# the older (comment) style, keeping only the Auth element
# (discarding kex, cipher, mac). For TLS 1.3 there is no kex
# element (and no _WITH); insert a spurious "RSA".
+ # Also in $tls_X_cipher_std reporting.
- s/^\s+by .+ with .+ \K tls TLS_.*?([^_]+)_WITH.+$/(TLS1.x:ke-$1-AES256-SHAnnn:xxx)/;
- s/^\s+by .+ with .+ \K tls TLS_.+$/(TLS1.x:ke-RSA-AES256-SHAnnn:xxx)/;
+ s/^\s+by \S+ with .+ \K \(TLS1(?:\.[0-3])?\) tls TLS_.*?([^_]+)_WITH.+$/(TLS1.x:ke-$1-AES256-SHAnnn:xxx)/;
+ s/^\s+by \S+ with .+ \K \(TLS1(?:\.[0-3])?\) tls TLS_.+$/(TLS1.x:ke-RSA-AES256-SHAnnn:xxx)/;
+
+ s/ cipher_ TLS_.*?([^_]+)_WITH.+$/ cipher_ TLS1.x:ke_$1_WITH_ci_mac/;
+ s/ cipher_ TLS_.*$/ cipher_ TLS1.x:ke_RSA_WITH_ci_mac/;
# Test machines might have various different TLS library versions supporting
# different protocols; can't rely upon TLS 1.2's AES256-GCM-SHA384, so we
# treat the standard algorithms the same.
#
- # TLSversion : KeyExchange? - Authentication/Signature - C_iph_er - MAC : ???
+ # TLSversion : KeyExchange? - Authentication/Signature - C_iph_er - MAC : bits
#
# So far, have seen:
# TLSv1:AES128-GCM-SHA256:128
#
# Retain the authentication algorith field as we want to test that.
- s/( (?: (?:\b|\s) [\(=] ) | \s )TLSv1(\.[123])?:/$1TLS1.x:/xg;
+ s/( (?: (?:\b|\s) [\(=] ) | \s )TLS1(\.[123])?:/$1TLS1.x:/xg;
s/(?<!ke-)((EC)?DHE-)?(RSA|ECDSA)-AES(128|256)-(GCM-SHA(256|384)|SHA)(?!:)/ke-$3-AES256-SHAnnn/g;
s/(?<!ke-)((EC)?DHE-)?(RSA|ECDSA)-AES(128|256)-(GCM-SHA(256|384)|SHA):(128|256)/ke-$3-AES256-SHAnnn:xxx/g;
# DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
# picking latter as canonical simply because regex easier that way.
s/\bDHE_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:128/RSA-AES256-SHA1:256/g;
- s/TLS1.[0123](-PKIX)?: # TLS version
+ s/TLS1.[x0123](-PKIX)?: # TLS version
((EC)?DHE(_((?<psk>PSK)_)?((?<auth>RSA|ECDSA)_)?
(SECP(256|521)R1|X25519))?__?)? # key-exchange
((?<auth>RSA|ECDSA)((_PSS_RSAE)?_SHA(512|256))?__?)? # authentication
+ (?<with>WITH_)? # stdname-with
AES_(256|128)_(CBC|GCM) # cipher
(__?AEAD)? # pseudo-MAC
(__?SHA(1|256|384))? # PRF
/"TLS1.x:ke-"
. (defined($+{psk}) ? $+{psk} : "")
. (defined($+{auth}) ? $+{auth} : "")
+ . (defined($+{with}) ? $+{with} : "")
. "-AES256-SHAnnn:xxx"/gex;
s/TLS1.2:RSA__CAMELLIA_256_GCM(_SHA384)?:256/TLS1.2:RSA_CAMELLIA_256_GCM-SHAnnn:256/g;
s/\b(ECDHE-(RSA|ECDSA)-AES256-SHA|DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256)\b/ke-$2-AES256-SHAnnn/g;
+ # Separate reporting of TLS version
+ s/ver: TLS1(\.[0-3])?$/ver: TLS1.x/;
+ s/ \(TLS1(\.[0-3])?\) / (TLS1.x) /;
+
# GnuTLS library error message changes
s/(No certificate was found|Certificate is required)/The peer did not send any certificate/g;
#(dodgy test?) s/\(certificate verification failed\): invalid/\(gnutls_handshake\): The peer did not send any certificate./g;
# Not all platforms support TCP Fast Open, and the compile omits the check
if (s/\S+ in hosts_try_fastopen\? (no \(option unset\)|yes \(matched "\*"\))\n$//)
{
+ chomp;
$_ .= <IN>;
s/ \.\.\. >>> / ... /;
- if (s/ non-TFO mode connection attempt to 224.0.0.0, 0 data\b$//) { $_ .= <IN>; }
+ if (s/ non-TFO mode connection attempt to 224.0.0.0, 0 data\b$//) { chomp; $_ .= <IN>; }
s/Address family not supported by protocol family/Network Error/;
s/Network is unreachable/Network Error/;
}
# Platform differences in errno strings
s/ SMTP\(Operation timed out\)<</ SMTP(Connection timed out)<</;
+ # Platform differences for errno values (eg. Hurd)
+ s/^errno = \d+$/errno = EEE/;
+ s/^writing error \d+: /writing error EEE: /;
+
# When Exim is checking the size of directories for maildir, it uses
# the check_dir_size() function to scan directories. Of course, the order
# of the files that are obtained using readdir() varies from system to
s/(?:\[[^\]]*\]:|port )\K$parm_port_n/PORT_N/;
s/I=\[[^\]]*\]:\K\d+/ppppp/;
+ # Platform differences for errno values (eg. Hurd). Leave 0 and negative numbers alone.
+ s/R=\w+ T=\w+ defer\K \([1-9]\d*\): / (EEE): /;
}
# ======== mail ========
log_failure($log_failed_filename, $testno, $rf);
log_test($log_summary_filename, $testno, 'F') if ($force_continue);
}
- return 1 if /^c$/i && $rf !~ /paniclog/ && $rsf !~ /paniclog/;
+ return 1 if /^c$/i && $rf !~ /paniclog/ && (!defined $rsf || $rsf !~ /paniclog/);
last if (/^[sc]$/);
}
s! DN="[^,"]*\K,!/!;
',
'rejectlog' => 's/ X=TLS\S+ / X=TLS_proto_and_cipher /',
- 'mail' => 's/^\s+by .+ with .+ \K tls TLS_.+$/(TLS_proto_and_cipher)/;
- s/ \(TLS[^)]*\)/ (TLS_proto_and_cipher)/;
- ',
},
'debug_pid' =>
{
if (/^(?:[0-9]+: )?([a-z0-9]+): /) { $ifname = $1; }
- if (not $parm_ipv4 and /^\s*inet(?:\saddr)?:?\s?(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)(?:\/\d+)?\s/i)
+ if (not $parm_ipv4 and /^\s*inet(?:\saddr(?:ess))?:?\s*(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)(?:\/\d+)?\s/i)
{
# It would ne nice to be able to vary the /16 used for manyhome; we could take
# an option to runtest used here - but we'd also have to pass it on to fakens.
$parm_ipv4 = $1;
}
- if (not $parm_ipv6 and /^\s*inet6(?:\saddr)?:?\s?([abcdef\d:]+)(?:%[^ \/]+)?(?:\/\d+)?/i)
+ if (not $parm_ipv6 and /^\s*inet6(?:\saddr(?:ess))?:?\s*([abcdef\d:]+)(?:%[^ \/]+)?(?:\/\d+)?/i)
{
next if $1 eq '::' or $1 eq '::1' or $1 =~ /^ff00/i or $1 =~ /^fe80::1/i;
$parm_ipv6 = $1;
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