X-Git-Url: https://vcs.fsf.org/?p=exim.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fsrc%2Ftls-openssl.c;h=7a82e1d554176ca1f8adb03c4c15348aefdd208f;hp=c40af65c743198e38243ef3423aa3a3de809fcf3;hb=5b195d6b9592fcef09b0b3b31390e73226deffc9;hpb=4d93129fffa7e0f92b83ebca52fc188f4d13d6e6;ds=sidebyside diff --git a/src/src/tls-openssl.c b/src/src/tls-openssl.c index c40af65c7..7a82e1d55 100644 --- a/src/src/tls-openssl.c +++ b/src/src/tls-openssl.c @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ functions from the OpenSSL library. */ #endif #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L # define EXIM_HAVE_OCSP_RESP_COUNT +# define OPENSSL_AUTO_SHA256 #else # define EXIM_HAVE_EPHEM_RSA_KEX # define EXIM_HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO @@ -74,6 +75,7 @@ change this guard and punt the issue for a while longer. */ # define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CIPHER_GET_ID # define EXIM_HAVE_SESSION_TICKET # define EXIM_HAVE_OPESSL_TRACE +# define EXIM_HAVE_OPESSL_GET0_SERIAL # else # define EXIM_NEED_OPENSSL_INIT # endif @@ -148,7 +150,7 @@ Plus SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3 for 1.1.2-dev static exim_openssl_option exim_openssl_options[] = { /* KEEP SORTED ALPHABETICALLY! */ #ifdef SSL_OP_ALL - { US"all", SSL_OP_ALL }, + { US"all", (long) SSL_OP_ALL }, #endif #ifdef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION { US"allow_unsafe_legacy_renegotiation", SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION }, @@ -261,6 +263,9 @@ for (struct exim_openssl_option * o = exim_openssl_options; # ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_TLS_RESUME builtin_macro_create_var(US"_RESUME_DECODE", RESUME_DECODE_STRING ); # endif +# ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3 +builtin_macro_create(US"_HAVE_TLS1_3"); +# endif } #else @@ -315,13 +320,18 @@ static SSL_CTX *server_sni = NULL; static char ssl_errstring[256]; -static int ssl_session_timeout = 3600; +static int ssl_session_timeout = 7200; /* Two hours */ static BOOL client_verify_optional = FALSE; static BOOL server_verify_optional = FALSE; static BOOL reexpand_tls_files_for_sni = FALSE; +typedef struct ocsp_resp { + struct ocsp_resp * next; + OCSP_RESPONSE * resp; +} ocsp_resplist; + typedef struct tls_ext_ctx_cb { tls_support * tlsp; uschar *certificate; @@ -332,8 +342,8 @@ typedef struct tls_ext_ctx_cb { union { struct { uschar *file; - uschar *file_expanded; - OCSP_RESPONSE *response; + const uschar *file_expanded; + ocsp_resplist *olist; } server; struct { X509_STORE *verify_store; /* non-null if status requested */ @@ -526,6 +536,7 @@ if (ev) } DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Event-action verify failure overridden " "(host in tls_try_verify_hosts)\n"); + tlsp->verify_override = TRUE; } X509_free(tlsp->peercert); tlsp->peercert = old_cert; @@ -585,6 +596,7 @@ if (!X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS dn, sizeof(dn))) } dn[sizeof(dn)-1] = '\0'; +tlsp->verify_override = FALSE; if (preverify_ok == 0) { uschar * extra = verify_mode ? string_sprintf(" (during %c-verify for [%s])", @@ -603,6 +615,7 @@ if (preverify_ok == 0) } DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify failure overridden (host in " "tls_try_verify_hosts)\n"); + tlsp->verify_override = TRUE; } else if (depth != 0) @@ -679,8 +692,9 @@ else tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert); /* record failing cert */ return 0; /* reject */ } - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify failure overridden (host in " + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify name failure overridden (host in " "tls_try_verify_hosts)\n"); + tlsp->verify_override = TRUE; } } @@ -691,7 +705,6 @@ else DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL%s verify ok: depth=0 SN=%s\n", *calledp ? "" : " authenticated", dn); - if (!*calledp) tlsp->certificate_verified = TRUE; *calledp = TRUE; } @@ -748,7 +761,7 @@ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("verify_callback_client_dane: %s depth %d %s\n", if (preverify_ok == 1) { - tls_out.dane_verified = tls_out.certificate_verified = TRUE; + tls_out.dane_verified = TRUE; #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP if (client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store) { /* client, wanting stapling */ @@ -909,7 +922,7 @@ if (enc) if (!(key = tk_current())) /* current key doesn't exist or isn't valid */ return 0; /* key couldn't be created */ memcpy(key_name, key->name, 16); - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("STEK expire %ld\n", key->expire - time(NULL)); + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("STEK expire " TIME_T_FMT "\n", key->expire - time(NULL)); /*XXX will want these dependent on the ssl session strength */ HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, key->hmac_key, sizeof(key->hmac_key), @@ -931,7 +944,7 @@ else DEBUG(D_tls) { debug_printf("ticket not usable (%s)\n", key ? "expired" : "not found"); - if (key) debug_printf("STEK expire %ld\n", key->expire - now); + if (key) debug_printf("STEK expire " TIME_T_FMT "\n", key->expire - now); } return 0; } @@ -940,7 +953,13 @@ else key->hmac_hash, NULL); EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, key->aes_cipher, NULL, key->aes_key, iv); - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("ticket usable, STEK expire %ld\n", key->expire - now); + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("ticket usable, STEK expire " TIME_T_FMT "\n", key->expire - now); + + /* The ticket lifetime and renewal are the same as the STEK lifetime and + renewal, which is overenthusiastic. A factor of, say, 3x longer STEK would + be better. To do that we'd have to encode ticket lifetime in the name as + we don't yet see the restored session. Could check posthandshake for TLS1.3 + and trigger a new ticket then, but cannot do that for TLS1.2 */ return key->renew < now ? 2 : 1; } } @@ -1180,12 +1199,13 @@ ASSUMES: single response, for single cert. Arguments: sctx the SSL_CTX* to update cbinfo various parts of session state - expanded the filename putatively holding an OCSP response + filename the filename putatively holding an OCSP response */ static void -ocsp_load_response(SSL_CTX *sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo, const uschar *expanded) +ocsp_load_response(SSL_CTX * sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo, + const uschar * filename) { BIO * bio; OCSP_RESPONSE * resp; @@ -1196,17 +1216,12 @@ STACK_OF(X509) * sk; unsigned long verify_flags; int status, reason, i; -cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded = string_copy(expanded); -if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response) - { - OCSP_RESPONSE_free(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response); - cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = NULL; - } +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_ocsp_file '%s'\n", filename); -if (!(bio = BIO_new_file(CS cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded, "rb"))) +if (!(bio = BIO_new_file(CS filename, "rb"))) { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Failed to open OCSP response file \"%s\"\n", - cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded); + filename); return; } @@ -1225,6 +1240,14 @@ if ((status = OCSP_response_status(resp)) != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) goto bad; } +#ifdef notdef + { + BIO * bp = BIO_new_fp(debug_file, BIO_NOCLOSE); + OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, resp, 0); /* extreme debug: stapling content */ + BIO_free(bp); + } +#endif + if (!(basic_response = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp))) { DEBUG(D_tls) @@ -1278,7 +1301,10 @@ proves false, we need to extract a cert id from our issued cert (tls_certificate) and use that for OCSP_resp_find_status() (which finds the right cert in the stack and then calls OCSP_single_get0_status()). -I'm hoping to avoid reworking a bunch more of how we handle state here. */ +I'm hoping to avoid reworking a bunch more of how we handle state here. + +XXX that will change when we add support for (TLS1.3) whole-chain stapling +*/ if (!(single_response = OCSP_resp_get0(basic_response, 0))) { @@ -1303,7 +1329,15 @@ if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX } supply_response: - cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = resp; /*XXX stack?*/ + /* Add the resp to the list used by tls_server_stapling_cb() */ + { + ocsp_resplist ** op = &cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.olist, * oentry; + while (oentry = *op) + op = &oentry->next; + *op = oentry = store_get(sizeof(ocsp_resplist), FALSE); + oentry->next = NULL; + oentry->resp = resp; + } return; bad: @@ -1319,6 +1353,16 @@ bad: } return; } + + +static void +ocsp_free_response_list(tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo) +{ +for (ocsp_resplist * olist = cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.olist; olist; + olist = olist->next) + OCSP_RESPONSE_free(olist->resp); +cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.olist = NULL; +} #endif /*!DISABLE_OCSP*/ @@ -1394,7 +1438,7 @@ static int tls_add_certfile(SSL_CTX * sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo, uschar * file, uschar ** errstr) { -DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_certificate file %s\n", file); +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_certificate file '%s'\n", file); if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(sctx, CS file)) return tls_error(string_sprintf( "SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file file=%s", file), @@ -1406,7 +1450,7 @@ static int tls_add_pkeyfile(SSL_CTX * sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo, uschar * file, uschar ** errstr) { -DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_privatekey file %s\n", file); +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_privatekey file '%s'\n", file); if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(sctx, CS file, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)) return tls_error(string_sprintf( "SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file file=%s", file), cbinfo->host, NULL, errstr); @@ -1431,10 +1475,10 @@ Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL */ static int -tls_expand_session_files(SSL_CTX *sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo, +tls_expand_session_files(SSL_CTX * sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo, uschar ** errstr) { -uschar *expanded; +uschar * expanded; if (!cbinfo->certificate) { @@ -1448,10 +1492,11 @@ else { int err; - if (Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_sni") || - Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_in_sni") || - Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_out_sni") - ) + if ( !reexpand_tls_files_for_sni + && ( Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_sni") + || Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_in_sni") + || Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_out_sni") + ) ) reexpand_tls_files_for_sni = TRUE; if (!expand_check(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_certificate", &expanded, errstr)) @@ -1463,10 +1508,43 @@ else const uschar * file_list = expanded; int sep = 0; uschar * file; +#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP + const uschar * olist = cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file; + int osep = 0; + uschar * ofile; + + if (olist) + if (!expand_check(olist, US"tls_ocsp_file", USS &olist, errstr)) + return DEFER; + if (olist && !*olist) + olist = NULL; + + if ( cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded && olist + && (Ustrcmp(olist, cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded) == 0)) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" - value unchanged, using existing values\n"); + olist = NULL; + } + else + { + ocsp_free_response_list(cbinfo); + cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded = olist; + } +#endif while (file = string_nextinlist(&file_list, &sep, NULL, 0)) + { if ((err = tls_add_certfile(sctx, cbinfo, file, errstr))) return err; + +#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP + if (olist) + if ((ofile = string_nextinlist(&olist, &osep, NULL, 0))) + ocsp_load_response(sctx, cbinfo, ofile); + else + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("ran out of ocsp file list\n"); +#endif + } } else /* would there ever be a need for multiple client certs? */ if ((err = tls_add_certfile(sctx, cbinfo, expanded, errstr))) @@ -1496,27 +1574,6 @@ else return err; } -#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP -if (cbinfo->is_server && cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file) - { - /*XXX stack*/ - if (!expand_check(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file, US"tls_ocsp_file", &expanded, errstr)) - return DEFER; - - if (expanded && *expanded) - { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_ocsp_file %s\n", expanded); - if ( cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded - && (Ustrcmp(expanded, cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded) == 0)) - { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" - value unchanged, using existing values\n"); - } - else - ocsp_load_response(sctx, cbinfo, expanded); - } - } -#endif - return OK; } @@ -1561,7 +1618,7 @@ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS SNI \"%s\"%s\n", servername, /* Make the extension value available for expansion */ store_pool = POOL_PERM; -tls_in.sni = string_copy(US servername); +tls_in.sni = string_copy_taint(US servername, TRUE); store_pool = old_pool; if (!reexpand_tls_files_for_sni) @@ -1646,27 +1703,78 @@ project. static int tls_server_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) { -const tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo = (tls_ext_ctx_cb *) arg; -uschar *response_der; /*XXX blob */ +const tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo = (tls_ext_ctx_cb *) arg; +ocsp_resplist * olist = cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.olist; +uschar * response_der; /*XXX blob */ int response_der_len; -/*XXX stack: use SSL_get_certificate() to see which cert; from that work -out which ocsp blob to send. Unfortunately, SSL_get_certificate is known -buggy in current OpenSSL; it returns the last cert loaded always rather than -the one actually presented. So we can't support a stack of OCSP proofs at -this time. */ - DEBUG(D_tls) - debug_printf("Received TLS status request (OCSP stapling); %s response\n", - cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response ? "have" : "lack"); + debug_printf("Received TLS status request (OCSP stapling); %s response list\n", + olist ? "have" : "lack"); tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP; -if (!cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response) +if (!olist) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; +#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPESSL_GET0_SERIAL + { + const X509 * cert_sent = SSL_get_certificate(s); + const ASN1_INTEGER * cert_serial = X509_get0_serialNumber(cert_sent); + const BIGNUM * cert_bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(cert_serial, NULL); + const X509_NAME * cert_issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(cert_sent); + uschar * chash; + uint chash_len; + + for (; olist; olist = olist->next) + { + OCSP_BASICRESP * bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(olist->resp); + const OCSP_SINGLERESP * single = OCSP_resp_get0(bs, 0); + const OCSP_CERTID * cid = OCSP_SINGLERESP_get0_id(single); + ASN1_INTEGER * res_cert_serial; + const BIGNUM * resp_bn; + ASN1_OCTET_STRING * res_cert_iNameHash; + + + (void) OCSP_id_get0_info(&res_cert_iNameHash, NULL, NULL, &res_cert_serial, + (OCSP_CERTID *) cid); + resp_bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(res_cert_serial, NULL); + + DEBUG(D_tls) + { + debug_printf("cert serial: %s\n", BN_bn2hex(cert_bn)); + debug_printf("resp serial: %s\n", BN_bn2hex(resp_bn)); + } + + if (BN_cmp(cert_bn, resp_bn) == 0) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("matched serial for ocsp\n"); + + /*XXX TODO: check the rest of the list for duplicate matches. + If any, need to also check the Issuer Name hash. + Without this, we will provide the wrong status in the case of + duplicate id. */ + + break; + } + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("not match serial for ocsp\n"); + } + if (!olist) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("failed to find match for ocsp\n"); + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; + } + } +#else +if (olist->next) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OpenSSL version too early to support multi-leaf OCSP\n"); + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; + } +#endif + +/*XXX could we do the i2d earlier, rather than during the callback? */ response_der = NULL; -response_der_len = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response, /*XXX stack*/ - &response_der); +response_der_len = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(olist->resp, &response_der); if (response_der_len <= 0) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; @@ -1706,17 +1814,17 @@ if(!p) return cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1; } -if(!(rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len))) - { - tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED; +if (!(rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len))) + { + tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED; /*XXX should use tlsp-> to permit concurrent outbound */ if (LOGGING(tls_cipher)) log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS cert status response, parse error"); else DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" parse error\n"); return 0; - } + } -if(!(bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp))) +if (!(bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp))) { tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED; if (LOGGING(tls_cipher)) @@ -1838,6 +1946,23 @@ return i; * Initialize for TLS * *************************************************/ +static void +tls_openssl_init(void) +{ +#ifdef EXIM_NEED_OPENSSL_INIT +SSL_load_error_strings(); /* basic set up */ +OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms(); +#endif + +#if defined(EXIM_HAVE_SHA256) && !defined(OPENSSL_AUTO_SHA256) +/* SHA256 is becoming ever more popular. This makes sure it gets added to the +list of available digests. */ +EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256()); +#endif +} + + + /* Called from both server and client code, to do preliminary initialization of the library. We allocate and return a context structure. @@ -1859,7 +1984,7 @@ static int tls_init(SSL_CTX **ctxp, host_item *host, uschar *dhparam, uschar *certificate, uschar *privatekey, #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP - uschar *ocsp_file, /*XXX stack, in server*/ + uschar *ocsp_file, #endif address_item *addr, tls_ext_ctx_cb ** cbp, tls_support * tlsp, @@ -1881,7 +2006,7 @@ if (!host) { cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file = ocsp_file; cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded = NULL; - cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = NULL; + cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.olist = NULL; } else cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store = NULL; @@ -1893,16 +2018,7 @@ cbinfo->host = host; cbinfo->event_action = NULL; #endif -#ifdef EXIM_NEED_OPENSSL_INIT -SSL_load_error_strings(); /* basic set up */ -OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms(); -#endif - -#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_SHA256 -/* SHA256 is becoming ever more popular. This makes sure it gets added to the -list of available digests. */ -EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256()); -#endif +tls_openssl_init(); /* Create a context. The OpenSSL docs in 1.0.1b have not been updated to clarify TLS variant @@ -2033,7 +2149,7 @@ if ((rc = tls_expand_session_files(ctx, cbinfo, errstr)) != OK) if (!host) /* server */ { # ifndef DISABLE_OCSP - /* We check u_ocsp.server.file, not server.response, because we care about if + /* We check u_ocsp.server.file, not server.olist, because we care about if the option exists, not what the current expansion might be, as SNI might change the certificate and OCSP file in use between now and the time the callback is invoked. */ @@ -2096,14 +2212,13 @@ Returns: pointer to allocated string in perm-pool */ static uschar * -construct_cipher_name(SSL * ssl, int * bits) +construct_cipher_name(SSL * ssl, const uschar * ver, int * bits) { int pool = store_pool; /* With OpenSSL 1.0.0a, 'c' needs to be const but the documentation doesn't yet reflect that. It should be a safe change anyway, even 0.9.8 versions have the accessor functions use const in the prototype. */ -const uschar * ver = CUS SSL_get_version(ssl); const SSL_CIPHER * c = (const SSL_CIPHER *) SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl); uschar * s; @@ -2134,6 +2249,21 @@ return cipher_stdname(id >> 8, id & 0xff); } +static const uschar * +tlsver_name(SSL * ssl) +{ +uschar * s, * p; +int pool = store_pool; + +store_pool = POOL_PERM; +s = string_copy(US SSL_get_version(ssl)); +store_pool = pool; +if ((p = Ustrchr(s, 'v'))) /* TLSv1.2 -> TLS1.2 */ + for (;; p++) if (!(*p = p[1])) break; +return CUS s; +} + + static void peer_cert(SSL * ssl, tls_support * tlsp, uschar * peerdn, unsigned siz) { @@ -2153,8 +2283,24 @@ if (tlsp->peercert) { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("X509_NAME_oneline() error\n"); } else { - peerdn[siz-1] = '\0'; - tlsp->peerdn = peerdn; /*XXX a static buffer... */ + int oldpool = store_pool; + + peerdn[siz-1] = '\0'; /* paranoia */ + store_pool = POOL_PERM; + tlsp->peerdn = string_copy(peerdn); + store_pool = oldpool; + + /* We used to set CV in the cert-verify callbacks (either plain or dane) + but they don't get called on session-resumption. So use the official + interface, which uses the resumed value. Unfortunately this claims verified + when it actually failed but we're in try-verify mode, due to us wanting the + knowlege that it failed so needing to have the callback and forcing a + permissive return. If we don't force it, the TLS startup is failed. + The extra bit of information is set in verify_override in the cb, stashed + for resumption next to the TLS session, and used here. */ + + if (!tlsp->verify_override) + tlsp->certificate_verified = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK; } } @@ -2244,6 +2390,10 @@ if (expcerts && *expcerts) /* In the server if we will be offering an OCSP proof, load chain from file for verifying the OCSP proof at load time. */ +/*XXX Glitch! The file here is tls_verify_certs: the chain for verifying the client cert. +This is inconsistent with the need to verify the OCSP proof of the server cert. +*/ + if ( !host && statbuf.st_size > 0 && server_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file @@ -2392,7 +2542,7 @@ the error. */ rc = tls_init(&server_ctx, NULL, tls_dhparam, tls_certificate, tls_privatekey, #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP - tls_ocsp_file, /*XXX stack*/ + tls_ocsp_file, #endif NULL, &server_static_cbinfo, &tls_in, errstr); if (rc != OK) return rc; @@ -2503,8 +2653,41 @@ ALARM_CLR(0); if (rc <= 0) { - (void) tls_error(US"SSL_accept", NULL, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL, errstr); - return FAIL; + int error = SSL_get_error(server_ssl, rc); + switch(error) + { + case SSL_ERROR_NONE: + break; + + case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN\n"); + (void) tls_error(US"SSL_accept", NULL, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL, errstr); + + if (SSL_get_shutdown(server_ssl) == SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) + SSL_shutdown(server_ssl); + + tls_close(NULL, TLS_NO_SHUTDOWN); + return FAIL; + + /* Handle genuine errors */ + case SSL_ERROR_SSL: + (void) tls_error(US"SSL_accept", NULL, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL, errstr); + return FAIL; + + default: + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL error %d\n", error); + if (error == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) + { + if (!errno) + { + *errstr = US"SSL_accept: TCP connection closed by peer"; + return FAIL; + } + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" - syscall %s\n", strerror(errno)); + } + (void) tls_error(US"SSL_accept", NULL, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL, errstr); + return FAIL; + } } DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_accept was successful\n"); @@ -2519,12 +2702,13 @@ if (SSL_session_reused(server_ssl)) } #endif -/* TLS has been set up. Adjust the input functions to read via TLS, -and initialize things. */ +/* TLS has been set up. Record data for the connection, +adjust the input functions to read via TLS, and initialize things. */ peer_cert(server_ssl, &tls_in, peerdn, sizeof(peerdn)); -tls_in.cipher = construct_cipher_name(server_ssl, &tls_in.bits); +tls_in.ver = tlsver_name(server_ssl); +tls_in.cipher = construct_cipher_name(server_ssl, tls_in.ver, &tls_in.bits); tls_in.cipher_stdname = cipher_stdname_ssl(server_ssl); DEBUG(D_tls) @@ -2544,7 +2728,7 @@ DEBUG(D_tls) #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_SESSION_TICKET { SSL_SESSION * ss = SSL_get_session(server_ssl); - if (SSL_SESSION_has_ticket(ss)) + if (SSL_SESSION_has_ticket(ss)) /* 1.1.0 */ debug_printf("The session has a ticket, life %lu seconds\n", SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(ss)); } @@ -2714,6 +2898,14 @@ if (tlsp->host_resumable) debug_printf("decoding session: %s\n", ssl_errstring); } } +#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_SESSION_TICKET + else if ( SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(ss) + dt->time_stamp + < time(NULL)) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("session expired\n"); + dbfn_delete(dbm_file, key); + } +#endif else if (!SSL_set_session(ssl, ss)) { DEBUG(D_tls) @@ -2727,6 +2919,8 @@ if (tlsp->host_resumable) { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("good session\n"); tlsp->resumption |= RESUME_CLIENT_SUGGESTED; + tlsp->verify_override = dt->verify_override; + tlsp->ocsp = dt->ocsp; } } else @@ -2749,20 +2943,22 @@ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_save_session_cb\n"); if (!cbinfo || !(tlsp = cbinfo->tlsp)->host_resumable) return 0; -# ifdef EXIM_HAVE_SESSION_TICKET - -if (SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(ss)) +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_NUM_TICKETS +if (SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(ss)) /* 1.1.1 */ +# endif { int len = i2d_SSL_SESSION(ss, NULL); int dlen = sizeof(dbdata_tls_session) + len; - dbdata_tls_session * dt = store_get(dlen); + dbdata_tls_session * dt = store_get(dlen, TRUE); uschar * s = dt->session; open_db dbblock, * dbm_file; DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("session is resumable\n"); tlsp->resumption |= RESUME_SERVER_TICKET; /* server gave us a ticket */ - len = i2d_SSL_SESSION(ss, &s); /* s gets bumped to end */ + dt->verify_override = tlsp->verify_override; + dt->ocsp = tlsp->ocsp; + (void) i2d_SSL_SESSION(ss, &s); /* s gets bumped to end */ if ((dbm_file = dbfn_open(US"tls", O_RDWR, &dbblock, FALSE, FALSE))) { @@ -2774,7 +2970,6 @@ if (SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(ss)) (unsigned)dlen); } } -# endif return 1; } @@ -2872,7 +3067,7 @@ BOOL require_ocsp = FALSE; rc = store_pool; store_pool = POOL_PERM; -exim_client_ctx = store_get(sizeof(exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx)); +exim_client_ctx = store_get(sizeof(exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx), FALSE); exim_client_ctx->corked = NULL; store_pool = rc; @@ -2992,12 +3187,6 @@ if (!(exim_client_ctx->ssl = SSL_new(exim_client_ctx->ctx))) } SSL_set_session_id_context(exim_client_ctx->ssl, sid_ctx, Ustrlen(sid_ctx)); -#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_TLS_RESUME -if (!tls_client_ssl_resume_prehandshake(exim_client_ctx->ssl, tlsp, host, - errstr)) - return FALSE; -#endif - SSL_set_fd(exim_client_ctx->ssl, cctx->sock); SSL_set_connect_state(exim_client_ctx->ssl); @@ -3057,6 +3246,12 @@ if (request_ocsp) } #endif +#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_TLS_RESUME +if (!tls_client_ssl_resume_prehandshake(exim_client_ctx->ssl, tlsp, host, + errstr)) + return FALSE; +#endif + #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT client_static_cbinfo->event_action = tb ? tb->event_action : NULL; #endif @@ -3098,7 +3293,8 @@ tls_client_resume_posthandshake(exim_client_ctx, tlsp); peer_cert(exim_client_ctx->ssl, tlsp, peerdn, sizeof(peerdn)); -tlsp->cipher = construct_cipher_name(exim_client_ctx->ssl, &tlsp->bits); +tlsp->ver = tlsver_name(exim_client_ctx->ssl); +tlsp->cipher = construct_cipher_name(exim_client_ctx->ssl, tlsp->ver, &tlsp->bits); tlsp->cipher_stdname = cipher_stdname_ssl(exim_client_ctx->ssl); /* Record the certificate we presented */ @@ -3153,32 +3349,10 @@ switch(error) case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN\n"); - receive_getc = smtp_getc; - receive_getbuf = smtp_getbuf; - receive_get_cache = smtp_get_cache; - receive_ungetc = smtp_ungetc; - receive_feof = smtp_feof; - receive_ferror = smtp_ferror; - receive_smtp_buffered = smtp_buffered; - if (SSL_get_shutdown(server_ssl) == SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) SSL_shutdown(server_ssl); -#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP - sk_X509_pop_free(server_static_cbinfo->verify_stack, X509_free); - server_static_cbinfo->verify_stack = NULL; -#endif - SSL_free(server_ssl); - SSL_CTX_free(server_ctx); - server_ctx = NULL; - server_ssl = NULL; - tls_in.active.sock = -1; - tls_in.active.tls_ctx = NULL; - tls_in.bits = 0; - tls_in.cipher = NULL; - tls_in.peerdn = NULL; - tls_in.sni = NULL; - + tls_close(NULL, TLS_NO_SHUTDOWN); return FALSE; /* Handle genuine errors */ @@ -3359,14 +3533,14 @@ a store reset there, so use POOL_PERM. */ if ((more || corked)) { -#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_PIPE_CONNECT +#ifndef DISABLE_PIPE_CONNECT int save_pool = store_pool; store_pool = POOL_PERM; #endif corked = string_catn(corked, buff, len); -#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_PIPE_CONNECT +#ifndef DISABLE_PIPE_CONNECT store_pool = save_pool; #endif @@ -3467,14 +3641,25 @@ if (shutdown) } } -#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP if (!o_ctx) /* server side */ { +#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP sk_X509_pop_free(server_static_cbinfo->verify_stack, X509_free); server_static_cbinfo->verify_stack = NULL; - } #endif + receive_getc = smtp_getc; + receive_getbuf = smtp_getbuf; + receive_get_cache = smtp_get_cache; + receive_ungetc = smtp_ungetc; + receive_feof = smtp_feof; + receive_ferror = smtp_ferror; + receive_smtp_buffered = smtp_buffered; + tls_in.active.tls_ctx = NULL; + tls_in.sni = NULL; + /* Leave bits, peercert, cipher, peerdn, certificate_verified set, for logging */ + } + SSL_CTX_free(*ctxp); SSL_free(*sslp); *ctxp = NULL; @@ -3501,18 +3686,7 @@ tls_validate_require_cipher(void) SSL_CTX *ctx; uschar *s, *expciphers, *err; -/* this duplicates from tls_init(), we need a better "init just global -state, for no specific purpose" singleton function of our own */ - -#ifdef EXIM_NEED_OPENSSL_INIT -SSL_load_error_strings(); -OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms(); -#endif -#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256) -/* SHA256 is becoming ever more popular. This makes sure it gets added to the -list of available digests. */ -EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256()); -#endif +tls_openssl_init(); if (!(tls_require_ciphers && *tls_require_ciphers)) return NULL;