Follow CNAME chains only one step. Bug 2264

[exim.git] / src / src / verify.c

diff --git a/src/src/verify.c b/src/src/verify.c
index 1df856604a066c012ae829ba2e669f56aa2c873d..5d0551e89c5ea8ac87c75eb37b6c68955b69ed32 100644 (file)
--- a/src/src/verify.c
+++ b/src/src/verify.c
@@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ else
       case ccache_accept:
        HDEBUG(D_verify)
          debug_printf("callout cache: domain accepts random addresses\n");
+       *failure_ptr = US"random";
        dbfn_close(dbm_file);
        return TRUE;     /* Default yield is OK */
 
@@ -787,7 +788,7 @@ tls_retry_connection:
       The sync_responses() would need to be taught about it and we'd
       need another return code filtering out to here.
 
-      Avoid using a SIZE option on the MAIL for all randon-rcpt checks.
+      Avoid using a SIZE option on the MAIL for all random-rcpt checks.
       */
 
       sx.avoid_option = OPTION_SIZE;
@@ -802,6 +803,7 @@ tls_retry_connection:
            new_domain_record.random_result = ccache_accept;
            yield = OK;         /* Only usable verify result we can return */
            done = TRUE;
+           *failure_ptr = US"random";
            goto no_conn;
          case FAIL:            /* rejected: the preferred result */
            new_domain_record.random_result = ccache_reject;
@@ -1033,11 +1035,20 @@ no_conn:
         cutthrough.delivery= FALSE;
         HDEBUG(D_acl|D_v) debug_printf("Cutthrough cancelled by presence of transport filter\n");
         }
+#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
       if (ob->dkim.dkim_domain)
         {
         cutthrough.delivery= FALSE;
         HDEBUG(D_acl|D_v) debug_printf("Cutthrough cancelled by presence of DKIM signing\n");
         }
+#endif
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_ARC
+      if (ob->arc_sign)
+        {
+        cutthrough.delivery= FALSE;
+        HDEBUG(D_acl|D_v) debug_printf("Cutthrough cancelled by presence of ARC signing\n");
+        }
+#endif
       }
 
     if (  (cutthrough.delivery || options & vopt_callout_hold)
@@ -1648,9 +1659,9 @@ else ko_prefix = cr = US"";
 
 if (parse_find_at(address) == NULL)
   {
-  if ((options & vopt_qualify) == 0)
+  if (!(options & vopt_qualify))
     {
-    if (f != NULL)
+    if (f)
       respond_printf(f, "%sA domain is required for \"%s\"%s\n",
         ko_prefix, address, cr);
     *failure_ptr = US"qualify";
@@ -1668,7 +1679,7 @@ DEBUG(D_verify)
 /* Rewrite and report on it. Clear the domain and local part caches - these
 may have been set by domains and local part tests during an ACL. */
 
-if (global_rewrite_rules != NULL)
+if (global_rewrite_rules)
   {
   uschar *old = address;
   address = rewrite_address(address, options & vopt_is_recipient, FALSE,
@@ -1677,21 +1688,21 @@ if (global_rewrite_rules != NULL)
     {
     for (i = 0; i < (MAX_NAMED_LIST * 2)/32; i++) vaddr->localpart_cache[i] = 0;
     for (i = 0; i < (MAX_NAMED_LIST * 2)/32; i++) vaddr->domain_cache[i] = 0;
-    if (f != NULL && !expn) fprintf(f, "Address rewritten as: %s\n", address);
+    if (f && !expn) fprintf(f, "Address rewritten as: %s\n", address);
     }
   }
 
 /* If this is the real sender address, we must update sender_address at
 this point, because it may be referred to in the routers. */
 
-if ((options & (vopt_fake_sender|vopt_is_recipient)) == 0)
+if (!(options & (vopt_fake_sender|vopt_is_recipient)))
   sender_address = address;
 
 /* If the address was rewritten to <> no verification can be done, and we have
 to return OK. This rewriting is permitted only for sender addresses; for other
 addresses, such rewriting fails. */
 
-if (address[0] == 0) return OK;
+if (!address[0]) return OK;
 
 /* Flip the legacy TLS-related variables over to the outbound set in case
 they're used in the context of a transport used by verification. Reset them
@@ -1743,7 +1754,7 @@ while (addr_new)
   if (testflag(addr, af_pfr))
     {
     allok = FALSE;
-    if (f != NULL)
+    if (f)
       {
       BOOL allow;
 
@@ -1754,8 +1765,8 @@ while (addr_new)
         }
       else
         {
-        allow = (addr->address[0] == '|')?
-          testflag(addr, af_allow_pipe) : testflag(addr, af_allow_file);
+        allow = addr->address[0] == '|'
+          ? testflag(addr, af_allow_pipe) : testflag(addr, af_allow_file);
         fprintf(f, "%s -> %s", addr->parent->address, addr->address);
         }
 
@@ -3400,9 +3411,8 @@ else
 
   /* If the lookup succeeded, cache the RHS address. The code allows for
   more than one address - this was for complete generality and the possible
-  use of A6 records. However, A6 records have been reduced to experimental
-  status (August 2001) and may die out. So they may never get used at all,
-  let alone in dnsbl records. However, leave the code here, just in case.
+  use of A6 records. However, A6 records are no longer supported. Leave the code
+  here, just in case.
 
   Quite apart from one A6 RR generating multiple addresses, there are DNS
   lists that return more than one A record, so we must handle multiple