X-Git-Url: https://vcs.fsf.org/?p=exim.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fsrc%2Ftls-gnu.c;h=1430f2f3c56fd3acb90132d009c33e17a46fabeb;hp=8836bb259edbbb1b7fcbd7ca69284113d7eb344b;hb=1b76ad22a23e704c1d931937953d44c9b206c867;hpb=d5c0d8c9374623620844d539d4810da63e9abca1 diff --git a/src/src/tls-gnu.c b/src/src/tls-gnu.c index 8836bb259..1430f2f3c 100644 --- a/src/src/tls-gnu.c +++ b/src/src/tls-gnu.c @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent * *************************************************/ -/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2015 */ +/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2018 */ /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */ /* Copyright (c) Phil Pennock 2012 */ @@ -60,10 +60,31 @@ require current GnuTLS, then we'll drop support for the ancient libraries). #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030014 # define SUPPORT_SYSDEFAULT_CABUNDLE #endif +#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030109 +# define SUPPORT_CORK +#endif +#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030506 && !defined(DISABLE_OCSP) +# define SUPPORT_SRV_OCSP_STACK +#endif + +#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE +# if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030000 +# define DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA 2 +# define DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE 3 +# else +# error GnuTLS version too early for DANE +# endif +# if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x999999 +# define GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION +# endif +#endif #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP # include #endif +#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE +# include +#endif /* GnuTLS 2 vs 3 @@ -79,7 +100,7 @@ Changes: /* Values for verify_requirement */ enum peer_verify_requirement - { VERIFY_NONE, VERIFY_OPTIONAL, VERIFY_REQUIRED }; + { VERIFY_NONE, VERIFY_OPTIONAL, VERIFY_REQUIRED, VERIFY_DANE }; /* This holds most state for server or client; with this, we can set up an outbound TLS-enabled connection in an ACL callout, while not stomping all @@ -100,10 +121,11 @@ typedef struct exim_gnutls_state { int fd_in; int fd_out; BOOL peer_cert_verified; + BOOL peer_dane_verified; BOOL trigger_sni_changes; BOOL have_set_peerdn; - const struct host_item *host; - gnutls_x509_crt_t peercert; + const struct host_item *host; /* NULL if server */ + gnutls_x509_crt_t peercert; uschar *peerdn; uschar *ciphersuite; uschar *received_sni; @@ -120,32 +142,64 @@ typedef struct exim_gnutls_state { uschar *exp_tls_verify_certificates; uschar *exp_tls_crl; uschar *exp_tls_require_ciphers; - uschar *exp_tls_ocsp_file; const uschar *exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames; #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT uschar *event_action; #endif +#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE + char * const * dane_data; + const int * dane_data_len; +#endif tls_support *tlsp; /* set in tls_init() */ uschar *xfer_buffer; int xfer_buffer_lwm; int xfer_buffer_hwm; - int xfer_eof; - int xfer_error; + BOOL xfer_eof; /*XXX never gets set! */ + BOOL xfer_error; } exim_gnutls_state_st; static const exim_gnutls_state_st exim_gnutls_state_init = { - NULL, NULL, NULL, VERIFY_NONE, -1, -1, FALSE, FALSE, FALSE, - NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, - NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, - NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, - NULL, + .session = NULL, + .x509_cred = NULL, + .priority_cache = NULL, + .verify_requirement = VERIFY_NONE, + .fd_in = -1, + .fd_out = -1, + .peer_cert_verified = FALSE, + .peer_dane_verified = FALSE, + .trigger_sni_changes =FALSE, + .have_set_peerdn = FALSE, + .host = NULL, + .peercert = NULL, + .peerdn = NULL, + .ciphersuite = NULL, + .received_sni = NULL, + + .tls_certificate = NULL, + .tls_privatekey = NULL, + .tls_sni = NULL, + .tls_verify_certificates = NULL, + .tls_crl = NULL, + .tls_require_ciphers =NULL, + + .exp_tls_certificate = NULL, + .exp_tls_privatekey = NULL, + .exp_tls_verify_certificates = NULL, + .exp_tls_crl = NULL, + .exp_tls_require_ciphers = NULL, + .exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames = NULL, #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT - NULL, + .event_action = NULL, #endif - NULL, - NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, + .tlsp = NULL, + + .xfer_buffer = NULL, + .xfer_buffer_lwm = 0, + .xfer_buffer_hwm = 0, + .xfer_eof = FALSE, + .xfer_error = FALSE, }; /* Not only do we have our own APIs which don't pass around state, assuming @@ -159,7 +213,7 @@ second connection. XXX But see gnutls_session_get_ptr() */ -static exim_gnutls_state_st state_server, state_client; +static exim_gnutls_state_st state_server; /* dh_params are initialised once within the lifetime of a process using TLS; if we used TLS in a long-lived daemon, we'd have to reconsider this. But we @@ -189,7 +243,8 @@ static BOOL gnutls_buggy_ocsp = FALSE; /* Set this to control gnutls_global_set_log_level(); values 0 to 9 will setup the library logging; a value less than 0 disables the calls to set up logging -callbacks. */ +callbacks. Possibly GNuTLS also looks for an environment variable +"GNUTLS_DEBUG_LEVEL". */ #ifndef EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL # define EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL -1 #endif @@ -205,8 +260,8 @@ before, for now. */ # define EXIM_SERVER_DH_BITS_PRE2_12 1024 #endif -#define exim_gnutls_err_check(Label) do { \ - if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) \ +#define exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, Label) do { \ + if ((rc) != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) \ return tls_error((Label), gnutls_strerror(rc), host, errstr); \ } while (0) @@ -393,7 +448,8 @@ gnutls_datum_t channel; #endif tls_support * tlsp = state->tlsp; -tlsp->active = state->fd_out; +tlsp->active.sock = state->fd_out; +tlsp->active.tls_ctx = state; cipher = gnutls_cipher_get(state->session); /* returns size in "bytes" */ @@ -404,6 +460,9 @@ tlsp->cipher = state->ciphersuite; DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("cipher: %s\n", state->ciphersuite); tlsp->certificate_verified = state->peer_cert_verified; +#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE +tlsp->dane_verified = state->peer_dane_verified; +#endif /* note that tls_channelbinding_b64 is not saved to the spool file, since it's only available for use for authenticators while this TLS session is running. */ @@ -474,7 +533,7 @@ host_item *host = NULL; /* dummy for macros */ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Initialising GnuTLS server params.\n"); rc = gnutls_dh_params_init(&dh_server_params); -exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_init"); +exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_dh_params_init"); m.data = NULL; m.size = 0; @@ -510,7 +569,7 @@ else if (m.data) { rc = gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3(dh_server_params, &m, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM); - exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3"); + exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3"); DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Loaded fixed standard D-H parameters\n"); return OK; } @@ -593,7 +652,7 @@ if ((fd = Uopen(filename, O_RDONLY, 0)) >= 0) rc = gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3(dh_server_params, &m, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM); free(m.data); - exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3"); + exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3"); DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("read D-H parameters from file \"%s\"\n", filename); } @@ -650,7 +709,7 @@ if (rc < 0) debug_printf("requesting generation of %d bit Diffie-Hellman prime ...\n", dh_bits_gen); rc = gnutls_dh_params_generate2(dh_server_params, dh_bits_gen); - exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_generate2"); + exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_dh_params_generate2"); /* gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3() will tell us the exact size, every time, and I confirmed that a NULL call to get the size first is how the GnuTLS @@ -661,7 +720,7 @@ if (rc < 0) rc = gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3(dh_server_params, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM, m.data, &sz); if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER) - exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3(NULL) sizing"); + exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3(NULL) sizing"); m.size = sz; if (!(m.data = malloc(m.size))) return tls_error(US"memory allocation failed", strerror(errno), NULL, errstr); @@ -672,7 +731,7 @@ if (rc < 0) if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { free(m.data); - exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3() real"); + exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3() real"); } m.size = sz; /* shrink by 1, probably */ @@ -732,7 +791,7 @@ if ((rc = gnutls_x509_privkey_generate(pkey, GNUTLS_PK_RSA, goto err; where = US"configuring cert"; -now = 0; +now = 1; if ( (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_version(cert, 3)) || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_serial(cert, &now, sizeof(now))) || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_activation_time(cert, now = time(NULL))) @@ -772,6 +831,27 @@ err: +/* Add certificate and key, from files. + +Return: + Zero or negative: good. Negate value for certificate index if < 0. + Greater than zero: FAIL or DEFER code. +*/ + +static int +tls_add_certfile(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, const host_item * host, + uschar * certfile, uschar * keyfile, uschar ** errstr) +{ +int rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_file(state->x509_cred, + CS certfile, CS keyfile, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM); +if (rc < 0) + return tls_error( + string_sprintf("cert/key setup: cert=%s key=%s", certfile, keyfile), + gnutls_strerror(rc), host, errstr); +return -rc; +} + + /************************************************* * Variables re-expanded post-SNI * *************************************************/ @@ -792,7 +872,7 @@ Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL */ static int -tls_expand_session_files(exim_gnutls_state_st *state, uschar ** errstr) +tls_expand_session_files(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, uschar ** errstr) { struct stat statbuf; int rc; @@ -807,11 +887,11 @@ int cert_count; if (!host) /* server */ if (!state->received_sni) { - if (state->tls_certificate && - (Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_sni") || - Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_in_sni") || - Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_out_sni") - )) + if ( state->tls_certificate + && ( Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_sni") + || Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_in_sni") + || Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_out_sni") + ) ) { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("We will re-expand TLS session files if we receive SNI.\n"); state->trigger_sni_changes = TRUE; @@ -827,7 +907,11 @@ if (!host) /* server */ } rc = gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials(&state->x509_cred); -exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials"); +exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials"); + +#ifdef SUPPORT_SRV_OCSP_STACK +gnutls_certificate_set_flags(state->x509_cred, GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_API_V2); +#endif /* remember: expand_check_tlsvar() is expand_check() but fiddling with state members, assuming consistent naming; and expand_check() returns @@ -878,44 +962,81 @@ if (state->exp_tls_certificate && *state->exp_tls_certificate) DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS SNI: have a changed cert/key pair.\n"); } - rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_file(state->x509_cred, - CS state->exp_tls_certificate, CS state->exp_tls_privatekey, - GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM); - exim_gnutls_err_check( - string_sprintf("cert/key setup: cert=%s key=%s", - state->exp_tls_certificate, state->exp_tls_privatekey)); - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: cert/key registered\n"); - } /* tls_certificate */ + if (!host) /* server */ + { + const uschar * clist = state->exp_tls_certificate; + const uschar * klist = state->exp_tls_privatekey; + const uschar * olist; + int csep = 0, ksep = 0, osep = 0, cnt = 0; + uschar * cfile, * kfile, * ofile; +#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP + if (!expand_check(tls_ocsp_file, US"tls_ocsp_file", &ofile, errstr)) + return DEFER; + olist = ofile; +#endif -/* Set the OCSP stapling server info */ + while (cfile = string_nextinlist(&clist, &csep, NULL, 0)) + + if (!(kfile = string_nextinlist(&klist, &ksep, NULL, 0))) + return tls_error(US"cert/key setup: out of keys", NULL, host, errstr); + else if (0 < (rc = tls_add_certfile(state, host, cfile, kfile, errstr))) + return rc; + else + { + int gnutls_cert_index = -rc; + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: cert/key %s registered\n", cfile); + + /* Set the OCSP stapling server info */ #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP -if ( !host /* server */ - && tls_ocsp_file - ) - { - if (gnutls_buggy_ocsp) - { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("GnuTLS library is buggy for OCSP; avoiding\n"); + if (tls_ocsp_file) + if (gnutls_buggy_ocsp) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("GnuTLS library is buggy for OCSP; avoiding\n"); + } + else if ((ofile = string_nextinlist(&olist, &osep, NULL, 0))) + { + /* Use the full callback method for stapling just to get + observability. More efficient would be to read the file once only, + if it never changed (due to SNI). Would need restart on file update, + or watch datestamp. */ + +# ifdef SUPPORT_SRV_OCSP_STACK + rc = gnutls_certificate_set_ocsp_status_request_function2( + state->x509_cred, gnutls_cert_index, + server_ocsp_stapling_cb, ofile); + + exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, + US"gnutls_certificate_set_ocsp_status_request_function2"); +# else + if (cnt++ > 0) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("oops; multiple OCSP files not supported\n"); + break; + } + gnutls_certificate_set_ocsp_status_request_function( + state->x509_cred, server_ocsp_stapling_cb, ofile); +# endif + + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response file = %s\n", ofile); + } + else + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("ran out of OCSP response files in list\n"); +#endif + } } else { - if (!expand_check(tls_ocsp_file, US"tls_ocsp_file", - &state->exp_tls_ocsp_file, errstr)) - return DEFER; - - /* Use the full callback method for stapling just to get observability. - More efficient would be to read the file once only, if it never changed - (due to SNI). Would need restart on file update, or watch datestamp. */ - - gnutls_certificate_set_ocsp_status_request_function(state->x509_cred, - server_ocsp_stapling_cb, state->exp_tls_ocsp_file); - - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response file = %s\n", state->exp_tls_ocsp_file); + if (0 < (rc = tls_add_certfile(state, host, + state->exp_tls_certificate, state->exp_tls_privatekey, errstr))) + return rc; + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: cert/key registered\n"); } - } -#endif + + } /* tls_certificate */ /* Set the trusted CAs file if one is provided, and then add the CRL if one is @@ -1010,7 +1131,7 @@ else if (cert_count < 0) { rc = cert_count; - exim_gnutls_err_check(US"setting certificate trust"); + exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"setting certificate trust"); } DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Added %d certificate authorities.\n", cert_count); @@ -1023,7 +1144,7 @@ if (state->tls_crl && *state->tls_crl && if (cert_count < 0) { rc = cert_count; - exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_certificate_set_x509_crl_file"); + exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_certificate_set_x509_crl_file"); } DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Processed %d CRLs.\n", cert_count); } @@ -1074,7 +1195,7 @@ if (!state->host) /* Link the credentials to the session. */ rc = gnutls_credentials_set(state->session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, state->x509_cred); -exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_credentials_set"); +exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_credentials_set"); return OK; } @@ -1142,6 +1263,7 @@ tls_init( const uschar *crl, const uschar *require_ciphers, exim_gnutls_state_st **caller_state, + tls_support * tlsp, uschar ** errstr) { exim_gnutls_state_st *state; @@ -1164,12 +1286,12 @@ if (!exim_gnutls_base_init_done) if (!gnutls_allow_auto_pkcs11) { rc = gnutls_pkcs11_init(GNUTLS_PKCS11_FLAG_MANUAL, NULL); - exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_pkcs11_init"); + exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_pkcs11_init"); } #endif rc = gnutls_global_init(); - exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_global_init"); + exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_global_init"); #if EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL >= 0 DEBUG(D_tls) @@ -1190,9 +1312,15 @@ if (!exim_gnutls_base_init_done) if (host) { - state = &state_client; + /* For client-side sessions we allocate a context. This lets us run + several in parallel. */ + int old_pool = store_pool; + store_pool = POOL_PERM; + state = store_get(sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_st)); + store_pool = old_pool; + memcpy(state, &exim_gnutls_state_init, sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_init)); - state->tlsp = &tls_out; + state->tlsp = tlsp; DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS client session\n"); rc = gnutls_init(&state->session, GNUTLS_CLIENT); } @@ -1200,11 +1328,11 @@ else { state = &state_server; memcpy(state, &exim_gnutls_state_init, sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_init)); - state->tlsp = &tls_in; + state->tlsp = tlsp; DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS server session\n"); rc = gnutls_init(&state->session, GNUTLS_SERVER); } -exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_init"); +exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_init"); state->host = host; @@ -1239,12 +1367,12 @@ if (host) sz = Ustrlen(state->tlsp->sni); rc = gnutls_server_name_set(state->session, GNUTLS_NAME_DNS, state->tlsp->sni, sz); - exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_server_name_set"); + exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_server_name_set"); } } else if (state->tls_sni) DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("*** PROBABLY A BUG *** " \ - "have an SNI set for a client [%s]\n", state->tls_sni); + "have an SNI set for a server [%s]\n", state->tls_sni); /* This is the priority string support, http://www.gnutls.org/manual/html_node/Priority-Strings.html @@ -1279,12 +1407,12 @@ if (want_default_priorities) p = US exim_default_gnutls_priority; } -exim_gnutls_err_check(string_sprintf( +exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, string_sprintf( "gnutls_priority_init(%s) failed at offset %ld, \"%.6s..\"", p, errpos - CS p, errpos)); rc = gnutls_priority_set(state->session, state->priority_cache); -exim_gnutls_err_check(US"gnutls_priority_set"); +exim_gnutls_err_check(rc, US"gnutls_priority_set"); gnutls_db_set_cache_expiration(state->session, ssl_session_timeout); @@ -1453,8 +1581,8 @@ gnutls_certificate_set_verify_function() to fail the handshake if we dislike the peer information, but that's too new for some OSes. Arguments: - state exim_gnutls_state_st * - errstr where to put an error message + state exim_gnutls_state_st * + errstr where to put an error message Returns: FALSE if the session should be rejected @@ -1462,11 +1590,15 @@ Returns: */ static BOOL -verify_certificate(exim_gnutls_state_st *state, uschar ** errstr) +verify_certificate(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, uschar ** errstr) { int rc; -unsigned int verify; +uint verify; +if (state->verify_requirement == VERIFY_NONE) + return TRUE; + +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: checking peer certificate\n"); *errstr = NULL; if ((rc = peer_status(state, errstr)) != OK) @@ -1475,14 +1607,139 @@ if ((rc = peer_status(state, errstr)) != OK) *errstr = US"certificate not supplied"; } else + + { +#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE + if (state->verify_requirement == VERIFY_DANE && state->host) + { + /* Using dane_verify_session_crt() would be easy, as it does it all for us + including talking to a DNS resolver. But we want to do that bit ourselves + as the testsuite intercepts and fakes its own DNS environment. */ + + dane_state_t s; + dane_query_t r; + uint lsize; + const gnutls_datum_t * certlist = + gnutls_certificate_get_peers(state->session, &lsize); + int usage = tls_out.tlsa_usage; + +# ifdef GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION + /* Split the TLSA records into two sets, TA and EE selectors. Run the + dane-verification separately so that we know which selector verified; + then we know whether to do name-verification (needed for TA but not EE). */ + + if (usage == ((1<dane_data_len[nrec]; ) nrec++; + nrec++; + + dd = store_get(nrec * sizeof(uschar *)); + ddl = store_get(nrec * sizeof(int)); + nrec--; + + if ((rc = dane_state_init(&s, 0))) + goto tlsa_prob; + + for (usage = DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE; + usage >= DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA; usage--) + { /* take records with this usage */ + for (j = i = 0; i < nrec; i++) + if (state->dane_data[i][0] == usage) + { + dd[j] = state->dane_data[i]; + ddl[j++] = state->dane_data_len[i]; + } + if (j) + { + dd[j] = NULL; + ddl[j] = 0; + + if ((rc = dane_raw_tlsa(s, &r, (char * const *)dd, ddl, 1, 0))) + goto tlsa_prob; + + if ((rc = dane_verify_crt_raw(s, certlist, lsize, + gnutls_certificate_type_get(state->session), + r, 0, + usage == DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE + ? DANE_VFLAG_ONLY_CHECK_EE_USAGE : 0, + &verify))) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLSA record problem: %s\n", dane_strerror(rc)); + } + else if (verify == 0) /* verification passed */ + { + usage = 1 << usage; + break; + } + } + } + + if (rc) goto tlsa_prob; + } + else +# endif + { + if ( (rc = dane_state_init(&s, 0)) + || (rc = dane_raw_tlsa(s, &r, state->dane_data, state->dane_data_len, + 1, 0)) + || (rc = dane_verify_crt_raw(s, certlist, lsize, + gnutls_certificate_type_get(state->session), + r, 0, +# ifdef GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION + usage == (1 << DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE) + ? DANE_VFLAG_ONLY_CHECK_EE_USAGE : 0, +# else + 0, +# endif + &verify)) + ) + goto tlsa_prob; + } + + if (verify != 0) /* verification failed */ + { + gnutls_datum_t str; + (void) dane_verification_status_print(verify, &str, 0); + *errstr = US str.data; /* don't bother to free */ + goto badcert; + } + +# ifdef GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION + /* If a TA-mode TLSA record was used for verification we must additionally + verify the cert name (but not the CA chain). For EE-mode, skip it. */ + + if (usage & (1 << DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE)) +# endif + { + state->peer_dane_verified = state->peer_cert_verified = TRUE; + goto goodcert; + } +# ifdef GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION + /* Assume that the name on the A-record is the one that should be matching + the cert. An alternate view is that the domain part of the email address + is also permissible. */ + + if (gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(state->tlsp->peercert, + CS state->host->name)) + { + state->peer_dane_verified = state->peer_cert_verified = TRUE; + goto goodcert; + } +# endif + } +#endif /*SUPPORT_DANE*/ + rc = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(state->session, &verify); + } -/* Handle the result of verification. INVALID seems to be set as well -as REVOKED, but leave the test for both. */ +/* Handle the result of verification. INVALID is set if any others are. */ -if (rc < 0 || - verify & (GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID|GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED) - ) +if (rc < 0 || verify & (GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID|GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED)) { state->peer_cert_verified = FALSE; if (!*errstr) @@ -1494,46 +1751,48 @@ if (rc < 0 || *errstr, state->peerdn ? state->peerdn : US""); if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED) - { - gnutls_alert_send(state->session, - GNUTLS_AL_FATAL, GNUTLS_A_BAD_CERTIFICATE); - return FALSE; - } + goto badcert; DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS verify failure overridden (host in tls_try_verify_hosts)\n"); } else { - if (state->exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames) + /* Client side, check the server's certificate name versus the name on the + A-record for the connection we made. What to do for server side - what name + to use for client? We document that there is no such checking for server + side. */ + + if ( state->exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames + && !gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(state->tlsp->peercert, + CS state->exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames) + ) { - int sep = 0; - const uschar * list = state->exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames; - uschar * name; - while ((name = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0))) - if (gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(state->tlsp->peercert, CS name)) - break; - if (!name) - { - DEBUG(D_tls) - debug_printf("TLS certificate verification failed: cert name mismatch\n"); - if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED) - { - gnutls_alert_send(state->session, - GNUTLS_AL_FATAL, GNUTLS_A_BAD_CERTIFICATE); - return FALSE; - } - return TRUE; - } + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLS certificate verification failed: cert name mismatch\n"); + if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED) + goto badcert; + return TRUE; } + state->peer_cert_verified = TRUE; DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS certificate verified: peerdn=\"%s\"\n", state->peerdn ? state->peerdn : US""); } -state->tlsp->peerdn = state->peerdn; +goodcert: + state->tlsp->peerdn = state->peerdn; + return TRUE; -return TRUE; +#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE +tlsa_prob: + *errstr = string_sprintf("TLSA record problem: %s", + rc == DANE_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE ? "none usable" : dane_strerror(rc)); +#endif + +badcert: + gnutls_alert_send(state->session, GNUTLS_AL_FATAL, GNUTLS_A_BAD_CERTIFICATE); + return FALSE; } @@ -1644,11 +1903,12 @@ server_ocsp_stapling_cb(gnutls_session_t session, void * ptr, gnutls_datum_t * ocsp_response) { int ret; +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP stapling callback: %s\n", US ptr); if ((ret = gnutls_load_file(ptr, ocsp_response)) < 0) { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Failed to load ocsp stapling file %s\n", - (char *)ptr); + CS ptr); tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP; return GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; } @@ -1680,12 +1940,10 @@ int rc; uschar * yield; exim_gnutls_state_st * state = gnutls_session_get_ptr(session); -cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session, &cert_list_size); -if (cert_list) +if ((cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session, &cert_list_size))) while (cert_list_size--) { - rc = import_cert(&cert_list[cert_list_size], &crt); - if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) + if ((rc = import_cert(&cert_list[cert_list_size], &crt)) != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: peer cert problem: depth %d: %s\n", cert_list_size, gnutls_strerror(rc)); @@ -1742,10 +2000,10 @@ int rc; exim_gnutls_state_st * state = NULL; /* Check for previous activation */ -if (tls_in.active >= 0) +if (tls_in.active.sock >= 0) { tls_error(US"STARTTLS received after TLS started", "", NULL, errstr); - smtp_printf("554 Already in TLS\r\n"); + smtp_printf("554 Already in TLS\r\n", FALSE); return FAIL; } @@ -1756,7 +2014,7 @@ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS as a server\n"); if ((rc = tls_init(NULL, tls_certificate, tls_privatekey, NULL, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, - require_ciphers, &state, errstr)) != OK) return rc; + require_ciphers, &state, &tls_in, errstr)) != OK) return rc; /* If this is a host for which certificate verification is mandatory or optional, set up appropriately. */ @@ -1806,12 +2064,15 @@ mode, the fflush() happens when smtp_getc() is called. */ if (!state->tlsp->on_connect) { - smtp_printf("220 TLS go ahead\r\n"); + smtp_printf("220 TLS go ahead\r\n", FALSE); fflush(smtp_out); } /* Now negotiate the TLS session. We put our own timer on it, since it seems -that the GnuTLS library doesn't. */ +that the GnuTLS library doesn't. +From 3.1.0 there is gnutls_handshake_set_timeout() - but it requires you +to set (and clear down afterwards) up a pull-timeout callback function that does +a select, so we're no better off unless avoiding signals becomes an issue. */ gnutls_transport_set_ptr2(state->session, (gnutls_transport_ptr_t)(long) fileno(smtp_in), @@ -1858,8 +2119,7 @@ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("gnutls_handshake was successful\n"); /* Verify after the fact */ -if ( state->verify_requirement != VERIFY_NONE - && !verify_certificate(state, errstr)) +if (!verify_certificate(state, errstr)) { if (state->verify_requirement != VERIFY_OPTIONAL) { @@ -1885,6 +2145,7 @@ and initialize appropriately. */ state->xfer_buffer = store_malloc(ssl_xfer_buffer_size); receive_getc = tls_getc; +receive_getbuf = tls_getbuf; receive_get_cache = tls_get_cache; receive_ungetc = tls_ungetc; receive_feof = tls_feof; @@ -1901,7 +2162,7 @@ static void tls_client_setup_hostname_checks(host_item * host, exim_gnutls_state_st * state, smtp_transport_options_block * ob) { -if (verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames, host) == OK) +if (verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames, host) == OK) { state->exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames = #ifdef SUPPORT_I18N @@ -1916,6 +2177,77 @@ if (verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames, host) == OK) } + + +#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE +/* Given our list of RRs from the TLSA lookup, build a lookup block in +GnuTLS-DANE's preferred format. Hang it on the state str for later +use in DANE verification. + +We point at the dnsa data not copy it, so it must remain valid until +after verification is done.*/ + +static BOOL +dane_tlsa_load(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, dns_answer * dnsa) +{ +dns_record * rr; +dns_scan dnss; +int i; +const char ** dane_data; +int * dane_data_len; + +for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS), i = 1; + rr; + rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT) + ) if (rr->type == T_TLSA) i++; + +dane_data = store_get(i * sizeof(uschar *)); +dane_data_len = store_get(i * sizeof(int)); + +for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS), i = 0; + rr; + rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT) + ) if (rr->type == T_TLSA && rr->size > 3) + { + const uschar * p = rr->data; + uint8_t usage = p[0], sel = p[1], type = p[2]; + + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLSA: %d %d %d size %d\n", usage, sel, type, rr->size); + + if ( (usage != DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA && usage != DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE) + || (sel != 0 && sel != 1) + ) + continue; + switch(type) + { + case 0: /* Full: cannot check at present */ + break; + case 1: if (rr->size != 3 + 256/8) continue; /* sha2-256 */ + break; + case 2: if (rr->size != 3 + 512/8) continue; /* sha2-512 */ + break; + default: continue; + } + + tls_out.tlsa_usage |= 1<size; + } + +if (!i) return FALSE; + +dane_data[i] = NULL; +dane_data_len[i] = 0; + +state->dane_data = (char * const *)dane_data; +state->dane_data_len = dane_data_len; +return TRUE; +} +#endif + + + /************************************************* * Start a TLS session in a client * *************************************************/ @@ -1924,42 +2256,64 @@ if (verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames, host) == OK) Arguments: fd the fd of the connection - host connected host (for messages) + host connected host (for messages and option-tests) addr the first address (not used) tb transport (always smtp) - + tlsa_dnsa non-NULL, either request or require dane for this host, and + a TLSA record found. Therefore, dane verify required. + Which implies cert must be requested and supplied, dane + verify must pass, and cert verify irrelevant (incl. + hostnames), and (caller handled) require_tls + tlsp record details of channel configuration errstr error string pointer -Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL (because using common functions), - but for a client, DEFER and FAIL have the same meaning +Returns: Pointer to TLS session context, or NULL on error */ -int +void * tls_client_start(int fd, host_item *host, address_item *addr ARG_UNUSED, transport_instance * tb, -#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE - dns_answer * tlsa_dnsa ARG_UNUSED, +#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE + dns_answer * tlsa_dnsa, #endif - uschar ** errstr) + tls_support * tlsp, uschar ** errstr) { -smtp_transport_options_block *ob = - (smtp_transport_options_block *)tb->options_block; +smtp_transport_options_block *ob = tb + ? (smtp_transport_options_block *)tb->options_block + : &smtp_transport_option_defaults; int rc; -exim_gnutls_state_st *state = NULL; +exim_gnutls_state_st * state = NULL; +uschar *cipher_list = NULL; + #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP BOOL require_ocsp = - verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_require_ocsp, host) == OK; + verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->hosts_require_ocsp, host) == OK; BOOL request_ocsp = require_ocsp ? TRUE - : verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_request_ocsp, host) == OK; + : verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->hosts_request_ocsp, host) == OK; #endif DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS as a client on fd %d\n", fd); -if ((rc = tls_init(host, ob->tls_certificate, ob->tls_privatekey, +#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE +if (tlsa_dnsa && ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers) + { + /* not using expand_check_tlsvar because not yet in state */ + if (!expand_check(ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers, US"dane_require_tls_ciphers", + &cipher_list, errstr)) + return NULL; + cipher_list = cipher_list && *cipher_list + ? ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers : ob->tls_require_ciphers; + } +#endif + +if (!cipher_list) + cipher_list = ob->tls_require_ciphers; + +if (tls_init(host, ob->tls_certificate, ob->tls_privatekey, ob->tls_sni, ob->tls_verify_certificates, ob->tls_crl, - ob->tls_require_ciphers, &state, errstr)) != OK) - return rc; + cipher_list, &state, tlsp, errstr) != OK) + return NULL; { int dh_min_bits = ob->tls_dh_min_bits; @@ -1982,12 +2336,22 @@ if ((rc = tls_init(host, ob->tls_certificate, ob->tls_privatekey, set but both tls_verify_hosts and tls_try_verify_hosts are unset. Check only the specified host patterns if one of them is defined */ -if ( ( state->exp_tls_verify_certificates - && !ob->tls_verify_hosts - && (!ob->tls_try_verify_hosts || !*ob->tls_try_verify_hosts) - ) - || verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_verify_hosts, host) == OK - ) +#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE +if (tlsa_dnsa && dane_tlsa_load(state, tlsa_dnsa)) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) + debug_printf("TLS: server certificate DANE required.\n"); + state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_DANE; + gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUIRE); + } +else +#endif + if ( ( state->exp_tls_verify_certificates + && !ob->tls_verify_hosts + && (!ob->tls_try_verify_hosts || !*ob->tls_try_verify_hosts) + ) + || verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_verify_hosts, host) == OK + ) { tls_client_setup_hostname_checks(host, state, ob); DEBUG(D_tls) @@ -1995,7 +2359,7 @@ if ( ( state->exp_tls_verify_certificates state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_REQUIRED; gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUIRE); } -else if (verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_try_verify_hosts, host) == OK) +else if (verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_try_verify_hosts, host) == OK) { tls_client_setup_hostname_checks(host, state, ob); DEBUG(D_tls) @@ -2018,14 +2382,16 @@ if (request_ocsp) DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: will request OCSP stapling\n"); if ((rc = gnutls_ocsp_status_request_enable_client(state->session, NULL, 0, NULL)) != OK) - return tls_error(US"cert-status-req", - gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host, errstr); - tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP; + { + tls_error(US"cert-status-req", gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host, errstr); + return NULL; + } + tlsp->ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP; } #endif #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT -if (tb->event_action) +if (tb && tb->event_action) { state->event_action = tb->event_action; gnutls_session_set_ptr(state->session, state); @@ -2043,28 +2409,31 @@ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("about to gnutls_handshake\n"); sigalrm_seen = FALSE; alarm(ob->command_timeout); do - { rc = gnutls_handshake(state->session); - } while ((rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN) || - (rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED && !sigalrm_seen)); +while (rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN || rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED && !sigalrm_seen); alarm(0); if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) + { if (sigalrm_seen) { gnutls_alert_send(state->session, GNUTLS_AL_FATAL, GNUTLS_A_USER_CANCELED); - return tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake", "timed out", state->host, errstr); + tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake", "timed out", state->host, errstr); } else - return tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake", gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host, errstr); + tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake", gnutls_strerror(rc), state->host, errstr); + return NULL; + } DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("gnutls_handshake was successful\n"); /* Verify late */ -if (state->verify_requirement != VERIFY_NONE && - !verify_certificate(state, errstr)) - return tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", *errstr, state->host, errstr); +if (!verify_certificate(state, errstr)) + { + tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", *errstr, state->host, errstr); + return NULL; + } #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP if (require_ocsp) @@ -2089,24 +2458,25 @@ if (require_ocsp) if (gnutls_ocsp_status_request_is_checked(state->session, 0) == 0) { - tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED; - return tls_error(US"certificate status check failed", NULL, state->host, errstr); + tlsp->ocsp = OCSP_FAILED; + tls_error(US"certificate status check failed", NULL, state->host, errstr); + return NULL; } DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Passed OCSP checking\n"); - tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED; + tlsp->ocsp = OCSP_VFIED; } #endif /* Figure out peer DN, and if authenticated, etc. */ -if ((rc = peer_status(state, errstr)) != OK) - return rc; +if (peer_status(state, errstr) != OK) + return NULL; /* Sets various Exim expansion variables; may need to adjust for ACL callouts */ extract_exim_vars_from_tls_state(state); -return OK; +return state; } @@ -2120,39 +2490,123 @@ return OK; daemon, to shut down the TLS library, without actually doing a shutdown (which would tamper with the TLS session in the parent process). -Arguments: TRUE if gnutls_bye is to be called +Arguments: + ct_ctx client context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context + shutdown 1 if TLS close-alert is to be sent, + 2 if also response to be waited for + Returns: nothing */ void -tls_close(BOOL is_server, BOOL shutdown) +tls_close(void * ct_ctx, int shutdown) { -exim_gnutls_state_st *state = is_server ? &state_server : &state_client; +exim_gnutls_state_st * state = ct_ctx ? ct_ctx : &state_server; -if (!state->tlsp || state->tlsp->active < 0) return; /* TLS was not active */ +if (!state->tlsp || state->tlsp->active.sock < 0) return; /* TLS was not active */ if (shutdown) { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_close(): shutting down TLS\n"); - gnutls_bye(state->session, GNUTLS_SHUT_WR); + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_close(): shutting down TLS%s\n", + shutdown > 1 ? " (with response-wait)" : ""); + + alarm(2); + gnutls_bye(state->session, shutdown > 1 ? GNUTLS_SHUT_RDWR : GNUTLS_SHUT_WR); + alarm(0); } gnutls_deinit(state->session); gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(state->x509_cred); -state->tlsp->active = -1; +state->tlsp->active.sock = -1; +state->tlsp->active.tls_ctx = NULL; +if (state->xfer_buffer) store_free(state->xfer_buffer); memcpy(state, &exim_gnutls_state_init, sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_init)); +} -if ((state_server.session == NULL) && (state_client.session == NULL)) + + + +static BOOL +tls_refill(unsigned lim) +{ +exim_gnutls_state_st * state = &state_server; +ssize_t inbytes; + +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling gnutls_record_recv(%p, %p, %u)\n", + state->session, state->xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size); + +sigalrm_seen = FALSE; +if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout); +inbytes = gnutls_record_recv(state->session, state->xfer_buffer, + MIN(ssl_xfer_buffer_size, lim)); +if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(0); + +if (had_command_timeout) /* set by signal handler */ + smtp_command_timeout_exit(); /* does not return */ +if (had_command_sigterm) + smtp_command_sigterm_exit(); +if (had_data_timeout) + smtp_data_timeout_exit(); +if (had_data_sigint) + smtp_data_sigint_exit(); + +/* Timeouts do not get this far. A zero-byte return appears to mean that the +TLS session has been closed down, not that the socket itself has been closed +down. Revert to non-TLS handling. */ + +if (sigalrm_seen) { - gnutls_global_deinit(); - exim_gnutls_base_init_done = FALSE; + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got tls read timeout\n"); + state->xfer_error = TRUE; + return FALSE; } -} +else if (inbytes == 0) + { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got TLS_EOF\n"); + + receive_getc = smtp_getc; + receive_getbuf = smtp_getbuf; + receive_get_cache = smtp_get_cache; + receive_ungetc = smtp_ungetc; + receive_feof = smtp_feof; + receive_ferror = smtp_ferror; + receive_smtp_buffered = smtp_buffered; + + gnutls_deinit(state->session); + gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(state->x509_cred); + + state->session = NULL; + state->tlsp->active.sock = -1; + state->tlsp->active.tls_ctx = NULL; + state->tlsp->bits = 0; + state->tlsp->certificate_verified = FALSE; + tls_channelbinding_b64 = NULL; + state->tlsp->cipher = NULL; + state->tlsp->peercert = NULL; + state->tlsp->peerdn = NULL; + + return FALSE; + } +/* Handle genuine errors */ +else if (inbytes < 0) + { +debug_printf("%s: err from gnutls_record_recv(\n", __FUNCTION__); + record_io_error(state, (int) inbytes, US"recv", NULL); + state->xfer_error = TRUE; + return FALSE; + } +#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM +dkim_exim_verify_feed(state->xfer_buffer, inbytes); +#endif +state->xfer_buffer_hwm = (int) inbytes; +state->xfer_buffer_lwm = 0; +return TRUE; +} /************************************************* * TLS version of getc * @@ -2171,77 +2625,41 @@ Returns: the next character or EOF int tls_getc(unsigned lim) { -exim_gnutls_state_st *state = &state_server; -if (state->xfer_buffer_lwm >= state->xfer_buffer_hwm) - { - ssize_t inbytes; - - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling gnutls_record_recv(%p, %p, %u)\n", - state->session, state->xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size); - - if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout); - inbytes = gnutls_record_recv(state->session, state->xfer_buffer, - MIN(ssl_xfer_buffer_size, lim)); - alarm(0); - - /* Timeouts do not get this far; see command_timeout_handler(). - A zero-byte return appears to mean that the TLS session has been - closed down, not that the socket itself has been closed down. Revert to - non-TLS handling. */ - - if (sigalrm_seen) - { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got tls read timeout\n"); - state->xfer_error = 1; - return EOF; - } - - else if (inbytes == 0) - { - DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got TLS_EOF\n"); - - receive_getc = smtp_getc; - receive_get_cache = smtp_get_cache; - receive_ungetc = smtp_ungetc; - receive_feof = smtp_feof; - receive_ferror = smtp_ferror; - receive_smtp_buffered = smtp_buffered; +exim_gnutls_state_st * state = &state_server; - gnutls_deinit(state->session); - gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(state->x509_cred); +if (state->xfer_buffer_lwm >= state->xfer_buffer_hwm) + if (!tls_refill(lim)) + return state->xfer_error ? EOF : smtp_getc(lim); - state->session = NULL; - state->tlsp->active = -1; - state->tlsp->bits = 0; - state->tlsp->certificate_verified = FALSE; - tls_channelbinding_b64 = NULL; - state->tlsp->cipher = NULL; - state->tlsp->peercert = NULL; - state->tlsp->peerdn = NULL; +/* Something in the buffer; return next uschar */ - return smtp_getc(lim); - } +return state->xfer_buffer[state->xfer_buffer_lwm++]; +} - /* Handle genuine errors */ +uschar * +tls_getbuf(unsigned * len) +{ +exim_gnutls_state_st * state = &state_server; +unsigned size; +uschar * buf; - else if (inbytes < 0) +if (state->xfer_buffer_lwm >= state->xfer_buffer_hwm) + if (!tls_refill(*len)) { - record_io_error(state, (int) inbytes, US"recv", NULL); - state->xfer_error = 1; - return EOF; + if (!state->xfer_error) return smtp_getbuf(len); + *len = 0; + return NULL; } -#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM - dkim_exim_verify_feed(state->xfer_buffer, inbytes); -#endif - state->xfer_buffer_hwm = (int) inbytes; - state->xfer_buffer_lwm = 0; - } - -/* Something in the buffer; return next uschar */ -return state->xfer_buffer[state->xfer_buffer_lwm++]; +if ((size = state->xfer_buffer_hwm - state->xfer_buffer_lwm) > *len) + size = *len; +buf = &state->xfer_buffer[state->xfer_buffer_lwm]; +state->xfer_buffer_lwm += size; +*len = size; +return buf; } + void tls_get_cache() { @@ -2254,6 +2672,14 @@ if (n > 0) } +BOOL +tls_could_read(void) +{ +return state_server.xfer_buffer_lwm < state_server.xfer_buffer_hwm + || gnutls_record_check_pending(state_server.session) > 0; +} + + /************************************************* @@ -2264,17 +2690,18 @@ if (n > 0) then the caller must feed DKIM. Arguments: + ct_ctx client context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context buff buffer of data len size of buffer Returns: the number of bytes read - -1 after a failed read + -1 after a failed read, including EOF */ int -tls_read(BOOL is_server, uschar *buff, size_t len) +tls_read(void * ct_ctx, uschar *buff, size_t len) { -exim_gnutls_state_st *state = is_server ? &state_server : &state_client; +exim_gnutls_state_st * state = ct_ctx ? ct_ctx : &state_server; ssize_t inbytes; if (len > INT_MAX) @@ -2296,7 +2723,11 @@ if (inbytes == 0) { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got TLS_EOF\n"); } -else record_io_error(state, (int)inbytes, US"recv", NULL); +else +{ +debug_printf("%s: err from gnutls_record_recv(\n", __FUNCTION__); +record_io_error(state, (int)inbytes, US"recv", NULL); +} return -1; } @@ -2310,22 +2741,30 @@ return -1; /* Arguments: - is_server channel specifier + ct_ctx client context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context buff buffer of data len number of bytes + more more data expected soon Returns: the number of bytes after a successful write, -1 after a failed write */ int -tls_write(BOOL is_server, const uschar *buff, size_t len) +tls_write(void * ct_ctx, const uschar * buff, size_t len, BOOL more) { ssize_t outbytes; size_t left = len; -exim_gnutls_state_st *state = is_server ? &state_server : &state_client; +exim_gnutls_state_st * state = ct_ctx ? ct_ctx : &state_server; +#ifdef SUPPORT_CORK +static BOOL corked = FALSE; + +if (more && !corked) gnutls_record_cork(state->session); +#endif + +DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("%s(%p, " SIZE_T_FMT "%s)\n", __FUNCTION__, + buff, left, more ? ", more" : ""); -DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_do_write(%p, " SIZE_T_FMT ")\n", buff, left); while (left > 0) { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("gnutls_record_send(SSL, %p, " SIZE_T_FMT ")\n", @@ -2335,6 +2774,7 @@ while (left > 0) DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("outbytes=" SSIZE_T_FMT "\n", outbytes); if (outbytes < 0) { + DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("%s: gnutls_record_send err\n", __FUNCTION__); record_io_error(state, outbytes, US"send", NULL); return -1; } @@ -2356,6 +2796,14 @@ if (len > INT_MAX) len = INT_MAX; } +#ifdef SUPPORT_CORK +if (more != corked) + { + if (!more) (void) gnutls_record_uncork(state->session, 0); + corked = more; + } +#endif + return (int) len; }