-/* $Cambridge: exim/src/src/tls-openssl.c,v 1.28 2010/06/12 17:56:32 jetmore Exp $ */
-
/*************************************************
* Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
*************************************************/
SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, (void (*)())info_callback);
+/* Automatically re-try reads/writes after renegotiation. */
+(void) SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
+
/* Apply administrator-supplied work-arounds.
Historically we applied just one requested option,
SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS, but when bug 994 requested a second, we
the accessor functions use const in the prototype. */
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
uschar *ver;
-int bits;
switch (ssl->session->ssl_version)
{
ver = US"TLSv1";
break;
+#ifdef TLS1_1_VERSION
+ case TLS1_1_VERSION:
+ ver = US"TLSv1.1";
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef TLS1_2_VERSION
+ case TLS1_2_VERSION:
+ ver = US"TLSv1.2";
+ break;
+#endif
+
default:
ver = US"UNKNOWN";
}
c = (const SSL_CIPHER *) SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
-SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(c, &bits);
+SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(c, &tls_bits);
string_format(cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf), "%s:%s:%u", ver,
- SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c), bits);
+ SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c), tls_bits);
tls_cipher = cipherbuf;
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Cipher: %s\n", cipherbuf);
/* Prepare for new connection */
if ((ssl = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) return tls_error(US"SSL_new", NULL, NULL);
-SSL_clear(ssl);
+
+/* Warning: we used to SSL_clear(ssl) here, it was removed.
+ *
+ * With the SSL_clear(), we get strange interoperability bugs with
+ * OpenSSL 1.0.1b and TLS1.1/1.2. It looks as though this may be a bug in
+ * OpenSSL itself, as a clear should not lead to inability to follow protocols.
+ *
+ * The SSL_clear() call is to let an existing SSL* be reused, typically after
+ * session shutdown. In this case, we have a brand new object and there's no
+ * obvious reason to immediately clear it. I'm guessing that this was
+ * originally added because of incomplete initialisation which the clear fixed,
+ * in some historic release.
+ */
/* Set context and tell client to go ahead, except in the case of TLS startup
on connection, where outputting anything now upsets the clients and tends to
int error;
int inbytes;
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_read(%lx, %lx, %u)\n", (long)ssl,
- (long)ssl_xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_read(%p, %p, %u)\n", ssl,
+ ssl_xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout);
inbytes = SSL_read(ssl, CS ssl_xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
ssl_xfer_error = 1;
return EOF;
}
+
#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
dkim_exim_verify_feed(ssl_xfer_buffer, inbytes);
#endif
int inbytes;
int error;
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_read(%lx, %lx, %u)\n", (long)ssl,
- (long)buff, (unsigned int)len);
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_read(%p, %p, %u)\n", ssl,
+ buff, (unsigned int)len);
inbytes = SSL_read(ssl, CS buff, len);
error = SSL_get_error(ssl, inbytes);
int error;
int left = len;
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_do_write(%lx, %d)\n", (long)buff, left);
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_do_write(%p, %d)\n", buff, left);
while (left > 0)
{
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_write(SSL, %lx, %d)\n", (long)buff, left);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_write(SSL, %p, %d)\n", buff, left);
outbytes = SSL_write(ssl, CS buff, left);
error = SSL_get_error(ssl, outbytes);
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("outbytes=%d error=%d\n", outbytes, error);
to apply.
This list is current as of:
- ==> 1.0.0c <== */
+ ==> 1.0.1b <== */
static struct exim_openssl_option exim_openssl_options[] = {
/* KEEP SORTED ALPHABETICALLY! */
#ifdef SSL_OP_ALL
#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
{ US"netscape_reuse_cipher_change_bug", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG },
#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
+ { US"no_compression", SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION },
+#endif
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
{ US"no_session_resumption_on_renegotiation", SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION },
#endif
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
{ US"no_tlsv1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 },
#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
+#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 == 0x00000400L
+ /* Error in chosen value in 1.0.1a; see first item in CHANGES for 1.0.1b */
+#warning OpenSSL 1.0.1a uses a bad value for SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, ignoring
+#else
+ { US"no_tlsv1_1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 },
+#endif
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
+ { US"no_tlsv1_2", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 },
+#endif
#ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
{ US"single_dh_use", SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE },
#endif
static int exim_openssl_options_size =
sizeof(exim_openssl_options)/sizeof(struct exim_openssl_option);
+
static BOOL
tls_openssl_one_option_parse(uschar *name, long *value)
{
uschar keep_c;
BOOL adding, item_parsed;
-/* We grandfather in as default the one option which we used to set always. */
-#ifdef SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
-result = SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS;
-#else
result = 0L;
-#endif
+/* Prior to 4.78 we or'd in SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS; removed
+ * from default because it increases BEAST susceptibility. */
if (option_spec == NULL)
{
if (*s != '+' && *s != '-')
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("malformed openssl option setting: "
- "+ or - expected but found \"%s\"", s);
+ "+ or - expected but found \"%s\"\n", s);
return FALSE;
}
adding = *s++ == '+';
item_parsed = tls_openssl_one_option_parse(s, &item);
if (!item_parsed)
{
- DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("openssl option setting unrecognised: \"%s\"", s);
+ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("openssl option setting unrecognised: \"%s\"\n", s);
return FALSE;
}
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("openssl option, %s from %lx: %lx (%s)\n",
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