# define EXIM_HAVE_SESSION_TICKET
# define EXIM_HAVE_OPESSL_TRACE
# define EXIM_HAVE_OPESSL_GET0_SERIAL
+# ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
+# define EXIM_HAVE_OCSP
+# endif
# else
# define EXIM_NEED_OPENSSL_INIT
# endif
# define OPENSSL_HAVE_KEYLOG_CB
# define OPENSSL_HAVE_NUM_TICKETS
# define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CIPHER_STD_NAME
+# else
+# define OPENSSL_BAD_SRVR_OURCERT
# endif
#endif
to apply.
This list is current as of:
- ==> 1.0.1b <==
-Plus SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG from 2013-June patch/discussion on openssl-dev
-Plus SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3 for 1.1.2-dev
+ ==> 1.1.1c <==
+
+XXX could we autobuild this list, as with predefined-macros?
+Seems just parsing ssl.h for SSL_OP_.* would be enough (except to exclude DTLS).
+Also allow a numeric literal?
*/
static exim_openssl_option exim_openssl_options[] = {
/* KEEP SORTED ALPHABETICALLY! */
#ifdef SSL_OP_ALL
{ US"all", (long) SSL_OP_ALL },
#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX
+ { US"allow_no_dhe_kex", SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX },
+#endif
#ifdef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
{ US"allow_unsafe_legacy_renegotiation", SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION },
#endif
#ifdef SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
{ US"cipher_server_preference", SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE },
#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG
+ { US"cryptopro_tlsext_bug", SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG },
+#endif
#ifdef SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
{ US"dont_insert_empty_fragments", SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS },
#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
+ { US"enable_middlebox_compat", SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT },
+#endif
#ifdef SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
{ US"ephemeral_rsa", SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA },
#endif
#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
{ US"netscape_reuse_cipher_change_bug", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG },
#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY
+ { US"no_anti_replay", SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY },
+#endif
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
{ US"no_compression", SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION },
#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
+ { US"no_encrypt_then_mac", SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC },
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
+ { US"no_renegotiation", SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION },
+#endif
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
{ US"no_session_resumption_on_renegotiation", SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION },
#endif
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3
{ US"no_tlsv1_3", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3 },
#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA
+ { US"prioritize_chacha", SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA },
+#endif
#ifdef SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
{ US"safari_ecdhe_ecdsa_bug", SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG },
#endif
#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
{ US"tls_rollback_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG },
#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING
+ { US"tlsext_padding", SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING },
+#endif
};
#ifndef MACRO_PREDEF
# ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3
builtin_macro_create(US"_HAVE_TLS1_3");
# endif
+# ifdef OPENSSL_BAD_SRVR_OURCERT
+builtin_macro_create(US"_TLS_BAD_MULTICERT_IN_OURCERT");
+# endif
+# ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OCSP
+builtin_macro_create(US"_HAVE_TLS_OCSP");
+builtin_macro_create(US"_HAVE_TLS_OCSP_LIST");
+# endif
}
#else
static void
keylog_callback(const SSL *ssl, const char *line)
{
+char * filename;
+FILE * fp;
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("%.200s\n", line);
+if (!(filename = getenv("SSLKEYLOGFILE"))) return;
+if (!(fp = fopen(filename, "a"))) return;
+fprintf(fp, "%s\n", line);
+fclose(fp);
}
#endif
sctx the SSL_CTX* to update
cbinfo various parts of session state
filename the filename putatively holding an OCSP response
+ is_pem file is PEM format; otherwise is DER
*/
static void
ocsp_load_response(SSL_CTX * sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo,
- const uschar * filename)
+ const uschar * filename, BOOL is_pem)
{
BIO * bio;
OCSP_RESPONSE * resp;
unsigned long verify_flags;
int status, reason, i;
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_ocsp_file '%s'\n", filename);
+DEBUG(D_tls)
+ debug_printf("tls_ocsp_file (%s) '%s'\n", is_pem ? "PEM" : "DER", filename);
if (!(bio = BIO_new_file(CS filename, "rb")))
{
return;
}
-resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(bio, NULL);
+if (is_pem)
+ {
+ uschar * data, * freep;
+ char * dummy;
+ long len;
+ if (!PEM_read_bio(bio, &dummy, &dummy, &data, &len))
+ {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Failed to read PEM file \"%s\"\n",
+ filename);
+ return;
+ }
+debug_printf("read pem file\n");
+ freep = data;
+ resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, CUSS &data, len);
+ OPENSSL_free(freep);
+ }
+else
+ resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(bio, NULL);
BIO_free(bio);
+
if (!resp)
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Error reading OCSP response.\n");
const uschar * olist = cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file;
int osep = 0;
uschar * ofile;
+ BOOL fmt_pem = FALSE;
if (olist)
if (!expand_check(olist, US"tls_ocsp_file", USS &olist, errstr))
#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
if (olist)
if ((ofile = string_nextinlist(&olist, &osep, NULL, 0)))
- ocsp_load_response(sctx, cbinfo, ofile);
+ {
+ if (Ustrncmp(ofile, US"PEM ", 4) == 0)
+ {
+ fmt_pem = TRUE;
+ ofile += 4;
+ }
+ else if (Ustrncmp(ofile, US"DER ", 4) == 0)
+ {
+ fmt_pem = FALSE;
+ ofile += 4;
+ }
+ ocsp_load_response(sctx, cbinfo, ofile, fmt_pem);
+ }
else
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("ran out of ocsp file list\n");
#endif
OCSP_BASICRESP * bs;
int i;
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS status response (OCSP stapling):");
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS status callback (OCSP stapling):\n");
len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &p);
if(!p)
{
/* Expect this when we requested ocsp but got none */
if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required && LOGGING(tls_cipher))
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS status callback, null content");
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Required TLS certificate status not received");
else
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" null\n");
return cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
*/
{
BIO * bp = NULL;
- int status, reason;
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
+#ifndef EXIM_HAVE_OCSP_RESP_COUNT
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) * sresp = bs->tbsResponseData->responses;
+#endif
DEBUG(D_tls) bp = BIO_new_fp(debug_file, BIO_NOCLOSE);
/* DEBUG(D_tls) x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store); */
if ((i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, cbinfo->verify_stack,
- cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store, 0)) <= 0)
- {
- tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
- if (LOGGING(tls_cipher)) log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
- "Received TLS cert status response, itself unverifiable: %s",
- ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_peek_error()));
- BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response verify failure\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bp);
- OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, rsp, 0);
- goto failed;
- }
+ cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store, OCSP_NOEXPLICIT)) <= 0)
+ if (ERR_peek_error())
+ {
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
+ if (LOGGING(tls_cipher)) log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
+ "Received TLS cert status response, itself unverifiable: %s",
+ ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_peek_error()));
+ BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response verify failure\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bp);
+ OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, rsp, 0);
+ goto failed;
+ }
+ else
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("no explicit trust for OCSP signing"
+ " in the root CA certificate; ignoring\n");
- BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response well-formed and signed OK\n");
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response well-formed and signed OK\n");
/*XXX So we have a good stapled OCSP status. How do we know
it is for the cert of interest? OpenSSL 1.1.0 has a routine
For now, carry on blindly accepting the resp. */
- {
- OCSP_SINGLERESP * single;
-
+ for (int idx =
#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OCSP_RESP_COUNT
- if (OCSP_resp_count(bs) != 1)
+ OCSP_resp_count(bs) - 1;
#else
- STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) * sresp = bs->tbsResponseData->responses;
- if (sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp) != 1)
+ sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp) - 1;
#endif
- {
- tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "OCSP stapling "
- "with multiple responses not handled");
- goto failed;
- }
- single = OCSP_resp_get0(bs, 0);
+ idx >= 0; idx--)
+ {
+ OCSP_SINGLERESP * single = OCSP_resp_get0(bs, idx);
+ int status, reason;
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME * rev, * thisupd, * nextupd;
+
+ /*XXX so I can see putting a loop in here to handle a rsp with >1 singleresp
+ - but what happens with a GnuTLS-style input?
+
+ we could do with a debug label for each singleresp
+ - it has a certID with a serialNumber, but I see no API to get that
+ */
status = OCSP_single_get0_status(single, &reason, &rev,
&thisupd, &nextupd);
- }
- DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "This OCSP Update", thisupd);
- DEBUG(D_tls) if(nextupd) time_print(bp, "Next OCSP Update", nextupd);
- if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd,
- EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE))
- {
- tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
- DEBUG(D_tls) ERR_print_errors(bp);
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server OSCP dates invalid");
- }
- else
- {
+ DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "This OCSP Update", thisupd);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) if(nextupd) time_print(bp, "Next OCSP Update", nextupd);
+ if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd,
+ EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE))
+ {
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
+ DEBUG(D_tls) ERR_print_errors(bp);
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server OSCP dates invalid");
+ goto failed;
+ }
+
DEBUG(D_tls) BIO_printf(bp, "Certificate status: %s\n",
OCSP_cert_status_str(status));
switch(status)
{
case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD:
- tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
- i = 1;
- goto good;
+ continue; /* the idx loop */
case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED:
- tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server certificate revoked%s%s",
reason != -1 ? "; reason: " : "",
reason != -1 ? OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason) : "");
DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "Revocation Time", rev);
break;
default:
- tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
"Server certificate status unknown, in OCSP stapling");
break;
}
+
+ goto failed;
}
+
+ i = 1;
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
+ goto good;
+
failed:
+ tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
good:
BIO_free(bp);
for resumption next to the TLS session, and used here. */
if (!tlsp->verify_override)
- tlsp->certificate_verified = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK;
+ tlsp->certificate_verified =
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
+ tlsp->dane_verified ||
+#endif
+ SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK;
}
}
#endif
}
- /* If a certificate file is empty, the next function fails with an
+ /* If a certificate file is empty, the load function fails with an
unhelpful error message. If we skip it, we get the correct behaviour (no
certificates are recognized, but the error message is still misleading (it
says no certificate was supplied). But this is better. */
&& !SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(sctx, CS file, CS dir))
return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations", host, NULL, errstr);
- /* Load the list of CAs for which we will accept certs, for sending
- to the client. This is only for the one-file tls_verify_certificates
- variant.
+ /* On the server load the list of CAs for which we will accept certs, for
+ sending to the client. This is only for the one-file
+ tls_verify_certificates variant.
If a list isn't loaded into the server, but some verify locations are set,
the server end appears to make a wildcard request for client certs.
Meanwhile, the client library as default behaviour *ignores* the list
{
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * names = SSL_load_client_CA_file(CS file);
- SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(sctx, names);
+ if (!host) SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(sctx, names);
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Added %d certificate authorities.\n",
sk_X509_NAME_num(names));
}
/* Handle genuine errors */
case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
- (void) tls_error(US"SSL_accept", NULL, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL, errstr);
+ {
+ uschar * s = US"SSL_accept";
+ int r = ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error());
+ if ( r == SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
+#ifdef SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
+ || r == SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
+#endif
+ || r == SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL || r == SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL)
+ s = string_sprintf("%s (%s)", s, SSL_get_version(server_ssl));
+ (void) tls_error(s, NULL, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL, errstr);
return FAIL;
+ }
default:
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL error %d\n", error);
/* TLS has been set up. Record data for the connection,
adjust the input functions to read via TLS, and initialize things. */
+#ifdef SSL_get_extms_support
+tls_in.ext_master_secret = SSL_get_extms_support(server_ssl) == 1;
+#endif
peer_cert(server_ssl, &tls_in, peerdn, sizeof(peerdn));
tls_in.ver = tlsver_name(server_ssl);
uschar c, * s;
size_t len = SSL_get_peer_finished(server_ssl, &c, 0);
int old_pool = store_pool;
-
+
SSL_get_peer_finished(server_ssl, s = store_get((int)len, FALSE), len);
store_pool = POOL_PERM;
tls_in.channelbinding = b64encode_taint(CUS s, (int)len, FALSE);
store_pool = old_pool;
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Have channel bindings cached for possible auth usage\n");
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Have channel bindings cached for possible auth usage %p\n", tls_in.channelbinding);
}
/* Only used by the server-side tls (tls_in), including tls_getc.
tlsp->resumption |= RESUME_CLIENT_REQUESTED;
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("checking for resumable session for %s\n", key);
- if ((dbm_file = dbfn_open(US"tls", O_RDONLY, &dbblock, FALSE, FALSE)))
+ if ((dbm_file = dbfn_open(US"tls", O_RDWR, &dbblock, FALSE, FALSE)))
{
/* key for the db is the IP */
if ((dt = dbfn_read_with_length(dbm_file, key, &len)))
tls_client_resume_posthandshake(exim_client_ctx, tlsp);
#endif
+#ifdef SSL_get_extms_support
+tlsp->ext_master_secret = SSL_get_extms_support(exim_client_ctx->ssl) == 1;
+#endif
peer_cert(exim_client_ctx->ssl, tlsp, peerdn, sizeof(peerdn));
tlsp->ver = tlsver_name(exim_client_ctx->ssl);
uschar c, * s;
size_t len = SSL_get_finished(exim_client_ctx->ssl, &c, 0);
int old_pool = store_pool;
-
+
SSL_get_finished(exim_client_ctx->ssl, s = store_get((int)len, TRUE), len);
store_pool = POOL_PERM;
tlsp->channelbinding = b64encode_taint(CUS s, (int)len, TRUE);
store_pool = old_pool;
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Have channel bindings cached for possible auth usage\n");
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Have channel bindings cached for possible auth usage %p %p\n", tlsp->channelbinding, tlsp);
}
tlsp->active.sock = cctx->sock;
tls_openssl_options_parse(uschar *option_spec, long *results)
{
long result, item;
-uschar *end;
+uschar * exp, * end;
uschar keep_c;
BOOL adding, item_parsed;
result = SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
/* Prior to 4.80 we or'd in SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS; removed
- * from default because it increases BEAST susceptibility. */
+from default because it increases BEAST susceptibility. */
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
result |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
#endif
#ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
result |= SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE;
#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
+result |= SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
+#endif
if (!option_spec)
{
return TRUE;
}
-for (uschar * s = option_spec; *s; /**/)
+if (!expand_check(option_spec, US"openssl_options", &exp, &end))
+ return FALSE;
+
+for (uschar * s = exp; *s; /**/)
{
while (isspace(*s)) ++s;
if (*s == '\0')
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("openssl option setting unrecognised: \"%s\"\n", s);
return FALSE;
}
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("openssl option, %s %8lx: %lx (%s)\n",
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("openssl option, %s %08lx: %08lx (%s)\n",
adding ? "adding to " : "removing from", result, item, s);
if (adding)
result |= item;
projects / exim.git / blobdiff