1 /* $Cambridge: exim/src/src/acl.c,v 1.65 2006/09/19 14:31:06 ph10 Exp $ */
3 /*************************************************
4 * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
5 *************************************************/
7 /* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2006 */
8 /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
10 /* Code for handling Access Control Lists (ACLs) */
15 /* Default callout timeout */
17 #define CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT 30
19 /* ACL verb codes - keep in step with the table of verbs that follows */
21 enum { ACL_ACCEPT
, ACL_DEFER
, ACL_DENY
, ACL_DISCARD
, ACL_DROP
, ACL_REQUIRE
,
26 static uschar
*verbs
[] =
27 { US
"accept", US
"defer", US
"deny", US
"discard", US
"drop", US
"require",
30 /* For each verb, the condition for which "message" is used */
32 static int msgcond
[] = { FAIL
, OK
, OK
, FAIL
, OK
, FAIL
, OK
};
34 /* ACL condition and modifier codes - keep in step with the table that
35 follows, and the cond_expand_at_top and uschar cond_modifiers tables lower
41 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
46 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
50 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
53 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
54 ACLC_DK_DOMAIN_SOURCE
,
56 ACLC_DK_SENDER_DOMAINS
,
57 ACLC_DK_SENDER_LOCAL_PARTS
,
69 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
73 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
78 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
84 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
87 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
92 /* ACL conditions/modifiers: "delay", "control", "endpass", "message",
93 "log_message", "logwrite", and "set" are modifiers that look like conditions
94 but always return TRUE. They are used for their side effects. */
96 static uschar
*conditions
[] = {
100 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
105 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
109 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
112 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
113 US
"dk_domain_source",
115 US
"dk_sender_domains",
116 US
"dk_sender_local_parts",
120 US
"dnslists", US
"domains", US
"encrypted",
121 US
"endpass", US
"hosts", US
"local_parts", US
"log_message", US
"logwrite",
122 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
126 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
131 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
134 US
"sender_domains", US
"senders", US
"set",
135 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
138 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
144 /* Return values from decode_control(); keep in step with the table of names
148 CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED
,
149 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
152 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
156 CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART
,
157 CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART
,
158 CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC
,
159 CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC
,
163 CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS
,
164 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
165 CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL
,
172 /* ACL control names; keep in step with the table above! This list is used for
173 turning ids into names. The actual list of recognized names is in the variable
174 control_def controls_list[] below. The fact that there are two lists is a mess
175 and should be tidied up. */
177 static uschar
*controls
[] = {
178 US
"allow_auth_unadvertised",
179 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
182 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
186 US
"caseful_local_part",
187 US
"caselower_local_part",
193 US
"suppress_local_fixups",
194 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
200 /* Flags to indicate for which conditions /modifiers a string expansion is done
201 at the outer level. In the other cases, expansion already occurs in the
202 checking functions. */
204 static uschar cond_expand_at_top
[] = {
206 TRUE
, /* add_header */
207 FALSE
, /* authenticated */
208 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
209 TRUE
, /* bmi_optin */
211 TRUE
, /* condition */
213 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
217 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
220 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
221 TRUE
, /* dk_domain_source */
222 TRUE
, /* dk_policy */
223 TRUE
, /* dk_sender_domains */
224 TRUE
, /* dk_sender_local_parts */
225 TRUE
, /* dk_senders */
226 TRUE
, /* dk_status */
230 FALSE
, /* encrypted */
233 FALSE
, /* local_parts */
234 TRUE
, /* log_message */
236 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
240 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
241 TRUE
, /* mime_regex */
243 TRUE
, /* ratelimit */
244 FALSE
, /* recipients */
245 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
248 FALSE
, /* sender_domains */
251 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
254 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
260 /* Flags to identify the modifiers */
262 static uschar cond_modifiers
[] = {
264 TRUE
, /* add_header */
265 FALSE
, /* authenticated */
266 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
267 TRUE
, /* bmi_optin */
269 FALSE
, /* condition */
271 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
275 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
278 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
279 FALSE
, /* dk_domain_source */
280 FALSE
, /* dk_policy */
281 FALSE
, /* dk_sender_domains */
282 FALSE
, /* dk_sender_local_parts */
283 FALSE
, /* dk_senders */
284 FALSE
, /* dk_status */
286 FALSE
, /* dnslists */
288 FALSE
, /* encrypted */
291 FALSE
, /* local_parts */
292 TRUE
, /* log_message */
294 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
298 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
299 FALSE
, /* mime_regex */
301 FALSE
, /* ratelimit */
302 FALSE
, /* recipients */
303 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
306 FALSE
, /* sender_domains */
309 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
312 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
318 /* Bit map vector of which conditions are not allowed at certain times. For
319 each condition, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier
320 to specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
322 static unsigned int cond_forbids
[] = {
326 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)| /* add_header */
327 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA
)|
328 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)|
329 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START
)),
331 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)| /* authenticated */
332 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START
)|
333 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO
),
335 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
336 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH
)| /* bmi_optin */
337 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO
)|
338 (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME
)|
339 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN
)|
340 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH
)|
341 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS
)|
342 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|
343 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START
),
348 /* Certain types of control are always allowed, so we let it through
349 always and check in the control processing itself. */
353 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
355 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME
), /* decode */
360 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
362 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)), /* demime */
365 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
366 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH
)| /* dk_domain_source */
367 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO
)|
368 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|
369 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN
)|
370 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT
)|
371 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS
)|
372 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START
),
374 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH
)| /* dk_policy */
375 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO
)|
376 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|
377 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN
)|
378 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT
)|
379 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS
)|
380 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START
),
382 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH
)| /* dk_sender_domains */
383 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO
)|
384 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|
385 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN
)|
386 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT
)|
387 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS
)|
388 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START
),
390 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH
)| /* dk_sender_local_parts */
391 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO
)|
392 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|
393 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN
)|
394 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT
)|
395 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS
)|
396 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START
),
398 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH
)| /* dk_senders */
399 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO
)|
400 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|
401 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN
)|
402 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT
)|
403 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS
)|
404 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START
),
406 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH
)| /* dk_status */
407 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO
)|
408 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|
409 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN
)|
410 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT
)|
411 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS
)|
412 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START
),
415 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)| /* dnslists */
416 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START
),
419 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
), /* domains */
421 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)| /* encrypted */
422 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)|
423 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START
)|
428 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)| /* hosts */
429 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START
),
432 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
), /* local_parts */
438 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
440 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)), /* malware */
445 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
447 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME
), /* mime_regex */
453 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
), /* recipients */
455 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
457 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)| /* regex */
458 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME
)),
461 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)| /* sender_domains */
463 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT
)|
464 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN
)|
465 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY
),
467 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)| /* senders */
469 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT
)|
470 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN
)|
471 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY
),
475 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
477 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)), /* spam */
480 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
481 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)| /* spf */
483 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH
)|
484 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN
)|
485 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY
)|
486 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)|
487 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START
),
490 /* Certain types of verify are always allowed, so we let it through
491 always and check in the verify function itself */
497 /* Bit map vector of which controls are not allowed at certain times. For
498 each control, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier to
499 specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
501 static unsigned int control_forbids
[] = {
503 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO
)), /* allow_auth_unadvertised */
505 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
509 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
510 (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)| /* dk_verify */
511 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START
),
517 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
), /* caseful_local_part */
520 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
), /* caselower_local_part */
522 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)| /* enforce_sync */
523 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START
),
525 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)| /* no_enforce_sync */
526 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START
),
529 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)| /* freeze */
530 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA
)|
531 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME
)),
534 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)| /* queue_only */
535 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA
)|
536 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME
)),
539 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)| /* submission */
540 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)),
543 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)| /* suppress_local_fixups */
544 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|
545 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START
)),
547 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
549 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)| /* no_mbox_unspool */
550 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA
)|
551 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME
)),
555 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)| /* fakedefer */
556 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA
)|
557 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME
)),
560 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)| /* fakereject */
561 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA
)|
562 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME
)),
564 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)| /* no_multiline */
565 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START
)
568 /* Structure listing various control arguments, with their characteristics. */
570 typedef struct control_def
{
572 int value
; /* CONTROL_xxx value */
573 BOOL has_option
; /* Has /option(s) following */
576 static control_def controls_list
[] = {
577 { US
"allow_auth_unadvertised", CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED
, FALSE
},
578 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
579 { US
"bmi_run", CONTROL_BMI_RUN
, FALSE
},
581 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
582 { US
"dk_verify", CONTROL_DK_VERIFY
, FALSE
},
584 { US
"caseful_local_part", CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART
, FALSE
},
585 { US
"caselower_local_part", CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART
, FALSE
},
586 { US
"enforce_sync", CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC
, FALSE
},
587 { US
"freeze", CONTROL_FREEZE
, TRUE
},
588 { US
"no_enforce_sync", CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC
, FALSE
},
589 { US
"no_multiline_responses", CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE
, FALSE
},
590 { US
"queue_only", CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY
, FALSE
},
591 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
592 { US
"no_mbox_unspool", CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL
, FALSE
},
594 { US
"fakedefer", CONTROL_FAKEDEFER
, TRUE
},
595 { US
"fakereject", CONTROL_FAKEREJECT
, TRUE
},
596 { US
"submission", CONTROL_SUBMISSION
, TRUE
},
597 { US
"suppress_local_fixups", CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS
, FALSE
}
600 /* Support data structures for Client SMTP Authorization. acl_verify_csa()
601 caches its result in a tree to avoid repeated DNS queries. The result is an
602 integer code which is used as an index into the following tables of
603 explanatory strings and verification return codes. */
605 static tree_node
*csa_cache
= NULL
;
607 enum { CSA_UNKNOWN
, CSA_OK
, CSA_DEFER_SRV
, CSA_DEFER_ADDR
,
608 CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT
, CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN
, CSA_FAIL_NOADDR
, CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH
};
610 /* The acl_verify_csa() return code is translated into an acl_verify() return
611 code using the following table. It is OK unless the client is definitely not
612 authorized. This is because CSA is supposed to be optional for sending sites,
613 so recipients should not be too strict about checking it - especially because
614 DNS problems are quite likely to occur. It's possible to use $csa_status in
615 further ACL conditions to distinguish ok, unknown, and defer if required, but
616 the aim is to make the usual configuration simple. */
618 static int csa_return_code
[] = {
620 FAIL
, FAIL
, FAIL
, FAIL
623 static uschar
*csa_status_string
[] = {
624 US
"unknown", US
"ok", US
"defer", US
"defer",
625 US
"fail", US
"fail", US
"fail", US
"fail"
628 static uschar
*csa_reason_string
[] = {
631 US
"deferred (SRV lookup failed)",
632 US
"deferred (target address lookup failed)",
633 US
"failed (explicit authorization required)",
634 US
"failed (host name not authorized)",
635 US
"failed (no authorized addresses)",
636 US
"failed (client address mismatch)"
639 /* Enable recursion between acl_check_internal() and acl_check_condition() */
641 static int acl_check_internal(int, address_item
*, uschar
*, int, uschar
**,
645 /*************************************************
646 * Pick out name from list *
647 *************************************************/
649 /* Use a binary chop method
656 Returns: offset in list, or -1 if not found
660 acl_checkname(uschar
*name
, uschar
**list
, int end
)
666 int mid
= (start
+ end
)/2;
667 int c
= Ustrcmp(name
, list
[mid
]);
668 if (c
== 0) return mid
;
669 if (c
< 0) end
= mid
; else start
= mid
+ 1;
676 /*************************************************
677 * Read and parse one ACL *
678 *************************************************/
680 /* This function is called both from readconf in order to parse the ACLs in the
681 configuration file, and also when an ACL is encountered dynamically (e.g. as
682 the result of an expansion). It is given a function to call in order to
683 retrieve the lines of the ACL. This function handles skipping comments and
684 blank lines (where relevant).
687 func function to get next line of ACL
688 error where to put an error message
690 Returns: pointer to ACL, or NULL
691 NULL can be legal (empty ACL); in this case error will be NULL
695 acl_read(uschar
*(*func
)(void), uschar
**error
)
697 acl_block
*yield
= NULL
;
698 acl_block
**lastp
= &yield
;
699 acl_block
*this = NULL
;
700 acl_condition_block
*cond
;
701 acl_condition_block
**condp
= NULL
;
706 while ((s
= (*func
)()) != NULL
)
709 BOOL negated
= FALSE
;
710 uschar
*saveline
= s
;
713 /* Conditions (but not verbs) are allowed to be negated by an initial
716 while (isspace(*s
)) s
++;
723 /* Read the name of a verb or a condition, or the start of a new ACL, which
724 can be started by a name, or by a macro definition. */
726 s
= readconf_readname(name
, sizeof(name
), s
);
727 if (*s
== ':' || (isupper(name
[0]) && *s
== '=')) return yield
;
729 /* If a verb is unrecognized, it may be another condition or modifier that
730 continues the previous verb. */
732 v
= acl_checkname(name
, verbs
, sizeof(verbs
)/sizeof(char *));
737 *error
= string_sprintf("unknown ACL verb \"%s\" in \"%s\"", name
,
749 *error
= string_sprintf("malformed ACL line \"%s\"", saveline
);
752 this = store_get(sizeof(acl_block
));
754 lastp
= &(this->next
);
757 this->condition
= NULL
;
758 condp
= &(this->condition
);
759 if (*s
== 0) continue; /* No condition on this line */
765 s
= readconf_readname(name
, sizeof(name
), s
); /* Condition name */
768 /* Handle a condition or modifier. */
770 c
= acl_checkname(name
, conditions
, sizeof(conditions
)/sizeof(char *));
773 *error
= string_sprintf("unknown ACL condition/modifier in \"%s\"",
778 /* The modifiers may not be negated */
780 if (negated
&& cond_modifiers
[c
])
782 *error
= string_sprintf("ACL error: negation is not allowed with "
783 "\"%s\"", conditions
[c
]);
787 /* ENDPASS may occur only with ACCEPT or DISCARD. */
789 if (c
== ACLC_ENDPASS
&&
790 this->verb
!= ACL_ACCEPT
&&
791 this->verb
!= ACL_DISCARD
)
793 *error
= string_sprintf("ACL error: \"%s\" is not allowed with \"%s\"",
794 conditions
[c
], verbs
[this->verb
]);
798 cond
= store_get(sizeof(acl_condition_block
));
801 cond
->u
.negated
= negated
;
804 condp
= &(cond
->next
);
806 /* The "set" modifier is different in that its argument is "name=value"
807 rather than just a value, and we can check the validity of the name, which
808 gives us a variable name to insert into the data block. The original ACL
809 variable names were acl_c0 ... acl_c9 and acl_m0 ... acl_m9. This was
810 extended to 20 of each type, but after that people successfully argued for
811 arbitrary names. In the new scheme, the names must start with acl_c or acl_m.
812 After that, we allow alphanumerics and underscores, but the first character
813 after c or m must be a digit or an underscore. This retains backwards
820 if (Ustrncmp(s
, "acl_c", 5) != 0 &&
821 Ustrncmp(s
, "acl_m", 5) != 0)
823 *error
= string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
824 "modifier \"set %s\" (must start \"acl_c\" or \"acl_m\")", s
);
829 if (!isdigit(*endptr
) && *endptr
!= '_')
831 *error
= string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
832 "modifier \"set %s\" (digit or underscore must follow acl_c or acl_m)",
837 while (*endptr
!= 0 && *endptr
!= '=' && !isspace(*endptr
))
839 if (!isalnum(*endptr
) && *endptr
!= '_')
841 *error
= string_sprintf("invalid character \"%c\" in variable name "
842 "in ACL modifier \"set %s\"", *endptr
, s
);
848 cond
->u
.varname
= string_copyn(s
+ 4, endptr
- s
- 4);
850 while (isspace(*s
)) s
++;
853 /* For "set", we are now positioned for the data. For the others, only
854 "endpass" has no data */
856 if (c
!= ACLC_ENDPASS
)
860 *error
= string_sprintf("\"=\" missing after ACL \"%s\" %s", name
,
861 cond_modifiers
[c
]? US
"modifier" : US
"condition");
864 while (isspace(*s
)) s
++;
865 cond
->arg
= string_copy(s
);
874 /*************************************************
875 * Set up added header line(s) *
876 *************************************************/
878 /* This function is called by the add_header modifier, and also from acl_warn()
879 to implement the now-deprecated way of adding header lines using "message" on a
880 "warn" verb. The argument is treated as a sequence of header lines which are
881 added to a chain, provided there isn't an identical one already there.
883 Argument: string of header lines
888 setup_header(uschar
*hstring
)
891 int hlen
= Ustrlen(hstring
);
893 /* An empty string does nothing; otherwise add a final newline if necessary. */
895 if (hlen
<= 0) return;
896 if (hstring
[hlen
-1] != '\n') hstring
= string_sprintf("%s\n", hstring
);
898 /* Loop for multiple header lines, taking care about continuations */
900 for (p
= q
= hstring
; *p
!= 0; )
903 int newtype
= htype_add_bot
;
904 header_line
**hptr
= &acl_added_headers
;
906 /* Find next header line within the string */
910 q
= Ustrchr(q
, '\n');
911 if (*(++q
) != ' ' && *q
!= '\t') break;
914 /* If the line starts with a colon, interpret the instruction for where to
915 add it. This temporarily sets up a new type. */
919 if (strncmpic(p
, US
":after_received:", 16) == 0)
921 newtype
= htype_add_rec
;
924 else if (strncmpic(p
, US
":at_start_rfc:", 14) == 0)
926 newtype
= htype_add_rfc
;
929 else if (strncmpic(p
, US
":at_start:", 10) == 0)
931 newtype
= htype_add_top
;
934 else if (strncmpic(p
, US
":at_end:", 8) == 0)
936 newtype
= htype_add_bot
;
939 while (*p
== ' ' || *p
== '\t') p
++;
942 /* See if this line starts with a header name, and if not, add X-ACL-Warn:
943 to the front of it. */
945 for (s
= p
; s
< q
- 1; s
++)
947 if (*s
== ':' || !isgraph(*s
)) break;
950 s
= string_sprintf("%s%.*s", (*s
== ':')? "" : "X-ACL-Warn: ", q
- p
, p
);
953 /* See if this line has already been added */
955 while (*hptr
!= NULL
)
957 if (Ustrncmp((*hptr
)->text
, s
, hlen
) == 0) break;
958 hptr
= &((*hptr
)->next
);
961 /* Add if not previously present */
965 header_line
*h
= store_get(sizeof(header_line
));
974 /* Advance for next header line within the string */
983 /*************************************************
985 *************************************************/
987 /* This function is called when a WARN verb's conditions are true. It adds to
988 the message's headers, and/or writes information to the log. In each case, this
989 only happens once (per message for headers, per connection for log).
991 ** NOTE: The header adding action using the "message" setting is historic, and
992 its use is now deprecated. The new add_header modifier should be used instead.
995 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
996 user_message message for adding to headers
997 log_message message for logging, if different
1003 acl_warn(int where
, uschar
*user_message
, uschar
*log_message
)
1005 if (log_message
!= NULL
&& log_message
!= user_message
)
1008 string_item
*logged
;
1010 text
= string_sprintf("%s Warning: %s", host_and_ident(TRUE
),
1011 string_printing(log_message
));
1013 /* If a sender verification has failed, and the log message is "sender verify
1014 failed", add the failure message. */
1016 if (sender_verified_failed
!= NULL
&&
1017 sender_verified_failed
->message
!= NULL
&&
1018 strcmpic(log_message
, US
"sender verify failed") == 0)
1019 text
= string_sprintf("%s: %s", text
, sender_verified_failed
->message
);
1021 /* Search previously logged warnings. They are kept in malloc
1022 store so they can be freed at the start of a new message. */
1024 for (logged
= acl_warn_logged
; logged
!= NULL
; logged
= logged
->next
)
1025 if (Ustrcmp(logged
->text
, text
) == 0) break;
1029 int length
= Ustrlen(text
) + 1;
1030 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN
, "%s", text
);
1031 logged
= store_malloc(sizeof(string_item
) + length
);
1032 logged
->text
= (uschar
*)logged
+ sizeof(string_item
);
1033 memcpy(logged
->text
, text
, length
);
1034 logged
->next
= acl_warn_logged
;
1035 acl_warn_logged
= logged
;
1039 /* If there's no user message, we are done. */
1041 if (user_message
== NULL
) return;
1043 /* If this isn't a message ACL, we can't do anything with a user message.
1046 if (where
> ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)
1048 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN
|LOG_PANIC
, "ACL \"warn\" with \"message\" setting "
1049 "found in a non-message (%s) ACL: cannot specify header lines here: "
1050 "message ignored", acl_wherenames
[where
]);
1054 /* The code for setting up header lines is now abstracted into a separate
1055 function so that it can be used for the add_header modifier as well. */
1057 setup_header(user_message
);
1062 /*************************************************
1063 * Verify and check reverse DNS *
1064 *************************************************/
1066 /* Called from acl_verify() below. We look up the host name(s) of the client IP
1067 address if this has not yet been done. The host_name_lookup() function checks
1068 that one of these names resolves to an address list that contains the client IP
1069 address, so we don't actually have to do the check here.
1072 user_msgptr pointer for user message
1073 log_msgptr pointer for log message
1075 Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
1076 FAIL verification failed
1077 DEFER there was a problem verifying
1081 acl_verify_reverse(uschar
**user_msgptr
, uschar
**log_msgptr
)
1085 user_msgptr
= user_msgptr
; /* stop compiler warning */
1087 /* Previous success */
1089 if (sender_host_name
!= NULL
) return OK
;
1091 /* Previous failure */
1093 if (host_lookup_failed
)
1095 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("host lookup failed%s", host_lookup_msg
);
1099 /* Need to do a lookup */
1102 debug_printf("looking up host name to force name/address consistency check\n");
1104 if ((rc
= host_name_lookup()) != OK
)
1106 *log_msgptr
= (rc
== DEFER
)?
1107 US
"host lookup deferred for reverse lookup check"
1109 string_sprintf("host lookup failed for reverse lookup check%s",
1111 return rc
; /* DEFER or FAIL */
1114 host_build_sender_fullhost();
1120 /*************************************************
1121 * Check client IP address matches CSA target *
1122 *************************************************/
1124 /* Called from acl_verify_csa() below. This routine scans a section of a DNS
1125 response for address records belonging to the CSA target hostname. The section
1126 is specified by the reset argument, either RESET_ADDITIONAL or RESET_ANSWERS.
1127 If one of the addresses matches the client's IP address, then the client is
1128 authorized by CSA. If there are target IP addresses but none of them match
1129 then the client is using an unauthorized IP address. If there are no target IP
1130 addresses then the client cannot be using an authorized IP address. (This is
1131 an odd configuration - why didn't the SRV record have a weight of 1 instead?)
1134 dnsa the DNS answer block
1135 dnss a DNS scan block for us to use
1136 reset option specifing what portion to scan, as described above
1137 target the target hostname to use for matching RR names
1139 Returns: CSA_OK successfully authorized
1140 CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH addresses found but none matched
1141 CSA_FAIL_NOADDR no target addresses found
1145 acl_verify_csa_address(dns_answer
*dnsa
, dns_scan
*dnss
, int reset
,
1151 BOOL target_found
= FALSE
;
1153 for (rr
= dns_next_rr(dnsa
, dnss
, reset
);
1155 rr
= dns_next_rr(dnsa
, dnss
, RESET_NEXT
))
1157 /* Check this is an address RR for the target hostname. */
1161 && rr
->type
!= T_AAAA
1168 if (strcmpic(target
, rr
->name
) != 0) continue;
1170 target_found
= TRUE
;
1172 /* Turn the target address RR into a list of textual IP addresses and scan
1173 the list. There may be more than one if it is an A6 RR. */
1175 for (da
= dns_address_from_rr(dnsa
, rr
); da
!= NULL
; da
= da
->next
)
1177 /* If the client IP address matches the target IP address, it's good! */
1179 DEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("CSA target address is %s\n", da
->address
);
1181 if (strcmpic(sender_host_address
, da
->address
) == 0) return CSA_OK
;
1185 /* If we found some target addresses but none of them matched, the client is
1186 using an unauthorized IP address, otherwise the target has no authorized IP
1189 if (target_found
) return CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH
;
1190 else return CSA_FAIL_NOADDR
;
1195 /*************************************************
1196 * Verify Client SMTP Authorization *
1197 *************************************************/
1199 /* Called from acl_verify() below. This routine calls dns_lookup_special()
1200 to find the CSA SRV record corresponding to the domain argument, or
1201 $sender_helo_name if no argument is provided. It then checks that the
1202 client is authorized, and that its IP address corresponds to the SRV
1203 target's address by calling acl_verify_csa_address() above. The address
1204 should have been returned in the DNS response's ADDITIONAL section, but if
1205 not we perform another DNS lookup to get it.
1208 domain pointer to optional parameter following verify = csa
1210 Returns: CSA_UNKNOWN no valid CSA record found
1211 CSA_OK successfully authorized
1212 CSA_FAIL_* client is definitely not authorized
1213 CSA_DEFER_* there was a DNS problem
1217 acl_verify_csa(uschar
*domain
)
1221 int priority
, weight
, port
;
1228 /* Work out the domain we are using for the CSA lookup. The default is the
1229 client's HELO domain. If the client has not said HELO, use its IP address
1230 instead. If it's a local client (exim -bs), CSA isn't applicable. */
1232 while (isspace(*domain
) && *domain
!= '\0') ++domain
;
1233 if (*domain
== '\0') domain
= sender_helo_name
;
1234 if (domain
== NULL
) domain
= sender_host_address
;
1235 if (sender_host_address
== NULL
) return CSA_UNKNOWN
;
1237 /* If we have an address literal, strip off the framing ready for turning it
1238 into a domain. The framing consists of matched square brackets possibly
1239 containing a keyword and a colon before the actual IP address. */
1241 if (domain
[0] == '[')
1243 uschar
*start
= Ustrchr(domain
, ':');
1244 if (start
== NULL
) start
= domain
;
1245 domain
= string_copyn(start
+ 1, Ustrlen(start
) - 2);
1248 /* Turn domains that look like bare IP addresses into domains in the reverse
1249 DNS. This code also deals with address literals and $sender_host_address. It's
1250 not quite kosher to treat bare domains such as EHLO 192.0.2.57 the same as
1251 address literals, but it's probably the most friendly thing to do. This is an
1252 extension to CSA, so we allow it to be turned off for proper conformance. */
1254 if (string_is_ip_address(domain
, NULL
) != 0)
1256 if (!dns_csa_use_reverse
) return CSA_UNKNOWN
;
1257 dns_build_reverse(domain
, target
);
1261 /* Find out if we've already done the CSA check for this domain. If we have,
1262 return the same result again. Otherwise build a new cached result structure
1263 for this domain. The name is filled in now, and the value is filled in when
1264 we return from this function. */
1266 t
= tree_search(csa_cache
, domain
);
1267 if (t
!= NULL
) return t
->data
.val
;
1269 t
= store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node
) + Ustrlen(domain
));
1270 Ustrcpy(t
->name
, domain
);
1271 (void)tree_insertnode(&csa_cache
, t
);
1273 /* Now we are ready to do the actual DNS lookup(s). */
1276 switch (dns_special_lookup(&dnsa
, domain
, T_CSA
, &found
))
1278 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1281 return t
->data
.val
= CSA_DEFER_SRV
;
1283 /* If we found nothing, the client's authorization is unknown. */
1287 return t
->data
.val
= CSA_UNKNOWN
;
1289 /* We got something! Go on to look at the reply in more detail. */
1295 /* Scan the reply for well-formed CSA SRV records. */
1297 for (rr
= dns_next_rr(&dnsa
, &dnss
, RESET_ANSWERS
);
1299 rr
= dns_next_rr(&dnsa
, &dnss
, RESET_NEXT
))
1301 if (rr
->type
!= T_SRV
) continue;
1303 /* Extract the numerical SRV fields (p is incremented) */
1306 GETSHORT(priority
, p
);
1307 GETSHORT(weight
, p
);
1311 debug_printf("CSA priority=%d weight=%d port=%d\n", priority
, weight
, port
);
1313 /* Check the CSA version number */
1315 if (priority
!= 1) continue;
1317 /* If the domain does not have a CSA SRV record of its own (i.e. the domain
1318 found by dns_special_lookup() is a parent of the one we asked for), we check
1319 the subdomain assertions in the port field. At the moment there's only one
1320 assertion: legitimate SMTP clients are all explicitly authorized with CSA
1321 SRV records of their own. */
1323 if (found
!= domain
)
1326 return t
->data
.val
= CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT
;
1328 return t
->data
.val
= CSA_UNKNOWN
;
1331 /* This CSA SRV record refers directly to our domain, so we check the value
1332 in the weight field to work out the domain's authorization. 0 and 1 are
1333 unauthorized; 3 means the client is authorized but we can't check the IP
1334 address in order to authenticate it, so we treat it as unknown; values
1335 greater than 3 are undefined. */
1337 if (weight
< 2) return t
->data
.val
= CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN
;
1339 if (weight
> 2) continue;
1341 /* Weight == 2, which means the domain is authorized. We must check that the
1342 client's IP address is listed as one of the SRV target addresses. Save the
1343 target hostname then break to scan the additional data for its addresses. */
1345 (void)dn_expand(dnsa
.answer
, dnsa
.answer
+ dnsa
.answerlen
, p
,
1346 (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE
)target
, sizeof(target
));
1348 DEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("CSA target is %s\n", target
);
1353 /* If we didn't break the loop then no appropriate records were found. */
1355 if (rr
== NULL
) return t
->data
.val
= CSA_UNKNOWN
;
1357 /* Do not check addresses if the target is ".", in accordance with RFC 2782.
1358 A target of "." indicates there are no valid addresses, so the client cannot
1359 be authorized. (This is an odd configuration because weight=2 target=. is
1360 equivalent to weight=1, but we check for it in order to keep load off the
1361 root name servers.) Note that dn_expand() turns "." into "". */
1363 if (Ustrcmp(target
, "") == 0) return t
->data
.val
= CSA_FAIL_NOADDR
;
1365 /* Scan the additional section of the CSA SRV reply for addresses belonging
1366 to the target. If the name server didn't return any additional data (e.g.
1367 because it does not fully support SRV records), we need to do another lookup
1368 to obtain the target addresses; otherwise we have a definitive result. */
1370 rc
= acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa
, &dnss
, RESET_ADDITIONAL
, target
);
1371 if (rc
!= CSA_FAIL_NOADDR
) return t
->data
.val
= rc
;
1373 /* The DNS lookup type corresponds to the IP version used by the client. */
1376 if (Ustrchr(sender_host_address
, ':') != NULL
)
1379 #endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */
1383 #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
1387 switch (dns_lookup(&dnsa
, target
, type
, NULL
))
1389 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1392 return t
->data
.val
= CSA_DEFER_ADDR
;
1394 /* If the query succeeded, scan the addresses and return the result. */
1397 rc
= acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa
, &dnss
, RESET_ANSWERS
, target
);
1398 if (rc
!= CSA_FAIL_NOADDR
) return t
->data
.val
= rc
;
1399 /* else fall through */
1401 /* If the target has no IP addresses, the client cannot have an authorized
1402 IP address. However, if the target site uses A6 records (not AAAA records)
1403 we have to do yet another lookup in order to check them. */
1408 #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
1409 if (type
== T_AAAA
) { type
= T_A6
; goto DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN
; }
1412 return t
->data
.val
= CSA_FAIL_NOADDR
;
1418 /*************************************************
1419 * Handle verification (address & other) *
1420 *************************************************/
1422 /* This function implements the "verify" condition. It is called when
1423 encountered in any ACL, because some tests are almost always permitted. Some
1424 just don't make sense, and always fail (for example, an attempt to test a host
1425 lookup for a non-TCP/IP message). Others are restricted to certain ACLs.
1428 where where called from
1429 addr the recipient address that the ACL is handling, or NULL
1430 arg the argument of "verify"
1431 user_msgptr pointer for user message
1432 log_msgptr pointer for log message
1433 basic_errno where to put verify errno
1435 Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
1436 FAIL verification failed
1437 DEFER there was a problem verifying
1442 acl_verify(int where
, address_item
*addr
, uschar
*arg
,
1443 uschar
**user_msgptr
, uschar
**log_msgptr
, int *basic_errno
)
1447 int callout_overall
= -1;
1448 int callout_connect
= -1;
1449 int verify_options
= 0;
1451 BOOL verify_header_sender
= FALSE
;
1452 BOOL defer_ok
= FALSE
;
1453 BOOL callout_defer_ok
= FALSE
;
1454 BOOL no_details
= FALSE
;
1455 BOOL success_on_redirect
= FALSE
;
1456 address_item
*sender_vaddr
= NULL
;
1457 uschar
*verify_sender_address
= NULL
;
1458 uschar
*pm_mailfrom
= NULL
;
1459 uschar
*se_mailfrom
= NULL
;
1461 /* Some of the verify items have slash-separated options; some do not. Diagnose
1462 an error if options are given for items that don't expect them. This code has
1463 now got very message. Refactoring to use a table would be a good idea one day.
1466 uschar
*slash
= Ustrchr(arg
, '/');
1468 uschar
*ss
= string_nextinlist(&list
, &sep
, big_buffer
, big_buffer_size
);
1470 if (ss
== NULL
) goto BAD_VERIFY
;
1472 /* Handle name/address consistency verification in a separate function. */
1474 if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"reverse_host_lookup") == 0)
1476 if (slash
!= NULL
) goto NO_OPTIONS
;
1477 if (sender_host_address
== NULL
) return OK
;
1478 return acl_verify_reverse(user_msgptr
, log_msgptr
);
1481 /* TLS certificate verification is done at STARTTLS time; here we just
1482 test whether it was successful or not. (This is for optional verification; for
1483 mandatory verification, the connection doesn't last this long.) */
1485 if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"certificate") == 0)
1487 if (slash
!= NULL
) goto NO_OPTIONS
;
1488 if (tls_certificate_verified
) return OK
;
1489 *user_msgptr
= US
"no verified certificate";
1493 /* We can test the result of optional HELO verification that might have
1494 occurred earlier. If not, we can attempt the verification now. */
1496 if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"helo") == 0)
1498 if (slash
!= NULL
) goto NO_OPTIONS
;
1499 if (!helo_verified
&& !helo_verify_failed
) smtp_verify_helo();
1500 return helo_verified
? OK
: FAIL
;
1503 /* Do Client SMTP Authorization checks in a separate function, and turn the
1504 result code into user-friendly strings. */
1506 if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"csa") == 0)
1508 rc
= acl_verify_csa(list
);
1509 *log_msgptr
= *user_msgptr
= string_sprintf("client SMTP authorization %s",
1510 csa_reason_string
[rc
]);
1511 csa_status
= csa_status_string
[rc
];
1512 DEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("CSA result %s\n", csa_status
);
1513 return csa_return_code
[rc
];
1516 /* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct syntax. If there is
1517 a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to
1518 send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as
1521 if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"header_syntax") == 0)
1523 if (slash
!= NULL
) goto NO_OPTIONS
;
1524 if (where
!= ACL_WHERE_DATA
&& where
!= ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
) goto WRONG_ACL
;
1525 rc
= verify_check_headers(log_msgptr
);
1526 if (rc
!= OK
&& smtp_return_error_details
&& *log_msgptr
!= NULL
)
1527 *user_msgptr
= string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr
);
1531 /* Check that no recipient of this message is "blind", that is, every envelope
1532 recipient must be mentioned in either To: or Cc:. */
1534 if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"not_blind") == 0)
1536 if (slash
!= NULL
) goto NO_OPTIONS
;
1537 if (where
!= ACL_WHERE_DATA
&& where
!= ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
) goto WRONG_ACL
;
1538 rc
= verify_check_notblind();
1541 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("bcc recipient detected");
1542 if (smtp_return_error_details
)
1543 *user_msgptr
= string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr
);
1548 /* The remaining verification tests check recipient and sender addresses,
1549 either from the envelope or from the header. There are a number of
1550 slash-separated options that are common to all of them. */
1553 /* Check that there is at least one verifiable sender address in the relevant
1554 header lines. This can be followed by callout and defer options, just like
1555 sender and recipient. */
1557 if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"header_sender") == 0)
1559 if (where
!= ACL_WHERE_DATA
&& where
!= ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
) goto WRONG_ACL
;
1560 verify_header_sender
= TRUE
;
1563 /* Otherwise, first item in verify argument must be "sender" or "recipient".
1564 In the case of a sender, this can optionally be followed by an address to use
1565 in place of the actual sender (rare special-case requirement). */
1567 else if (strncmpic(ss
, US
"sender", 6) == 0)
1570 if (where
> ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)
1572 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("cannot verify sender in ACL for %s "
1573 "(only possible for MAIL, RCPT, PREDATA, or DATA)",
1574 acl_wherenames
[where
]);
1578 verify_sender_address
= sender_address
;
1581 while (isspace(*s
)) s
++;
1582 if (*s
++ != '=') goto BAD_VERIFY
;
1583 while (isspace(*s
)) s
++;
1584 verify_sender_address
= string_copy(s
);
1589 if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"recipient") != 0) goto BAD_VERIFY
;
1592 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("cannot verify recipient in ACL for %s "
1593 "(only possible for RCPT)", acl_wherenames
[where
]);
1598 /* Remaining items are optional; they apply to sender and recipient
1599 verification, including "header sender" verification. */
1601 while ((ss
= string_nextinlist(&list
, &sep
, big_buffer
, big_buffer_size
))
1604 if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"defer_ok") == 0) defer_ok
= TRUE
;
1605 else if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"no_details") == 0) no_details
= TRUE
;
1606 else if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"success_on_redirect") == 0) success_on_redirect
= TRUE
;
1608 /* These two old options are left for backwards compatibility */
1610 else if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"callout_defer_ok") == 0)
1612 callout_defer_ok
= TRUE
;
1613 if (callout
== -1) callout
= CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT
;
1616 else if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"check_postmaster") == 0)
1619 if (callout
== -1) callout
= CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT
;
1622 /* The callout option has a number of sub-options, comma separated */
1624 else if (strncmpic(ss
, US
"callout", 7) == 0)
1626 callout
= CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT
;
1630 while (isspace(*ss
)) ss
++;
1636 while (isspace(*ss
)) ss
++;
1638 /* This callout option handling code has become a mess as new options
1639 have been added in an ad hoc manner. It should be tidied up into some
1640 kind of table-driven thing. */
1642 while ((opt
= string_nextinlist(&ss
, &optsep
, buffer
, sizeof(buffer
)))
1645 if (strcmpic(opt
, US
"defer_ok") == 0) callout_defer_ok
= TRUE
;
1646 else if (strcmpic(opt
, US
"no_cache") == 0)
1647 verify_options
|= vopt_callout_no_cache
;
1648 else if (strcmpic(opt
, US
"random") == 0)
1649 verify_options
|= vopt_callout_random
;
1650 else if (strcmpic(opt
, US
"use_sender") == 0)
1651 verify_options
|= vopt_callout_recipsender
;
1652 else if (strcmpic(opt
, US
"use_postmaster") == 0)
1653 verify_options
|= vopt_callout_recippmaster
;
1654 else if (strcmpic(opt
, US
"postmaster") == 0) pm_mailfrom
= US
"";
1655 else if (strcmpic(opt
, US
"fullpostmaster") == 0)
1658 verify_options
|= vopt_callout_fullpm
;
1661 else if (strncmpic(opt
, US
"mailfrom", 8) == 0)
1663 if (!verify_header_sender
)
1665 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("\"mailfrom\" is allowed as a "
1666 "callout option only for verify=header_sender (detected in ACL "
1667 "condition \"%s\")", arg
);
1671 while (isspace(*opt
)) opt
++;
1674 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1675 "\"mailfrom\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg
);
1678 while (isspace(*opt
)) opt
++;
1679 se_mailfrom
= string_copy(opt
);
1682 else if (strncmpic(opt
, US
"postmaster_mailfrom", 19) == 0)
1685 while (isspace(*opt
)) opt
++;
1688 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1689 "\"postmaster_mailfrom\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg
);
1692 while (isspace(*opt
)) opt
++;
1693 pm_mailfrom
= string_copy(opt
);
1696 else if (strncmpic(opt
, US
"maxwait", 7) == 0)
1699 while (isspace(*opt
)) opt
++;
1702 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"maxwait\" in "
1703 "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg
);
1706 while (isspace(*opt
)) opt
++;
1707 callout_overall
= readconf_readtime(opt
, 0, FALSE
);
1708 if (callout_overall
< 0)
1710 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1711 "\"verify %s\"", arg
);
1715 else if (strncmpic(opt
, US
"connect", 7) == 0)
1718 while (isspace(*opt
)) opt
++;
1721 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1722 "\"callout_overaall\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg
);
1725 while (isspace(*opt
)) opt
++;
1726 callout_connect
= readconf_readtime(opt
, 0, FALSE
);
1727 if (callout_connect
< 0)
1729 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1730 "\"verify %s\"", arg
);
1734 else /* Plain time is callout connect/command timeout */
1736 callout
= readconf_readtime(opt
, 0, FALSE
);
1739 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1740 "\"verify %s\"", arg
);
1748 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"callout\" in "
1749 "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg
);
1755 /* Option not recognized */
1759 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("unknown option \"%s\" in ACL "
1760 "condition \"verify %s\"", ss
, arg
);
1765 if ((verify_options
& (vopt_callout_recipsender
|vopt_callout_recippmaster
)) ==
1766 (vopt_callout_recipsender
|vopt_callout_recippmaster
))
1768 *log_msgptr
= US
"only one of use_sender and use_postmaster can be set "
1769 "for a recipient callout";
1773 /* Handle sender-in-header verification. Default the user message to the log
1774 message if giving out verification details. */
1776 if (verify_header_sender
)
1779 rc
= verify_check_header_address(user_msgptr
, log_msgptr
, callout
,
1780 callout_overall
, callout_connect
, se_mailfrom
, pm_mailfrom
, verify_options
,
1784 *basic_errno
= verrno
;
1785 if (smtp_return_error_details
)
1787 if (*user_msgptr
== NULL
&& *log_msgptr
!= NULL
)
1788 *user_msgptr
= string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr
);
1789 if (rc
== DEFER
) acl_temp_details
= TRUE
;
1794 /* Handle a sender address. The default is to verify *the* sender address, but
1795 optionally a different address can be given, for special requirements. If the
1796 address is empty, we are dealing with a bounce message that has no sender, so
1797 we cannot do any checking. If the real sender address gets rewritten during
1798 verification (e.g. DNS widening), set the flag to stop it being rewritten again
1799 during message reception.
1801 A list of verified "sender" addresses is kept to try to avoid doing to much
1802 work repetitively when there are multiple recipients in a message and they all
1803 require sender verification. However, when callouts are involved, it gets too
1804 complicated because different recipients may require different callout options.
1805 Therefore, we always do a full sender verify when any kind of callout is
1806 specified. Caching elsewhere, for instance in the DNS resolver and in the
1807 callout handling, should ensure that this is not terribly inefficient. */
1809 else if (verify_sender_address
!= NULL
)
1811 if ((verify_options
& (vopt_callout_recipsender
|vopt_callout_recippmaster
))
1814 *log_msgptr
= US
"use_sender or use_postmaster cannot be used for a "
1815 "sender verify callout";
1819 sender_vaddr
= verify_checked_sender(verify_sender_address
);
1820 if (sender_vaddr
!= NULL
&& /* Previously checked */
1821 callout
<= 0) /* No callout needed this time */
1823 /* If the "routed" flag is set, it means that routing worked before, so
1824 this check can give OK (the saved return code value, if set, belongs to a
1825 callout that was done previously). If the "routed" flag is not set, routing
1826 must have failed, so we use the saved return code. */
1828 if (testflag(sender_vaddr
, af_verify_routed
)) rc
= OK
; else
1830 rc
= sender_vaddr
->special_action
;
1831 *basic_errno
= sender_vaddr
->basic_errno
;
1833 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("using cached sender verify result\n");
1836 /* Do a new verification, and cache the result. The cache is used to avoid
1837 verifying the sender multiple times for multiple RCPTs when callouts are not
1838 specified (see comments above).
1840 The cache is also used on failure to give details in response to the first
1841 RCPT that gets bounced for this reason. However, this can be suppressed by
1842 the no_details option, which sets the flag that says "this detail has already
1843 been sent". The cache normally contains just one address, but there may be
1844 more in esoteric circumstances. */
1849 uschar
*save_address_data
= deliver_address_data
;
1851 sender_vaddr
= deliver_make_addr(verify_sender_address
, TRUE
);
1852 if (no_details
) setflag(sender_vaddr
, af_sverify_told
);
1853 if (verify_sender_address
[0] != 0)
1855 /* If this is the real sender address, save the unrewritten version
1856 for use later in receive. Otherwise, set a flag so that rewriting the
1857 sender in verify_address() does not update sender_address. */
1859 if (verify_sender_address
== sender_address
)
1860 sender_address_unrewritten
= sender_address
;
1862 verify_options
|= vopt_fake_sender
;
1864 if (success_on_redirect
)
1865 verify_options
|= vopt_success_on_redirect
;
1867 /* The recipient, qualify, and expn options are never set in
1870 rc
= verify_address(sender_vaddr
, NULL
, verify_options
, callout
,
1871 callout_overall
, callout_connect
, se_mailfrom
, pm_mailfrom
, &routed
);
1873 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
1877 if (Ustrcmp(sender_vaddr
->address
, verify_sender_address
) != 0)
1879 DEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("sender %s verified ok as %s\n",
1880 verify_sender_address
, sender_vaddr
->address
);
1884 DEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("sender %s verified ok\n",
1885 verify_sender_address
);
1888 else *basic_errno
= sender_vaddr
->basic_errno
;
1890 else rc
= OK
; /* Null sender */
1892 /* Cache the result code */
1894 if (routed
) setflag(sender_vaddr
, af_verify_routed
);
1895 if (callout
> 0) setflag(sender_vaddr
, af_verify_callout
);
1896 sender_vaddr
->special_action
= rc
;
1897 sender_vaddr
->next
= sender_verified_list
;
1898 sender_verified_list
= sender_vaddr
;
1900 /* Restore the recipient address data, which might have been clobbered by
1901 the sender verification. */
1903 deliver_address_data
= save_address_data
;
1906 /* Put the sender address_data value into $sender_address_data */
1908 sender_address_data
= sender_vaddr
->p
.address_data
;
1911 /* A recipient address just gets a straightforward verify; again we must handle
1912 the DEFER overrides. */
1918 if (success_on_redirect
)
1919 verify_options
|= vopt_success_on_redirect
;
1921 /* We must use a copy of the address for verification, because it might
1925 rc
= verify_address(&addr2
, NULL
, verify_options
|vopt_is_recipient
, callout
,
1926 callout_overall
, callout_connect
, se_mailfrom
, pm_mailfrom
, NULL
);
1927 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
1929 *log_msgptr
= addr2
.message
;
1930 *user_msgptr
= (addr2
.user_message
!= NULL
)?
1931 addr2
.user_message
: addr2
.message
;
1932 *basic_errno
= addr2
.basic_errno
;
1934 /* Make $address_data visible */
1935 deliver_address_data
= addr2
.p
.address_data
;
1938 /* We have a result from the relevant test. Handle defer overrides first. */
1940 if (rc
== DEFER
&& (defer_ok
||
1941 (callout_defer_ok
&& *basic_errno
== ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER
)))
1943 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("verify defer overridden by %s\n",
1944 defer_ok
? "defer_ok" : "callout_defer_ok");
1948 /* If we've failed a sender, set up a recipient message, and point
1949 sender_verified_failed to the address item that actually failed. */
1951 if (rc
!= OK
&& verify_sender_address
!= NULL
)
1955 *log_msgptr
= *user_msgptr
= US
"Sender verify failed";
1957 else if (*basic_errno
!= ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER
)
1959 *log_msgptr
= *user_msgptr
= US
"Could not complete sender verify";
1963 *log_msgptr
= US
"Could not complete sender verify callout";
1964 *user_msgptr
= smtp_return_error_details
? sender_vaddr
->user_message
:
1968 sender_verified_failed
= sender_vaddr
;
1971 /* Verifying an address messes up the values of $domain and $local_part,
1972 so reset them before returning if this is a RCPT ACL. */
1976 deliver_domain
= addr
->domain
;
1977 deliver_localpart
= addr
->local_part
;
1981 /* Syntax errors in the verify argument come here. */
1984 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("expected \"sender[=address]\", \"recipient\", "
1985 "\"helo\", \"header_syntax\", \"header_sender\" or "
1986 "\"reverse_host_lookup\" at start of ACL condition "
1987 "\"verify %s\"", arg
);
1990 /* Options supplied when not allowed come here */
1993 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("unexpected '/' found in \"%s\" "
1994 "(this verify item has no options)", arg
);
1997 /* Calls in the wrong ACL come here */
2000 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s "
2001 "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames
[where
]);
2008 /*************************************************
2009 * Check argument for control= modifier *
2010 *************************************************/
2012 /* Called from acl_check_condition() below
2015 arg the argument string for control=
2016 pptr set to point to the terminating character
2017 where which ACL we are in
2018 log_msgptr for error messages
2020 Returns: CONTROL_xxx value
2024 decode_control(uschar
*arg
, uschar
**pptr
, int where
, uschar
**log_msgptr
)
2029 for (d
= controls_list
;
2030 d
< controls_list
+ sizeof(controls_list
)/sizeof(control_def
);
2033 len
= Ustrlen(d
->name
);
2034 if (Ustrncmp(d
->name
, arg
, len
) == 0) break;
2037 if (d
>= controls_list
+ sizeof(controls_list
)/sizeof(control_def
) ||
2038 (arg
[len
] != 0 && (!d
->has_option
|| arg
[len
] != '/')))
2040 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg
);
2041 return CONTROL_ERROR
;
2050 /*************************************************
2051 * Handle rate limiting *
2052 *************************************************/
2054 /* Called by acl_check_condition() below to calculate the result
2055 of the ACL ratelimit condition.
2057 Note that the return value might be slightly unexpected: if the
2058 sender's rate is above the limit then the result is OK. This is
2059 similar to the dnslists condition, and is so that you can write
2060 ACL clauses like: defer ratelimit = 15 / 1h
2063 arg the option string for ratelimit=
2064 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
2065 log_msgptr for error messages
2067 Returns: OK - Sender's rate is above limit
2068 FAIL - Sender's rate is below limit
2069 DEFER - Problem opening ratelimit database
2070 ERROR - Syntax error in options.
2074 acl_ratelimit(uschar
*arg
, int where
, uschar
**log_msgptr
)
2076 double limit
, period
;
2079 BOOL have_key
= FALSE
, leaky
= FALSE
, strict
= FALSE
;
2080 BOOL per_byte
= FALSE
, per_cmd
= FALSE
, per_conn
= FALSE
, per_mail
= FALSE
;
2082 tree_node
**anchor
, *t
;
2083 open_db dbblock
, *dbm
;
2084 dbdata_ratelimit
*dbd
;
2087 /* Parse the first two options and record their values in expansion
2088 variables. These variables allow the configuration to have informative
2089 error messages based on rate limits obtained from a table lookup. */
2091 /* First is the maximum number of messages per period and maximum burst
2092 size, which must be greater than or equal to zero. Zero is useful for
2093 rate measurement as opposed to rate limiting. */
2095 sender_rate_limit
= string_nextinlist(&arg
, &sep
, NULL
, 0);
2096 if (sender_rate_limit
== NULL
)
2100 limit
= Ustrtod(sender_rate_limit
, &ss
);
2101 if (tolower(*ss
) == 'k') { limit
*= 1024.0; ss
++; }
2102 else if (tolower(*ss
) == 'm') { limit
*= 1024.0*1024.0; ss
++; }
2103 else if (tolower(*ss
) == 'g') { limit
*= 1024.0*1024.0*1024.0; ss
++; }
2105 if (limit
< 0.0 || *ss
!= 0)
2107 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for "
2108 "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a positive number",
2113 /* We use the rest of the argument list following the limit as the
2114 lookup key, because it doesn't make sense to use the same stored data
2115 if the period or options are different. */
2119 /* Second is the rate measurement period and exponential smoothing time
2120 constant. This must be strictly greater than zero, because zero leads to
2121 run-time division errors. */
2123 sender_rate_period
= string_nextinlist(&arg
, &sep
, NULL
, 0);
2124 if (sender_rate_period
== NULL
) period
= -1.0;
2125 else period
= readconf_readtime(sender_rate_period
, 0, FALSE
);
2128 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for "
2129 "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a time value",
2130 sender_rate_period
);
2134 /* Parse the other options. Should we check if the per_* options are being
2135 used in ACLs where they don't make sense, e.g. per_mail in the connect ACL? */
2137 while ((ss
= string_nextinlist(&arg
, &sep
, big_buffer
, big_buffer_size
))
2140 if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"leaky") == 0) leaky
= TRUE
;
2141 else if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"strict") == 0) strict
= TRUE
;
2142 else if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"per_byte") == 0) per_byte
= TRUE
;
2143 else if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"per_cmd") == 0) per_cmd
= TRUE
;
2144 else if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"per_conn") == 0) per_conn
= TRUE
;
2145 else if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"per_mail") == 0) per_mail
= TRUE
;
2146 else if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"per_rcpt") == 0) per_cmd
= TRUE
; /* alias */
2147 else have_key
= TRUE
;
2149 if (leaky
+ strict
> 1 || per_byte
+ per_cmd
+ per_conn
+ per_mail
> 1)
2151 *log_msgptr
= US
"conflicting options for \"ratelimit\" condition";
2155 /* Default option values */
2156 if (!strict
) leaky
= TRUE
;
2157 if (!per_byte
&& !per_cmd
&& !per_conn
) per_mail
= TRUE
;
2159 /* If there is no explicit key, use the sender_host_address. If there is no
2160 sender_host_address (e.g. -bs or acl_not_smtp) then we simply omit it. */
2162 if (!have_key
&& sender_host_address
!= NULL
)
2163 key
= string_sprintf("%s / %s", key
, sender_host_address
);
2165 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("ratelimit condition limit=%.0f period=%.0f key=%s\n",
2166 limit
, period
, key
);
2168 /* See if we have already computed the rate by looking in the relevant tree. For
2169 per-connection rate limiting, store tree nodes and dbdata in the permanent pool
2170 so that they survive across resets. */
2173 old_pool
= store_pool
;
2177 anchor
= &ratelimiters_conn
;
2178 store_pool
= POOL_PERM
;
2180 else if (per_mail
|| per_byte
)
2181 anchor
= &ratelimiters_mail
;
2183 anchor
= &ratelimiters_cmd
;
2185 if (anchor
!= NULL
&& (t
= tree_search(*anchor
, key
)) != NULL
)
2188 /* The following few lines duplicate some of the code below. */
2189 if (dbd
->rate
< limit
) rc
= FAIL
;
2191 store_pool
= old_pool
;
2192 sender_rate
= string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd
->rate
);
2194 debug_printf("ratelimit found pre-computed rate %s\n", sender_rate
);
2198 /* We aren't using a pre-computed rate, so get a previously recorded
2199 rate from the database, update it, and write it back. If there's no
2200 previous rate for this key, create one. */
2202 dbm
= dbfn_open(US
"ratelimit", O_RDWR
, &dbblock
, TRUE
);
2205 store_pool
= old_pool
;
2207 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("ratelimit database not available\n");
2208 *log_msgptr
= US
"ratelimit database not available";
2211 dbd
= dbfn_read(dbm
, key
);
2213 gettimeofday(&tv
, NULL
);
2217 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("ratelimit initializing new key's data\n");
2218 dbd
= store_get(sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit
));
2219 dbd
->time_stamp
= tv
.tv_sec
;
2220 dbd
->time_usec
= tv
.tv_usec
;
2225 /* The smoothed rate is computed using an exponentially weighted moving
2226 average adjusted for variable sampling intervals. The standard EWMA for
2227 a fixed sampling interval is: f'(t) = (1 - a) * f(t) + a * f'(t - 1)
2228 where f() is the measured value and f'() is the smoothed value.
2230 Old data decays out of the smoothed value exponentially, such that data n
2231 samples old is multiplied by a^n. The exponential decay time constant p
2232 is defined such that data p samples old is multiplied by 1/e, which means
2233 that a = exp(-1/p). We can maintain the same time constant for a variable
2234 sampling interval i by using a = exp(-i/p).
2236 The rate we are measuring is messages per period, suitable for directly
2237 comparing with the limit. The average rate between now and the previous
2238 message is period / interval, which we feed into the EWMA as the sample.
2240 It turns out that the number of messages required for the smoothed rate
2241 to reach the limit when they are sent in a burst is equal to the limit.
2242 This can be seen by analysing the value of the smoothed rate after N
2243 messages sent at even intervals. Let k = (1 - a) * p/i
2245 rate_1 = (1 - a) * p/i + a * rate_0
2247 rate_2 = k + a * rate_1
2248 = k + a * k + a^2 * rate_0
2249 rate_3 = k + a * k + a^2 * k + a^3 * rate_0
2250 rate_N = rate_0 * a^N + k * SUM(x=0..N-1)(a^x)
2251 = rate_0 * a^N + k * (1 - a^N) / (1 - a)
2252 = rate_0 * a^N + p/i * (1 - a^N)
2254 When N is large, a^N -> 0 so rate_N -> p/i as desired.
2256 rate_N = p/i + (rate_0 - p/i) * a^N
2257 a^N = (rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i)
2258 N * -i/p = log((rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i))
2259 N = p/i * log((rate_0 - p/i) / (rate_N - p/i))
2261 Numerical analysis of the above equation, setting the computed rate to
2262 increase from rate_0 = 0 to rate_N = limit, shows that for large sending
2263 rates, p/i, the number of messages N = limit. So limit serves as both the
2264 maximum rate measured in messages per period, and the maximum number of
2265 messages that can be sent in a fast burst. */
2267 double this_time
= (double)tv
.tv_sec
2268 + (double)tv
.tv_usec
/ 1000000.0;
2269 double prev_time
= (double)dbd
->time_stamp
2270 + (double)dbd
->time_usec
/ 1000000.0;
2272 /* We must avoid division by zero, and deal gracefully with the clock going
2273 backwards. If we blunder ahead when time is in reverse then the computed
2274 rate will be bogus. To be safe we clamp interval to a very small number. */
2276 double interval
= this_time
- prev_time
<= 0.0 ? 1e-9
2277 : this_time
- prev_time
;
2279 double i_over_p
= interval
/ period
;
2280 double a
= exp(-i_over_p
);
2282 dbd
->time_stamp
= tv
.tv_sec
;
2283 dbd
->time_usec
= tv
.tv_usec
;
2285 /* If we are measuring the rate in bytes per period, multiply the
2286 measured rate by the message size. If we don't know the message size
2287 then it's safe to just use a value of zero and let the recorded rate
2288 decay as if nothing happened. */
2291 dbd
->rate
= (message_size
< 0 ? 0.0 : (double)message_size
)
2292 * (1 - a
) / i_over_p
+ a
* dbd
->rate
;
2293 else if (per_cmd
&& where
== ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)
2294 dbd
->rate
= (double)recipients_count
2295 * (1 - a
) / i_over_p
+ a
* dbd
->rate
;
2297 dbd
->rate
= (1 - a
) / i_over_p
+ a
* dbd
->rate
;
2300 /* Clients sending at the limit are considered to be over the limit. This
2301 matters for edge cases such the first message sent by a client (which gets
2302 the initial rate of 0.0) when the rate limit is zero (i.e. the client should
2303 be completely blocked). */
2305 if (dbd
->rate
< limit
) rc
= FAIL
;
2308 /* Update the state if the rate is low or if we are being strict. If we
2309 are in leaky mode and the sender's rate is too high, we do not update
2310 the recorded rate in order to avoid an over-aggressive sender's retry
2311 rate preventing them from getting any email through. */
2313 if (rc
== FAIL
|| !leaky
)
2314 dbfn_write(dbm
, key
, dbd
, sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit
));
2317 /* Store the result in the tree for future reference, if necessary. */
2321 t
= store_get(sizeof(tree_node
) + Ustrlen(key
));
2323 Ustrcpy(t
->name
, key
);
2324 (void)tree_insertnode(anchor
, t
);
2327 /* We create the formatted version of the sender's rate very late in
2328 order to ensure that it is done using the correct storage pool. */
2330 store_pool
= old_pool
;
2331 sender_rate
= string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd
->rate
);
2334 debug_printf("ratelimit computed rate %s\n", sender_rate
);
2341 /*************************************************
2342 * Handle conditions/modifiers on an ACL item *
2343 *************************************************/
2345 /* Called from acl_check() below.
2349 cb ACL condition block - if NULL, result is OK
2350 where where called from
2351 addr the address being checked for RCPT, or NULL
2352 level the nesting level
2353 epp pointer to pass back TRUE if "endpass" encountered
2354 (applies only to "accept" and "discard")
2355 user_msgptr user message pointer
2356 log_msgptr log message pointer
2357 basic_errno pointer to where to put verify error
2359 Returns: OK - all conditions are met
2360 DISCARD - an "acl" condition returned DISCARD - only allowed
2361 for "accept" or "discard" verbs
2362 FAIL - at least one condition fails
2363 FAIL_DROP - an "acl" condition returned FAIL_DROP
2364 DEFER - can't tell at the moment (typically, lookup defer,
2365 but can be temporary callout problem)
2366 ERROR - ERROR from nested ACL or expansion failure or other
2371 acl_check_condition(int verb
, acl_condition_block
*cb
, int where
,
2372 address_item
*addr
, int level
, BOOL
*epp
, uschar
**user_msgptr
,
2373 uschar
**log_msgptr
, int *basic_errno
)
2375 uschar
*user_message
= NULL
;
2376 uschar
*log_message
= NULL
;
2379 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2383 for (; cb
!= NULL
; cb
= cb
->next
)
2388 /* The message and log_message items set up messages to be used in
2389 case of rejection. They are expanded later. */
2391 if (cb
->type
== ACLC_MESSAGE
)
2393 user_message
= cb
->arg
;
2397 if (cb
->type
== ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE
)
2399 log_message
= cb
->arg
;
2403 /* The endpass "condition" just sets a flag to show it occurred. This is
2404 checked at compile time to be on an "accept" or "discard" item. */
2406 if (cb
->type
== ACLC_ENDPASS
)
2412 /* For other conditions and modifiers, the argument is expanded now for some
2413 of them, but not for all, because expansion happens down in some lower level
2414 checking functions in some cases. */
2416 if (cond_expand_at_top
[cb
->type
])
2418 arg
= expand_string(cb
->arg
);
2421 if (expand_string_forcedfail
) continue;
2422 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s",
2423 cb
->arg
, expand_string_message
);
2424 return search_find_defer
? DEFER
: ERROR
;
2429 /* Show condition, and expanded condition if it's different */
2434 debug_printf("check %s%s %n",
2435 (!cond_modifiers
[cb
->type
] && cb
->u
.negated
)? "!":"",
2436 conditions
[cb
->type
], &lhswidth
);
2438 if (cb
->type
== ACLC_SET
)
2440 debug_printf("acl_%s ", cb
->u
.varname
);
2441 lhswidth
+= 5 + Ustrlen(cb
->u
.varname
);
2444 debug_printf("= %s\n", cb
->arg
);
2447 debug_printf("%.*s= %s\n", lhswidth
,
2451 /* Check that this condition makes sense at this time */
2453 if ((cond_forbids
[cb
->type
] & (1 << where
)) != 0)
2455 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("cannot %s %s condition in %s ACL",
2456 cond_modifiers
[cb
->type
]? "use" : "test",
2457 conditions
[cb
->type
], acl_wherenames
[where
]);
2461 /* Run the appropriate test for each condition, or take the appropriate
2462 action for the remaining modifiers. */
2466 case ACLC_ADD_HEADER
:
2470 /* A nested ACL that returns "discard" makes sense only for an "accept" or
2474 rc
= acl_check_internal(where
, addr
, arg
, level
+1, user_msgptr
, log_msgptr
);
2475 if (rc
== DISCARD
&& verb
!= ACL_ACCEPT
&& verb
!= ACL_DISCARD
)
2477 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("nested ACL returned \"discard\" for "
2478 "\"%s\" command (only allowed with \"accept\" or \"discard\")",
2484 case ACLC_AUTHENTICATED
:
2485 rc
= (sender_host_authenticated
== NULL
)? FAIL
:
2486 match_isinlist(sender_host_authenticated
, &arg
, 0, NULL
, NULL
, MCL_STRING
,
2490 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
2491 case ACLC_BMI_OPTIN
:
2493 int old_pool
= store_pool
;
2494 store_pool
= POOL_PERM
;
2495 bmi_current_optin
= string_copy(arg
);
2496 store_pool
= old_pool
;
2501 case ACLC_CONDITION
:
2502 if (Ustrspn(arg
, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg
)) /* Digits, or empty */
2503 rc
= (Uatoi(arg
) == 0)? FAIL
: OK
;
2505 rc
= (strcmpic(arg
, US
"no") == 0 ||
2506 strcmpic(arg
, US
"false") == 0)? FAIL
:
2507 (strcmpic(arg
, US
"yes") == 0 ||
2508 strcmpic(arg
, US
"true") == 0)? OK
: DEFER
;
2510 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("invalid \"condition\" value \"%s\"", arg
);
2514 control_type
= decode_control(arg
, &p
, where
, log_msgptr
);
2516 /* Check if this control makes sense at this time */
2518 if ((control_forbids
[control_type
] & (1 << where
)) != 0)
2520 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("cannot use \"control=%s\" in %s ACL",
2521 controls
[control_type
], acl_wherenames
[where
]);
2525 switch(control_type
)
2527 case CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED
:
2528 allow_auth_unadvertised
= TRUE
;
2531 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
2532 case CONTROL_BMI_RUN
:
2537 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
2538 case CONTROL_DK_VERIFY
:
2546 case CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART
:
2547 deliver_localpart
= addr
->cc_local_part
;
2550 case CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART
:
2551 deliver_localpart
= addr
->lc_local_part
;
2554 case CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC
:
2555 smtp_enforce_sync
= TRUE
;
2558 case CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC
:
2559 smtp_enforce_sync
= FALSE
;
2562 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2563 case CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL
:
2564 no_mbox_unspool
= TRUE
;
2568 case CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE
:
2569 no_multiline_responses
= TRUE
;
2572 case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER
:
2573 case CONTROL_FAKEREJECT
:
2574 fake_response
= (control_type
== CONTROL_FAKEDEFER
) ? DEFER
: FAIL
;
2578 while (*pp
!= 0) pp
++;
2579 fake_response_text
= expand_string(string_copyn(p
+1, pp
-p
-1));
2584 /* Explicitly reset to default string */
2585 fake_response_text
= US
"Your message has been rejected but is being kept for evaluation.\nIf it was a legitimate message, it may still be delivered to the target recipient(s).";
2589 case CONTROL_FREEZE
:
2590 deliver_freeze
= TRUE
;
2591 deliver_frozen_at
= time(NULL
);
2592 freeze_tell
= freeze_tell_config
; /* Reset to configured value */
2593 if (Ustrncmp(p
, "/no_tell", 8) == 0)
2600 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg
);
2605 case CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY
:
2606 queue_only_policy
= TRUE
;
2609 case CONTROL_SUBMISSION
:
2610 originator_name
= US
"";
2611 submission_mode
= TRUE
;
2614 if (Ustrncmp(p
, "/sender_retain", 14) == 0)
2617 active_local_sender_retain
= TRUE
;
2618 active_local_from_check
= FALSE
;
2620 else if (Ustrncmp(p
, "/domain=", 8) == 0)
2623 while (*pp
!= 0 && *pp
!= '/') pp
++;
2624 submission_domain
= string_copyn(p
+8, pp
-p
-8);
2627 /* The name= option must be last, because it swallows the rest of
2629 else if (Ustrncmp(p
, "/name=", 6) == 0)
2632 while (*pp
!= 0) pp
++;
2633 submission_name
= string_copy(parse_fix_phrase(p
+6, pp
-p
-6,
2634 big_buffer
, big_buffer_size
));
2641 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg
);
2646 case CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS
:
2647 suppress_local_fixups
= TRUE
;
2652 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2654 rc
= mime_decode(&arg
);
2660 int delay
= readconf_readtime(arg
, 0, FALSE
);
2663 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for \"delay\" "
2664 "modifier: \"%s\" is not a time value", arg
);
2669 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("delay modifier requests %d-second delay\n",
2674 debug_printf("delay skipped in -bh checking mode\n");
2677 /* It appears to be impossible to detect that a TCP/IP connection has
2678 gone away without reading from it. This means that we cannot shorten
2679 the delay below if the client goes away, because we cannot discover
2680 that the client has closed its end of the connection. (The connection
2681 is actually in a half-closed state, waiting for the server to close its
2682 end.) It would be nice to be able to detect this state, so that the
2683 Exim process is not held up unnecessarily. However, it seems that we
2684 can't. The poll() function does not do the right thing, and in any case
2685 it is not always available.
2687 NOTE: If ever this state of affairs changes, remember that we may be
2688 dealing with stdin/stdout here, in addition to TCP/IP connections.
2689 Whatever is done must work in both cases. To detected the stdin/stdout
2690 case, check for smtp_in or smtp_out being NULL. */
2694 while (delay
> 0) delay
= sleep(delay
);
2700 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
2706 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
2707 case ACLC_DK_DOMAIN_SOURCE
:
2708 if (dk_verify_block
== NULL
) { rc
= FAIL
; break; };
2709 /* check header source of domain against given string */
2710 switch (dk_verify_block
->address_source
) {
2711 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_FROM_FROM
:
2712 rc
= match_isinlist(US
"from", &arg
, 0, NULL
,
2713 NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2715 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_FROM_SENDER
:
2716 rc
= match_isinlist(US
"sender", &arg
, 0, NULL
,
2717 NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2719 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_NONE
:
2720 rc
= match_isinlist(US
"none", &arg
, 0, NULL
,
2721 NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2726 case ACLC_DK_POLICY
:
2727 if (dk_verify_block
== NULL
) { rc
= FAIL
; break; };
2728 /* check policy against given string, default FAIL */
2730 if (dk_verify_block
->signsall
)
2731 rc
= match_isinlist(US
"signsall", &arg
, 0, NULL
,
2732 NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2733 if (dk_verify_block
->testing
)
2734 rc
= match_isinlist(US
"testing", &arg
, 0, NULL
,
2735 NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2738 case ACLC_DK_SENDER_DOMAINS
:
2739 if (dk_verify_block
== NULL
) { rc
= FAIL
; break; };
2740 if (dk_verify_block
->domain
!= NULL
)
2741 rc
= match_isinlist(dk_verify_block
->domain
, &arg
, 0, &domainlist_anchor
,
2742 NULL
, MCL_DOMAIN
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2746 case ACLC_DK_SENDER_LOCAL_PARTS
:
2747 if (dk_verify_block
== NULL
) { rc
= FAIL
; break; };
2748 if (dk_verify_block
->local_part
!= NULL
)
2749 rc
= match_isinlist(dk_verify_block
->local_part
, &arg
, 0, &localpartlist_anchor
,
2750 NULL
, MCL_LOCALPART
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2754 case ACLC_DK_SENDERS
:
2755 if (dk_verify_block
== NULL
) { rc
= FAIL
; break; };
2756 if (dk_verify_block
->address
!= NULL
)
2757 rc
= match_address_list(dk_verify_block
->address
, TRUE
, TRUE
, &arg
, NULL
, -1, 0, NULL
);
2761 case ACLC_DK_STATUS
:
2762 if (dk_verify_block
== NULL
) { rc
= FAIL
; break; };
2763 if (dk_verify_block
->result
> 0) {
2764 switch(dk_verify_block
->result
) {
2765 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_BAD_FORMAT
:
2766 rc
= match_isinlist(US
"bad format", &arg
, 0, NULL
,
2767 NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2769 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NO_KEY
:
2770 rc
= match_isinlist(US
"no key", &arg
, 0, NULL
,
2771 NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2773 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NO_SIGNATURE
:
2774 rc
= match_isinlist(US
"no signature", &arg
, 0, NULL
,
2775 NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2777 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_REVOKED
:
2778 rc
= match_isinlist(US
"revoked", &arg
, 0, NULL
,
2779 NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2781 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NON_PARTICIPANT
:
2782 rc
= match_isinlist(US
"non-participant", &arg
, 0, NULL
,
2783 NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2785 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_GOOD
:
2786 rc
= match_isinlist(US
"good", &arg
, 0, NULL
,
2787 NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2789 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_BAD
:
2790 rc
= match_isinlist(US
"bad", &arg
, 0, NULL
,
2791 NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2799 rc
= verify_check_dnsbl(&arg
);
2803 rc
= match_isinlist(addr
->domain
, &arg
, 0, &domainlist_anchor
,
2804 addr
->domain_cache
, MCL_DOMAIN
, TRUE
, &deliver_domain_data
);
2807 /* The value in tls_cipher is the full cipher name, for example,
2808 TLSv1:DES-CBC3-SHA:168, whereas the values to test for are just the
2809 cipher names such as DES-CBC3-SHA. But program defensively. We don't know
2810 what may in practice come out of the SSL library - which at the time of
2811 writing is poorly documented. */
2813 case ACLC_ENCRYPTED
:
2814 if (tls_cipher
== NULL
) rc
= FAIL
; else
2816 uschar
*endcipher
= NULL
;
2817 uschar
*cipher
= Ustrchr(tls_cipher
, ':');
2818 if (cipher
== NULL
) cipher
= tls_cipher
; else
2820 endcipher
= Ustrchr(++cipher
, ':');
2821 if (endcipher
!= NULL
) *endcipher
= 0;
2823 rc
= match_isinlist(cipher
, &arg
, 0, NULL
, NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2824 if (endcipher
!= NULL
) *endcipher
= ':';
2828 /* Use verify_check_this_host() instead of verify_check_host() so that
2829 we can pass over &host_data to catch any looked up data. Once it has been
2830 set, it retains its value so that it's still there if another ACL verb
2831 comes through here and uses the cache. However, we must put it into
2832 permanent store in case it is also expected to be used in a subsequent
2833 message in the same SMTP connection. */
2836 rc
= verify_check_this_host(&arg
, sender_host_cache
, NULL
,
2837 (sender_host_address
== NULL
)? US
"" : sender_host_address
, &host_data
);
2838 if (host_data
!= NULL
) host_data
= string_copy_malloc(host_data
);
2841 case ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS
:
2842 rc
= match_isinlist(addr
->cc_local_part
, &arg
, 0,
2843 &localpartlist_anchor
, addr
->localpart_cache
, MCL_LOCALPART
, TRUE
,
2844 &deliver_localpart_data
);
2856 if (Ustrncmp(s
, "main", 4) == 0)
2857 { logbits
|= LOG_MAIN
; s
+= 4; }
2858 else if (Ustrncmp(s
, "panic", 5) == 0)
2859 { logbits
|= LOG_PANIC
; s
+= 5; }
2860 else if (Ustrncmp(s
, "reject", 6) == 0)
2861 { logbits
|= LOG_REJECT
; s
+= 6; }
2864 logbits
= LOG_MAIN
|LOG_PANIC
;
2865 s
= string_sprintf(":unknown log name in \"%s\" in "
2866 "\"logwrite\" in %s ACL", arg
, acl_wherenames
[where
]);
2872 while (isspace(*s
)) s
++;
2873 if (logbits
== 0) logbits
= LOG_MAIN
;
2874 log_write(0, logbits
, "%s", string_printing(s
));
2878 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2881 /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
2882 uschar
*ss
= string_nextinlist(&arg
, &sep
, big_buffer
, big_buffer_size
);
2883 /* Run the malware backend. */
2885 /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
2886 while ((ss
= string_nextinlist(&arg
, &sep
, big_buffer
, big_buffer_size
))
2888 if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"defer_ok") == 0 && rc
== DEFER
)
2890 /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
2897 case ACLC_MIME_REGEX
:
2898 rc
= mime_regex(&arg
);
2902 case ACLC_RATELIMIT
:
2903 rc
= acl_ratelimit(arg
, where
, log_msgptr
);
2906 case ACLC_RECIPIENTS
:
2907 rc
= match_address_list(addr
->address
, TRUE
, TRUE
, &arg
, NULL
, -1, 0,
2911 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2917 case ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS
:
2920 sdomain
= Ustrrchr(sender_address
, '@');
2921 sdomain
= (sdomain
== NULL
)? US
"" : sdomain
+ 1;
2922 rc
= match_isinlist(sdomain
, &arg
, 0, &domainlist_anchor
,
2923 sender_domain_cache
, MCL_DOMAIN
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2928 rc
= match_address_list(sender_address
, TRUE
, TRUE
, &arg
,
2929 sender_address_cache
, -1, 0, &sender_data
);
2932 /* Connection variables must persist forever */
2936 int old_pool
= store_pool
;
2937 if (cb
->u
.varname
[0] == 'c') store_pool
= POOL_PERM
;
2938 acl_var_create(cb
->u
.varname
)->data
.ptr
= string_copy(arg
);
2939 store_pool
= old_pool
;
2943 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2946 /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
2947 uschar
*ss
= string_nextinlist(&arg
, &sep
, big_buffer
, big_buffer_size
);
2948 /* Run the spam backend. */
2950 /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
2951 while ((ss
= string_nextinlist(&arg
, &sep
, big_buffer
, big_buffer_size
))
2953 if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"defer_ok") == 0 && rc
== DEFER
)
2955 /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
2963 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
2965 rc
= spf_process(&arg
, sender_address
);
2969 /* If the verb is WARN, discard any user message from verification, because
2970 such messages are SMTP responses, not header additions. The latter come
2971 only from explicit "message" modifiers. However, put the user message into
2972 $acl_verify_message so it can be used in subsequent conditions or modifiers
2973 (until something changes it). */
2976 rc
= acl_verify(where
, addr
, arg
, user_msgptr
, log_msgptr
, basic_errno
);
2977 acl_verify_message
= *user_msgptr
;
2978 if (verb
== ACL_WARN
) *user_msgptr
= NULL
;
2982 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN
|LOG_PANIC_DIE
, "internal ACL error: unknown "
2983 "condition %d", cb
->type
);
2987 /* If a condition was negated, invert OK/FAIL. */
2989 if (!cond_modifiers
[cb
->type
] && cb
->u
.negated
)
2991 if (rc
== OK
) rc
= FAIL
;
2992 else if (rc
== FAIL
|| rc
== FAIL_DROP
) rc
= OK
;
2995 if (rc
!= OK
) break; /* Conditions loop */
2999 /* If the result is the one for which "message" and/or "log_message" are used,
3000 handle the values of these options. Most verbs have but a single return for
3001 which the messages are relevant, but for "discard", it's useful to have the log
3002 message both when it succeeds and when it fails. Also, for an "accept" that
3003 appears in a QUIT ACL, we want to handle the user message. Since only "accept"
3004 and "warn" are permitted in that ACL, we don't need to test the verb.
3006 These modifiers act in different ways:
3008 "message" is a user message that will be included in an SMTP response. Unless
3009 it is empty, it overrides any previously set user message.
3011 "log_message" is a non-user message, and it adds to any existing non-user
3012 message that is already set.
3014 If there isn't a log message set, we make it the same as the user message. */
3016 if (((rc
== FAIL_DROP
)? FAIL
: rc
) == msgcond
[verb
] ||
3017 (verb
== ACL_DISCARD
&& rc
== OK
) ||
3018 (where
== ACL_WHERE_QUIT
))
3022 /* If the verb is "warn", messages generated by conditions (verification or
3023 nested ACLs) are discarded. Only messages specified at this level are used.
3024 However, the value of an existing message is available in $acl_verify_message
3025 during expansions. */
3027 uschar
*old_user_msgptr
= *user_msgptr
;
3028 uschar
*old_log_msgptr
= (*log_msgptr
!= NULL
)? *log_msgptr
: old_user_msgptr
;
3030 if (verb
== ACL_WARN
) *log_msgptr
= *user_msgptr
= NULL
;
3032 if (user_message
!= NULL
)
3034 acl_verify_message
= old_user_msgptr
;
3035 expmessage
= expand_string(user_message
);
3036 if (expmessage
== NULL
)
3038 if (!expand_string_forcedfail
)
3039 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN
|LOG_PANIC
, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
3040 user_message
, expand_string_message
);
3042 else if (expmessage
[0] != 0) *user_msgptr
= expmessage
;
3045 if (log_message
!= NULL
)
3047 acl_verify_message
= old_log_msgptr
;
3048 expmessage
= expand_string(log_message
);
3049 if (expmessage
== NULL
)
3051 if (!expand_string_forcedfail
)
3052 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN
|LOG_PANIC
, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
3053 log_message
, expand_string_message
);
3055 else if (expmessage
[0] != 0)
3057 *log_msgptr
= (*log_msgptr
== NULL
)? expmessage
:
3058 string_sprintf("%s: %s", expmessage
, *log_msgptr
);
3062 /* If no log message, default it to the user message */
3064 if (*log_msgptr
== NULL
) *log_msgptr
= *user_msgptr
;
3067 acl_verify_message
= NULL
;
3075 /*************************************************
3076 * Get line from a literal ACL *
3077 *************************************************/
3079 /* This function is passed to acl_read() in order to extract individual lines
3080 of a literal ACL, which we access via static pointers. We can destroy the
3081 contents because this is called only once (the compiled ACL is remembered).
3083 This code is intended to treat the data in the same way as lines in the main
3084 Exim configuration file. That is:
3086 . Leading spaces are ignored.
3088 . A \ at the end of a line is a continuation - trailing spaces after the \
3089 are permitted (this is because I don't believe in making invisible things
3090 significant). Leading spaces on the continued part of a line are ignored.
3092 . Physical lines starting (significantly) with # are totally ignored, and
3093 may appear within a sequence of backslash-continued lines.
3095 . Blank lines are ignored, but will end a sequence of continuations.
3098 Returns: a pointer to the next line
3102 static uschar
*acl_text
; /* Current pointer in the text */
3103 static uschar
*acl_text_end
; /* Points one past the terminating '0' */
3111 /* This loop handles leading blank lines and comments. */
3115 while (isspace(*acl_text
)) acl_text
++; /* Leading spaces/empty lines */
3116 if (*acl_text
== 0) return NULL
; /* No more data */
3117 yield
= acl_text
; /* Potential data line */
3119 while (*acl_text
!= 0 && *acl_text
!= '\n') acl_text
++;
3121 /* If we hit the end before a newline, we have the whole logical line. If
3122 it's a comment, there's no more data to be given. Otherwise, yield it. */
3124 if (*acl_text
== 0) return (*yield
== '#')? NULL
: yield
;
3126 /* After reaching a newline, end this loop if the physical line does not
3127 start with '#'. If it does, it's a comment, and the loop continues. */
3129 if (*yield
!= '#') break;
3132 /* This loop handles continuations. We know we have some real data, ending in
3133 newline. See if there is a continuation marker at the end (ignoring trailing
3134 white space). We know that *yield is not white space, so no need to test for
3135 cont > yield in the backwards scanning loop. */
3140 for (cont
= acl_text
- 1; isspace(*cont
); cont
--);
3142 /* If no continuation follows, we are done. Mark the end of the line and
3151 /* We have encountered a continuation. Skip over whitespace at the start of
3152 the next line, and indeed the whole of the next line or lines if they are
3157 while (*(++acl_text
) == ' ' || *acl_text
== '\t');
3158 if (*acl_text
!= '#') break;
3159 while (*(++acl_text
) != 0 && *acl_text
!= '\n');
3162 /* We have the start of a continuation line. Move all the rest of the data
3163 to join onto the previous line, and then find its end. If the end is not a
3164 newline, we are done. Otherwise loop to look for another continuation. */
3166 memmove(cont
, acl_text
, acl_text_end
- acl_text
);
3167 acl_text_end
-= acl_text
- cont
;
3169 while (*acl_text
!= 0 && *acl_text
!= '\n') acl_text
++;
3170 if (*acl_text
== 0) return yield
;
3173 /* Control does not reach here */
3180 /*************************************************
3181 * Check access using an ACL *
3182 *************************************************/
3184 /* This function is called from address_check. It may recurse via
3185 acl_check_condition() - hence the use of a level to stop looping. The ACL is
3186 passed as a string which is expanded. A forced failure implies no access check
3187 is required. If the result is a single word, it is taken as the name of an ACL
3188 which is sought in the global ACL tree. Otherwise, it is taken as literal ACL
3189 text, complete with newlines, and parsed as such. In both cases, the ACL check
3190 is then run. This function uses an auxiliary function for acl_read() to call
3191 for reading individual lines of a literal ACL. This is acl_getline(), which
3192 appears immediately above.
3195 where where called from
3196 addr address item when called from RCPT; otherwise NULL
3197 s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
3198 level the nesting level
3199 user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
3200 log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
3202 Returns: OK access is granted
3203 DISCARD access is apparently granted...
3204 FAIL access is denied
3205 FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection
3206 DEFER can't tell at the moment
3211 acl_check_internal(int where
, address_item
*addr
, uschar
*s
, int level
,
3212 uschar
**user_msgptr
, uschar
**log_msgptr
)
3215 acl_block
*acl
= NULL
;
3216 uschar
*acl_name
= US
"inline ACL";
3219 /* Catch configuration loops */
3223 *log_msgptr
= US
"ACL nested too deep: possible loop";
3229 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("ACL is NULL: implicit DENY\n");
3233 /* At top level, we expand the incoming string. At lower levels, it has already
3234 been expanded as part of condition processing. */
3238 ss
= expand_string(s
);
3241 if (expand_string_forcedfail
) return OK
;
3242 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s", s
,
3243 expand_string_message
);
3249 while (isspace(*ss
))ss
++;
3251 /* If we can't find a named ACL, the default is to parse it as an inline one.
3252 (Unless it begins with a slash; non-existent files give rise to an error.) */
3256 /* Handle the case of a string that does not contain any spaces. Look for a
3257 named ACL among those read from the configuration, or a previously read file.
3258 It is possible that the pointer to the ACL is NULL if the configuration
3259 contains a name with no data. If not found, and the text begins with '/',
3260 read an ACL from a file, and save it so it can be re-used. */
3262 if (Ustrchr(ss
, ' ') == NULL
)
3264 tree_node
*t
= tree_search(acl_anchor
, ss
);
3267 acl
= (acl_block
*)(t
->data
.ptr
);
3270 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("ACL \"%s\" is empty: implicit DENY\n", ss
);
3273 acl_name
= string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss
);
3274 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("using ACL \"%s\"\n", ss
);
3277 else if (*ss
== '/')
3279 struct stat statbuf
;
3280 fd
= Uopen(ss
, O_RDONLY
, 0);
3283 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("failed to open ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss
,
3288 if (fstat(fd
, &statbuf
) != 0)
3290 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("failed to fstat ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss
,
3295 acl_text
= store_get(statbuf
.st_size
+ 1);
3296 acl_text_end
= acl_text
+ statbuf
.st_size
+ 1;
3298 if (read(fd
, acl_text
, statbuf
.st_size
) != statbuf
.st_size
)
3300 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("failed to read ACL file \"%s\": %s",
3301 ss
, strerror(errno
));
3304 acl_text
[statbuf
.st_size
] = 0;
3307 acl_name
= string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss
);
3308 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("read ACL from file %s\n", ss
);
3312 /* Parse an ACL that is still in text form. If it came from a file, remember it
3313 in the ACL tree, having read it into the POOL_PERM store pool so that it
3314 persists between multiple messages. */
3318 int old_pool
= store_pool
;
3319 if (fd
>= 0) store_pool
= POOL_PERM
;
3320 acl
= acl_read(acl_getline
, log_msgptr
);
3321 store_pool
= old_pool
;
3322 if (acl
== NULL
&& *log_msgptr
!= NULL
) return ERROR
;
3325 tree_node
*t
= store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node
) + Ustrlen(ss
));
3326 Ustrcpy(t
->name
, ss
);
3328 (void)tree_insertnode(&acl_anchor
, t
);
3332 /* Now we have an ACL to use. It's possible it may be NULL. */
3337 int basic_errno
= 0;
3338 BOOL endpass_seen
= FALSE
;
3340 *log_msgptr
= *user_msgptr
= NULL
;
3341 acl_temp_details
= FALSE
;
3343 if (where
== ACL_WHERE_QUIT
&&
3344 acl
->verb
!= ACL_ACCEPT
&&
3345 acl
->verb
!= ACL_WARN
)
3347 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("\"%s\" is not allowed in a QUIT ACL",
3352 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("processing \"%s\"\n", verbs
[acl
->verb
]);
3354 /* Clear out any search error message from a previous check before testing
3357 search_error_message
= NULL
;
3358 cond
= acl_check_condition(acl
->verb
, acl
->condition
, where
, addr
, level
,
3359 &endpass_seen
, user_msgptr
, log_msgptr
, &basic_errno
);
3361 /* Handle special returns: DEFER causes a return except on a WARN verb;
3362 ERROR always causes a return. */
3367 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("%s: condition test deferred\n", verbs
[acl
->verb
]);
3368 if (basic_errno
!= ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER
)
3370 if (search_error_message
!= NULL
&& *search_error_message
!= 0)
3371 *log_msgptr
= search_error_message
;
3372 if (smtp_return_error_details
) acl_temp_details
= TRUE
;
3376 acl_temp_details
= TRUE
;
3378 if (acl
->verb
!= ACL_WARN
) return DEFER
;
3381 default: /* Paranoia */
3383 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("%s: condition test error\n", verbs
[acl
->verb
]);
3387 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("%s: condition test succeeded\n",
3392 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("%s: condition test failed\n", verbs
[acl
->verb
]);
3395 /* DISCARD and DROP can happen only from a nested ACL condition, and
3396 DISCARD can happen only for an "accept" or "discard" verb. */
3399 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("%s: condition test yielded \"discard\"\n",
3404 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("%s: condition test yielded \"drop\"\n",
3409 /* At this point, cond for most verbs is either OK or FAIL or (as a result of
3410 a nested ACL condition) FAIL_DROP. However, for WARN, cond may be DEFER, and
3411 for ACCEPT and DISCARD, it may be DISCARD after a nested ACL call. */
3416 if (cond
== OK
|| cond
== DISCARD
) return cond
;
3419 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("accept: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
3427 acl_temp_details
= TRUE
;
3433 if (cond
== OK
) return FAIL
;
3437 if (cond
== OK
|| cond
== DISCARD
) return DISCARD
;
3440 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("discard: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
3446 if (cond
== OK
) return FAIL_DROP
;
3450 if (cond
!= OK
) return cond
;
3455 acl_warn(where
, *user_msgptr
, *log_msgptr
);
3456 else if (cond
== DEFER
&& (log_extra_selector
& LX_acl_warn_skipped
) != 0)
3457 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN
, "%s Warning: ACL \"warn\" statement skipped: "
3458 "condition test deferred%s%s", host_and_ident(TRUE
),
3459 (*log_msgptr
== NULL
)? US
"" : US
": ",
3460 (*log_msgptr
== NULL
)? US
"" : *log_msgptr
);
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