = (1 - a) * p/i
2080
2081 rate_1 = (1 - a) * p/i + a * rate_0
2082 = k + a * rate_0
2083 rate_2 = k + a * rate_1
2084 = k + a * k + a^2 * rate_0
2085 rate_3 = k + a * k + a^2 * k + a^3 * rate_0
2086 rate_N = rate_0 * a^N + k * SUM(x=0..N-1)(a^x)
2087 = rate_0 * a^N + k * (1 - a^N) / (1 - a)
2088 = rate_0 * a^N + p/i * (1 - a^N)
2089
2090 When N is large, a^N -> 0 so rate_N -> p/i as desired.
2091
2092 rate_N = p/i + (rate_0 - p/i) * a^N
2093 a^N = (rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i)
2094 N * -i/p = log((rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i))
2095 N = p/i * log((rate_0 - p/i) / (rate_N - p/i))
2096
2097 Numerical analysis of the above equation, setting the computed rate to
2098 increase from rate_0 = 0 to rate_N = limit, shows that for large sending
2099 rates, p/i, the number of messages N = limit. So limit serves as both the
2100 maximum rate measured in messages per period, and the maximum number of
2101 messages that can be sent in a fast burst. */
2102
2103 double this_time = (double)tv.tv_sec
2104 + (double)tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0;
2105 double prev_time = (double)dbd->time_stamp
2106 + (double)dbd->time_usec / 1000000.0;
2107 double interval = this_time - prev_time;
2108
2109 double i_over_p = interval / period;
2110 double a = exp(-i_over_p);
2111
2112 /* We must avoid division by zero, and deal gracefully with the clock going
2113 backwards. If we blunder ahead when time is in reverse then the computed
2114 rate will become bogusly huge. Clamp i/p to a very small number instead. */
2115
2116 if (i_over_p <= 0.0) i_over_p = 1e-9;
2117
2118 dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
2119 dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
2120
2121 /* If we are measuring the rate in bytes per period, multiply the
2122 measured rate by the message size. If we don't know the message size
2123 then it's safe to just use a value of zero and let the recorded rate
2124 decay as if nothing happened. */
2125
2126 if (per_byte)
2127 dbd->rate = (message_size < 0 ? 0.0 : (double)message_size)
2128 * (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
2129 else
2130 dbd->rate = (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
2131 }
2132
2133 /* Clients sending at the limit are considered to be over the limit. This
2134 matters for edge cases such the first message sent by a client (which gets
2135 the initial rate of 0.0) when the rate limit is zero (i.e. the client should
2136 be completely blocked). */
2137
2138 if (dbd->rate < limit) rc = FAIL;
2139 else rc = OK;
2140
2141 /* Update the state if the rate is low or if we are being strict. If we
2142 are in leaky mode and the sender's rate is too high, we do not update
2143 the recorded rate in order to avoid an over-aggressive sender's retry
2144 rate preventing them from getting any email through. */
2145
2146 if (rc == FAIL || !leaky)
2147 dbfn_write(dbm, key, dbd, sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit));
2148 dbfn_close(dbm);
2149
2150 /* Store the result in the tree for future reference, if necessary. */
2151
2152 if (anchor != NULL)
2153 {
2154 t = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(key));
2155 t->data.ptr = dbd;
2156 Ustrcpy(t->name, key);
2157 (void)tree_insertnode(anchor, t);
2158 }
2159
2160 /* We create the formatted version of the sender's rate very late in
2161 order to ensure that it is done using the correct storage pool. */
2162
2163 store_pool = old_pool;
2164 sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
2165
2166 HDEBUG(D_acl)
2167 debug_printf("ratelimit computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
2168
2169 return rc;
2170 }
2171
2172
2173
2174 /*************************************************
2175 * Handle conditions/modifiers on an ACL item *
2176 *************************************************/
2177
2178 /* Called from acl_check() below.
2179
2180 Arguments:
2181 verb ACL verb
2182 cb ACL condition block - if NULL, result is OK
2183 where where called from
2184 addr the address being checked for RCPT, or NULL
2185 level the nesting level
2186 epp pointer to pass back TRUE if "endpass" encountered
2187 (applies only to "accept" and "discard")
2188 user_msgptr user message pointer
2189 log_msgptr log message pointer
2190 basic_errno pointer to where to put verify error
2191
2192 Returns: OK - all conditions are met
2193 DISCARD - an "acl" condition returned DISCARD - only allowed
2194 for "accept" or "discard" verbs
2195 FAIL - at least one condition fails
2196 FAIL_DROP - an "acl" condition returned FAIL_DROP
2197 DEFER - can't tell at the moment (typically, lookup defer,
2198 but can be temporary callout problem)
2199 ERROR - ERROR from nested ACL or expansion failure or other
2200 error
2201 */
2202
2203 static int
2204 acl_check_condition(int verb, acl_condition_block *cb, int where,
2205 address_item *addr, int level, BOOL *epp, uschar **user_msgptr,
2206 uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
2207 {
2208 uschar *user_message = NULL;
2209 uschar *log_message = NULL;
2210 uschar *p;
2211 int rc = OK;
2212 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2213 int sep = '/';
2214 #endif
2215
2216 for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next)
2217 {
2218 uschar *arg;
2219 int control_type;
2220
2221 /* The message and log_message items set up messages to be used in
2222 case of rejection. They are expanded later. */
2223
2224 if (cb->type == ACLC_MESSAGE)
2225 {
2226 user_message = cb->arg;
2227 continue;
2228 }
2229
2230 if (cb->type == ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE)
2231 {
2232 log_message = cb->arg;
2233 continue;
2234 }
2235
2236 /* The endpass "condition" just sets a flag to show it occurred. This is
2237 checked at compile time to be on an "accept" or "discard" item. */
2238
2239 if (cb->type == ACLC_ENDPASS)
2240 {
2241 *epp = TRUE;
2242 continue;
2243 }
2244
2245 /* For other conditions and modifiers, the argument is expanded now for some
2246 of them, but not for all, because expansion happens down in some lower level
2247 checking functions in some cases. */
2248
2249 if (cond_expand_at_top[cb->type])
2250 {
2251 arg = expand_string(cb->arg);
2252 if (arg == NULL)
2253 {
2254 if (expand_string_forcedfail) continue;
2255 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s",
2256 cb->arg, expand_string_message);
2257 return search_find_defer? DEFER : ERROR;
2258 }
2259 }
2260 else arg = cb->arg;
2261
2262 /* Show condition, and expanded condition if it's different */
2263
2264 HDEBUG(D_acl)
2265 {
2266 int lhswidth = 0;
2267 debug_printf("check %s%s %n",
2268 (!cond_modifiers[cb->type] && cb->u.negated)? "!":"",
2269 conditions[cb->type], &lhswidth);
2270
2271 if (cb->type == ACLC_SET)
2272 {
2273 int n = cb->u.varnumber;
2274 int t = (n < ACL_C_MAX)? 'c' : 'm';
2275 if (n >= ACL_C_MAX) n -= ACL_C_MAX;
2276 debug_printf("acl_%c%d ", t, n);
2277 lhswidth += 7;
2278 }
2279
2280 debug_printf("= %s\n", cb->arg);
2281
2282 if (arg != cb->arg)
2283 debug_printf("%.*s= %s\n", lhswidth,
2284 US" ", CS arg);
2285 }
2286
2287 /* Check that this condition makes sense at this time */
2288
2289 if ((cond_forbids[cb->type] & (1 << where)) != 0)
2290 {
2291 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot %s %s condition in %s ACL",
2292 cond_modifiers[cb->type]? "use" : "test",
2293 conditions[cb->type], acl_wherenames[where]);
2294 return ERROR;
2295 }
2296
2297 /* Run the appropriate test for each condition, or take the appropriate
2298 action for the remaining modifiers. */
2299
2300 switch(cb->type)
2301 {
2302 /* A nested ACL that returns "discard" makes sense only for an "accept" or
2303 "discard" verb. */
2304
2305 case ACLC_ACL:
2306 rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, arg, level+1, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
2307 if (rc == DISCARD && verb != ACL_ACCEPT && verb != ACL_DISCARD)
2308 {
2309 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("nested ACL returned \"discard\" for "
2310 "\"%s\" command (only allowed with \"accept\" or \"discard\")",
2311 verbs[verb]);
2312 return ERROR;
2313 }
2314 break;
2315
2316 case ACLC_AUTHENTICATED:
2317 rc = (sender_host_authenticated == NULL)? FAIL :
2318 match_isinlist(sender_host_authenticated, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING,
2319 TRUE, NULL);
2320 break;
2321
2322 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
2323 case ACLC_BMI_OPTIN:
2324 {
2325 int old_pool = store_pool;
2326 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2327 bmi_current_optin = string_copy(arg);
2328 store_pool = old_pool;
2329 }
2330 break;
2331 #endif
2332
2333 case ACLC_CONDITION:
2334 if (Ustrspn(arg, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg)) /* Digits, or empty */
2335 rc = (Uatoi(arg) == 0)? FAIL : OK;
2336 else
2337 rc = (strcmpic(arg, US"no") == 0 ||
2338 strcmpic(arg, US"false") == 0)? FAIL :
2339 (strcmpic(arg, US"yes") == 0 ||
2340 strcmpic(arg, US"true") == 0)? OK : DEFER;
2341 if (rc == DEFER)
2342 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("invalid \"condition\" value \"%s\"", arg);
2343 break;
2344
2345 case ACLC_CONTROL:
2346 control_type = decode_control(arg, &p, where, log_msgptr);
2347
2348 /* Check if this control makes sense at this time */
2349
2350 if ((control_forbids[control_type] & (1 << where)) != 0)
2351 {
2352 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot use \"control=%s\" in %s ACL",
2353 controls[control_type], acl_wherenames[where]);
2354 return ERROR;
2355 }
2356
2357 switch(control_type)
2358 {
2359 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
2360 case CONTROL_BMI_RUN:
2361 bmi_run = 1;
2362 break;
2363 #endif
2364 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
2365 case CONTROL_DK_VERIFY:
2366 dk_do_verify = 1;
2367 break;
2368 #endif
2369 case CONTROL_ERROR:
2370 return ERROR;
2371
2372 case CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART:
2373 deliver_localpart = addr->cc_local_part;
2374 break;
2375
2376 case CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART:
2377 deliver_localpart = addr->lc_local_part;
2378 break;
2379
2380 case CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC:
2381 smtp_enforce_sync = TRUE;
2382 break;
2383
2384 case CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC:
2385 smtp_enforce_sync = FALSE;
2386 break;
2387
2388 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2389 case CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL:
2390 no_mbox_unspool = TRUE;
2391 break;
2392 #endif
2393
2394 case CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE:
2395 no_multiline_responses = TRUE;
2396 break;
2397
2398 case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER:
2399 case CONTROL_FAKEREJECT:
2400 fake_response = (control_type == CONTROL_FAKEDEFER) ? DEFER : FAIL;
2401 if (*p == '/')
2402 {
2403 uschar *pp = p + 1;
2404 while (*pp != 0) pp++;
2405 fake_response_text = expand_string(string_copyn(p+1, pp-p-1));
2406 p = pp;
2407 }
2408 else
2409 {
2410 /* Explicitly reset to default string */
2411 fake_response_text = US"Your message has been rejected but is being kept for evaluation.\nIf it was a legitimate message, it may still be delivered to the target recipient(s).";
2412 }
2413 break;
2414
2415 case CONTROL_FREEZE:
2416 deliver_freeze = TRUE;
2417 deliver_frozen_at = time(NULL);
2418 break;
2419
2420 case CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY:
2421 queue_only_policy = TRUE;
2422 break;
2423
2424 case CONTROL_SUBMISSION:
2425 originator_name = US"";
2426 submission_mode = TRUE;
2427 while (*p == '/')
2428 {
2429 if (Ustrncmp(p, "/sender_retain", 14) == 0)
2430 {
2431 p += 14;
2432 active_local_sender_retain = TRUE;
2433 active_local_from_check = FALSE;
2434 }
2435 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/domain=", 8) == 0)
2436 {
2437 uschar *pp = p + 8;
2438 while (*pp != 0 && *pp != '/') pp++;
2439 submission_domain = string_copyn(p+8, pp-p-8);
2440 p = pp;
2441 }
2442 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/name=", 6) == 0)
2443 {
2444 uschar *pp = p + 6;
2445 while (*pp != 0 && *pp != '/') pp++;
2446 originator_name = string_copy(parse_fix_phrase(p+6, pp-p-6,
2447 big_buffer, big_buffer_size));
2448 p = pp;
2449 }
2450 else break;
2451 }
2452 if (*p != 0)
2453 {
2454 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
2455 return ERROR;
2456 }
2457 break;
2458 }
2459 break;
2460
2461 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2462 case ACLC_DECODE:
2463 rc = mime_decode(&arg);
2464 break;
2465 #endif
2466
2467 case ACLC_DELAY:
2468 {
2469 int delay = readconf_readtime(arg, 0, FALSE);
2470 if (delay < 0)
2471 {
2472 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for \"delay\" "
2473 "modifier: \"%s\" is not a time value", arg);
2474 return ERROR;
2475 }
2476 else
2477 {
2478 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("delay modifier requests %d-second delay\n",
2479 delay);
2480 if (host_checking)
2481 {
2482 HDEBUG(D_acl)
2483 debug_printf("delay skipped in -bh checking mode\n");
2484 }
2485
2486 /* It appears to be impossible to detect that a TCP/IP connection has
2487 gone away without reading from it. This means that we cannot shorten
2488 the delay below if the client goes away, because we cannot discover
2489 that the client has closed its end of the connection. (The connection
2490 is actually in a half-closed state, waiting for the server to close its
2491 end.) It would be nice to be able to detect this state, so that the
2492 Exim process is not held up unnecessarily. However, it seems that we
2493 can't. The poll() function does not do the right thing, and in any case
2494 it is not always available.
2495
2496 NOTE: If ever this state of affairs changes, remember that we may be
2497 dealing with stdin/stdout here, in addition to TCP/IP connections.
2498 Whatever is done must work in both cases. To detected the stdin/stdout
2499 case, check for smtp_in or smtp_out being NULL. */
2500
2501 else
2502 {
2503 while (delay > 0) delay = sleep(delay);
2504 }
2505 }
2506 }
2507 break;
2508
2509 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
2510 case ACLC_DEMIME:
2511 rc = demime(&arg);
2512 break;
2513 #endif
2514
2515 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
2516 case ACLC_DK_DOMAIN_SOURCE:
2517 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2518 /* check header source of domain against given string */
2519 switch (dk_verify_block->address_source) {
2520 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_FROM_FROM:
2521 rc = match_isinlist(US"from", &arg, 0, NULL,
2522 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2523 break;
2524 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_FROM_SENDER:
2525 rc = match_isinlist(US"sender", &arg, 0, NULL,
2526 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2527 break;
2528 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_NONE:
2529 rc = match_isinlist(US"none", &arg, 0, NULL,
2530 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2531 break;
2532 }
2533 break;
2534 case ACLC_DK_POLICY:
2535 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2536 /* check policy against given string, default FAIL */
2537 rc = FAIL;
2538 if (dk_verify_block->signsall)
2539 rc = match_isinlist(US"signsall", &arg, 0, NULL,
2540 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2541 if (dk_verify_block->testing)
2542 rc = match_isinlist(US"testing", &arg, 0, NULL,
2543 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2544 break;
2545 case ACLC_DK_SENDER_DOMAINS:
2546 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2547 if (dk_verify_block->domain != NULL)
2548 rc = match_isinlist(dk_verify_block->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
2549 NULL, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL);
2550 else rc = FAIL;
2551 break;
2552 case ACLC_DK_SENDER_LOCAL_PARTS:
2553 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2554 if (dk_verify_block->local_part != NULL)
2555 rc = match_isinlist(dk_verify_block->local_part, &arg, 0, &localpartlist_anchor,
2556 NULL, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE, NULL);
2557 else rc = FAIL;
2558 break;
2559 case ACLC_DK_SENDERS:
2560 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2561 if (dk_verify_block->address != NULL)
2562 rc = match_address_list(dk_verify_block->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0, NULL);
2563 else rc = FAIL;
2564 break;
2565 case ACLC_DK_STATUS:
2566 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2567 if (dk_verify_block->result > 0) {
2568 switch(dk_verify_block->result) {
2569 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_BAD_FORMAT:
2570 rc = match_isinlist(US"bad format", &arg, 0, NULL,
2571 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2572 break;
2573 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NO_KEY:
2574 rc = match_isinlist(US"no key", &arg, 0, NULL,
2575 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2576 break;
2577 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NO_SIGNATURE:
2578 rc = match_isinlist(US"no signature", &arg, 0, NULL,
2579 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2580 break;
2581 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_REVOKED:
2582 rc = match_isinlist(US"revoked", &arg, 0, NULL,
2583 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2584 break;
2585 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NON_PARTICIPANT:
2586 rc = match_isinlist(US"non-participant", &arg, 0, NULL,
2587 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2588 break;
2589 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_GOOD:
2590 rc = match_isinlist(US"good", &arg, 0, NULL,
2591 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2592 break;
2593 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_BAD:
2594 rc = match_isinlist(US"bad", &arg, 0, NULL,
2595 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2596 break;
2597 }
2598 }
2599 break;
2600 #endif
2601
2602 case ACLC_DNSLISTS:
2603 rc = verify_check_dnsbl(&arg);
2604 break;
2605
2606 case ACLC_DOMAINS:
2607 rc = match_isinlist(addr->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
2608 addr->domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, &deliver_domain_data);
2609 break;
2610
2611 /* The value in tls_cipher is the full cipher name, for example,
2612 TLSv1:DES-CBC3-SHA:168, whereas the values to test for are just the
2613 cipher names such as DES-CBC3-SHA. But program defensively. We don't know
2614 what may in practice come out of the SSL library - which at the time of
2615 writing is poorly documented. */
2616
2617 case ACLC_ENCRYPTED:
2618 if (tls_cipher == NULL) rc = FAIL; else
2619 {
2620 uschar *endcipher = NULL;
2621 uschar *cipher = Ustrchr(tls_cipher, ':');
2622 if (cipher == NULL) cipher = tls_cipher; else
2623 {
2624 endcipher = Ustrchr(++cipher, ':');
2625 if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = 0;
2626 }
2627 rc = match_isinlist(cipher, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2628 if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = ':';
2629 }
2630 break;
2631
2632 /* Use verify_check_this_host() instead of verify_check_host() so that
2633 we can pass over &host_data to catch any looked up data. Once it has been
2634 set, it retains its value so that it's still there if another ACL verb
2635 comes through here and uses the cache. However, we must put it into
2636 permanent store in case it is also expected to be used in a subsequent
2637 message in the same SMTP connection. */
2638
2639 case ACLC_HOSTS:
2640 rc = verify_check_this_host(&arg, sender_host_cache, NULL,
2641 (sender_host_address == NULL)? US"" : sender_host_address, &host_data);
2642 if (host_data != NULL) host_data = string_copy_malloc(host_data);
2643 break;
2644
2645 case ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS:
2646 rc = match_isinlist(addr->cc_local_part, &arg, 0,
2647 &localpartlist_anchor, addr->localpart_cache, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE,
2648 &deliver_localpart_data);
2649 break;
2650
2651 case ACLC_LOGWRITE:
2652 {
2653 int logbits = 0;
2654 uschar *s = arg;
2655 if (*s == ':')
2656 {
2657 s++;
2658 while (*s != ':')
2659 {
2660 if (Ustrncmp(s, "main", 4) == 0)
2661 { logbits |= LOG_MAIN; s += 4; }
2662 else if (Ustrncmp(s, "panic", 5) == 0)
2663 { logbits |= LOG_PANIC; s += 5; }
2664 else if (Ustrncmp(s, "reject", 6) == 0)
2665 { logbits |= LOG_REJECT; s += 6; }
2666 else
2667 {
2668 logbits = LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC;
2669 s = string_sprintf(":unknown log name in \"%s\" in "
2670 "\"logwrite\" in %s ACL", arg, acl_wherenames[where]);
2671 }
2672 if (*s == ',') s++;
2673 }
2674 s++;
2675 }
2676 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
2677 if (logbits == 0) logbits = LOG_MAIN;
2678 log_write(0, logbits, "%s", string_printing(s));
2679 }
2680 break;
2681
2682 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2683 case ACLC_MALWARE:
2684 {
2685 /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
2686 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
2687 /* Run the malware backend. */
2688 rc = malware(&ss);
2689 /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
2690 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2691 != NULL) {
2692 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
2693 {
2694 /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
2695 rc = FAIL;
2696 }
2697 }
2698 }
2699 break;
2700
2701 case ACLC_MIME_REGEX:
2702 rc = mime_regex(&arg);
2703 break;
2704 #endif
2705
2706 case ACLC_RATELIMIT:
2707 rc = acl_ratelimit(arg, log_msgptr);
2708 break;
2709
2710 case ACLC_RECIPIENTS:
2711 rc = match_address_list(addr->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0,
2712 &recipient_data);
2713 break;
2714
2715 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2716 case ACLC_REGEX:
2717 rc = regex(&arg);
2718 break;
2719 #endif
2720
2721 case ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS:
2722 {
2723 uschar *sdomain;
2724 sdomain = Ustrrchr(sender_address, '@');
2725 sdomain = (sdomain == NULL)? US"" : sdomain + 1;
2726 rc = match_isinlist(sdomain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
2727 sender_domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL);
2728 }
2729 break;
2730
2731 case ACLC_SENDERS:
2732 rc = match_address_list(sender_address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg,
2733 sender_address_cache, -1, 0, &sender_data);
2734 break;
2735
2736 /* Connection variables must persist forever */
2737
2738 case ACLC_SET:
2739 {
2740 int old_pool = store_pool;
2741 if (cb->u.varnumber < ACL_C_MAX) store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2742 acl_var[cb->u.varnumber] = string_copy(arg);
2743 store_pool = old_pool;
2744 }
2745 break;
2746
2747 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2748 case ACLC_SPAM:
2749 {
2750 /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
2751 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
2752 /* Run the spam backend. */
2753 rc = spam(&ss);
2754 /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
2755 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2756 != NULL) {
2757 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
2758 {
2759 /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
2760 rc = FAIL;
2761 }
2762 }
2763 }
2764 break;
2765 #endif
2766
2767 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
2768 case ACLC_SPF:
2769 rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address);
2770 break;
2771 #endif
2772
2773 /* If the verb is WARN, discard any user message from verification, because
2774 such messages are SMTP responses, not header additions. The latter come
2775 only from explicit "message" modifiers. However, put the user message into
2776 $acl_verify_message so it can be used in subsequent conditions or modifiers
2777 (until something changes it). */
2778
2779 case ACLC_VERIFY:
2780 rc = acl_verify(where, addr, arg, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, basic_errno);
2781 acl_verify_message = *user_msgptr;
2782 if (verb == ACL_WARN) *user_msgptr = NULL;
2783 break;
2784
2785 default:
2786 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown "
2787 "condition %d", cb->type);
2788 break;
2789 }
2790
2791 /* If a condition was negated, invert OK/FAIL. */
2792
2793 if (!cond_modifiers[cb->type] && cb->u.negated)
2794 {
2795 if (rc == OK) rc = FAIL;
2796 else if (rc == FAIL || rc == FAIL_DROP) rc = OK;
2797 }
2798
2799 if (rc != OK) break; /* Conditions loop */
2800 }
2801
2802
2803 /* If the result is the one for which "message" and/or "log_message" are used,
2804 handle the values of these options. Most verbs have but a single return for
2805 which the messages are relevant, but for "discard", it's useful to have the log
2806 message both when it succeeds and when it fails. Also, for an "accept" that
2807 appears in a QUIT ACL, we want to handle the user message. Since only "accept"
2808 and "warn" are permitted in that ACL, we don't need to test the verb.
2809
2810 These modifiers act in different ways:
2811
2812 "message" is a user message that will be included in an SMTP response. Unless
2813 it is empty, it overrides any previously set user message.
2814
2815 "log_message" is a non-user message, and it adds to any existing non-user
2816 message that is already set.
2817
2818 If there isn't a log message set, we make it the same as the user message. */
2819
2820 if (((rc == FAIL_DROP)? FAIL : rc) == msgcond[verb] ||
2821 (verb == ACL_DISCARD && rc == OK) ||
2822 (where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT))
2823 {
2824 uschar *expmessage;
2825
2826 /* If the verb is "warn", messages generated by conditions (verification or
2827 nested ACLs) are discarded. Only messages specified at this level are used.
2828 However, the value of an existing message is available in $acl_verify_message
2829 during expansions. */
2830
2831 uschar *old_user_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
2832 uschar *old_log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr != NULL)? *log_msgptr : old_user_msgptr;
2833
2834 if (verb == ACL_WARN) *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
2835
2836 if (user_message != NULL)
2837 {
2838 acl_verify_message = old_user_msgptr;
2839 expmessage = expand_string(user_message);
2840 if (expmessage == NULL)
2841 {
2842 if (!expand_string_forcedfail)
2843 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
2844 user_message, expand_string_message);
2845 }
2846 else if (expmessage[0] != 0) *user_msgptr = expmessage;
2847 }
2848
2849 if (log_message != NULL)
2850 {
2851 acl_verify_message = old_log_msgptr;
2852 expmessage = expand_string(log_message);
2853 if (expmessage == NULL)
2854 {
2855 if (!expand_string_forcedfail)
2856 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
2857 log_message, expand_string_message);
2858 }
2859 else if (expmessage[0] != 0)
2860 {
2861 *log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr == NULL)? expmessage :
2862 string_sprintf("%s: %s", expmessage, *log_msgptr);
2863 }
2864 }
2865
2866 /* If no log message, default it to the user message */
2867
2868 if (*log_msgptr == NULL) *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
2869 }
2870
2871 acl_verify_message = NULL;
2872 return rc;
2873 }
2874
2875
2876
2877
2878
2879 /*************************************************
2880 * Get line from a literal ACL *
2881 *************************************************/
2882
2883 /* This function is passed to acl_read() in order to extract individual lines
2884 of a literal ACL, which we access via static pointers. We can destroy the
2885 contents because this is called only once (the compiled ACL is remembered).
2886
2887 This code is intended to treat the data in the same way as lines in the main
2888 Exim configuration file. That is:
2889
2890 . Leading spaces are ignored.
2891
2892 . A \ at the end of a line is a continuation - trailing spaces after the \
2893 are permitted (this is because I don't believe in making invisible things
2894 significant). Leading spaces on the continued part of a line are ignored.
2895
2896 . Physical lines starting (significantly) with # are totally ignored, and
2897 may appear within a sequence of backslash-continued lines.
2898
2899 . Blank lines are ignored, but will end a sequence of continuations.
2900
2901 Arguments: none
2902 Returns: a pointer to the next line
2903 */
2904
2905
2906 static uschar *acl_text; /* Current pointer in the text */
2907 static uschar *acl_text_end; /* Points one past the terminating '0' */
2908
2909
2910 static uschar *
2911 acl_getline(void)
2912 {
2913 uschar *yield;
2914
2915 /* This loop handles leading blank lines and comments. */
2916
2917 for(;;)
2918 {
2919 while (isspace(*acl_text)) acl_text++; /* Leading spaces/empty lines */
2920 if (*acl_text == 0) return NULL; /* No more data */
2921 yield = acl_text; /* Potential data line */
2922
2923 while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
2924
2925 /* If we hit the end before a newline, we have the whole logical line. If
2926 it's a comment, there's no more data to be given. Otherwise, yield it. */
2927
2928 if (*acl_text == 0) return (*yield == '#')? NULL : yield;
2929
2930 /* After reaching a newline, end this loop if the physical line does not
2931 start with '#'. If it does, it's a comment, and the loop continues. */
2932
2933 if (*yield != '#') break;
2934 }
2935
2936 /* This loop handles continuations. We know we have some real data, ending in
2937 newline. See if there is a continuation marker at the end (ignoring trailing
2938 white space). We know that *yield is not white space, so no need to test for
2939 cont > yield in the backwards scanning loop. */
2940
2941 for(;;)
2942 {
2943 uschar *cont;
2944 for (cont = acl_text - 1; isspace(*cont); cont--);
2945
2946 /* If no continuation follows, we are done. Mark the end of the line and
2947 return it. */
2948
2949 if (*cont != '\\')
2950 {
2951 *acl_text++ = 0;
2952 return yield;
2953 }
2954
2955 /* We have encountered a continuation. Skip over whitespace at the start of
2956 the next line, and indeed the whole of the next line or lines if they are
2957 comment lines. */
2958
2959 for (;;)
2960 {
2961 while (*(++acl_text) == ' ' || *acl_text == '\t');
2962 if (*acl_text != '#') break;
2963 while (*(++acl_text) != 0 && *acl_text != '\n');
2964 }
2965
2966 /* We have the start of a continuation line. Move all the rest of the data
2967 to join onto the previous line, and then find its end. If the end is not a
2968 newline, we are done. Otherwise loop to look for another continuation. */
2969
2970 memmove(cont, acl_text, acl_text_end - acl_text);
2971 acl_text_end -= acl_text - cont;
2972 acl_text = cont;
2973 while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
2974 if (*acl_text == 0) return yield;
2975 }
2976
2977 /* Control does not reach here */
2978 }
2979
2980
2981
2982
2983
2984 /*************************************************
2985 * Check access using an ACL *
2986 *************************************************/
2987
2988 /* This function is called from address_check. It may recurse via
2989 acl_check_condition() - hence the use of a level to stop looping. The ACL is
2990 passed as a string which is expanded. A forced failure implies no access check
2991 is required. If the result is a single word, it is taken as the name of an ACL
2992 which is sought in the global ACL tree. Otherwise, it is taken as literal ACL
2993 text, complete with newlines, and parsed as such. In both cases, the ACL check
2994 is then run. This function uses an auxiliary function for acl_read() to call
2995 for reading individual lines of a literal ACL. This is acl_getline(), which
2996 appears immediately above.
2997
2998 Arguments:
2999 where where called from
3000 addr address item when called from RCPT; otherwise NULL
3001 s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
3002 level the nesting level
3003 user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
3004 log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
3005
3006 Returns: OK access is granted
3007 DISCARD access is apparently granted...
3008 FAIL access is denied
3009 FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection
3010 DEFER can't tell at the moment
3011 ERROR disaster
3012 */
3013
3014 static int
3015 acl_check_internal(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *s, int level,
3016 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
3017 {
3018 int fd = -1;
3019 acl_block *acl = NULL;
3020 uschar *acl_name = US"inline ACL";
3021 uschar *ss;
3022
3023 /* Catch configuration loops */
3024
3025 if (level > 20)
3026 {
3027 *log_msgptr = US"ACL nested too deep: possible loop";
3028 return ERROR;
3029 }
3030
3031 if (s == NULL)
3032 {
3033 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ACL is NULL: implicit DENY\n");
3034 return FAIL;
3035 }
3036
3037 /* At top level, we expand the incoming string. At lower levels, it has already
3038 been expanded as part of condition processing. */
3039
3040 if (level == 0)
3041 {
3042 ss = expand_string(s);
3043 if (ss == NULL)
3044 {
3045 if (expand_string_forcedfail) return OK;
3046 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s", s,
3047 expand_string_message);
3048 return ERROR;
3049 }
3050 }
3051 else ss = s;
3052
3053 while (isspace(*ss))ss++;
3054
3055 /* If we can't find a named ACL, the default is to parse it as an inline one.
3056 (Unless it begins with a slash; non-existent files give rise to an error.) */
3057
3058 acl_text = ss;
3059
3060 /* Handle the case of a string that does not contain any spaces. Look for a
3061 named ACL among those read from the configuration, or a previously read file.
3062 It is possible that the pointer to the ACL is NULL if the configuration
3063 contains a name with no data. If not found, and the text begins with '/',
3064 read an ACL from a file, and save it so it can be re-used. */
3065
3066 if (Ustrchr(ss, ' ') == NULL)
3067 {
3068 tree_node *t = tree_search(acl_anchor, ss);
3069 if (t != NULL)
3070 {
3071 acl = (acl_block *)(t->data.ptr);
3072 if (acl == NULL)
3073 {
3074 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ACL \"%s\" is empty: implicit DENY\n", ss);
3075 return FAIL;
3076 }
3077 acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
3078 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("using ACL \"%s\"\n", ss);
3079 }
3080
3081 else if (*ss == '/')
3082 {
3083 struct stat statbuf;
3084 fd = Uopen(ss, O_RDONLY, 0);
3085 if (fd < 0)
3086 {
3087 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to open ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
3088 strerror(errno));
3089 return ERROR;
3090 }
3091
3092 if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) != 0)
3093 {
3094 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to fstat ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
3095 strerror(errno));
3096 return ERROR;
3097 }
3098
3099 acl_text = store_get(statbuf.st_size + 1);
3100 acl_text_end = acl_text + statbuf.st_size + 1;
3101
3102 if (read(fd, acl_text, statbuf.st_size) != statbuf.st_size)
3103 {
3104 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to read ACL file \"%s\": %s",
3105 ss, strerror(errno));
3106 return ERROR;
3107 }
3108 acl_text[statbuf.st_size] = 0;
3109 close(fd);
3110
3111 acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
3112 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("read ACL from file %s\n", ss);
3113 }
3114 }
3115
3116 /* Parse an ACL that is still in text form. If it came from a file, remember it
3117 in the ACL tree, having read it into the POOL_PERM store pool so that it
3118 persists between multiple messages. */
3119
3120 if (acl == NULL)
3121 {
3122 int old_pool = store_pool;
3123 if (fd >= 0) store_pool = POOL_PERM;
3124 acl = acl_read(acl_getline, log_msgptr);
3125 store_pool = old_pool;
3126 if (acl == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL) return ERROR;
3127 if (fd >= 0)
3128 {
3129 tree_node *t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(ss));
3130 Ustrcpy(t->name, ss);
3131 t->data.ptr = acl;
3132 (void)tree_insertnode(&acl_anchor, t);
3133 }
3134 }
3135
3136 /* Now we have an ACL to use. It's possible it may be NULL. */
3137
3138 while (acl != NULL)
3139 {
3140 int cond;
3141 int basic_errno = 0;
3142 BOOL endpass_seen = FALSE;
3143
3144 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
3145 acl_temp_details = FALSE;
3146
3147 if (where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT &&
3148 acl->verb != ACL_ACCEPT &&
3149 acl->verb != ACL_WARN)
3150 {
3151 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"%s\" is not allowed in a QUIT ACL",
3152 verbs[acl->verb]);
3153 return ERROR;
3154 }
3155
3156 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("processing \"%s\"\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3157
3158 /* Clear out any search error message from a previous check before testing
3159 this condition. */
3160
3161 search_error_message = NULL;
3162 cond = acl_check_condition(acl->verb, acl->condition, where, addr, level,
3163 &endpass_seen, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, &basic_errno);
3164
3165 /* Handle special returns: DEFER causes a return except on a WARN verb;
3166 ERROR always causes a return. */
3167
3168 switch (cond)
3169 {
3170 case DEFER:
3171 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test deferred\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3172 if (basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
3173 {
3174 if (search_error_message != NULL && *search_error_message != 0)
3175 *log_msgptr = search_error_message;
3176 if (smtp_return_error_details) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
3177 }
3178 else
3179 {
3180 acl_temp_details = TRUE;
3181 }
3182 if (acl->verb != ACL_WARN) return DEFER;
3183 break;
3184
3185 default: /* Paranoia */
3186 case ERROR:
3187 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test error\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3188 return ERROR;
3189
3190 case OK:
3191 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test succeeded\n",
3192 verbs[acl->verb]);
3193 break;
3194
3195 case FAIL:
3196 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test failed\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3197 break;
3198
3199 /* DISCARD and DROP can happen only from a nested ACL condition, and
3200 DISCARD can happen only for an "accept" or "discard" verb. */
3201
3202 case DISCARD:
3203 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test yielded \"discard\"\n",
3204 verbs[acl->verb]);
3205 break;
3206
3207 case FAIL_DROP:
3208 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test yielded \"drop\"\n",
3209 verbs[acl->verb]);
3210 break;
3211 }
3212
3213 /* At this point, cond for most verbs is either OK or FAIL or (as a result of
3214 a nested ACL condition) FAIL_DROP. However, for WARN, cond may be DEFER, and
3215 for ACCEPT and DISCARD, it may be DISCARD after a nested ACL call. */
3216
3217 switch(acl->verb)
3218 {
3219 case ACL_ACCEPT:
3220 if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD) return cond;
3221 if (endpass_seen)
3222 {
3223 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("accept: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
3224 return cond;
3225 }
3226 break;
3227
3228 case ACL_DEFER:
3229 if (cond == OK)
3230 {
3231 acl_temp_details = TRUE;
3232 return DEFER;
3233 }
3234 break;
3235
3236 case ACL_DENY:
3237 if (cond == OK) return FAIL;
3238 break;
3239
3240 case ACL_DISCARD:
3241 if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD) return DISCARD;
3242 if (endpass_seen)
3243 {
3244 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("discard: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
3245 return cond;
3246 }
3247 break;
3248
3249 case ACL_DROP:
3250 if (cond == OK) return FAIL_DROP;
3251 break;
3252
3253 case ACL_REQUIRE:
3254 if (cond != OK) return cond;
3255 break;
3256
3257 case ACL_WARN:
3258 if (cond == OK)
3259 acl_warn(where, *user_msgptr, *log_msgptr);
3260 else if (cond == DEFER)
3261 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s Warning: ACL \"warn\" statement skipped: "
3262 "condition test deferred%s%s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
3263 (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : US": ",
3264 (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : *log_msgptr);
3265 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL; /* In case implicit DENY follows */
3266 break;
3267
3268 default:
3269 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown verb %d",
3270 acl->verb);
3271 break;
3272 }
3273
3274 /* Pass to the next ACL item */
3275
3276 acl = acl->next;
3277 }
3278
3279 /* We have reached the end of the ACL. This is an implicit DENY. */
3280
3281 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("end of %s: implicit DENY\n", acl_name);
3282 return FAIL;
3283 }
3284
3285
3286 /*************************************************
3287 * Check access using an ACL *
3288 *************************************************/
3289
3290 /* This is the external interface for ACL checks. It sets up an address and the
3291 expansions for $domain and $local_part when called after RCPT, then calls
3292 acl_check_internal() to do the actual work.
3293
3294 Arguments:
3295 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating where called from
3296 data_string RCPT address, or SMTP command argument, or NULL
3297 s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
3298 user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
3299 log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
3300
3301 Returns: OK access is granted by an ACCEPT verb
3302 DISCARD access is granted by a DISCARD verb
3303 FAIL access is denied
3304 FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection
3305 DEFER can't tell at the moment
3306 ERROR disaster
3307 */
3308
3309 int
3310 acl_check(int where, uschar *data_string, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr,
3311 uschar **log_msgptr)
3312 {
3313 int rc;
3314 address_item adb;
3315 address_item *addr;
3316
3317 *user_msgptr = *log_msgptr = NULL;
3318 sender_verified_failed = NULL;
3319
3320 if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT)
3321 {
3322 adb = address_defaults;
3323 addr = &adb;
3324 addr->address = data_string;
3325 if (deliver_split_address(addr) == DEFER)
3326 {
3327 *log_msgptr = US"defer in percent_hack_domains check";
3328 return DEFER;
3329 }
3330 deliver_domain = addr->domain;
3331 deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
3332 }
3333 else
3334 {
3335 addr = NULL;
3336 smtp_command_argument = data_string;
3337 }
3338
3339 rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, 0, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
3340
3341 smtp_command_argument = deliver_domain =
3342 deliver_localpart = deliver_address_data = sender_address_data = NULL;
3343
3344 /* A DISCARD response is permitted only for message ACLs, excluding the PREDATA
3345 ACL, which is really in the middle of an SMTP command. */
3346
3347 if (rc == DISCARD)
3348 {
3349 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP || where == ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)
3350 {
3351 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "\"discard\" verb not allowed in %s "
3352 "ACL", acl_wherenames[where]);
3353 return ERROR;
3354 }
3355 return DISCARD;
3356 }
3357
3358 /* A DROP response is not permitted from MAILAUTH */
3359
3360 if (rc == FAIL_DROP && where == ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)
3361 {
3362 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "\"drop\" verb not allowed in %s "
3363 "ACL", acl_wherenames[where]);
3364 return ERROR;
3365 }
3366
3367 /* Before giving an error response, take a look at the length of any user
3368 message, and split it up into multiple lines if possible. */
3369
3370 if (rc != OK && *user_msgptr != NULL && Ustrlen(*user_msgptr) > 75)
3371 {
3372 uschar *s = *user_msgptr = string_copy(*user_msgptr);
3373 uschar *ss = s;
3374
3375 for (;;)
3376 {
3377 int i = 0;
3378 while (i < 75 && *ss != 0 && *ss != '\n') ss++, i++;
3379 if (*ss == 0) break;
3380 if (*ss == '\n')
3381 s = ++ss;
3382 else
3383 {
3384 uschar *t = ss + 1;
3385 uschar *tt = NULL;
3386 while (--t > s + 35)
3387 {
3388 if (*t == ' ')
3389 {
3390 if (t[-1] == ':') { tt = t; break; }
3391 if (tt == NULL) tt = t;
3392 }
3393 }
3394
3395 if (tt == NULL) /* Can't split behind - try ahead */
3396 {
3397 t = ss + 1;
3398 while (*t != 0)
3399 {
3400 if (*t == ' ' || *t == '\n')
3401 { tt = t; break; }
3402 t++;
3403 }
3404 }
3405
3406 if (tt == NULL) break; /* Can't find anywhere to split */
3407 *tt = '\n';
3408 s = ss = tt+1;
3409 }
3410 }
3411 }
3412
3413 return rc;
3414 }
3415
3416 /* End of acl.c */