-/* $Cambridge: exim/src/src/acl.c,v 1.9 2004/12/29 16:34:31 ph10 Exp $ */
-
/*************************************************
* Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
*************************************************/
-/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2004 */
+/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2009 */
/* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
/* Code for handling Access Control Lists (ACLs) */
{ US"accept", US"defer", US"deny", US"discard", US"drop", US"require",
US"warn" };
-/* For each verb, the condition for which "message" is used */
-
-static int msgcond[] = { FAIL, OK, OK, FAIL, OK, FAIL, OK };
+/* For each verb, the conditions for which "message" or "log_message" are used
+are held as a bitmap. This is to avoid expanding the strings unnecessarily. For
+"accept", the FAIL case is used only after "endpass", but that is selected in
+the code. */
+
+static int msgcond[] = {
+ (1<<OK) | (1<<FAIL) | (1<<FAIL_DROP), /* accept */
+ (1<<OK), /* defer */
+ (1<<OK), /* deny */
+ (1<<OK) | (1<<FAIL) | (1<<FAIL_DROP), /* discard */
+ (1<<OK), /* drop */
+ (1<<FAIL) | (1<<FAIL_DROP), /* require */
+ (1<<OK) /* warn */
+ };
/* ACL condition and modifier codes - keep in step with the table that
-follows. */
+follows, and the cond_expand_at_top and uschar cond_modifiers tables lower
+down. */
-enum { ACLC_ACL, ACLC_AUTHENTICATED,
+enum { ACLC_ACL,
+ ACLC_ADD_HEADER,
+ ACLC_AUTHENTICATED,
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
ACLC_BMI_OPTIN,
#endif
-ACLC_CONDITION, ACLC_CONTROL,
+ ACLC_CONDITION,
+ ACLC_CONTINUE,
+ ACLC_CONTROL,
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
+ ACLC_DCC,
+#endif
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
ACLC_DECODE,
#endif
ACLC_DELAY,
#ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
ACLC_DEMIME,
-#endif
- ACLC_DNSLISTS, ACLC_DOMAINS, ACLC_ENCRYPTED, ACLC_ENDPASS,
- ACLC_HOSTS, ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS, ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE, ACLC_LOGWRITE,
+#endif
+#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
+ ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER,
+ ACLC_DKIM_STATUS,
+#endif
+ ACLC_DNSLISTS,
+ ACLC_DOMAINS,
+ ACLC_ENCRYPTED,
+ ACLC_ENDPASS,
+ ACLC_HOSTS,
+ ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS,
+ ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE,
+ ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET,
+ ACLC_LOGWRITE,
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
ACLC_MALWARE,
#endif
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
ACLC_MIME_REGEX,
#endif
+ ACLC_RATELIMIT,
ACLC_RECIPIENTS,
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
ACLC_REGEX,
#endif
- ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS, ACLC_SENDERS, ACLC_SET,
+ ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS,
+ ACLC_SENDERS,
+ ACLC_SET,
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- ACLC_SPAM,
+ ACLC_SPAM,
#endif
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
ACLC_SPF,
+ ACLC_SPF_GUESS,
#endif
ACLC_VERIFY };
-/* ACL conditions/modifiers: "delay", "control", "endpass", "message",
-"log_message", "logwrite", and "set" are modifiers that look like conditions
-but always return TRUE. They are used for their side effects. */
+/* ACL conditions/modifiers: "delay", "control", "continue", "endpass",
+"message", "log_message", "log_reject_target", "logwrite", and "set" are
+modifiers that look like conditions but always return TRUE. They are used for
+their side effects. */
-static uschar *conditions[] = { US"acl", US"authenticated",
+static uschar *conditions[] = {
+ US"acl",
+ US"add_header",
+ US"authenticated",
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
US"bmi_optin",
#endif
US"condition",
- US"control",
+ US"continue",
+ US"control",
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
+ US"dcc",
+#endif
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
US"decode",
#endif
#ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
US"demime",
#endif
- US"dnslists", US"domains", US"encrypted",
- US"endpass", US"hosts", US"local_parts", US"log_message", US"logwrite",
+#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
+ US"dkim_signers",
+ US"dkim_status",
+#endif
+ US"dnslists",
+ US"domains",
+ US"encrypted",
+ US"endpass",
+ US"hosts",
+ US"local_parts",
+ US"log_message",
+ US"log_reject_target",
+ US"logwrite",
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
US"malware",
#endif
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
US"mime_regex",
#endif
+ US"ratelimit",
US"recipients",
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
US"regex",
#endif
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
US"spf",
+ US"spf_guess",
#endif
US"verify" };
-
-/* ACL control names */
-static uschar *controls[] = { US"error", US"caseful_local_part",
- US"caselower_local_part", US"enforce_sync", US"no_enforce_sync", US"freeze",
- US"queue_only", US"submission", US"no_multiline"};
-/* Flags to indicate for which conditions /modifiers a string expansion is done
+/* Return values from decode_control(); keep in step with the table of names
+that follows! */
+
+enum {
+ CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED,
+ #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
+ CONTROL_BMI_RUN,
+ #endif
+ CONTROL_DEBUG,
+ #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
+ CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY,
+ #endif
+ CONTROL_ERROR,
+ CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART,
+ CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART,
+ CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC,
+ CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC,
+ CONTROL_FREEZE,
+ CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY,
+ CONTROL_SUBMISSION,
+ CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS,
+ #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
+ CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL,
+ #endif
+ CONTROL_FAKEDEFER,
+ CONTROL_FAKEREJECT,
+ CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE,
+ CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING,
+ CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH,
+ CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH
+};
+
+/* ACL control names; keep in step with the table above! This list is used for
+turning ids into names. The actual list of recognized names is in the variable
+control_def controls_list[] below. The fact that there are two lists is a mess
+and should be tidied up. */
+
+static uschar *controls[] = {
+ US"allow_auth_unadvertised",
+ #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
+ US"bmi_run",
+ #endif
+ US"debug",
+ #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
+ US"dkim_disable_verify",
+ #endif
+ US"error",
+ US"caseful_local_part",
+ US"caselower_local_part",
+ US"enforce_sync",
+ US"no_enforce_sync",
+ US"freeze",
+ US"queue_only",
+ US"submission",
+ US"suppress_local_fixups",
+ #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
+ US"no_mbox_unspool",
+ #endif
+ US"fakedefer",
+ US"fakereject",
+ US"no_multiline_responses",
+ US"no_pipelining",
+ US"no_delay_flush",
+ US"no_callout_flush"
+};
+
+/* Flags to indicate for which conditions/modifiers a string expansion is done
at the outer level. In the other cases, expansion already occurs in the
checking functions. */
static uschar cond_expand_at_top[] = {
TRUE, /* acl */
+ TRUE, /* add_header */
FALSE, /* authenticated */
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
TRUE, /* bmi_optin */
-#endif
+#endif
TRUE, /* condition */
+ TRUE, /* continue */
TRUE, /* control */
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
+ TRUE, /* dcc */
+#endif
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
TRUE, /* decode */
#endif
TRUE, /* delay */
#ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
TRUE, /* demime */
+#endif
+#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
+ TRUE, /* dkim_signers */
+ TRUE, /* dkim_status */
#endif
TRUE, /* dnslists */
FALSE, /* domains */
FALSE, /* hosts */
FALSE, /* local_parts */
TRUE, /* log_message */
+ TRUE, /* log_reject_target */
TRUE, /* logwrite */
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
TRUE, /* malware */
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
TRUE, /* mime_regex */
#endif
+ TRUE, /* ratelimit */
FALSE, /* recipients */
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
TRUE, /* regex */
#endif
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
TRUE, /* spf */
+ TRUE, /* spf_guess */
#endif
TRUE /* verify */
};
static uschar cond_modifiers[] = {
FALSE, /* acl */
+ TRUE, /* add_header */
FALSE, /* authenticated */
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
TRUE, /* bmi_optin */
-#endif
+#endif
FALSE, /* condition */
+ TRUE, /* continue */
TRUE, /* control */
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
+ FALSE, /* dcc */
+#endif
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
FALSE, /* decode */
#endif
TRUE, /* delay */
#ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
FALSE, /* demime */
+#endif
+#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
+ FALSE, /* dkim_signers */
+ FALSE, /* dkim_status */
#endif
FALSE, /* dnslists */
FALSE, /* domains */
FALSE, /* hosts */
FALSE, /* local_parts */
TRUE, /* log_message */
+ TRUE, /* log_reject_target */
TRUE, /* logwrite */
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
FALSE, /* malware */
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
FALSE, /* mime_regex */
#endif
+ FALSE, /* ratelimit */
FALSE, /* recipients */
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
FALSE, /* regex */
#endif
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
FALSE, /* spf */
+ FALSE, /* spf_guess */
#endif
FALSE /* verify */
};
-/* Bit map vector of which conditions are not allowed at certain times. For
-each condition, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. */
+/* Bit map vector of which conditions and modifiers are not allowed at certain
+times. For each condition and modifier, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times.
+For some, it is easier to specify the negation of a small number of allowed
+times. */
static unsigned int cond_forbids[] = {
0, /* acl */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* authenticated */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO),
-
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
+
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* add_header */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_DKIM)|
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)),
+
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* authenticated */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)|
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO),
+
+ #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
(1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* bmi_optin */
(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA),
-#endif
-
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
+ #endif
+
0, /* condition */
-
+
+ 0, /* continue */
+
/* Certain types of control are always allowed, so we let it through
- always and check in the control processing itself */
-
+ always and check in the control processing itself. */
+
0, /* control */
-
-#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* decode */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT),
-#endif
- 0, /* delay */
-
-#ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* demime */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME),
-#endif
-
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* dnslists */
+ #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* dcc */
+ #endif
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* domains */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
+ #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* decode */
+ #endif
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* encrypted */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTQUIT), /* delay */
+
+ #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* demime */
+ #endif
+
+ #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_DKIM), /* dkim_signers */
+
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_DKIM), /* dkim_status */
+ #endif
+
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* dnslists */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
+
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* domains */
+
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* encrypted */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO),
+
0, /* endpass */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* hosts */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* local_parts */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* hosts */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
+
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* local_parts */
0, /* log_message */
+
+ 0, /* log_reject_target */
+
0, /* logwrite */
-
-#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* malware */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME),
-#endif
+
+ #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* malware */
+ #endif
0, /* message */
-#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* mime_regex */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT),
-#endif
+ #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* mime_regex */
+ #endif
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* recipients */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
+ 0, /* ratelimit */
-#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* regex */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME),
-#endif
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* recipients */
+
+ #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* regex */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
+ #endif
(1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* sender_domains */
(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
0, /* set */
-#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* spam */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME),
-#endif
+ #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* spam */
+ #endif
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
+ #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
(1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* spf */
(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
(1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
-#endif
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
+
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* spf_guess */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
+ #endif
/* Certain types of verify are always allowed, so we let it through
always and check in the verify function itself */
};
-/* Return values from decode_control() */
-
-enum {
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
- CONTROL_BMI_RUN,
-#endif
- CONTROL_ERROR, CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART,
- CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, CONTROL_FREEZE,
- CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY, CONTROL_SUBMISSION,
-#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL, CONTROL_FAKEREJECT,
-#endif
- CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE };
-
/* Bit map vector of which controls are not allowed at certain times. For
each control, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier to
specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
static unsigned int control_forbids[] = {
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)), /* allow_auth_unadvertised */
+
+ #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
0, /* bmi_run */
-#endif
+ #endif
+
+ 0, /* debug */
+
+ #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* dkim_disable_verify */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
+ #endif
+
0, /* error */
+
+ (unsigned int)
~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* caseful_local_part */
+
+ (unsigned int)
~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* caselower_local_part */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* enforce_sync */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* no_enforce_sync */
-
+
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* enforce_sync */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
+
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_enforce_sync */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
+
+ (unsigned int)
~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* freeze */
(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)),
-
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
+
+ (unsigned int)
~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* queue_only */
(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)),
-
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
+
+ (unsigned int)
~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* submission */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)),
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)),
-#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* no_mbox_unspool */
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* fakereject */
-#endif
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* suppress_local_fixups */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)),
+
+ #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* no_mbox_unspool */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
+ #endif
+
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakedefer */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
+
+ (unsigned int)
+ ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakereject */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
+
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_multiline */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
+
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_pipelining */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
- (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) /* no_multiline */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_delay_flush */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
+
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_callout_flush */
+ (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)
};
/* Structure listing various control arguments, with their characteristics. */
} control_def;
static control_def controls_list[] = {
+ { US"allow_auth_unadvertised", CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED, FALSE },
#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
- { US"bmi_run", CONTROL_BMI_RUN, FALSE},
+ { US"bmi_run", CONTROL_BMI_RUN, FALSE },
+#endif
+ { US"debug", CONTROL_DEBUG, TRUE },
+#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
+ { US"dkim_disable_verify", CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY, FALSE },
#endif
- { US"caseful_local_part", CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, FALSE},
- { US"caselower_local_part", CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART, FALSE},
- { US"enforce_sync", CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE},
- { US"freeze", CONTROL_FREEZE, FALSE},
- { US"no_enforce_sync", CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE},
- { US"no_multiline_responses", CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE, FALSE},
- { US"queue_only", CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY, FALSE},
+ { US"caseful_local_part", CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, FALSE },
+ { US"caselower_local_part", CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART, FALSE },
+ { US"enforce_sync", CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE },
+ { US"freeze", CONTROL_FREEZE, TRUE },
+ { US"no_callout_flush", CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH, FALSE },
+ { US"no_delay_flush", CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH, FALSE },
+ { US"no_enforce_sync", CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE },
+ { US"no_multiline_responses", CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE, FALSE },
+ { US"no_pipelining", CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING, FALSE },
+ { US"queue_only", CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY, FALSE },
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- { US"no_mbox_unspool", CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL, FALSE},
- { US"fakereject", CONTROL_FAKEREJECT, TRUE},
+ { US"no_mbox_unspool", CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL, FALSE },
#endif
- { US"submission", CONTROL_SUBMISSION, TRUE}
+ { US"fakedefer", CONTROL_FAKEDEFER, TRUE },
+ { US"fakereject", CONTROL_FAKEREJECT, TRUE },
+ { US"submission", CONTROL_SUBMISSION, TRUE },
+ { US"suppress_local_fixups", CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS, FALSE }
};
+/* Support data structures for Client SMTP Authorization. acl_verify_csa()
+caches its result in a tree to avoid repeated DNS queries. The result is an
+integer code which is used as an index into the following tables of
+explanatory strings and verification return codes. */
+
+static tree_node *csa_cache = NULL;
+
+enum { CSA_UNKNOWN, CSA_OK, CSA_DEFER_SRV, CSA_DEFER_ADDR,
+ CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT, CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN, CSA_FAIL_NOADDR, CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH };
+
+/* The acl_verify_csa() return code is translated into an acl_verify() return
+code using the following table. It is OK unless the client is definitely not
+authorized. This is because CSA is supposed to be optional for sending sites,
+so recipients should not be too strict about checking it - especially because
+DNS problems are quite likely to occur. It's possible to use $csa_status in
+further ACL conditions to distinguish ok, unknown, and defer if required, but
+the aim is to make the usual configuration simple. */
+
+static int csa_return_code[] = {
+ OK, OK, OK, OK,
+ FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL
+};
+
+static uschar *csa_status_string[] = {
+ US"unknown", US"ok", US"defer", US"defer",
+ US"fail", US"fail", US"fail", US"fail"
+};
+
+static uschar *csa_reason_string[] = {
+ US"unknown",
+ US"ok",
+ US"deferred (SRV lookup failed)",
+ US"deferred (target address lookup failed)",
+ US"failed (explicit authorization required)",
+ US"failed (host name not authorized)",
+ US"failed (no authorized addresses)",
+ US"failed (client address mismatch)"
+};
+
+/* Options for the ratelimit condition. Note that there are two variants of
+the per_rcpt option, depending on the ACL that is used to measure the rate.
+However any ACL must be able to look up per_rcpt rates in /noupdate mode,
+so the two variants must have the same internal representation as well as
+the same configuration string. */
+
+enum {
+ RATE_PER_WHAT, RATE_PER_CLASH, RATE_PER_ADDR, RATE_PER_BYTE, RATE_PER_CMD,
+ RATE_PER_CONN, RATE_PER_MAIL, RATE_PER_RCPT, RATE_PER_ALLRCPTS
+};
+
+#define RATE_SET(var,new) \
+ (((var) == RATE_PER_WHAT) ? ((var) = RATE_##new) : ((var) = RATE_PER_CLASH))
+
+static uschar *ratelimit_option_string[] = {
+ US"?", US"!", US"per_addr", US"per_byte", US"per_cmd",
+ US"per_conn", US"per_mail", US"per_rcpt", US"per_rcpt"
+};
+
/* Enable recursion between acl_check_internal() and acl_check_condition() */
static int acl_check_internal(int, address_item *, uschar *, int, uschar **,
s++;
}
- /* Read the name of a verb or a condition, or the start of a new ACL */
+ /* Read the name of a verb or a condition, or the start of a new ACL, which
+ can be started by a name, or by a macro definition. */
s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s);
- if (*s == ':')
- {
- if (negated || name[0] == 0)
- {
- *error = string_sprintf("malformed ACL name in \"%s\"", saveline);
- return NULL;
- }
- break;
- }
+ if (*s == ':' || (isupper(name[0]) && *s == '=')) return yield;
/* If a verb is unrecognized, it may be another condition or modifier that
continues the previous verb. */
{
if (this == NULL)
{
- *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL verb in \"%s\"", saveline);
+ *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL verb \"%s\" in \"%s\"", name,
+ saveline);
return NULL;
}
}
/* The "set" modifier is different in that its argument is "name=value"
rather than just a value, and we can check the validity of the name, which
- gives us a variable number to insert into the data block. */
+ gives us a variable name to insert into the data block. The original ACL
+ variable names were acl_c0 ... acl_c9 and acl_m0 ... acl_m9. This was
+ extended to 20 of each type, but after that people successfully argued for
+ arbitrary names. In the new scheme, the names must start with acl_c or acl_m.
+ After that, we allow alphanumerics and underscores, but the first character
+ after c or m must be a digit or an underscore. This retains backwards
+ compatibility. */
if (c == ACLC_SET)
{
- if (Ustrncmp(s, "acl_", 4) != 0 || (s[4] != 'c' && s[4] != 'm') ||
- !isdigit(s[5]) || (!isspace(s[6]) && s[6] != '='))
+ uschar *endptr;
+
+ if (Ustrncmp(s, "acl_c", 5) != 0 &&
+ Ustrncmp(s, "acl_m", 5) != 0)
+ {
+ *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
+ "modifier \"set %s\" (must start \"acl_c\" or \"acl_m\")", s);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ endptr = s + 5;
+ if (!isdigit(*endptr) && *endptr != '_')
{
- *error = string_sprintf("unrecognized name after \"set\" in ACL "
- "modifier \"set %s\"", s);
+ *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
+ "modifier \"set %s\" (digit or underscore must follow acl_c or acl_m)",
+ s);
return NULL;
}
- cond->u.varnumber = s[5] - '0';
- if (s[4] == 'm') cond->u.varnumber += ACL_C_MAX;
- s += 6;
+ while (*endptr != 0 && *endptr != '=' && !isspace(*endptr))
+ {
+ if (!isalnum(*endptr) && *endptr != '_')
+ {
+ *error = string_sprintf("invalid character \"%c\" in variable name "
+ "in ACL modifier \"set %s\"", *endptr, s);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ endptr++;
+ }
+
+ cond->u.varname = string_copyn(s + 4, endptr - s - 4);
+ s = endptr;
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
}
+/*************************************************
+* Set up added header line(s) *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* This function is called by the add_header modifier, and also from acl_warn()
+to implement the now-deprecated way of adding header lines using "message" on a
+"warn" verb. The argument is treated as a sequence of header lines which are
+added to a chain, provided there isn't an identical one already there.
+
+Argument: string of header lines
+Returns: nothing
+*/
+
+static void
+setup_header(uschar *hstring)
+{
+uschar *p, *q;
+int hlen = Ustrlen(hstring);
+
+/* An empty string does nothing; otherwise add a final newline if necessary. */
+
+if (hlen <= 0) return;
+if (hstring[hlen-1] != '\n') hstring = string_sprintf("%s\n", hstring);
+
+/* Loop for multiple header lines, taking care about continuations */
+
+for (p = q = hstring; *p != 0; )
+ {
+ uschar *s;
+ int newtype = htype_add_bot;
+ header_line **hptr = &acl_added_headers;
+
+ /* Find next header line within the string */
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ q = Ustrchr(q, '\n');
+ if (*(++q) != ' ' && *q != '\t') break;
+ }
+
+ /* If the line starts with a colon, interpret the instruction for where to
+ add it. This temporarily sets up a new type. */
+
+ if (*p == ':')
+ {
+ if (strncmpic(p, US":after_received:", 16) == 0)
+ {
+ newtype = htype_add_rec;
+ p += 16;
+ }
+ else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start_rfc:", 14) == 0)
+ {
+ newtype = htype_add_rfc;
+ p += 14;
+ }
+ else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start:", 10) == 0)
+ {
+ newtype = htype_add_top;
+ p += 10;
+ }
+ else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_end:", 8) == 0)
+ {
+ newtype = htype_add_bot;
+ p += 8;
+ }
+ while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') p++;
+ }
+
+ /* See if this line starts with a header name, and if not, add X-ACL-Warn:
+ to the front of it. */
+
+ for (s = p; s < q - 1; s++)
+ {
+ if (*s == ':' || !isgraph(*s)) break;
+ }
+
+ s = string_sprintf("%s%.*s", (*s == ':')? "" : "X-ACL-Warn: ", q - p, p);
+ hlen = Ustrlen(s);
+
+ /* See if this line has already been added */
+
+ while (*hptr != NULL)
+ {
+ if (Ustrncmp((*hptr)->text, s, hlen) == 0) break;
+ hptr = &((*hptr)->next);
+ }
+
+ /* Add if not previously present */
+
+ if (*hptr == NULL)
+ {
+ header_line *h = store_get(sizeof(header_line));
+ h->text = s;
+ h->next = NULL;
+ h->type = newtype;
+ h->slen = hlen;
+ *hptr = h;
+ hptr = &(h->next);
+ }
+
+ /* Advance for next header line within the string */
+
+ p = q;
+ }
+}
+
+
+
+
/*************************************************
* Handle warnings *
*************************************************/
the message's headers, and/or writes information to the log. In each case, this
only happens once (per message for headers, per connection for log).
+** NOTE: The header adding action using the "message" setting is historic, and
+its use is now deprecated. The new add_header modifier should be used instead.
+
Arguments:
where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
user_message message for adding to headers
static void
acl_warn(int where, uschar *user_message, uschar *log_message)
{
-int hlen;
-
if (log_message != NULL && log_message != user_message)
{
uschar *text;
strcmpic(log_message, US"sender verify failed") == 0)
text = string_sprintf("%s: %s", text, sender_verified_failed->message);
- /* Search previously logged warnings. They are kept in malloc store so they
- can be freed at the start of a new message. */
+ /* Search previously logged warnings. They are kept in malloc
+ store so they can be freed at the start of a new message. */
for (logged = acl_warn_logged; logged != NULL; logged = logged->next)
if (Ustrcmp(logged->text, text) == 0) break;
return;
}
-/* Treat the user message as a sequence of one or more header lines. */
-
-hlen = Ustrlen(user_message);
-if (hlen > 0)
- {
- uschar *text, *p, *q;
-
- /* Add a final newline if not present */
-
- text = ((user_message)[hlen-1] == '\n')? user_message :
- string_sprintf("%s\n", user_message);
-
- /* Loop for multiple header lines, taking care about continuations */
-
- for (p = q = text; *p != 0; )
- {
- uschar *s;
- int newtype = htype_add_bot;
- header_line **hptr = &acl_warn_headers;
-
- /* Find next header line within the string */
-
- for (;;)
- {
- q = Ustrchr(q, '\n');
- if (*(++q) != ' ' && *q != '\t') break;
- }
-
- /* If the line starts with a colon, interpret the instruction for where to
- add it. This temporarily sets up a new type. */
-
- if (*p == ':')
- {
- if (strncmpic(p, US":after_received:", 16) == 0)
- {
- newtype = htype_add_rec;
- p += 16;
- }
- else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start_rfc:", 14) == 0)
- {
- newtype = htype_add_rfc;
- p += 14;
- }
- else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start:", 10) == 0)
- {
- newtype = htype_add_top;
- p += 10;
- }
- else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_end:", 8) == 0)
- {
- newtype = htype_add_bot;
- p += 8;
- }
- while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') p++;
- }
-
- /* See if this line starts with a header name, and if not, add X-ACL-Warn:
- to the front of it. */
-
- for (s = p; s < q - 1; s++)
- {
- if (*s == ':' || !isgraph(*s)) break;
- }
-
- s = string_sprintf("%s%.*s", (*s == ':')? "" : "X-ACL-Warn: ", q - p, p);
- hlen = Ustrlen(s);
-
- /* See if this line has already been added */
-
- while (*hptr != NULL)
- {
- if (Ustrncmp((*hptr)->text, s, hlen) == 0) break;
- hptr = &((*hptr)->next);
- }
-
- /* Add if not previously present */
+/* The code for setting up header lines is now abstracted into a separate
+function so that it can be used for the add_header modifier as well. */
- if (*hptr == NULL)
- {
- header_line *h = store_get(sizeof(header_line));
- h->text = s;
- h->next = NULL;
- h->type = newtype;
- h->slen = hlen;
- *hptr = h;
- hptr = &(h->next);
- }
-
- /* Advance for next header line within the string */
-
- p = q;
- }
- }
+setup_header(user_message);
}
/*************************************************
-* Handle verification (address & other) *
+* Check client IP address matches CSA target *
*************************************************/
-/* This function implements the "verify" condition. It is called when
+/* Called from acl_verify_csa() below. This routine scans a section of a DNS
+response for address records belonging to the CSA target hostname. The section
+is specified by the reset argument, either RESET_ADDITIONAL or RESET_ANSWERS.
+If one of the addresses matches the client's IP address, then the client is
+authorized by CSA. If there are target IP addresses but none of them match
+then the client is using an unauthorized IP address. If there are no target IP
+addresses then the client cannot be using an authorized IP address. (This is
+an odd configuration - why didn't the SRV record have a weight of 1 instead?)
+
+Arguments:
+ dnsa the DNS answer block
+ dnss a DNS scan block for us to use
+ reset option specifing what portion to scan, as described above
+ target the target hostname to use for matching RR names
+
+Returns: CSA_OK successfully authorized
+ CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH addresses found but none matched
+ CSA_FAIL_NOADDR no target addresses found
+*/
+
+static int
+acl_verify_csa_address(dns_answer *dnsa, dns_scan *dnss, int reset,
+ uschar *target)
+{
+dns_record *rr;
+dns_address *da;
+
+BOOL target_found = FALSE;
+
+for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, reset);
+ rr != NULL;
+ rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, RESET_NEXT))
+ {
+ /* Check this is an address RR for the target hostname. */
+
+ if (rr->type != T_A
+ #if HAVE_IPV6
+ && rr->type != T_AAAA
+ #ifdef SUPPORT_A6
+ && rr->type != T_A6
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ ) continue;
+
+ if (strcmpic(target, rr->name) != 0) continue;
+
+ target_found = TRUE;
+
+ /* Turn the target address RR into a list of textual IP addresses and scan
+ the list. There may be more than one if it is an A6 RR. */
+
+ for (da = dns_address_from_rr(dnsa, rr); da != NULL; da = da->next)
+ {
+ /* If the client IP address matches the target IP address, it's good! */
+
+ DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target address is %s\n", da->address);
+
+ if (strcmpic(sender_host_address, da->address) == 0) return CSA_OK;
+ }
+ }
+
+/* If we found some target addresses but none of them matched, the client is
+using an unauthorized IP address, otherwise the target has no authorized IP
+addresses. */
+
+if (target_found) return CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH;
+else return CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
+}
+
+
+
+/*************************************************
+* Verify Client SMTP Authorization *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Called from acl_verify() below. This routine calls dns_lookup_special()
+to find the CSA SRV record corresponding to the domain argument, or
+$sender_helo_name if no argument is provided. It then checks that the
+client is authorized, and that its IP address corresponds to the SRV
+target's address by calling acl_verify_csa_address() above. The address
+should have been returned in the DNS response's ADDITIONAL section, but if
+not we perform another DNS lookup to get it.
+
+Arguments:
+ domain pointer to optional parameter following verify = csa
+
+Returns: CSA_UNKNOWN no valid CSA record found
+ CSA_OK successfully authorized
+ CSA_FAIL_* client is definitely not authorized
+ CSA_DEFER_* there was a DNS problem
+*/
+
+static int
+acl_verify_csa(uschar *domain)
+{
+tree_node *t;
+uschar *found, *p;
+int priority, weight, port;
+dns_answer dnsa;
+dns_scan dnss;
+dns_record *rr;
+int rc, type;
+uschar target[256];
+
+/* Work out the domain we are using for the CSA lookup. The default is the
+client's HELO domain. If the client has not said HELO, use its IP address
+instead. If it's a local client (exim -bs), CSA isn't applicable. */
+
+while (isspace(*domain) && *domain != '\0') ++domain;
+if (*domain == '\0') domain = sender_helo_name;
+if (domain == NULL) domain = sender_host_address;
+if (sender_host_address == NULL) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
+
+/* If we have an address literal, strip off the framing ready for turning it
+into a domain. The framing consists of matched square brackets possibly
+containing a keyword and a colon before the actual IP address. */
+
+if (domain[0] == '[')
+ {
+ uschar *start = Ustrchr(domain, ':');
+ if (start == NULL) start = domain;
+ domain = string_copyn(start + 1, Ustrlen(start) - 2);
+ }
+
+/* Turn domains that look like bare IP addresses into domains in the reverse
+DNS. This code also deals with address literals and $sender_host_address. It's
+not quite kosher to treat bare domains such as EHLO 192.0.2.57 the same as
+address literals, but it's probably the most friendly thing to do. This is an
+extension to CSA, so we allow it to be turned off for proper conformance. */
+
+if (string_is_ip_address(domain, NULL) != 0)
+ {
+ if (!dns_csa_use_reverse) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
+ dns_build_reverse(domain, target);
+ domain = target;
+ }
+
+/* Find out if we've already done the CSA check for this domain. If we have,
+return the same result again. Otherwise build a new cached result structure
+for this domain. The name is filled in now, and the value is filled in when
+we return from this function. */
+
+t = tree_search(csa_cache, domain);
+if (t != NULL) return t->data.val;
+
+t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(domain));
+Ustrcpy(t->name, domain);
+(void)tree_insertnode(&csa_cache, t);
+
+/* Now we are ready to do the actual DNS lookup(s). */
+
+found = domain;
+switch (dns_special_lookup(&dnsa, domain, T_CSA, &found))
+ {
+ /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
+
+ default:
+ return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_SRV;
+
+ /* If we found nothing, the client's authorization is unknown. */
+
+ case DNS_NOMATCH:
+ case DNS_NODATA:
+ return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
+
+ /* We got something! Go on to look at the reply in more detail. */
+
+ case DNS_SUCCEED:
+ break;
+ }
+
+/* Scan the reply for well-formed CSA SRV records. */
+
+for (rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
+ rr != NULL;
+ rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT))
+ {
+ if (rr->type != T_SRV) continue;
+
+ /* Extract the numerical SRV fields (p is incremented) */
+
+ p = rr->data;
+ GETSHORT(priority, p);
+ GETSHORT(weight, p);
+ GETSHORT(port, p);
+
+ DEBUG(D_acl)
+ debug_printf("CSA priority=%d weight=%d port=%d\n", priority, weight, port);
+
+ /* Check the CSA version number */
+
+ if (priority != 1) continue;
+
+ /* If the domain does not have a CSA SRV record of its own (i.e. the domain
+ found by dns_special_lookup() is a parent of the one we asked for), we check
+ the subdomain assertions in the port field. At the moment there's only one
+ assertion: legitimate SMTP clients are all explicitly authorized with CSA
+ SRV records of their own. */
+
+ if (found != domain)
+ {
+ if (port & 1)
+ return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT;
+ else
+ return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+
+ /* This CSA SRV record refers directly to our domain, so we check the value
+ in the weight field to work out the domain's authorization. 0 and 1 are
+ unauthorized; 3 means the client is authorized but we can't check the IP
+ address in order to authenticate it, so we treat it as unknown; values
+ greater than 3 are undefined. */
+
+ if (weight < 2) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN;
+
+ if (weight > 2) continue;
+
+ /* Weight == 2, which means the domain is authorized. We must check that the
+ client's IP address is listed as one of the SRV target addresses. Save the
+ target hostname then break to scan the additional data for its addresses. */
+
+ (void)dn_expand(dnsa.answer, dnsa.answer + dnsa.answerlen, p,
+ (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)target, sizeof(target));
+
+ DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target is %s\n", target);
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+/* If we didn't break the loop then no appropriate records were found. */
+
+if (rr == NULL) return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
+
+/* Do not check addresses if the target is ".", in accordance with RFC 2782.
+A target of "." indicates there are no valid addresses, so the client cannot
+be authorized. (This is an odd configuration because weight=2 target=. is
+equivalent to weight=1, but we check for it in order to keep load off the
+root name servers.) Note that dn_expand() turns "." into "". */
+
+if (Ustrcmp(target, "") == 0) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
+
+/* Scan the additional section of the CSA SRV reply for addresses belonging
+to the target. If the name server didn't return any additional data (e.g.
+because it does not fully support SRV records), we need to do another lookup
+to obtain the target addresses; otherwise we have a definitive result. */
+
+rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ADDITIONAL, target);
+if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
+
+/* The DNS lookup type corresponds to the IP version used by the client. */
+
+#if HAVE_IPV6
+if (Ustrchr(sender_host_address, ':') != NULL)
+ type = T_AAAA;
+else
+#endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */
+ type = T_A;
+
+
+#if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
+DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN:
+#endif
+
+switch (dns_lookup(&dnsa, target, type, NULL))
+ {
+ /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
+
+ default:
+ return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_ADDR;
+
+ /* If the query succeeded, scan the addresses and return the result. */
+
+ case DNS_SUCCEED:
+ rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS, target);
+ if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
+ /* else fall through */
+
+ /* If the target has no IP addresses, the client cannot have an authorized
+ IP address. However, if the target site uses A6 records (not AAAA records)
+ we have to do yet another lookup in order to check them. */
+
+ case DNS_NOMATCH:
+ case DNS_NODATA:
+
+ #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
+ if (type == T_AAAA) { type = T_A6; goto DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN; }
+ #endif
+
+ return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
+ }
+}
+
+
+
+/*************************************************
+* Handle verification (address & other) *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* This function implements the "verify" condition. It is called when
encountered in any ACL, because some tests are almost always permitted. Some
just don't make sense, and always fail (for example, an attempt to test a host
lookup for a non-TCP/IP message). Others are restricted to certain ACLs.
BOOL defer_ok = FALSE;
BOOL callout_defer_ok = FALSE;
BOOL no_details = FALSE;
+BOOL success_on_redirect = FALSE;
address_item *sender_vaddr = NULL;
uschar *verify_sender_address = NULL;
uschar *pm_mailfrom = NULL;
uschar *se_mailfrom = NULL;
+
+/* Some of the verify items have slash-separated options; some do not. Diagnose
+an error if options are given for items that don't expect them. This code has
+now got very message. Refactoring to use a table would be a good idea one day.
+*/
+
+uschar *slash = Ustrchr(arg, '/');
uschar *list = arg;
uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
if (strcmpic(ss, US"reverse_host_lookup") == 0)
{
+ if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
if (sender_host_address == NULL) return OK;
return acl_verify_reverse(user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
}
if (strcmpic(ss, US"certificate") == 0)
{
+ if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
if (tls_certificate_verified) return OK;
*user_msgptr = US"no verified certificate";
return FAIL;
}
-/* We can test the result of optional HELO verification */
+/* We can test the result of optional HELO verification that might have
+occurred earlier. If not, we can attempt the verification now. */
-if (strcmpic(ss, US"helo") == 0) return helo_verified? OK : FAIL;
+if (strcmpic(ss, US"helo") == 0)
+ {
+ if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
+ if (!helo_verified && !helo_verify_failed) smtp_verify_helo();
+ return helo_verified? OK : FAIL;
+ }
-/* Handle header verification options - permitted only after DATA or a non-SMTP
-message. */
+/* Do Client SMTP Authorization checks in a separate function, and turn the
+result code into user-friendly strings. */
-if (strncmpic(ss, US"header_", 7) == 0)
+if (strcmpic(ss, US"csa") == 0)
{
- if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
- {
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s "
- "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames[where]);
- return ERROR;
- }
+ rc = acl_verify_csa(list);
+ *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("client SMTP authorization %s",
+ csa_reason_string[rc]);
+ csa_status = csa_status_string[rc];
+ DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA result %s\n", csa_status);
+ return csa_return_code[rc];
+ }
- /* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct syntax. If there is
- a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to
- send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as
- always). */
+/* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct syntax. If there is
+a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to
+send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as
+always). */
- if (strcmpic(ss+7, US"syntax") == 0)
+if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_syntax") == 0)
+ {
+ if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
+ if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL;
+ rc = verify_check_headers(log_msgptr);
+ if (rc != OK && smtp_return_error_details && *log_msgptr != NULL)
+ *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+/* Check that no recipient of this message is "blind", that is, every envelope
+recipient must be mentioned in either To: or Cc:. */
+
+if (strcmpic(ss, US"not_blind") == 0)
+ {
+ if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
+ if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL;
+ rc = verify_check_notblind();
+ if (rc != OK)
{
- int rc = verify_check_headers(log_msgptr);
- if (rc != OK && smtp_return_error_details && *log_msgptr != NULL)
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bcc recipient detected");
+ if (smtp_return_error_details)
*user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
- return rc;
}
+ return rc;
+ }
- /* Check that there is at least one verifiable sender address in the relevant
- header lines. This can be followed by callout and defer options, just like
- sender and recipient. */
+/* The remaining verification tests check recipient and sender addresses,
+either from the envelope or from the header. There are a number of
+slash-separated options that are common to all of them. */
- else if (strcmpic(ss+7, US"sender") == 0) verify_header_sender = TRUE;
- /* Unknown verify argument starting with "header_" */
+/* Check that there is at least one verifiable sender address in the relevant
+header lines. This can be followed by callout and defer options, just like
+sender and recipient. */
- else goto BAD_VERIFY;
+if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_sender") == 0)
+ {
+ if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL;
+ verify_header_sender = TRUE;
}
/* Otherwise, first item in verify argument must be "sender" or "recipient".
}
}
-/* Remaining items are optional */
+/* Remaining items are optional; they apply to sender and recipient
+verification, including "header sender" verification. */
while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
!= NULL)
{
if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0) defer_ok = TRUE;
else if (strcmpic(ss, US"no_details") == 0) no_details = TRUE;
+ else if (strcmpic(ss, US"success_on_redirect") == 0) success_on_redirect = TRUE;
/* These two old options are left for backwards compatibility */
uschar *opt;
uschar buffer[256];
while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
-
- /* This callout option handling code has become a mess as new options
- have been added in an ad hoc manner. It should be tidied up into some
+
+ /* This callout option handling code has become a mess as new options
+ have been added in an ad hoc manner. It should be tidied up into some
kind of table-driven thing. */
-
+
while ((opt = string_nextinlist(&ss, &optsep, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
!= NULL)
{
else if (strcmpic(opt, US"use_postmaster") == 0)
verify_options |= vopt_callout_recippmaster;
else if (strcmpic(opt, US"postmaster") == 0) pm_mailfrom = US"";
+ else if (strcmpic(opt, US"fullpostmaster") == 0)
+ {
+ pm_mailfrom = US"";
+ verify_options |= vopt_callout_fullpm;
+ }
else if (strncmpic(opt, US"mailfrom", 8) == 0)
{
if (verify_header_sender)
{
+ int verrno;
rc = verify_check_header_address(user_msgptr, log_msgptr, callout,
- callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, verify_options);
- if (smtp_return_error_details)
+ callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, verify_options,
+ &verrno);
+ if (rc != OK)
{
- if (*user_msgptr == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL)
- *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
- if (rc == DEFER) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
+ *basic_errno = verrno;
+ if (smtp_return_error_details)
+ {
+ if (*user_msgptr == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL)
+ *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
+ if (rc == DEFER) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
+ }
}
}
{
BOOL routed = TRUE;
uschar *save_address_data = deliver_address_data;
-
+
sender_vaddr = deliver_make_addr(verify_sender_address, TRUE);
if (no_details) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_sverify_told);
if (verify_sender_address[0] != 0)
else
verify_options |= vopt_fake_sender;
+ if (success_on_redirect)
+ verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect;
+
/* The recipient, qualify, and expn options are never set in
verify_options. */
sender_vaddr->special_action = rc;
sender_vaddr->next = sender_verified_list;
sender_verified_list = sender_vaddr;
-
- /* Restore the recipient address data, which might have been clobbered by
+
+ /* Restore the recipient address data, which might have been clobbered by
the sender verification. */
-
+
deliver_address_data = save_address_data;
}
-
+
/* Put the sender address_data value into $sender_address_data */
- sender_address_data = sender_vaddr->p.address_data;
+ sender_address_data = sender_vaddr->p.address_data;
}
/* A recipient address just gets a straightforward verify; again we must handle
{
address_item addr2;
+ if (success_on_redirect)
+ verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect;
+
/* We must use a copy of the address for verification, because it might
get rewritten. */
rc = verify_address(&addr2, NULL, verify_options|vopt_is_recipient, callout,
callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, NULL);
HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
- *log_msgptr = addr2.message;
- *user_msgptr = addr2.user_message;
+
*basic_errno = addr2.basic_errno;
+ *log_msgptr = addr2.message;
+ *user_msgptr = (addr2.user_message != NULL)?
+ addr2.user_message : addr2.message;
+
+ /* Allow details for temporary error if the address is so flagged. */
+ if (testflag((&addr2), af_pass_message)) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
/* Make $address_data visible */
deliver_address_data = addr2.p.address_data;
}
-/* We have a result from the relevant test. Handle defer overrides first. */
+/* We have a result from the relevant test. Handle defer overrides first. */
+
+if (rc == DEFER && (defer_ok ||
+ (callout_defer_ok && *basic_errno == ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)))
+ {
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("verify defer overridden by %s\n",
+ defer_ok? "defer_ok" : "callout_defer_ok");
+ rc = OK;
+ }
+
+/* If we've failed a sender, set up a recipient message, and point
+sender_verified_failed to the address item that actually failed. */
+
+if (rc != OK && verify_sender_address != NULL)
+ {
+ if (rc != DEFER)
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Sender verify failed";
+ }
+ else if (*basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify";
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify callout";
+ *user_msgptr = smtp_return_error_details? sender_vaddr->user_message :
+ *log_msgptr;
+ }
+
+ sender_verified_failed = sender_vaddr;
+ }
+
+/* Verifying an address messes up the values of $domain and $local_part,
+so reset them before returning if this is a RCPT ACL. */
+
+if (addr != NULL)
+ {
+ deliver_domain = addr->domain;
+ deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
+ }
+return rc;
+
+/* Syntax errors in the verify argument come here. */
+
+BAD_VERIFY:
+*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("expected \"sender[=address]\", \"recipient\", "
+ "\"helo\", \"header_syntax\", \"header_sender\" or "
+ "\"reverse_host_lookup\" at start of ACL condition "
+ "\"verify %s\"", arg);
+return ERROR;
+
+/* Options supplied when not allowed come here */
+
+NO_OPTIONS:
+*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unexpected '/' found in \"%s\" "
+ "(this verify item has no options)", arg);
+return ERROR;
+
+/* Calls in the wrong ACL come here */
+
+WRONG_ACL:
+*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s "
+ "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames[where]);
+return ERROR;
+}
+
+
+
+
+/*************************************************
+* Check argument for control= modifier *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Called from acl_check_condition() below
+
+Arguments:
+ arg the argument string for control=
+ pptr set to point to the terminating character
+ where which ACL we are in
+ log_msgptr for error messages
+
+Returns: CONTROL_xxx value
+*/
+
+static int
+decode_control(uschar *arg, uschar **pptr, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
+{
+int len;
+control_def *d;
+
+for (d = controls_list;
+ d < controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def);
+ d++)
+ {
+ len = Ustrlen(d->name);
+ if (Ustrncmp(d->name, arg, len) == 0) break;
+ }
+
+if (d >= controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def) ||
+ (arg[len] != 0 && (!d->has_option || arg[len] != '/')))
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
+ return CONTROL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+*pptr = arg + len;
+return d->value;
+}
+
+
+
+
+/*************************************************
+* Return a ratelimit error *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Called from acl_ratelimit() below
+
+Arguments:
+ log_msgptr for error messages
+ format format string
+ ... supplementary arguments
+ ss ratelimit option name
+ where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
+
+Returns: ERROR
+*/
+
+static int
+ratelimit_error(uschar **log_msgptr, const char *format, ...)
+{
+va_list ap;
+uschar buffer[STRING_SPRINTF_BUFFER_SIZE];
+va_start(ap, format);
+if (!string_vformat(buffer, sizeof(buffer), format, ap))
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE,
+ "string_sprintf expansion was longer than %d", sizeof(buffer));
+va_end(ap);
+*log_msgptr = string_sprintf(
+ "error in arguments to \"ratelimit\" condition: %s", buffer);
+return ERROR;
+}
+
+
+
+
+/*************************************************
+* Handle rate limiting *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Called by acl_check_condition() below to calculate the result
+of the ACL ratelimit condition.
+
+Note that the return value might be slightly unexpected: if the
+sender's rate is above the limit then the result is OK. This is
+similar to the dnslists condition, and is so that you can write
+ACL clauses like: defer ratelimit = 15 / 1h
+
+Arguments:
+ arg the option string for ratelimit=
+ where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
+ log_msgptr for error messages
+
+Returns: OK - Sender's rate is above limit
+ FAIL - Sender's rate is below limit
+ DEFER - Problem opening ratelimit database
+ ERROR - Syntax error in options.
+*/
+
+static int
+acl_ratelimit(uschar *arg, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
+{
+double limit, period, count;
+uschar *ss;
+uschar *key = NULL;
+uschar *unique = NULL;
+int sep = '/';
+BOOL leaky = FALSE, strict = FALSE, readonly = FALSE;
+BOOL noupdate = FALSE, badacl = FALSE;
+int mode = RATE_PER_WHAT;
+int old_pool, rc;
+tree_node **anchor, *t;
+open_db dbblock, *dbm;
+int dbdb_size;
+dbdata_ratelimit *dbd;
+dbdata_ratelimit_unique *dbdb;
+struct timeval tv;
+
+/* Parse the first two options and record their values in expansion
+variables. These variables allow the configuration to have informative
+error messages based on rate limits obtained from a table lookup. */
+
+/* First is the maximum number of messages per period / maximum burst
+size, which must be greater than or equal to zero. Zero is useful for
+rate measurement as opposed to rate limiting. */
+
+sender_rate_limit = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
+if (sender_rate_limit == NULL)
+ limit = -1.0;
+else
+ {
+ limit = Ustrtod(sender_rate_limit, &ss);
+ if (tolower(*ss) == 'k') { limit *= 1024.0; ss++; }
+ else if (tolower(*ss) == 'm') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
+ else if (tolower(*ss) == 'g') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
+ }
+if (limit < 0.0 || *ss != '\0')
+ return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
+ "\"%s\" is not a positive number", sender_rate_limit);
+
+/* Second is the rate measurement period / exponential smoothing time
+constant. This must be strictly greater than zero, because zero leads to
+run-time division errors. */
+
+sender_rate_period = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
+if (sender_rate_period == NULL) period = -1.0;
+else period = readconf_readtime(sender_rate_period, 0, FALSE);
+if (period <= 0.0)
+ return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
+ "\"%s\" is not a time value", sender_rate_period);
+
+/* By default we are counting one of something, but the per_rcpt,
+per_byte, and count options can change this. */
+
+count = 1.0;
+
+/* Parse the other options. */
+
+while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
+ != NULL)
+ {
+ if (strcmpic(ss, US"leaky") == 0) leaky = TRUE;
+ else if (strcmpic(ss, US"strict") == 0) strict = TRUE;
+ else if (strcmpic(ss, US"noupdate") == 0) noupdate = TRUE;
+ else if (strcmpic(ss, US"readonly") == 0) readonly = TRUE;
+ else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_cmd") == 0) RATE_SET(mode, PER_CMD);
+ else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_conn") == 0)
+ {
+ RATE_SET(mode, PER_CONN);
+ if (where == ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP || where == ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)
+ badacl = TRUE;
+ }
+ else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_mail") == 0)
+ {
+ RATE_SET(mode, PER_MAIL);
+ if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) badacl = TRUE;
+ }
+ else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_rcpt") == 0)
+ {
+ /* If we are running in the RCPT ACL, then we'll count the recipients
+ one by one, but if we are running when we have accumulated the whole
+ list then we'll add them all in one batch. */
+ if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT)
+ RATE_SET(mode, PER_RCPT);
+ else if (where >= ACL_WHERE_PREDATA && where <= ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
+ RATE_SET(mode, PER_ALLRCPTS), count = (double)recipients_count;
+ else if (where == ACL_WHERE_MAIL || where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
+ RATE_SET(mode, PER_RCPT), badacl = TRUE;
+ }
+ else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_byte") == 0)
+ {
+ /* If we have not yet received the message data and there was no SIZE
+ declaration on the MAIL comand, then it's safe to just use a value of
+ zero and let the recorded rate decay as if nothing happened. */
+ RATE_SET(mode, PER_MAIL);
+ if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) badacl = TRUE;
+ else count = message_size < 0 ? 0.0 : (double)message_size;
+ }
+ else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_addr") == 0)
+ {
+ RATE_SET(mode, PER_RCPT);
+ if (where != ACL_WHERE_RCPT) badacl = TRUE, unique = "*";
+ else unique = string_sprintf("%s@%s", deliver_localpart, deliver_domain);
+ }
+ else if (strncmpic(ss, US"count=", 6) == 0)
+ {
+ uschar *e;
+ count = Ustrtod(ss+6, &e);
+ if (count < 0.0 || *e != '\0')
+ return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
+ "\"%s\" is not a positive number", ss);
+ }
+ else if (strncmpic(ss, US"unique=", 7) == 0)
+ unique = string_copy(ss + 7);
+ else if (key == NULL)
+ key = string_copy(ss);
+ else
+ key = string_sprintf("%s/%s", key, ss);
+ }
+
+/* Sanity check. When the badacl flag is set the update mode must either
+be readonly (which is the default if it is omitted) or, for backwards
+compatibility, a combination of noupdate and strict or leaky. */
+
+if (mode == RATE_PER_CLASH)
+ return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "conflicting per_* options");
+if (leaky + strict + readonly > 1)
+ return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "conflicting update modes");
+if (badacl && (leaky || strict) && !noupdate)
+ return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
+ "\"%s\" must not have /leaky or /strict option in %s ACL",
+ ratelimit_option_string[mode], acl_wherenames[where]);
+
+/* Set the default values of any unset options. In readonly mode we
+perform the rate computation without any increment so that its value
+decays to eventually allow over-limit senders through. */
+
+if (noupdate) readonly = TRUE, leaky = strict = FALSE;
+if (badacl) readonly = TRUE;
+if (readonly) count = 0.0;
+if (!strict && !readonly) leaky = TRUE;
+if (mode == RATE_PER_WHAT) mode = RATE_PER_MAIL;
+
+/* Create the lookup key. If there is no explicit key, use sender_host_address.
+If there is no sender_host_address (e.g. -bs or acl_not_smtp) then we simply
+omit it. The smoothing constant (sender_rate_period) and the per_xxx options
+are added to the key because they alter the meaning of the stored data. */
+
+if (key == NULL)
+ key = (sender_host_address == NULL)? US"" : sender_host_address;
+
+key = string_sprintf("%s/%s/%s%s",
+ sender_rate_period,
+ ratelimit_option_string[mode],
+ unique == NULL ? "" : "unique/",
+ key);
+
+HDEBUG(D_acl)
+ debug_printf("ratelimit condition count=%.0f %.1f/%s\n", count, limit, key);
+
+/* See if we have already computed the rate by looking in the relevant tree.
+For per-connection rate limiting, store tree nodes and dbdata in the permanent
+pool so that they survive across resets. In readonly mode we only remember the
+result for the rest of this command in case a later command changes it. After
+this bit of logic the code is independent of the per_* mode. */
+
+old_pool = store_pool;
+
+if (readonly)
+ anchor = &ratelimiters_cmd;
+else switch(mode) {
+case RATE_PER_CONN:
+ anchor = &ratelimiters_conn;
+ store_pool = POOL_PERM;
+ break;
+case RATE_PER_BYTE:
+case RATE_PER_MAIL:
+case RATE_PER_ALLRCPTS:
+ anchor = &ratelimiters_mail;
+ break;
+case RATE_PER_ADDR:
+case RATE_PER_CMD:
+case RATE_PER_RCPT:
+ anchor = &ratelimiters_cmd;
+ break;
+default:
+ anchor = NULL; /* silence an "unused" complaint */
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE,
+ "internal ACL error: unknown ratelimit mode %d", mode);
+ break;
+}
+
+t = tree_search(*anchor, key);
+if (t != NULL)
+ {
+ dbd = t->data.ptr;
+ /* The following few lines duplicate some of the code below. */
+ rc = (dbd->rate < limit)? FAIL : OK;
+ store_pool = old_pool;
+ sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
+ HDEBUG(D_acl)
+ debug_printf("ratelimit found pre-computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+/* We aren't using a pre-computed rate, so get a previously recorded rate
+from the database, which will be updated and written back if required. */
-if (rc == DEFER && (defer_ok ||
- (callout_defer_ok && *basic_errno == ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)))
+dbm = dbfn_open(US"ratelimit", O_RDWR, &dbblock, TRUE);
+if (dbm == NULL)
{
- HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("verify defer overridden by %s\n",
- defer_ok? "defer_ok" : "callout_defer_ok");
- rc = OK;
+ store_pool = old_pool;
+ sender_rate = NULL;
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit database not available\n");
+ *log_msgptr = US"ratelimit database not available";
+ return DEFER;
}
+dbdb = dbfn_read_with_length(dbm, key, &dbdb_size);
+dbd = NULL;
-/* If we've failed a sender, set up a recipient message, and point
-sender_verified_failed to the address item that actually failed. */
+gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
-if (rc != OK && verify_sender_address != NULL)
+if (dbdb != NULL)
{
- if (rc != DEFER)
+ /* Locate the basic ratelimit block inside the DB data. */
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit found key in database\n");
+ dbd = &dbdb->dbd;
+
+ /* Forget the old Bloom filter if it is too old, so that we count each
+ repeating event once per period. We don't simply clear and re-use the old
+ filter because we want its size to change if the limit changes. Note that
+ we keep the dbd pointer for copying the rate into the new data block. */
+
+ if(unique != NULL && tv.tv_sec > dbdb->bloom_epoch + period)
{
- *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Sender verify failed";
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit discarding old Bloom filter\n");
+ dbdb = NULL;
}
- else if (*basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
+
+ /* Sanity check. */
+
+ if(unique != NULL && dbdb_size < sizeof(*dbdb))
{
- *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify";
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit discarding undersize Bloom filter\n");
+ dbdb = NULL;
}
- else
+ }
+
+/* Allocate a new data block if the database lookup failed
+or the Bloom filter passed its age limit. */
+
+if (dbdb == NULL)
+ {
+ if (unique == NULL)
{
- *log_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify callout";
- *user_msgptr = smtp_return_error_details? sender_vaddr->user_message :
- *log_msgptr;
+ /* No Bloom filter. This basic ratelimit block is initialized below. */
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit creating new rate data block\n");
+ dbdb_size = sizeof(*dbd);
+ dbdb = store_get(dbdb_size);
}
+ else
+ {
+ int extra;
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit creating new Bloom filter\n");
- sender_verified_failed = sender_vaddr;
- }
+ /* See the long comment below for an explanation of the magic number 2.
+ The filter has a minimum size in case the rate limit is very small;
+ this is determined by the definition of dbdata_ratelimit_unique. */
-/* Verifying an address messes up the values of $domain and $local_part,
-so reset them before returning if this is a RCPT ACL. */
+ extra = (int)limit * 2 - sizeof(dbdb->bloom);
+ if (extra < 0) extra = 0;
+ dbdb_size = sizeof(*dbdb) + extra;
+ dbdb = store_get(dbdb_size);
+ dbdb->bloom_epoch = tv.tv_sec;
+ dbdb->bloom_size = sizeof(dbdb->bloom) + extra;
+ memset(dbdb->bloom, 0, dbdb->bloom_size);
-if (addr != NULL)
- {
- deliver_domain = addr->domain;
- deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
- }
-return rc;
+ /* Preserve any basic ratelimit data (which is our longer-term memory)
+ by copying it from the discarded block. */
-/* Syntax errors in the verify argument come here. */
+ if (dbd != NULL)
+ {
+ dbdb->dbd = *dbd;
+ dbd = &dbdb->dbd;
+ }
+ }
+ }
-BAD_VERIFY:
-*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("expected \"sender[=address]\", \"recipient\", "
- "\"header_syntax\" or \"header_sender\" at start of ACL condition "
- "\"verify %s\"", arg);
-return ERROR;
-}
+/* If we are counting unique events, find out if this event is new or not.
+If the client repeats the event during the current period then it should be
+counted. We skip this code in readonly mode for efficiency, because any
+changes to the filter will be discarded and because count is already set to
+zero. */
+if (unique != NULL && !readonly)
+ {
+ /* We identify unique events using a Bloom filter. (You can find my
+ notes on Bloom filters at http://fanf.livejournal.com/81696.html)
+ With the per_addr option, an "event" is a recipient address, though the
+ user can use the unique option to define their own events. We only count
+ an event if we have not seen it before.
+
+ We size the filter according to the rate limit, which (in leaky mode)
+ is the limit on the population of the filter. We allow 16 bits of space
+ per entry (see the construction code above) and we set (up to) 8 of them
+ when inserting an element (see the loop below). The probability of a false
+ positive (an event we have not seen before but which we fail to count) is
+
+ size = limit * 16
+ numhash = 8
+ allzero = exp(-numhash * pop / size)
+ = exp(-0.5 * pop / limit)
+ fpr = pow(1 - allzero, numhash)
+
+ For senders at the limit the fpr is 0.06% or 1 in 1700
+ and for senders at half the limit it is 0.0006% or 1 in 170000
+
+ In strict mode the Bloom filter can fill up beyond the normal limit, in
+ which case the false positive rate will rise. This means that the
+ measured rate for very fast senders can bogusly drop off after a while.
+
+ At twice the limit, the fpr is 2.5% or 1 in 40
+ At four times the limit, it is 31% or 1 in 3.2
+
+ It takes ln(pop/limit) periods for an over-limit burst of pop events to
+ decay below the limit, and if this is more than one then the Bloom filter
+ will be discarded before the decay gets that far. The false positive rate
+ at this threshold is 9.3% or 1 in 10.7. */
+
+ BOOL seen;
+ unsigned n, hash, hinc;
+ uschar md5sum[16];
+ md5 md5info;
+
+ /* Instead of using eight independent hash values, we combine two values
+ using the formula h1 + n * h2. This does not harm the Bloom filter's
+ performance, and means the amount of hash we need is independent of the
+ number of bits we set in the filter. */
+
+ md5_start(&md5info);
+ md5_end(&md5info, unique, Ustrlen(unique), md5sum);
+ hash = md5sum[0] | md5sum[1] << 8 | md5sum[2] << 16 | md5sum[3] << 24;
+ hinc = md5sum[4] | md5sum[5] << 8 | md5sum[6] << 16 | md5sum[7] << 24;
+
+ /* Scan the bits corresponding to this event. A zero bit means we have
+ not seen it before. Ensure all bits are set to record this event. */
+
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit checking uniqueness of %s\n", unique);
+
+ seen = TRUE;
+ for (n = 0; n < 8; n++, hash += hinc)
+ {
+ int bit = 1 << (hash % 8);
+ int byte = (hash / 8) % dbdb->bloom_size;
+ if ((dbdb->bloom[byte] & bit) == 0)
+ {
+ dbdb->bloom[byte] |= bit;
+ seen = FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+ /* If this event has occurred before, do not count it. */
+ if (seen)
+ {
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit event found in Bloom filter\n");
+ count = 0.0;
+ }
+ else
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit event added to Bloom filter\n");
+ }
-/*************************************************
-* Check argument for control= modifier *
-*************************************************/
+/* If there was no previous ratelimit data block for this key, initialize
+the new one, otherwise update the block from the database. The initial rate
+is what would be computed by the code below for an infinite interval. */
-/* Called from acl_check_condition() below
+if (dbd == NULL)
+ {
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit initializing new key's rate data\n");
+ dbd = &dbdb->dbd;
+ dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
+ dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
+ dbd->rate = count;
+ }
+else
+ {
+ /* The smoothed rate is computed using an exponentially weighted moving
+ average adjusted for variable sampling intervals. The standard EWMA for
+ a fixed sampling interval is: f'(t) = (1 - a) * f(t) + a * f'(t - 1)
+ where f() is the measured value and f'() is the smoothed value.
+
+ Old data decays out of the smoothed value exponentially, such that data n
+ samples old is multiplied by a^n. The exponential decay time constant p
+ is defined such that data p samples old is multiplied by 1/e, which means
+ that a = exp(-1/p). We can maintain the same time constant for a variable
+ sampling interval i by using a = exp(-i/p).
+
+ The rate we are measuring is messages per period, suitable for directly
+ comparing with the limit. The average rate between now and the previous
+ message is period / interval, which we feed into the EWMA as the sample.
+
+ It turns out that the number of messages required for the smoothed rate
+ to reach the limit when they are sent in a burst is equal to the limit.
+ This can be seen by analysing the value of the smoothed rate after N
+ messages sent at even intervals. Let k = (1 - a) * p/i
+
+ rate_1 = (1 - a) * p/i + a * rate_0
+ = k + a * rate_0
+ rate_2 = k + a * rate_1
+ = k + a * k + a^2 * rate_0
+ rate_3 = k + a * k + a^2 * k + a^3 * rate_0
+ rate_N = rate_0 * a^N + k * SUM(x=0..N-1)(a^x)
+ = rate_0 * a^N + k * (1 - a^N) / (1 - a)
+ = rate_0 * a^N + p/i * (1 - a^N)
+
+ When N is large, a^N -> 0 so rate_N -> p/i as desired.
+
+ rate_N = p/i + (rate_0 - p/i) * a^N
+ a^N = (rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i)
+ N * -i/p = log((rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i))
+ N = p/i * log((rate_0 - p/i) / (rate_N - p/i))
+
+ Numerical analysis of the above equation, setting the computed rate to
+ increase from rate_0 = 0 to rate_N = limit, shows that for large sending
+ rates, p/i, the number of messages N = limit. So limit serves as both the
+ maximum rate measured in messages per period, and the maximum number of
+ messages that can be sent in a fast burst. */
+
+ double this_time = (double)tv.tv_sec
+ + (double)tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0;
+ double prev_time = (double)dbd->time_stamp
+ + (double)dbd->time_usec / 1000000.0;
+
+ /* We must avoid division by zero, and deal gracefully with the clock going
+ backwards. If we blunder ahead when time is in reverse then the computed
+ rate will be bogus. To be safe we clamp interval to a very small number. */
+
+ double interval = this_time - prev_time <= 0.0 ? 1e-9
+ : this_time - prev_time;
+
+ double i_over_p = interval / period;
+ double a = exp(-i_over_p);
+
+ /* Combine the instantaneous rate (period / interval) with the previous rate
+ using the smoothing factor a. In order to measure sized events, multiply the
+ instantaneous rate by the count of bytes or recipients etc. */
+
+ dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
+ dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
+ dbd->rate = (1 - a) * count / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
+
+ /* When events are very widely spaced the computed rate tends towards zero.
+ Although this is accurate it turns out not to be useful for our purposes,
+ especially when the first event after a long silence is the start of a spam
+ run. A more useful model is that the rate for an isolated event should be the
+ size of the event per the period size, ignoring the lack of events outside
+ the current period and regardless of where the event falls in the period. So,
+ if the interval was so long that the calculated rate is unhelpfully small, we
+ re-intialize the rate. In the absence of higher-rate bursts, the condition
+ below is true if the interval is greater than the period. */
+
+ if (dbd->rate < count) dbd->rate = count;
+ }
-Arguments:
- arg the argument string for control=
- pptr set to point to the terminating character
- where which ACL we are in
- log_msgptr for error messages
+/* Clients sending at the limit are considered to be over the limit.
+This matters for edge cases such as a limit of zero, when the client
+should be completely blocked. */
-Returns: CONTROL_xxx value
-*/
+rc = (dbd->rate < limit)? FAIL : OK;
-static int
-decode_control(uschar *arg, uschar **pptr, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
-{
-int len;
-control_def *d;
+/* Update the state if the rate is low or if we are being strict. If we
+are in leaky mode and the sender's rate is too high, we do not update
+the recorded rate in order to avoid an over-aggressive sender's retry
+rate preventing them from getting any email through. If readonly is set,
+neither leaky nor strict are set, so we do not do any updates. */
-for (d = controls_list;
- d < controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def);
- d++)
+if ((rc == FAIL && leaky) || strict)
{
- len = Ustrlen(d->name);
- if (Ustrncmp(d->name, arg, len) == 0) break;
+ dbfn_write(dbm, key, dbdb, dbdb_size);
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit db updated\n");
}
-
-if (d >= controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def) ||
- (arg[len] != 0 && (!d->has_option || arg[len] != '/')))
+else
{
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
- return CONTROL_ERROR;
+ HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit db not updated: %s\n",
+ readonly? "readonly mode" : "over the limit, but leaky");
}
-*pptr = arg + len;
-return d->value;
+dbfn_close(dbm);
+
+/* Store the result in the tree for future reference. */
+
+t = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(key));
+t->data.ptr = dbd;
+Ustrcpy(t->name, key);
+(void)tree_insertnode(anchor, t);
+
+/* We create the formatted version of the sender's rate very late in
+order to ensure that it is done using the correct storage pool. */
+
+store_pool = old_pool;
+sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
+
+HDEBUG(D_acl)
+ debug_printf("ratelimit computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
+
+return rc;
}
{
uschar *user_message = NULL;
uschar *log_message = NULL;
-uschar *p;
+uschar *debug_tag = NULL;
+uschar *debug_opts = NULL;
+uschar *p = NULL;
int rc = OK;
#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
int sep = '/';
for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next)
{
uschar *arg;
- int control_type;
+ int control_type;
/* The message and log_message items set up messages to be used in
case of rejection. They are expanded later. */
if (cb->type == ACLC_SET)
{
- int n = cb->u.varnumber;
- int t = (n < ACL_C_MAX)? 'c' : 'm';
- if (n >= ACL_C_MAX) n -= ACL_C_MAX;
- debug_printf("acl_%c%d ", t, n);
- lhswidth += 7;
+ debug_printf("acl_%s ", cb->u.varname);
+ lhswidth += 5 + Ustrlen(cb->u.varname);
}
debug_printf("= %s\n", cb->arg);
switch(cb->type)
{
+ case ACLC_ADD_HEADER:
+ setup_header(arg);
+ break;
+
/* A nested ACL that returns "discard" makes sense only for an "accept" or
"discard" verb. */
TRUE, NULL);
break;
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
+ #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
case ACLC_BMI_OPTIN:
{
int old_pool = store_pool;
store_pool = old_pool;
}
break;
-#endif
+ #endif
case ACLC_CONDITION:
+ /* The true/false parsing here should be kept in sync with that used in
+ expand.c when dealing with ECOND_BOOL so that we don't have too many
+ different definitions of what can be a boolean. */
if (Ustrspn(arg, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg)) /* Digits, or empty */
rc = (Uatoi(arg) == 0)? FAIL : OK;
else
*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("invalid \"condition\" value \"%s\"", arg);
break;
+ case ACLC_CONTINUE: /* Always succeeds */
+ break;
+
case ACLC_CONTROL:
control_type = decode_control(arg, &p, where, log_msgptr);
*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot use \"control=%s\" in %s ACL",
controls[control_type], acl_wherenames[where]);
return ERROR;
- }
+ }
switch(control_type)
{
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
+ case CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED:
+ allow_auth_unadvertised = TRUE;
+ break;
+
+ #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
case CONTROL_BMI_RUN:
bmi_run = 1;
break;
-#endif
-
+ #endif
+
+ #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
+ case CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY:
+ dkim_disable_verify = TRUE;
+ break;
+ #endif
+
case CONTROL_ERROR:
return ERROR;
smtp_enforce_sync = FALSE;
break;
-#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
+ #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
case CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL:
no_mbox_unspool = TRUE;
break;
-#endif
+ #endif
case CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE:
no_multiline_responses = TRUE;
break;
+ case CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING:
+ pipelining_enable = FALSE;
+ break;
+
+ case CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH:
+ disable_delay_flush = TRUE;
+ break;
+
+ case CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH:
+ disable_callout_flush = TRUE;
+ break;
+
+ case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER:
case CONTROL_FAKEREJECT:
- fake_reject = TRUE;
+ fake_response = (control_type == CONTROL_FAKEDEFER) ? DEFER : FAIL;
if (*p == '/')
- {
+ {
uschar *pp = p + 1;
- while (*pp != 0) pp++;
- fake_reject_text = expand_string(string_copyn(p+1, pp-p));
+ while (*pp != 0) pp++;
+ fake_response_text = expand_string(string_copyn(p+1, pp-p-1));
p = pp;
}
else
{
/* Explicitly reset to default string */
- fake_reject_text = US"Your message has been rejected but is being kept for evaluation.\nIf it was a legit message, it may still be delivered to the target recipient(s).";
+ fake_response_text = US"Your message has been rejected but is being kept for evaluation.\nIf it was a legitimate message, it may still be delivered to the target recipient(s).";
}
break;
case CONTROL_FREEZE:
deliver_freeze = TRUE;
deliver_frozen_at = time(NULL);
+ freeze_tell = freeze_tell_config; /* Reset to configured value */
+ if (Ustrncmp(p, "/no_tell", 8) == 0)
+ {
+ p += 8;
+ freeze_tell = NULL;
+ }
+ if (*p != 0)
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
+ return ERROR;
+ }
break;
case CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY:
break;
case CONTROL_SUBMISSION:
+ originator_name = US"";
submission_mode = TRUE;
while (*p == '/')
- {
+ {
if (Ustrncmp(p, "/sender_retain", 14) == 0)
{
p += 14;
active_local_sender_retain = TRUE;
- active_local_from_check = FALSE;
- }
+ active_local_from_check = FALSE;
+ }
else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/domain=", 8) == 0)
{
uschar *pp = p + 8;
- while (*pp != 0 && *pp != '/') pp++;
- submission_domain = string_copyn(p+8, pp-p);
- p = pp;
+ while (*pp != 0 && *pp != '/') pp++;
+ submission_domain = string_copyn(p+8, pp-p-8);
+ p = pp;
}
- else break;
- }
+ /* The name= option must be last, because it swallows the rest of
+ the string. */
+ else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/name=", 6) == 0)
+ {
+ uschar *pp = p + 6;
+ while (*pp != 0) pp++;
+ submission_name = string_copy(parse_fix_phrase(p+6, pp-p-6,
+ big_buffer, big_buffer_size));
+ p = pp;
+ }
+ else break;
+ }
if (*p != 0)
{
*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
return ERROR;
}
break;
+
+ case CONTROL_DEBUG:
+ while (*p == '/')
+ {
+ if (Ustrncmp(p, "/tag=", 5) == 0)
+ {
+ uschar *pp = p + 5;
+ while (*pp != '\0' && *pp != '/') pp++;
+ debug_tag = string_copyn(p+5, pp-p-5);
+ p = pp;
+ }
+ else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/opts=", 6) == 0)
+ {
+ uschar *pp = p + 6;
+ while (*pp != '\0' && *pp != '/') pp++;
+ debug_opts = string_copyn(p+6, pp-p-6);
+ p = pp;
+ }
+ }
+ debug_logging_activate(debug_tag, debug_opts);
+ break;
+
+ case CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS:
+ suppress_local_fixups = TRUE;
+ break;
}
break;
-#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
+ #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
+ case ACLC_DCC:
+ {
+ /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
+ uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
+ /* Run the dcc backend. */
+ rc = dcc_process(&ss);
+ /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
+ while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
+ != NULL) {
+ if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
+ {
+ /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
+ rc = FAIL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ #endif
+
+ #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
case ACLC_DECODE:
rc = mime_decode(&arg);
break;
-#endif
+ #endif
case ACLC_DELAY:
{
HDEBUG(D_acl)
debug_printf("delay skipped in -bh checking mode\n");
}
- else sleep(delay);
+
+ /* It appears to be impossible to detect that a TCP/IP connection has
+ gone away without reading from it. This means that we cannot shorten
+ the delay below if the client goes away, because we cannot discover
+ that the client has closed its end of the connection. (The connection
+ is actually in a half-closed state, waiting for the server to close its
+ end.) It would be nice to be able to detect this state, so that the
+ Exim process is not held up unnecessarily. However, it seems that we
+ can't. The poll() function does not do the right thing, and in any case
+ it is not always available.
+
+ NOTE 1: If ever this state of affairs changes, remember that we may be
+ dealing with stdin/stdout here, in addition to TCP/IP connections.
+ Also, delays may be specified for non-SMTP input, where smtp_out and
+ smtp_in will be NULL. Whatever is done must work in all cases.
+
+ NOTE 2: The added feature of flushing the output before a delay must
+ apply only to SMTP input. Hence the test for smtp_out being non-NULL.
+ */
+
+ else
+ {
+ if (smtp_out != NULL && !disable_delay_flush) mac_smtp_fflush();
+ while (delay > 0) delay = sleep(delay);
+ }
}
}
break;
-#ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
+ #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
case ACLC_DEMIME:
rc = demime(&arg);
break;
-#endif
+ #endif
+
+ #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
+ case ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER:
+ if (dkim_cur_signer != NULL)
+ rc = match_isinlist(dkim_cur_signer,
+ &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL);
+ else
+ rc = FAIL;
+ break;
+
+ case ACLC_DKIM_STATUS:
+ rc = match_isinlist(dkim_exim_expand_query(DKIM_VERIFY_STATUS),
+ &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL);
+ break;
+ #endif
case ACLC_DNSLISTS:
rc = verify_check_dnsbl(&arg);
&deliver_localpart_data);
break;
+ case ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET:
+ {
+ int logbits = 0;
+ int sep = 0;
+ uschar *s = arg;
+ uschar *ss;
+ while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&s, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
+ != NULL)
+ {
+ if (Ustrcmp(ss, "main") == 0) logbits |= LOG_MAIN;
+ else if (Ustrcmp(ss, "panic") == 0) logbits |= LOG_PANIC;
+ else if (Ustrcmp(ss, "reject") == 0) logbits |= LOG_REJECT;
+ else
+ {
+ logbits |= LOG_MAIN|LOG_REJECT;
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "unknown log name \"%s\" in "
+ "\"log_reject_target\" in %s ACL", ss, acl_wherenames[where]);
+ }
+ }
+ log_reject_target = logbits;
+ }
+ break;
+
case ACLC_LOGWRITE:
{
int logbits = 0;
s++;
}
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
+
+
if (logbits == 0) logbits = LOG_MAIN;
log_write(0, logbits, "%s", string_printing(s));
}
break;
-
-#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
+
+ #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
case ACLC_MALWARE:
{
- /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
+ /* Separate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
/* Run the malware backend. */
rc = malware(&ss);
break;
case ACLC_MIME_REGEX:
- rc = mime_regex(&arg);
+ rc = mime_regex(&arg);
+ break;
+ #endif
+
+ case ACLC_RATELIMIT:
+ rc = acl_ratelimit(arg, where, log_msgptr);
break;
-#endif
case ACLC_RECIPIENTS:
rc = match_address_list(addr->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0,
&recipient_data);
break;
-#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
- case ACLC_REGEX:
- rc = regex(&arg);
+ #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
+ case ACLC_REGEX:
+ rc = regex(&arg);
break;
-#endif
+ #endif
case ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS:
{
case ACLC_SET:
{
int old_pool = store_pool;
- if (cb->u.varnumber < ACL_C_MAX) store_pool = POOL_PERM;
- acl_var[cb->u.varnumber] = string_copy(arg);
+ if (cb->u.varname[0] == 'c') store_pool = POOL_PERM;
+ acl_var_create(cb->u.varname)->data.ptr = string_copy(arg);
store_pool = old_pool;
}
break;
-#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
+ #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
case ACLC_SPAM:
{
/* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
}
}
break;
-#endif
+ #endif
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
+ #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
case ACLC_SPF:
- rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address);
+ rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address, SPF_PROCESS_NORMAL);
break;
-#endif
+ case ACLC_SPF_GUESS:
+ rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address, SPF_PROCESS_GUESS);
+ break;
+ #endif
/* If the verb is WARN, discard any user message from verification, because
such messages are SMTP responses, not header additions. The latter come
- only from explicit "message" modifiers. */
+ only from explicit "message" modifiers. However, put the user message into
+ $acl_verify_message so it can be used in subsequent conditions or modifiers
+ (until something changes it). */
case ACLC_VERIFY:
rc = acl_verify(where, addr, arg, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, basic_errno);
+ acl_verify_message = *user_msgptr;
if (verb == ACL_WARN) *user_msgptr = NULL;
break;
/* If the result is the one for which "message" and/or "log_message" are used,
-handle the values of these options. Most verbs have but a single return for
-which the messages are relevant, but for "discard", it's useful to have the log
-message both when it succeeds and when it fails. Also, for an "accept" that
-appears in a QUIT ACL, we want to handle the user message. Since only "accept"
-and "warn" are permitted in that ACL, we don't need to test the verb.
-
-These modifiers act in different ways:
+handle the values of these modifiers. If there isn't a log message set, we make
+it the same as the user message.
"message" is a user message that will be included in an SMTP response. Unless
it is empty, it overrides any previously set user message.
"log_message" is a non-user message, and it adds to any existing non-user
message that is already set.
-If there isn't a log message set, we make it the same as the user message. */
+Most verbs have but a single return for which the messages are relevant, but
+for "discard", it's useful to have the log message both when it succeeds and
+when it fails. For "accept", the message is used in the OK case if there is no
+"endpass", but (for backwards compatibility) in the FAIL case if "endpass" is
+present. */
+
+if (*epp && rc == OK) user_message = NULL;
-if (((rc == FAIL_DROP)? FAIL : rc) == msgcond[verb] ||
- (verb == ACL_DISCARD && rc == OK) ||
- (where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT))
+if (((1<<rc) & msgcond[verb]) != 0)
{
uschar *expmessage;
+ uschar *old_user_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
+ uschar *old_log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr != NULL)? *log_msgptr : old_user_msgptr;
/* If the verb is "warn", messages generated by conditions (verification or
- nested ACLs) are discarded. Only messages specified at this level are used.
+ nested ACLs) are always discarded. This also happens for acceptance verbs
+ when they actually do accept. Only messages specified at this level are used.
However, the value of an existing message is available in $acl_verify_message
during expansions. */
- uschar *old_user_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
- uschar *old_log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr != NULL)? *log_msgptr : old_user_msgptr;
-
- if (verb == ACL_WARN) *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
+ if (verb == ACL_WARN ||
+ (rc == OK && (verb == ACL_ACCEPT || verb == ACL_DISCARD)))
+ *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
if (user_message != NULL)
{
return ERROR;
}
acl_text[statbuf.st_size] = 0;
- close(fd);
+ (void)close(fd);
acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("read ACL from file %s\n", ss);
*log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
acl_temp_details = FALSE;
- if (where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT &&
+ if ((where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT || where == ACL_WHERE_NOTQUIT) &&
acl->verb != ACL_ACCEPT &&
acl->verb != ACL_WARN)
{
- *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"%s\" is not allowed in a QUIT ACL",
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"%s\" is not allowed in a QUIT or not-QUIT ACL",
verbs[acl->verb]);
return ERROR;
}
case ACL_WARN:
if (cond == OK)
acl_warn(where, *user_msgptr, *log_msgptr);
- else if (cond == DEFER)
- acl_warn(where, NULL, string_sprintf("ACL \"warn\" statement skipped: "
- "condition test deferred: %s",
- (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : *log_msgptr));
+ else if (cond == DEFER && (log_extra_selector & LX_acl_warn_skipped) != 0)
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s Warning: ACL \"warn\" statement skipped: "
+ "condition test deferred%s%s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
+ (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : US": ",
+ (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : *log_msgptr);
*log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL; /* In case implicit DENY follows */
break;
Arguments:
where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating where called from
- data_string RCPT address, or SMTP command argument, or NULL
+ recipient RCPT address for RCPT check, else NULL
s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
*/
int
-acl_check(int where, uschar *data_string, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr,
+acl_check(int where, uschar *recipient, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr,
uschar **log_msgptr)
{
int rc;
address_item adb;
-address_item *addr;
+address_item *addr = NULL;
*user_msgptr = *log_msgptr = NULL;
sender_verified_failed = NULL;
+ratelimiters_cmd = NULL;
+log_reject_target = LOG_MAIN|LOG_REJECT;
if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT)
{
adb = address_defaults;
addr = &adb;
- addr->address = data_string;
+ addr->address = recipient;
if (deliver_split_address(addr) == DEFER)
{
*log_msgptr = US"defer in percent_hack_domains check";
deliver_domain = addr->domain;
deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
}
-else
- {
- addr = NULL;
- smtp_command_argument = data_string;
- }
rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, 0, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
-smtp_command_argument = deliver_domain =
- deliver_localpart = deliver_address_data = sender_address_data = NULL;
+deliver_domain = deliver_localpart = deliver_address_data =
+ sender_address_data = NULL;
/* A DISCARD response is permitted only for message ACLs, excluding the PREDATA
ACL, which is really in the middle of an SMTP command. */
return ERROR;
}
-/* Before giving an error response, take a look at the length of any user
-message, and split it up into multiple lines if possible. */
+/* Before giving a response, take a look at the length of any user message, and
+split it up into multiple lines if possible. */
-if (rc != OK && *user_msgptr != NULL && Ustrlen(*user_msgptr) > 75)
- {
- uschar *s = *user_msgptr = string_copy(*user_msgptr);
- uschar *ss = s;
+*user_msgptr = string_split_message(*user_msgptr);
+if (fake_response != OK)
+ fake_response_text = string_split_message(fake_response_text);
- for (;;)
- {
- int i = 0;
- while (i < 75 && *ss != 0 && *ss != '\n') ss++, i++;
- if (*ss == 0) break;
- if (*ss == '\n')
- s = ++ss;
- else
- {
- uschar *t = ss + 1;
- uschar *tt = NULL;
- while (--t > s + 35)
- {
- if (*t == ' ')
- {
- if (t[-1] == ':') { tt = t; break; }
- if (tt == NULL) tt = t;
- }
- }
+return rc;
+}
- if (tt == NULL) /* Can't split behind - try ahead */
- {
- t = ss + 1;
- while (*t != 0)
- {
- if (*t == ' ' || *t == '\n')
- { tt = t; break; }
- t++;
- }
- }
- if (tt == NULL) break; /* Can't find anywhere to split */
- *tt = '\n';
- s = ss = tt+1;
- }
- }
+
+/*************************************************
+* Create ACL variable *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* Create an ACL variable or reuse an existing one. ACL variables are in a
+binary tree (see tree.c) with acl_var_c and acl_var_m as root nodes.
+
+Argument:
+ name pointer to the variable's name, starting with c or m
+
+Returns the pointer to variable's tree node
+*/
+
+tree_node *
+acl_var_create(uschar *name)
+{
+tree_node *node, **root;
+root = (name[0] == 'c')? &acl_var_c : &acl_var_m;
+node = tree_search(*root, name);
+if (node == NULL)
+ {
+ node = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(name));
+ Ustrcpy(node->name, name);
+ (void)tree_insertnode(root, node);
}
+node->data.ptr = NULL;
+return node;
+}
-return rc;
+
+
+/*************************************************
+* Write an ACL variable in spool format *
+*************************************************/
+
+/* This function is used as a callback for tree_walk when writing variables to
+the spool file. To retain spool file compatibility, what is written is -aclc or
+-aclm followed by the rest of the name and the data length, space separated,
+then the value itself, starting on a new line, and terminated by an additional
+newline. When we had only numbered ACL variables, the first line might look
+like this: "-aclc 5 20". Now it might be "-aclc foo 20" for the variable called
+acl_cfoo.
+
+Arguments:
+ name of the variable
+ value of the variable
+ ctx FILE pointer (as a void pointer)
+
+Returns: nothing
+*/
+
+void
+acl_var_write(uschar *name, uschar *value, void *ctx)
+{
+FILE *f = (FILE *)ctx;
+fprintf(f, "-acl%c %s %d\n%s\n", name[0], name+1, Ustrlen(value), value);
}
/* End of acl.c */
projects / exim.git / blobdiff