Flush SMTP output buffer before "delay" in an ACL; add control =
[exim.git] / src / src / acl.c
1 /* $Cambridge: exim/src/src/acl.c,v 1.70 2007/02/05 12:35:46 ph10 Exp $ */
2
3 /*************************************************
4 * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
5 *************************************************/
6
7 /* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2007 */
8 /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
9
10 /* Code for handling Access Control Lists (ACLs) */
11
12 #include "exim.h"
13
14
15 /* Default callout timeout */
16
17 #define CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT 30
18
19 /* ACL verb codes - keep in step with the table of verbs that follows */
20
21 enum { ACL_ACCEPT, ACL_DEFER, ACL_DENY, ACL_DISCARD, ACL_DROP, ACL_REQUIRE,
22 ACL_WARN };
23
24 /* ACL verbs */
25
26 static uschar *verbs[] =
27 { US"accept", US"defer", US"deny", US"discard", US"drop", US"require",
28 US"warn" };
29
30 /* For each verb, the conditions for which "message" or "log_message" are used
31 are held as a bitmap. This is to avoid expanding the strings unnecessarily. For
32 "accept", the FAIL case is used only after "endpass", but that is selected in
33 the code. */
34
35 static int msgcond[] = {
36 (1<<OK) | (1<<FAIL) | (1<<FAIL_DROP), /* accept */
37 (1<<OK), /* defer */
38 (1<<OK), /* deny */
39 (1<<OK) | (1<<FAIL) | (1<<FAIL_DROP), /* discard */
40 (1<<OK), /* drop */
41 (1<<FAIL) | (1<<FAIL_DROP), /* require */
42 (1<<OK) /* warn */
43 };
44
45 /* ACL condition and modifier codes - keep in step with the table that
46 follows, and the cond_expand_at_top and uschar cond_modifiers tables lower
47 down. */
48
49 enum { ACLC_ACL,
50 ACLC_ADD_HEADER,
51 ACLC_AUTHENTICATED,
52 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
53 ACLC_BMI_OPTIN,
54 #endif
55 ACLC_CONDITION,
56 ACLC_CONTROL,
57 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
58 ACLC_DECODE,
59 #endif
60 ACLC_DELAY,
61 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
62 ACLC_DEMIME,
63 #endif
64 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
65 ACLC_DK_DOMAIN_SOURCE,
66 ACLC_DK_POLICY,
67 ACLC_DK_SENDER_DOMAINS,
68 ACLC_DK_SENDER_LOCAL_PARTS,
69 ACLC_DK_SENDERS,
70 ACLC_DK_STATUS,
71 #endif
72 ACLC_DNSLISTS,
73 ACLC_DOMAINS,
74 ACLC_ENCRYPTED,
75 ACLC_ENDPASS,
76 ACLC_HOSTS,
77 ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS,
78 ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE,
79 ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET,
80 ACLC_LOGWRITE,
81 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
82 ACLC_MALWARE,
83 #endif
84 ACLC_MESSAGE,
85 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
86 ACLC_MIME_REGEX,
87 #endif
88 ACLC_RATELIMIT,
89 ACLC_RECIPIENTS,
90 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
91 ACLC_REGEX,
92 #endif
93 ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS,
94 ACLC_SENDERS,
95 ACLC_SET,
96 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
97 ACLC_SPAM,
98 #endif
99 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
100 ACLC_SPF,
101 #endif
102 ACLC_VERIFY };
103
104 /* ACL conditions/modifiers: "delay", "control", "endpass", "message",
105 "log_message", "log_reject_target", "logwrite", and "set" are modifiers that
106 look like conditions but always return TRUE. They are used for their side
107 effects. */
108
109 static uschar *conditions[] = {
110 US"acl",
111 US"add_header",
112 US"authenticated",
113 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
114 US"bmi_optin",
115 #endif
116 US"condition",
117 US"control",
118 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
119 US"decode",
120 #endif
121 US"delay",
122 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
123 US"demime",
124 #endif
125 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
126 US"dk_domain_source",
127 US"dk_policy",
128 US"dk_sender_domains",
129 US"dk_sender_local_parts",
130 US"dk_senders",
131 US"dk_status",
132 #endif
133 US"dnslists",
134 US"domains",
135 US"encrypted",
136 US"endpass",
137 US"hosts",
138 US"local_parts",
139 US"log_message",
140 US"log_reject_target",
141 US"logwrite",
142 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
143 US"malware",
144 #endif
145 US"message",
146 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
147 US"mime_regex",
148 #endif
149 US"ratelimit",
150 US"recipients",
151 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
152 US"regex",
153 #endif
154 US"sender_domains", US"senders", US"set",
155 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
156 US"spam",
157 #endif
158 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
159 US"spf",
160 #endif
161 US"verify" };
162
163
164 /* Return values from decode_control(); keep in step with the table of names
165 that follows! */
166
167 enum {
168 CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED,
169 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
170 CONTROL_BMI_RUN,
171 #endif
172 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
173 CONTROL_DK_VERIFY,
174 #endif
175 CONTROL_ERROR,
176 CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART,
177 CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART,
178 CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC,
179 CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC,
180 CONTROL_FREEZE,
181 CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY,
182 CONTROL_SUBMISSION,
183 CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS,
184 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
185 CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL,
186 #endif
187 CONTROL_FAKEDEFER,
188 CONTROL_FAKEREJECT,
189 CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE,
190 CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING,
191 CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH
192 };
193
194 /* ACL control names; keep in step with the table above! This list is used for
195 turning ids into names. The actual list of recognized names is in the variable
196 control_def controls_list[] below. The fact that there are two lists is a mess
197 and should be tidied up. */
198
199 static uschar *controls[] = {
200 US"allow_auth_unadvertised",
201 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
202 US"bmi_run",
203 #endif
204 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
205 US"dk_verify",
206 #endif
207 US"error",
208 US"caseful_local_part",
209 US"caselower_local_part",
210 US"enforce_sync",
211 US"no_enforce_sync",
212 US"freeze",
213 US"queue_only",
214 US"submission",
215 US"suppress_local_fixups",
216 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
217 US"no_mbox_unspool",
218 #endif
219 US"fakedefer",
220 US"fakereject",
221 US"no_multiline",
222 US"no_pipelining",
223 US"no_delay_flush"
224 };
225
226 /* Flags to indicate for which conditions/modifiers a string expansion is done
227 at the outer level. In the other cases, expansion already occurs in the
228 checking functions. */
229
230 static uschar cond_expand_at_top[] = {
231 TRUE, /* acl */
232 TRUE, /* add_header */
233 FALSE, /* authenticated */
234 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
235 TRUE, /* bmi_optin */
236 #endif
237 TRUE, /* condition */
238 TRUE, /* control */
239 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
240 TRUE, /* decode */
241 #endif
242 TRUE, /* delay */
243 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
244 TRUE, /* demime */
245 #endif
246 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
247 TRUE, /* dk_domain_source */
248 TRUE, /* dk_policy */
249 TRUE, /* dk_sender_domains */
250 TRUE, /* dk_sender_local_parts */
251 TRUE, /* dk_senders */
252 TRUE, /* dk_status */
253 #endif
254 TRUE, /* dnslists */
255 FALSE, /* domains */
256 FALSE, /* encrypted */
257 TRUE, /* endpass */
258 FALSE, /* hosts */
259 FALSE, /* local_parts */
260 TRUE, /* log_message */
261 TRUE, /* log_reject_target */
262 TRUE, /* logwrite */
263 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
264 TRUE, /* malware */
265 #endif
266 TRUE, /* message */
267 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
268 TRUE, /* mime_regex */
269 #endif
270 TRUE, /* ratelimit */
271 FALSE, /* recipients */
272 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
273 TRUE, /* regex */
274 #endif
275 FALSE, /* sender_domains */
276 FALSE, /* senders */
277 TRUE, /* set */
278 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
279 TRUE, /* spam */
280 #endif
281 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
282 TRUE, /* spf */
283 #endif
284 TRUE /* verify */
285 };
286
287 /* Flags to identify the modifiers */
288
289 static uschar cond_modifiers[] = {
290 FALSE, /* acl */
291 TRUE, /* add_header */
292 FALSE, /* authenticated */
293 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
294 TRUE, /* bmi_optin */
295 #endif
296 FALSE, /* condition */
297 TRUE, /* control */
298 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
299 FALSE, /* decode */
300 #endif
301 TRUE, /* delay */
302 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
303 FALSE, /* demime */
304 #endif
305 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
306 FALSE, /* dk_domain_source */
307 FALSE, /* dk_policy */
308 FALSE, /* dk_sender_domains */
309 FALSE, /* dk_sender_local_parts */
310 FALSE, /* dk_senders */
311 FALSE, /* dk_status */
312 #endif
313 FALSE, /* dnslists */
314 FALSE, /* domains */
315 FALSE, /* encrypted */
316 TRUE, /* endpass */
317 FALSE, /* hosts */
318 FALSE, /* local_parts */
319 TRUE, /* log_message */
320 TRUE, /* log_reject_target */
321 TRUE, /* logwrite */
322 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
323 FALSE, /* malware */
324 #endif
325 TRUE, /* message */
326 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
327 FALSE, /* mime_regex */
328 #endif
329 FALSE, /* ratelimit */
330 FALSE, /* recipients */
331 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
332 FALSE, /* regex */
333 #endif
334 FALSE, /* sender_domains */
335 FALSE, /* senders */
336 TRUE, /* set */
337 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
338 FALSE, /* spam */
339 #endif
340 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
341 FALSE, /* spf */
342 #endif
343 FALSE /* verify */
344 };
345
346 /* Bit map vector of which conditions are not allowed at certain times. For
347 each condition, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier
348 to specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
349
350 static unsigned int cond_forbids[] = {
351 0, /* acl */
352
353 (unsigned int)
354 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* add_header */
355 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
356 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|
357 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)),
358
359 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* authenticated */
360 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)|
361 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO),
362
363 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
364 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* bmi_optin */
365 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
366 (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)|
367 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
368 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
369 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
370 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
371 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
372 #endif
373
374 0, /* condition */
375
376 /* Certain types of control are always allowed, so we let it through
377 always and check in the control processing itself. */
378
379 0, /* control */
380
381 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
382 (unsigned int)
383 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* decode */
384 #endif
385
386 0, /* delay */
387
388 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
389 (unsigned int)
390 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* demime */
391 #endif
392
393 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
394 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_domain_source */
395 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
396 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
397 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
398 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
399 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
400 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
401
402 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_policy */
403 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
404 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
405 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
406 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
407 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
408 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
409
410 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_sender_domains */
411 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
412 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
413 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
414 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
415 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
416 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
417
418 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_sender_local_parts */
419 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
420 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
421 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
422 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
423 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
424 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
425
426 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_senders */
427 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
428 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
429 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
430 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
431 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
432 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
433
434 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_status */
435 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
436 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
437 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
438 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
439 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
440 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
441 #endif
442
443 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* dnslists */
444 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
445
446 (unsigned int)
447 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* domains */
448
449 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* encrypted */
450 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|
451 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)|
452 (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO),
453
454 0, /* endpass */
455
456 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* hosts */
457 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
458
459 (unsigned int)
460 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* local_parts */
461
462 0, /* log_message */
463
464 0, /* log_reject_target */
465
466 0, /* logwrite */
467
468 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
469 (unsigned int)
470 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* malware */
471 #endif
472
473 0, /* message */
474
475 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
476 (unsigned int)
477 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* mime_regex */
478 #endif
479
480 0, /* ratelimit */
481
482 (unsigned int)
483 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* recipients */
484
485 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
486 (unsigned int)
487 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* regex */
488 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
489 #endif
490
491 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* sender_domains */
492 (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
493 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
494 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
495 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
496
497 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* senders */
498 (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
499 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
500 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
501 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
502
503 0, /* set */
504
505 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
506 (unsigned int)
507 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* spam */
508 #endif
509
510 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
511 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* spf */
512 (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
513 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
514 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
515 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|
516 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|
517 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
518 #endif
519
520 /* Certain types of verify are always allowed, so we let it through
521 always and check in the verify function itself */
522
523 0 /* verify */
524 };
525
526
527 /* Bit map vector of which controls are not allowed at certain times. For
528 each control, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier to
529 specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
530
531 static unsigned int control_forbids[] = {
532 (unsigned int)
533 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)), /* allow_auth_unadvertised */
534
535 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
536 0, /* bmi_run */
537 #endif
538
539 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
540 (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* dk_verify */
541 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
542 #endif
543
544 0, /* error */
545
546 (unsigned int)
547 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* caseful_local_part */
548
549 (unsigned int)
550 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* caselower_local_part */
551
552 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* enforce_sync */
553 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
554
555 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_enforce_sync */
556 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
557
558 (unsigned int)
559 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* freeze */
560 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
561 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
562
563 (unsigned int)
564 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* queue_only */
565 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
566 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
567
568 (unsigned int)
569 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* submission */
570 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)),
571
572 (unsigned int)
573 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* suppress_local_fixups */
574 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
575 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)),
576
577 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
578 (unsigned int)
579 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* no_mbox_unspool */
580 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
581 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
582 #endif
583
584 (unsigned int)
585 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakedefer */
586 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
587 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
588
589 (unsigned int)
590 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakereject */
591 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
592 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
593
594 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_multiline */
595 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
596
597 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_pipelining */
598 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START),
599
600 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* no_delay_flush */
601 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)
602 };
603
604 /* Structure listing various control arguments, with their characteristics. */
605
606 typedef struct control_def {
607 uschar *name;
608 int value; /* CONTROL_xxx value */
609 BOOL has_option; /* Has /option(s) following */
610 } control_def;
611
612 static control_def controls_list[] = {
613 { US"allow_auth_unadvertised", CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED, FALSE },
614 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
615 { US"bmi_run", CONTROL_BMI_RUN, FALSE },
616 #endif
617 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
618 { US"dk_verify", CONTROL_DK_VERIFY, FALSE },
619 #endif
620 { US"caseful_local_part", CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, FALSE },
621 { US"caselower_local_part", CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART, FALSE },
622 { US"enforce_sync", CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE },
623 { US"freeze", CONTROL_FREEZE, TRUE },
624 { US"no_delay_flush", CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH, FALSE },
625 { US"no_enforce_sync", CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE },
626 { US"no_multiline_responses", CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE, FALSE },
627 { US"no_pipelining", CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING, FALSE },
628 { US"queue_only", CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY, FALSE },
629 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
630 { US"no_mbox_unspool", CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL, FALSE },
631 #endif
632 { US"fakedefer", CONTROL_FAKEDEFER, TRUE },
633 { US"fakereject", CONTROL_FAKEREJECT, TRUE },
634 { US"submission", CONTROL_SUBMISSION, TRUE },
635 { US"suppress_local_fixups", CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS, FALSE }
636 };
637
638 /* Support data structures for Client SMTP Authorization. acl_verify_csa()
639 caches its result in a tree to avoid repeated DNS queries. The result is an
640 integer code which is used as an index into the following tables of
641 explanatory strings and verification return codes. */
642
643 static tree_node *csa_cache = NULL;
644
645 enum { CSA_UNKNOWN, CSA_OK, CSA_DEFER_SRV, CSA_DEFER_ADDR,
646 CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT, CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN, CSA_FAIL_NOADDR, CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH };
647
648 /* The acl_verify_csa() return code is translated into an acl_verify() return
649 code using the following table. It is OK unless the client is definitely not
650 authorized. This is because CSA is supposed to be optional for sending sites,
651 so recipients should not be too strict about checking it - especially because
652 DNS problems are quite likely to occur. It's possible to use $csa_status in
653 further ACL conditions to distinguish ok, unknown, and defer if required, but
654 the aim is to make the usual configuration simple. */
655
656 static int csa_return_code[] = {
657 OK, OK, OK, OK,
658 FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL
659 };
660
661 static uschar *csa_status_string[] = {
662 US"unknown", US"ok", US"defer", US"defer",
663 US"fail", US"fail", US"fail", US"fail"
664 };
665
666 static uschar *csa_reason_string[] = {
667 US"unknown",
668 US"ok",
669 US"deferred (SRV lookup failed)",
670 US"deferred (target address lookup failed)",
671 US"failed (explicit authorization required)",
672 US"failed (host name not authorized)",
673 US"failed (no authorized addresses)",
674 US"failed (client address mismatch)"
675 };
676
677 /* Enable recursion between acl_check_internal() and acl_check_condition() */
678
679 static int acl_check_internal(int, address_item *, uschar *, int, uschar **,
680 uschar **);
681
682
683 /*************************************************
684 * Pick out name from list *
685 *************************************************/
686
687 /* Use a binary chop method
688
689 Arguments:
690 name name to find
691 list list of names
692 end size of list
693
694 Returns: offset in list, or -1 if not found
695 */
696
697 static int
698 acl_checkname(uschar *name, uschar **list, int end)
699 {
700 int start = 0;
701
702 while (start < end)
703 {
704 int mid = (start + end)/2;
705 int c = Ustrcmp(name, list[mid]);
706 if (c == 0) return mid;
707 if (c < 0) end = mid; else start = mid + 1;
708 }
709
710 return -1;
711 }
712
713
714 /*************************************************
715 * Read and parse one ACL *
716 *************************************************/
717
718 /* This function is called both from readconf in order to parse the ACLs in the
719 configuration file, and also when an ACL is encountered dynamically (e.g. as
720 the result of an expansion). It is given a function to call in order to
721 retrieve the lines of the ACL. This function handles skipping comments and
722 blank lines (where relevant).
723
724 Arguments:
725 func function to get next line of ACL
726 error where to put an error message
727
728 Returns: pointer to ACL, or NULL
729 NULL can be legal (empty ACL); in this case error will be NULL
730 */
731
732 acl_block *
733 acl_read(uschar *(*func)(void), uschar **error)
734 {
735 acl_block *yield = NULL;
736 acl_block **lastp = &yield;
737 acl_block *this = NULL;
738 acl_condition_block *cond;
739 acl_condition_block **condp = NULL;
740 uschar *s;
741
742 *error = NULL;
743
744 while ((s = (*func)()) != NULL)
745 {
746 int v, c;
747 BOOL negated = FALSE;
748 uschar *saveline = s;
749 uschar name[64];
750
751 /* Conditions (but not verbs) are allowed to be negated by an initial
752 exclamation mark. */
753
754 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
755 if (*s == '!')
756 {
757 negated = TRUE;
758 s++;
759 }
760
761 /* Read the name of a verb or a condition, or the start of a new ACL, which
762 can be started by a name, or by a macro definition. */
763
764 s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s);
765 if (*s == ':' || (isupper(name[0]) && *s == '=')) return yield;
766
767 /* If a verb is unrecognized, it may be another condition or modifier that
768 continues the previous verb. */
769
770 v = acl_checkname(name, verbs, sizeof(verbs)/sizeof(char *));
771 if (v < 0)
772 {
773 if (this == NULL)
774 {
775 *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL verb \"%s\" in \"%s\"", name,
776 saveline);
777 return NULL;
778 }
779 }
780
781 /* New verb */
782
783 else
784 {
785 if (negated)
786 {
787 *error = string_sprintf("malformed ACL line \"%s\"", saveline);
788 return NULL;
789 }
790 this = store_get(sizeof(acl_block));
791 *lastp = this;
792 lastp = &(this->next);
793 this->next = NULL;
794 this->verb = v;
795 this->condition = NULL;
796 condp = &(this->condition);
797 if (*s == 0) continue; /* No condition on this line */
798 if (*s == '!')
799 {
800 negated = TRUE;
801 s++;
802 }
803 s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s); /* Condition name */
804 }
805
806 /* Handle a condition or modifier. */
807
808 c = acl_checkname(name, conditions, sizeof(conditions)/sizeof(char *));
809 if (c < 0)
810 {
811 *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL condition/modifier in \"%s\"",
812 saveline);
813 return NULL;
814 }
815
816 /* The modifiers may not be negated */
817
818 if (negated && cond_modifiers[c])
819 {
820 *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: negation is not allowed with "
821 "\"%s\"", conditions[c]);
822 return NULL;
823 }
824
825 /* ENDPASS may occur only with ACCEPT or DISCARD. */
826
827 if (c == ACLC_ENDPASS &&
828 this->verb != ACL_ACCEPT &&
829 this->verb != ACL_DISCARD)
830 {
831 *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: \"%s\" is not allowed with \"%s\"",
832 conditions[c], verbs[this->verb]);
833 return NULL;
834 }
835
836 cond = store_get(sizeof(acl_condition_block));
837 cond->next = NULL;
838 cond->type = c;
839 cond->u.negated = negated;
840
841 *condp = cond;
842 condp = &(cond->next);
843
844 /* The "set" modifier is different in that its argument is "name=value"
845 rather than just a value, and we can check the validity of the name, which
846 gives us a variable name to insert into the data block. The original ACL
847 variable names were acl_c0 ... acl_c9 and acl_m0 ... acl_m9. This was
848 extended to 20 of each type, but after that people successfully argued for
849 arbitrary names. In the new scheme, the names must start with acl_c or acl_m.
850 After that, we allow alphanumerics and underscores, but the first character
851 after c or m must be a digit or an underscore. This retains backwards
852 compatibility. */
853
854 if (c == ACLC_SET)
855 {
856 uschar *endptr;
857
858 if (Ustrncmp(s, "acl_c", 5) != 0 &&
859 Ustrncmp(s, "acl_m", 5) != 0)
860 {
861 *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
862 "modifier \"set %s\" (must start \"acl_c\" or \"acl_m\")", s);
863 return NULL;
864 }
865
866 endptr = s + 5;
867 if (!isdigit(*endptr) && *endptr != '_')
868 {
869 *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
870 "modifier \"set %s\" (digit or underscore must follow acl_c or acl_m)",
871 s);
872 return NULL;
873 }
874
875 while (*endptr != 0 && *endptr != '=' && !isspace(*endptr))
876 {
877 if (!isalnum(*endptr) && *endptr != '_')
878 {
879 *error = string_sprintf("invalid character \"%c\" in variable name "
880 "in ACL modifier \"set %s\"", *endptr, s);
881 return NULL;
882 }
883 endptr++;
884 }
885
886 cond->u.varname = string_copyn(s + 4, endptr - s - 4);
887 s = endptr;
888 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
889 }
890
891 /* For "set", we are now positioned for the data. For the others, only
892 "endpass" has no data */
893
894 if (c != ACLC_ENDPASS)
895 {
896 if (*s++ != '=')
897 {
898 *error = string_sprintf("\"=\" missing after ACL \"%s\" %s", name,
899 cond_modifiers[c]? US"modifier" : US"condition");
900 return NULL;
901 }
902 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
903 cond->arg = string_copy(s);
904 }
905 }
906
907 return yield;
908 }
909
910
911
912 /*************************************************
913 * Set up added header line(s) *
914 *************************************************/
915
916 /* This function is called by the add_header modifier, and also from acl_warn()
917 to implement the now-deprecated way of adding header lines using "message" on a
918 "warn" verb. The argument is treated as a sequence of header lines which are
919 added to a chain, provided there isn't an identical one already there.
920
921 Argument: string of header lines
922 Returns: nothing
923 */
924
925 static void
926 setup_header(uschar *hstring)
927 {
928 uschar *p, *q;
929 int hlen = Ustrlen(hstring);
930
931 /* An empty string does nothing; otherwise add a final newline if necessary. */
932
933 if (hlen <= 0) return;
934 if (hstring[hlen-1] != '\n') hstring = string_sprintf("%s\n", hstring);
935
936 /* Loop for multiple header lines, taking care about continuations */
937
938 for (p = q = hstring; *p != 0; )
939 {
940 uschar *s;
941 int newtype = htype_add_bot;
942 header_line **hptr = &acl_added_headers;
943
944 /* Find next header line within the string */
945
946 for (;;)
947 {
948 q = Ustrchr(q, '\n');
949 if (*(++q) != ' ' && *q != '\t') break;
950 }
951
952 /* If the line starts with a colon, interpret the instruction for where to
953 add it. This temporarily sets up a new type. */
954
955 if (*p == ':')
956 {
957 if (strncmpic(p, US":after_received:", 16) == 0)
958 {
959 newtype = htype_add_rec;
960 p += 16;
961 }
962 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start_rfc:", 14) == 0)
963 {
964 newtype = htype_add_rfc;
965 p += 14;
966 }
967 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start:", 10) == 0)
968 {
969 newtype = htype_add_top;
970 p += 10;
971 }
972 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_end:", 8) == 0)
973 {
974 newtype = htype_add_bot;
975 p += 8;
976 }
977 while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') p++;
978 }
979
980 /* See if this line starts with a header name, and if not, add X-ACL-Warn:
981 to the front of it. */
982
983 for (s = p; s < q - 1; s++)
984 {
985 if (*s == ':' || !isgraph(*s)) break;
986 }
987
988 s = string_sprintf("%s%.*s", (*s == ':')? "" : "X-ACL-Warn: ", q - p, p);
989 hlen = Ustrlen(s);
990
991 /* See if this line has already been added */
992
993 while (*hptr != NULL)
994 {
995 if (Ustrncmp((*hptr)->text, s, hlen) == 0) break;
996 hptr = &((*hptr)->next);
997 }
998
999 /* Add if not previously present */
1000
1001 if (*hptr == NULL)
1002 {
1003 header_line *h = store_get(sizeof(header_line));
1004 h->text = s;
1005 h->next = NULL;
1006 h->type = newtype;
1007 h->slen = hlen;
1008 *hptr = h;
1009 hptr = &(h->next);
1010 }
1011
1012 /* Advance for next header line within the string */
1013
1014 p = q;
1015 }
1016 }
1017
1018
1019
1020
1021 /*************************************************
1022 * Handle warnings *
1023 *************************************************/
1024
1025 /* This function is called when a WARN verb's conditions are true. It adds to
1026 the message's headers, and/or writes information to the log. In each case, this
1027 only happens once (per message for headers, per connection for log).
1028
1029 ** NOTE: The header adding action using the "message" setting is historic, and
1030 its use is now deprecated. The new add_header modifier should be used instead.
1031
1032 Arguments:
1033 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
1034 user_message message for adding to headers
1035 log_message message for logging, if different
1036
1037 Returns: nothing
1038 */
1039
1040 static void
1041 acl_warn(int where, uschar *user_message, uschar *log_message)
1042 {
1043 if (log_message != NULL && log_message != user_message)
1044 {
1045 uschar *text;
1046 string_item *logged;
1047
1048 text = string_sprintf("%s Warning: %s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
1049 string_printing(log_message));
1050
1051 /* If a sender verification has failed, and the log message is "sender verify
1052 failed", add the failure message. */
1053
1054 if (sender_verified_failed != NULL &&
1055 sender_verified_failed->message != NULL &&
1056 strcmpic(log_message, US"sender verify failed") == 0)
1057 text = string_sprintf("%s: %s", text, sender_verified_failed->message);
1058
1059 /* Search previously logged warnings. They are kept in malloc
1060 store so they can be freed at the start of a new message. */
1061
1062 for (logged = acl_warn_logged; logged != NULL; logged = logged->next)
1063 if (Ustrcmp(logged->text, text) == 0) break;
1064
1065 if (logged == NULL)
1066 {
1067 int length = Ustrlen(text) + 1;
1068 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s", text);
1069 logged = store_malloc(sizeof(string_item) + length);
1070 logged->text = (uschar *)logged + sizeof(string_item);
1071 memcpy(logged->text, text, length);
1072 logged->next = acl_warn_logged;
1073 acl_warn_logged = logged;
1074 }
1075 }
1076
1077 /* If there's no user message, we are done. */
1078
1079 if (user_message == NULL) return;
1080
1081 /* If this isn't a message ACL, we can't do anything with a user message.
1082 Log an error. */
1083
1084 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
1085 {
1086 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "ACL \"warn\" with \"message\" setting "
1087 "found in a non-message (%s) ACL: cannot specify header lines here: "
1088 "message ignored", acl_wherenames[where]);
1089 return;
1090 }
1091
1092 /* The code for setting up header lines is now abstracted into a separate
1093 function so that it can be used for the add_header modifier as well. */
1094
1095 setup_header(user_message);
1096 }
1097
1098
1099
1100 /*************************************************
1101 * Verify and check reverse DNS *
1102 *************************************************/
1103
1104 /* Called from acl_verify() below. We look up the host name(s) of the client IP
1105 address if this has not yet been done. The host_name_lookup() function checks
1106 that one of these names resolves to an address list that contains the client IP
1107 address, so we don't actually have to do the check here.
1108
1109 Arguments:
1110 user_msgptr pointer for user message
1111 log_msgptr pointer for log message
1112
1113 Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
1114 FAIL verification failed
1115 DEFER there was a problem verifying
1116 */
1117
1118 static int
1119 acl_verify_reverse(uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
1120 {
1121 int rc;
1122
1123 user_msgptr = user_msgptr; /* stop compiler warning */
1124
1125 /* Previous success */
1126
1127 if (sender_host_name != NULL) return OK;
1128
1129 /* Previous failure */
1130
1131 if (host_lookup_failed)
1132 {
1133 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("host lookup failed%s", host_lookup_msg);
1134 return FAIL;
1135 }
1136
1137 /* Need to do a lookup */
1138
1139 HDEBUG(D_acl)
1140 debug_printf("looking up host name to force name/address consistency check\n");
1141
1142 if ((rc = host_name_lookup()) != OK)
1143 {
1144 *log_msgptr = (rc == DEFER)?
1145 US"host lookup deferred for reverse lookup check"
1146 :
1147 string_sprintf("host lookup failed for reverse lookup check%s",
1148 host_lookup_msg);
1149 return rc; /* DEFER or FAIL */
1150 }
1151
1152 host_build_sender_fullhost();
1153 return OK;
1154 }
1155
1156
1157
1158 /*************************************************
1159 * Check client IP address matches CSA target *
1160 *************************************************/
1161
1162 /* Called from acl_verify_csa() below. This routine scans a section of a DNS
1163 response for address records belonging to the CSA target hostname. The section
1164 is specified by the reset argument, either RESET_ADDITIONAL or RESET_ANSWERS.
1165 If one of the addresses matches the client's IP address, then the client is
1166 authorized by CSA. If there are target IP addresses but none of them match
1167 then the client is using an unauthorized IP address. If there are no target IP
1168 addresses then the client cannot be using an authorized IP address. (This is
1169 an odd configuration - why didn't the SRV record have a weight of 1 instead?)
1170
1171 Arguments:
1172 dnsa the DNS answer block
1173 dnss a DNS scan block for us to use
1174 reset option specifing what portion to scan, as described above
1175 target the target hostname to use for matching RR names
1176
1177 Returns: CSA_OK successfully authorized
1178 CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH addresses found but none matched
1179 CSA_FAIL_NOADDR no target addresses found
1180 */
1181
1182 static int
1183 acl_verify_csa_address(dns_answer *dnsa, dns_scan *dnss, int reset,
1184 uschar *target)
1185 {
1186 dns_record *rr;
1187 dns_address *da;
1188
1189 BOOL target_found = FALSE;
1190
1191 for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, reset);
1192 rr != NULL;
1193 rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, RESET_NEXT))
1194 {
1195 /* Check this is an address RR for the target hostname. */
1196
1197 if (rr->type != T_A
1198 #if HAVE_IPV6
1199 && rr->type != T_AAAA
1200 #ifdef SUPPORT_A6
1201 && rr->type != T_A6
1202 #endif
1203 #endif
1204 ) continue;
1205
1206 if (strcmpic(target, rr->name) != 0) continue;
1207
1208 target_found = TRUE;
1209
1210 /* Turn the target address RR into a list of textual IP addresses and scan
1211 the list. There may be more than one if it is an A6 RR. */
1212
1213 for (da = dns_address_from_rr(dnsa, rr); da != NULL; da = da->next)
1214 {
1215 /* If the client IP address matches the target IP address, it's good! */
1216
1217 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target address is %s\n", da->address);
1218
1219 if (strcmpic(sender_host_address, da->address) == 0) return CSA_OK;
1220 }
1221 }
1222
1223 /* If we found some target addresses but none of them matched, the client is
1224 using an unauthorized IP address, otherwise the target has no authorized IP
1225 addresses. */
1226
1227 if (target_found) return CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH;
1228 else return CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1229 }
1230
1231
1232
1233 /*************************************************
1234 * Verify Client SMTP Authorization *
1235 *************************************************/
1236
1237 /* Called from acl_verify() below. This routine calls dns_lookup_special()
1238 to find the CSA SRV record corresponding to the domain argument, or
1239 $sender_helo_name if no argument is provided. It then checks that the
1240 client is authorized, and that its IP address corresponds to the SRV
1241 target's address by calling acl_verify_csa_address() above. The address
1242 should have been returned in the DNS response's ADDITIONAL section, but if
1243 not we perform another DNS lookup to get it.
1244
1245 Arguments:
1246 domain pointer to optional parameter following verify = csa
1247
1248 Returns: CSA_UNKNOWN no valid CSA record found
1249 CSA_OK successfully authorized
1250 CSA_FAIL_* client is definitely not authorized
1251 CSA_DEFER_* there was a DNS problem
1252 */
1253
1254 static int
1255 acl_verify_csa(uschar *domain)
1256 {
1257 tree_node *t;
1258 uschar *found, *p;
1259 int priority, weight, port;
1260 dns_answer dnsa;
1261 dns_scan dnss;
1262 dns_record *rr;
1263 int rc, type;
1264 uschar target[256];
1265
1266 /* Work out the domain we are using for the CSA lookup. The default is the
1267 client's HELO domain. If the client has not said HELO, use its IP address
1268 instead. If it's a local client (exim -bs), CSA isn't applicable. */
1269
1270 while (isspace(*domain) && *domain != '\0') ++domain;
1271 if (*domain == '\0') domain = sender_helo_name;
1272 if (domain == NULL) domain = sender_host_address;
1273 if (sender_host_address == NULL) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
1274
1275 /* If we have an address literal, strip off the framing ready for turning it
1276 into a domain. The framing consists of matched square brackets possibly
1277 containing a keyword and a colon before the actual IP address. */
1278
1279 if (domain[0] == '[')
1280 {
1281 uschar *start = Ustrchr(domain, ':');
1282 if (start == NULL) start = domain;
1283 domain = string_copyn(start + 1, Ustrlen(start) - 2);
1284 }
1285
1286 /* Turn domains that look like bare IP addresses into domains in the reverse
1287 DNS. This code also deals with address literals and $sender_host_address. It's
1288 not quite kosher to treat bare domains such as EHLO 192.0.2.57 the same as
1289 address literals, but it's probably the most friendly thing to do. This is an
1290 extension to CSA, so we allow it to be turned off for proper conformance. */
1291
1292 if (string_is_ip_address(domain, NULL) != 0)
1293 {
1294 if (!dns_csa_use_reverse) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
1295 dns_build_reverse(domain, target);
1296 domain = target;
1297 }
1298
1299 /* Find out if we've already done the CSA check for this domain. If we have,
1300 return the same result again. Otherwise build a new cached result structure
1301 for this domain. The name is filled in now, and the value is filled in when
1302 we return from this function. */
1303
1304 t = tree_search(csa_cache, domain);
1305 if (t != NULL) return t->data.val;
1306
1307 t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(domain));
1308 Ustrcpy(t->name, domain);
1309 (void)tree_insertnode(&csa_cache, t);
1310
1311 /* Now we are ready to do the actual DNS lookup(s). */
1312
1313 found = domain;
1314 switch (dns_special_lookup(&dnsa, domain, T_CSA, &found))
1315 {
1316 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1317
1318 default:
1319 return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_SRV;
1320
1321 /* If we found nothing, the client's authorization is unknown. */
1322
1323 case DNS_NOMATCH:
1324 case DNS_NODATA:
1325 return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1326
1327 /* We got something! Go on to look at the reply in more detail. */
1328
1329 case DNS_SUCCEED:
1330 break;
1331 }
1332
1333 /* Scan the reply for well-formed CSA SRV records. */
1334
1335 for (rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
1336 rr != NULL;
1337 rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT))
1338 {
1339 if (rr->type != T_SRV) continue;
1340
1341 /* Extract the numerical SRV fields (p is incremented) */
1342
1343 p = rr->data;
1344 GETSHORT(priority, p);
1345 GETSHORT(weight, p);
1346 GETSHORT(port, p);
1347
1348 DEBUG(D_acl)
1349 debug_printf("CSA priority=%d weight=%d port=%d\n", priority, weight, port);
1350
1351 /* Check the CSA version number */
1352
1353 if (priority != 1) continue;
1354
1355 /* If the domain does not have a CSA SRV record of its own (i.e. the domain
1356 found by dns_special_lookup() is a parent of the one we asked for), we check
1357 the subdomain assertions in the port field. At the moment there's only one
1358 assertion: legitimate SMTP clients are all explicitly authorized with CSA
1359 SRV records of their own. */
1360
1361 if (found != domain)
1362 {
1363 if (port & 1)
1364 return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT;
1365 else
1366 return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1367 }
1368
1369 /* This CSA SRV record refers directly to our domain, so we check the value
1370 in the weight field to work out the domain's authorization. 0 and 1 are
1371 unauthorized; 3 means the client is authorized but we can't check the IP
1372 address in order to authenticate it, so we treat it as unknown; values
1373 greater than 3 are undefined. */
1374
1375 if (weight < 2) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN;
1376
1377 if (weight > 2) continue;
1378
1379 /* Weight == 2, which means the domain is authorized. We must check that the
1380 client's IP address is listed as one of the SRV target addresses. Save the
1381 target hostname then break to scan the additional data for its addresses. */
1382
1383 (void)dn_expand(dnsa.answer, dnsa.answer + dnsa.answerlen, p,
1384 (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)target, sizeof(target));
1385
1386 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target is %s\n", target);
1387
1388 break;
1389 }
1390
1391 /* If we didn't break the loop then no appropriate records were found. */
1392
1393 if (rr == NULL) return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1394
1395 /* Do not check addresses if the target is ".", in accordance with RFC 2782.
1396 A target of "." indicates there are no valid addresses, so the client cannot
1397 be authorized. (This is an odd configuration because weight=2 target=. is
1398 equivalent to weight=1, but we check for it in order to keep load off the
1399 root name servers.) Note that dn_expand() turns "." into "". */
1400
1401 if (Ustrcmp(target, "") == 0) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1402
1403 /* Scan the additional section of the CSA SRV reply for addresses belonging
1404 to the target. If the name server didn't return any additional data (e.g.
1405 because it does not fully support SRV records), we need to do another lookup
1406 to obtain the target addresses; otherwise we have a definitive result. */
1407
1408 rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ADDITIONAL, target);
1409 if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
1410
1411 /* The DNS lookup type corresponds to the IP version used by the client. */
1412
1413 #if HAVE_IPV6
1414 if (Ustrchr(sender_host_address, ':') != NULL)
1415 type = T_AAAA;
1416 else
1417 #endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */
1418 type = T_A;
1419
1420
1421 #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
1422 DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN:
1423 #endif
1424
1425 switch (dns_lookup(&dnsa, target, type, NULL))
1426 {
1427 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1428
1429 default:
1430 return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_ADDR;
1431
1432 /* If the query succeeded, scan the addresses and return the result. */
1433
1434 case DNS_SUCCEED:
1435 rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS, target);
1436 if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
1437 /* else fall through */
1438
1439 /* If the target has no IP addresses, the client cannot have an authorized
1440 IP address. However, if the target site uses A6 records (not AAAA records)
1441 we have to do yet another lookup in order to check them. */
1442
1443 case DNS_NOMATCH:
1444 case DNS_NODATA:
1445
1446 #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
1447 if (type == T_AAAA) { type = T_A6; goto DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN; }
1448 #endif
1449
1450 return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1451 }
1452 }
1453
1454
1455
1456 /*************************************************
1457 * Handle verification (address & other) *
1458 *************************************************/
1459
1460 /* This function implements the "verify" condition. It is called when
1461 encountered in any ACL, because some tests are almost always permitted. Some
1462 just don't make sense, and always fail (for example, an attempt to test a host
1463 lookup for a non-TCP/IP message). Others are restricted to certain ACLs.
1464
1465 Arguments:
1466 where where called from
1467 addr the recipient address that the ACL is handling, or NULL
1468 arg the argument of "verify"
1469 user_msgptr pointer for user message
1470 log_msgptr pointer for log message
1471 basic_errno where to put verify errno
1472
1473 Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
1474 FAIL verification failed
1475 DEFER there was a problem verifying
1476 ERROR syntax error
1477 */
1478
1479 static int
1480 acl_verify(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *arg,
1481 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
1482 {
1483 int sep = '/';
1484 int callout = -1;
1485 int callout_overall = -1;
1486 int callout_connect = -1;
1487 int verify_options = 0;
1488 int rc;
1489 BOOL verify_header_sender = FALSE;
1490 BOOL defer_ok = FALSE;
1491 BOOL callout_defer_ok = FALSE;
1492 BOOL no_details = FALSE;
1493 BOOL success_on_redirect = FALSE;
1494 address_item *sender_vaddr = NULL;
1495 uschar *verify_sender_address = NULL;
1496 uschar *pm_mailfrom = NULL;
1497 uschar *se_mailfrom = NULL;
1498
1499 /* Some of the verify items have slash-separated options; some do not. Diagnose
1500 an error if options are given for items that don't expect them. This code has
1501 now got very message. Refactoring to use a table would be a good idea one day.
1502 */
1503
1504 uschar *slash = Ustrchr(arg, '/');
1505 uschar *list = arg;
1506 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
1507
1508 if (ss == NULL) goto BAD_VERIFY;
1509
1510 /* Handle name/address consistency verification in a separate function. */
1511
1512 if (strcmpic(ss, US"reverse_host_lookup") == 0)
1513 {
1514 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1515 if (sender_host_address == NULL) return OK;
1516 return acl_verify_reverse(user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
1517 }
1518
1519 /* TLS certificate verification is done at STARTTLS time; here we just
1520 test whether it was successful or not. (This is for optional verification; for
1521 mandatory verification, the connection doesn't last this long.) */
1522
1523 if (strcmpic(ss, US"certificate") == 0)
1524 {
1525 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1526 if (tls_certificate_verified) return OK;
1527 *user_msgptr = US"no verified certificate";
1528 return FAIL;
1529 }
1530
1531 /* We can test the result of optional HELO verification that might have
1532 occurred earlier. If not, we can attempt the verification now. */
1533
1534 if (strcmpic(ss, US"helo") == 0)
1535 {
1536 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1537 if (!helo_verified && !helo_verify_failed) smtp_verify_helo();
1538 return helo_verified? OK : FAIL;
1539 }
1540
1541 /* Do Client SMTP Authorization checks in a separate function, and turn the
1542 result code into user-friendly strings. */
1543
1544 if (strcmpic(ss, US"csa") == 0)
1545 {
1546 rc = acl_verify_csa(list);
1547 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("client SMTP authorization %s",
1548 csa_reason_string[rc]);
1549 csa_status = csa_status_string[rc];
1550 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA result %s\n", csa_status);
1551 return csa_return_code[rc];
1552 }
1553
1554 /* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct syntax. If there is
1555 a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to
1556 send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as
1557 always). */
1558
1559 if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_syntax") == 0)
1560 {
1561 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1562 if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL;
1563 rc = verify_check_headers(log_msgptr);
1564 if (rc != OK && smtp_return_error_details && *log_msgptr != NULL)
1565 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1566 return rc;
1567 }
1568
1569 /* Check that no recipient of this message is "blind", that is, every envelope
1570 recipient must be mentioned in either To: or Cc:. */
1571
1572 if (strcmpic(ss, US"not_blind") == 0)
1573 {
1574 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1575 if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL;
1576 rc = verify_check_notblind();
1577 if (rc != OK)
1578 {
1579 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bcc recipient detected");
1580 if (smtp_return_error_details)
1581 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1582 }
1583 return rc;
1584 }
1585
1586 /* The remaining verification tests check recipient and sender addresses,
1587 either from the envelope or from the header. There are a number of
1588 slash-separated options that are common to all of them. */
1589
1590
1591 /* Check that there is at least one verifiable sender address in the relevant
1592 header lines. This can be followed by callout and defer options, just like
1593 sender and recipient. */
1594
1595 if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_sender") == 0)
1596 {
1597 if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) goto WRONG_ACL;
1598 verify_header_sender = TRUE;
1599 }
1600
1601 /* Otherwise, first item in verify argument must be "sender" or "recipient".
1602 In the case of a sender, this can optionally be followed by an address to use
1603 in place of the actual sender (rare special-case requirement). */
1604
1605 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"sender", 6) == 0)
1606 {
1607 uschar *s = ss + 6;
1608 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
1609 {
1610 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify sender in ACL for %s "
1611 "(only possible for MAIL, RCPT, PREDATA, or DATA)",
1612 acl_wherenames[where]);
1613 return ERROR;
1614 }
1615 if (*s == 0)
1616 verify_sender_address = sender_address;
1617 else
1618 {
1619 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1620 if (*s++ != '=') goto BAD_VERIFY;
1621 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1622 verify_sender_address = string_copy(s);
1623 }
1624 }
1625 else
1626 {
1627 if (strcmpic(ss, US"recipient") != 0) goto BAD_VERIFY;
1628 if (addr == NULL)
1629 {
1630 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify recipient in ACL for %s "
1631 "(only possible for RCPT)", acl_wherenames[where]);
1632 return ERROR;
1633 }
1634 }
1635
1636 /* Remaining items are optional; they apply to sender and recipient
1637 verification, including "header sender" verification. */
1638
1639 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
1640 != NULL)
1641 {
1642 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0) defer_ok = TRUE;
1643 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"no_details") == 0) no_details = TRUE;
1644 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"success_on_redirect") == 0) success_on_redirect = TRUE;
1645
1646 /* These two old options are left for backwards compatibility */
1647
1648 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"callout_defer_ok") == 0)
1649 {
1650 callout_defer_ok = TRUE;
1651 if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1652 }
1653
1654 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"check_postmaster") == 0)
1655 {
1656 pm_mailfrom = US"";
1657 if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1658 }
1659
1660 /* The callout option has a number of sub-options, comma separated */
1661
1662 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"callout", 7) == 0)
1663 {
1664 callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1665 ss += 7;
1666 if (*ss != 0)
1667 {
1668 while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
1669 if (*ss++ == '=')
1670 {
1671 int optsep = ',';
1672 uschar *opt;
1673 uschar buffer[256];
1674 while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
1675
1676 /* This callout option handling code has become a mess as new options
1677 have been added in an ad hoc manner. It should be tidied up into some
1678 kind of table-driven thing. */
1679
1680 while ((opt = string_nextinlist(&ss, &optsep, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
1681 != NULL)
1682 {
1683 if (strcmpic(opt, US"defer_ok") == 0) callout_defer_ok = TRUE;
1684 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"no_cache") == 0)
1685 verify_options |= vopt_callout_no_cache;
1686 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"random") == 0)
1687 verify_options |= vopt_callout_random;
1688 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"use_sender") == 0)
1689 verify_options |= vopt_callout_recipsender;
1690 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"use_postmaster") == 0)
1691 verify_options |= vopt_callout_recippmaster;
1692 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"postmaster") == 0) pm_mailfrom = US"";
1693 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"fullpostmaster") == 0)
1694 {
1695 pm_mailfrom = US"";
1696 verify_options |= vopt_callout_fullpm;
1697 }
1698
1699 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"mailfrom", 8) == 0)
1700 {
1701 if (!verify_header_sender)
1702 {
1703 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"mailfrom\" is allowed as a "
1704 "callout option only for verify=header_sender (detected in ACL "
1705 "condition \"%s\")", arg);
1706 return ERROR;
1707 }
1708 opt += 8;
1709 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1710 if (*opt++ != '=')
1711 {
1712 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1713 "\"mailfrom\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1714 return ERROR;
1715 }
1716 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1717 se_mailfrom = string_copy(opt);
1718 }
1719
1720 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"postmaster_mailfrom", 19) == 0)
1721 {
1722 opt += 19;
1723 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1724 if (*opt++ != '=')
1725 {
1726 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1727 "\"postmaster_mailfrom\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1728 return ERROR;
1729 }
1730 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1731 pm_mailfrom = string_copy(opt);
1732 }
1733
1734 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"maxwait", 7) == 0)
1735 {
1736 opt += 7;
1737 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1738 if (*opt++ != '=')
1739 {
1740 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"maxwait\" in "
1741 "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1742 return ERROR;
1743 }
1744 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1745 callout_overall = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1746 if (callout_overall < 0)
1747 {
1748 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1749 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1750 return ERROR;
1751 }
1752 }
1753 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"connect", 7) == 0)
1754 {
1755 opt += 7;
1756 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1757 if (*opt++ != '=')
1758 {
1759 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1760 "\"callout_overaall\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1761 return ERROR;
1762 }
1763 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1764 callout_connect = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1765 if (callout_connect < 0)
1766 {
1767 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1768 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1769 return ERROR;
1770 }
1771 }
1772 else /* Plain time is callout connect/command timeout */
1773 {
1774 callout = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1775 if (callout < 0)
1776 {
1777 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1778 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1779 return ERROR;
1780 }
1781 }
1782 }
1783 }
1784 else
1785 {
1786 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"callout\" in "
1787 "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1788 return ERROR;
1789 }
1790 }
1791 }
1792
1793 /* Option not recognized */
1794
1795 else
1796 {
1797 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unknown option \"%s\" in ACL "
1798 "condition \"verify %s\"", ss, arg);
1799 return ERROR;
1800 }
1801 }
1802
1803 if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster)) ==
1804 (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster))
1805 {
1806 *log_msgptr = US"only one of use_sender and use_postmaster can be set "
1807 "for a recipient callout";
1808 return ERROR;
1809 }
1810
1811 /* Handle sender-in-header verification. Default the user message to the log
1812 message if giving out verification details. */
1813
1814 if (verify_header_sender)
1815 {
1816 int verrno;
1817 rc = verify_check_header_address(user_msgptr, log_msgptr, callout,
1818 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, verify_options,
1819 &verrno);
1820 if (rc != OK)
1821 {
1822 *basic_errno = verrno;
1823 if (smtp_return_error_details)
1824 {
1825 if (*user_msgptr == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL)
1826 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1827 if (rc == DEFER) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
1828 }
1829 }
1830 }
1831
1832 /* Handle a sender address. The default is to verify *the* sender address, but
1833 optionally a different address can be given, for special requirements. If the
1834 address is empty, we are dealing with a bounce message that has no sender, so
1835 we cannot do any checking. If the real sender address gets rewritten during
1836 verification (e.g. DNS widening), set the flag to stop it being rewritten again
1837 during message reception.
1838
1839 A list of verified "sender" addresses is kept to try to avoid doing to much
1840 work repetitively when there are multiple recipients in a message and they all
1841 require sender verification. However, when callouts are involved, it gets too
1842 complicated because different recipients may require different callout options.
1843 Therefore, we always do a full sender verify when any kind of callout is
1844 specified. Caching elsewhere, for instance in the DNS resolver and in the
1845 callout handling, should ensure that this is not terribly inefficient. */
1846
1847 else if (verify_sender_address != NULL)
1848 {
1849 if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster))
1850 != 0)
1851 {
1852 *log_msgptr = US"use_sender or use_postmaster cannot be used for a "
1853 "sender verify callout";
1854 return ERROR;
1855 }
1856
1857 sender_vaddr = verify_checked_sender(verify_sender_address);
1858 if (sender_vaddr != NULL && /* Previously checked */
1859 callout <= 0) /* No callout needed this time */
1860 {
1861 /* If the "routed" flag is set, it means that routing worked before, so
1862 this check can give OK (the saved return code value, if set, belongs to a
1863 callout that was done previously). If the "routed" flag is not set, routing
1864 must have failed, so we use the saved return code. */
1865
1866 if (testflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed)) rc = OK; else
1867 {
1868 rc = sender_vaddr->special_action;
1869 *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
1870 }
1871 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("using cached sender verify result\n");
1872 }
1873
1874 /* Do a new verification, and cache the result. The cache is used to avoid
1875 verifying the sender multiple times for multiple RCPTs when callouts are not
1876 specified (see comments above).
1877
1878 The cache is also used on failure to give details in response to the first
1879 RCPT that gets bounced for this reason. However, this can be suppressed by
1880 the no_details option, which sets the flag that says "this detail has already
1881 been sent". The cache normally contains just one address, but there may be
1882 more in esoteric circumstances. */
1883
1884 else
1885 {
1886 BOOL routed = TRUE;
1887 uschar *save_address_data = deliver_address_data;
1888
1889 sender_vaddr = deliver_make_addr(verify_sender_address, TRUE);
1890 if (no_details) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_sverify_told);
1891 if (verify_sender_address[0] != 0)
1892 {
1893 /* If this is the real sender address, save the unrewritten version
1894 for use later in receive. Otherwise, set a flag so that rewriting the
1895 sender in verify_address() does not update sender_address. */
1896
1897 if (verify_sender_address == sender_address)
1898 sender_address_unrewritten = sender_address;
1899 else
1900 verify_options |= vopt_fake_sender;
1901
1902 if (success_on_redirect)
1903 verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect;
1904
1905 /* The recipient, qualify, and expn options are never set in
1906 verify_options. */
1907
1908 rc = verify_address(sender_vaddr, NULL, verify_options, callout,
1909 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, &routed);
1910
1911 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
1912
1913 if (rc == OK)
1914 {
1915 if (Ustrcmp(sender_vaddr->address, verify_sender_address) != 0)
1916 {
1917 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("sender %s verified ok as %s\n",
1918 verify_sender_address, sender_vaddr->address);
1919 }
1920 else
1921 {
1922 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("sender %s verified ok\n",
1923 verify_sender_address);
1924 }
1925 }
1926 else *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
1927 }
1928 else rc = OK; /* Null sender */
1929
1930 /* Cache the result code */
1931
1932 if (routed) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed);
1933 if (callout > 0) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_callout);
1934 sender_vaddr->special_action = rc;
1935 sender_vaddr->next = sender_verified_list;
1936 sender_verified_list = sender_vaddr;
1937
1938 /* Restore the recipient address data, which might have been clobbered by
1939 the sender verification. */
1940
1941 deliver_address_data = save_address_data;
1942 }
1943
1944 /* Put the sender address_data value into $sender_address_data */
1945
1946 sender_address_data = sender_vaddr->p.address_data;
1947 }
1948
1949 /* A recipient address just gets a straightforward verify; again we must handle
1950 the DEFER overrides. */
1951
1952 else
1953 {
1954 address_item addr2;
1955
1956 if (success_on_redirect)
1957 verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect;
1958
1959 /* We must use a copy of the address for verification, because it might
1960 get rewritten. */
1961
1962 addr2 = *addr;
1963 rc = verify_address(&addr2, NULL, verify_options|vopt_is_recipient, callout,
1964 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, NULL);
1965 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
1966
1967 *log_msgptr = addr2.message;
1968 *user_msgptr = (addr2.user_message != NULL)?
1969 addr2.user_message : addr2.message;
1970 *basic_errno = addr2.basic_errno;
1971
1972 /* Make $address_data visible */
1973 deliver_address_data = addr2.p.address_data;
1974 }
1975
1976 /* We have a result from the relevant test. Handle defer overrides first. */
1977
1978 if (rc == DEFER && (defer_ok ||
1979 (callout_defer_ok && *basic_errno == ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)))
1980 {
1981 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("verify defer overridden by %s\n",
1982 defer_ok? "defer_ok" : "callout_defer_ok");
1983 rc = OK;
1984 }
1985
1986 /* If we've failed a sender, set up a recipient message, and point
1987 sender_verified_failed to the address item that actually failed. */
1988
1989 if (rc != OK && verify_sender_address != NULL)
1990 {
1991 if (rc != DEFER)
1992 {
1993 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Sender verify failed";
1994 }
1995 else if (*basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
1996 {
1997 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify";
1998 }
1999 else
2000 {
2001 *log_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify callout";
2002 *user_msgptr = smtp_return_error_details? sender_vaddr->user_message :
2003 *log_msgptr;
2004 }
2005
2006 sender_verified_failed = sender_vaddr;
2007 }
2008
2009 /* Verifying an address messes up the values of $domain and $local_part,
2010 so reset them before returning if this is a RCPT ACL. */
2011
2012 if (addr != NULL)
2013 {
2014 deliver_domain = addr->domain;
2015 deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
2016 }
2017 return rc;
2018
2019 /* Syntax errors in the verify argument come here. */
2020
2021 BAD_VERIFY:
2022 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("expected \"sender[=address]\", \"recipient\", "
2023 "\"helo\", \"header_syntax\", \"header_sender\" or "
2024 "\"reverse_host_lookup\" at start of ACL condition "
2025 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
2026 return ERROR;
2027
2028 /* Options supplied when not allowed come here */
2029
2030 NO_OPTIONS:
2031 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unexpected '/' found in \"%s\" "
2032 "(this verify item has no options)", arg);
2033 return ERROR;
2034
2035 /* Calls in the wrong ACL come here */
2036
2037 WRONG_ACL:
2038 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s "
2039 "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames[where]);
2040 return ERROR;
2041 }
2042
2043
2044
2045
2046 /*************************************************
2047 * Check argument for control= modifier *
2048 *************************************************/
2049
2050 /* Called from acl_check_condition() below
2051
2052 Arguments:
2053 arg the argument string for control=
2054 pptr set to point to the terminating character
2055 where which ACL we are in
2056 log_msgptr for error messages
2057
2058 Returns: CONTROL_xxx value
2059 */
2060
2061 static int
2062 decode_control(uschar *arg, uschar **pptr, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
2063 {
2064 int len;
2065 control_def *d;
2066
2067 for (d = controls_list;
2068 d < controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def);
2069 d++)
2070 {
2071 len = Ustrlen(d->name);
2072 if (Ustrncmp(d->name, arg, len) == 0) break;
2073 }
2074
2075 if (d >= controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def) ||
2076 (arg[len] != 0 && (!d->has_option || arg[len] != '/')))
2077 {
2078 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
2079 return CONTROL_ERROR;
2080 }
2081
2082 *pptr = arg + len;
2083 return d->value;
2084 }
2085
2086
2087
2088 /*************************************************
2089 * Handle rate limiting *
2090 *************************************************/
2091
2092 /* Called by acl_check_condition() below to calculate the result
2093 of the ACL ratelimit condition.
2094
2095 Note that the return value might be slightly unexpected: if the
2096 sender's rate is above the limit then the result is OK. This is
2097 similar to the dnslists condition, and is so that you can write
2098 ACL clauses like: defer ratelimit = 15 / 1h
2099
2100 Arguments:
2101 arg the option string for ratelimit=
2102 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
2103 log_msgptr for error messages
2104
2105 Returns: OK - Sender's rate is above limit
2106 FAIL - Sender's rate is below limit
2107 DEFER - Problem opening ratelimit database
2108 ERROR - Syntax error in options.
2109 */
2110
2111 static int
2112 acl_ratelimit(uschar *arg, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
2113 {
2114 double limit, period;
2115 uschar *ss, *key;
2116 int sep = '/';
2117 BOOL have_key = FALSE, leaky = FALSE, strict = FALSE;
2118 BOOL per_byte = FALSE, per_cmd = FALSE, per_conn = FALSE, per_mail = FALSE;
2119 int old_pool, rc;
2120 tree_node **anchor, *t;
2121 open_db dbblock, *dbm;
2122 dbdata_ratelimit *dbd;
2123 struct timeval tv;
2124
2125 /* Parse the first two options and record their values in expansion
2126 variables. These variables allow the configuration to have informative
2127 error messages based on rate limits obtained from a table lookup. */
2128
2129 /* First is the maximum number of messages per period and maximum burst
2130 size, which must be greater than or equal to zero. Zero is useful for
2131 rate measurement as opposed to rate limiting. */
2132
2133 sender_rate_limit = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
2134 if (sender_rate_limit == NULL)
2135 limit = -1.0;
2136 else
2137 {
2138 limit = Ustrtod(sender_rate_limit, &ss);
2139 if (tolower(*ss) == 'k') { limit *= 1024.0; ss++; }
2140 else if (tolower(*ss) == 'm') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
2141 else if (tolower(*ss) == 'g') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
2142 }
2143 if (limit < 0.0 || *ss != 0)
2144 {
2145 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for "
2146 "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a positive number",
2147 sender_rate_limit);
2148 return ERROR;
2149 }
2150
2151 /* We use the rest of the argument list following the limit as the
2152 lookup key, because it doesn't make sense to use the same stored data
2153 if the period or options are different. */
2154
2155 key = arg;
2156
2157 /* Second is the rate measurement period and exponential smoothing time
2158 constant. This must be strictly greater than zero, because zero leads to
2159 run-time division errors. */
2160
2161 sender_rate_period = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
2162 if (sender_rate_period == NULL) period = -1.0;
2163 else period = readconf_readtime(sender_rate_period, 0, FALSE);
2164 if (period <= 0.0)
2165 {
2166 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for "
2167 "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a time value",
2168 sender_rate_period);
2169 return ERROR;
2170 }
2171
2172 /* Parse the other options. Should we check if the per_* options are being
2173 used in ACLs where they don't make sense, e.g. per_mail in the connect ACL? */
2174
2175 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2176 != NULL)
2177 {
2178 if (strcmpic(ss, US"leaky") == 0) leaky = TRUE;
2179 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"strict") == 0) strict = TRUE;
2180 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_byte") == 0) per_byte = TRUE;
2181 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_cmd") == 0) per_cmd = TRUE;
2182 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_conn") == 0) per_conn = TRUE;
2183 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_mail") == 0) per_mail = TRUE;
2184 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_rcpt") == 0) per_cmd = TRUE; /* alias */
2185 else have_key = TRUE;
2186 }
2187 if (leaky + strict > 1 || per_byte + per_cmd + per_conn + per_mail > 1)
2188 {
2189 *log_msgptr = US"conflicting options for \"ratelimit\" condition";
2190 return ERROR;
2191 }
2192
2193 /* Default option values */
2194 if (!strict) leaky = TRUE;
2195 if (!per_byte && !per_cmd && !per_conn) per_mail = TRUE;
2196
2197 /* If there is no explicit key, use the sender_host_address. If there is no
2198 sender_host_address (e.g. -bs or acl_not_smtp) then we simply omit it. */
2199
2200 if (!have_key && sender_host_address != NULL)
2201 key = string_sprintf("%s / %s", key, sender_host_address);
2202
2203 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit condition limit=%.0f period=%.0f key=%s\n",
2204 limit, period, key);
2205
2206 /* See if we have already computed the rate by looking in the relevant tree. For
2207 per-connection rate limiting, store tree nodes and dbdata in the permanent pool
2208 so that they survive across resets. */
2209
2210 anchor = NULL;
2211 old_pool = store_pool;
2212
2213 if (per_conn)
2214 {
2215 anchor = &ratelimiters_conn;
2216 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2217 }
2218 else if (per_mail || per_byte)
2219 anchor = &ratelimiters_mail;
2220 else if (per_cmd)
2221 anchor = &ratelimiters_cmd;
2222
2223 if (anchor != NULL && (t = tree_search(*anchor, key)) != NULL)
2224 {
2225 dbd = t->data.ptr;
2226 /* The following few lines duplicate some of the code below. */
2227 if (dbd->rate < limit) rc = FAIL;
2228 else rc = OK;
2229 store_pool = old_pool;
2230 sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
2231 HDEBUG(D_acl)
2232 debug_printf("ratelimit found pre-computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
2233 return rc;
2234 }
2235
2236 /* We aren't using a pre-computed rate, so get a previously recorded
2237 rate from the database, update it, and write it back. If there's no
2238 previous rate for this key, create one. */
2239
2240 dbm = dbfn_open(US"ratelimit", O_RDWR, &dbblock, TRUE);
2241 if (dbm == NULL)
2242 {
2243 store_pool = old_pool;
2244 sender_rate = NULL;
2245 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit database not available\n");
2246 *log_msgptr = US"ratelimit database not available";
2247 return DEFER;
2248 }
2249 dbd = dbfn_read(dbm, key);
2250
2251 gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
2252
2253 if (dbd == NULL)
2254 {
2255 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit initializing new key's data\n");
2256 dbd = store_get(sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit));
2257 dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
2258 dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
2259 dbd->rate = 0.0;
2260 }
2261 else
2262 {
2263 /* The smoothed rate is computed using an exponentially weighted moving
2264 average adjusted for variable sampling intervals. The standard EWMA for
2265 a fixed sampling interval is: f'(t) = (1 - a) * f(t) + a * f'(t - 1)
2266 where f() is the measured value and f'() is the smoothed value.
2267
2268 Old data decays out of the smoothed value exponentially, such that data n
2269 samples old is multiplied by a^n. The exponential decay time constant p
2270 is defined such that data p samples old is multiplied by 1/e, which means
2271 that a = exp(-1/p). We can maintain the same time constant for a variable
2272 sampling interval i by using a = exp(-i/p).
2273
2274 The rate we are measuring is messages per period, suitable for directly
2275 comparing with the limit. The average rate between now and the previous
2276 message is period / interval, which we feed into the EWMA as the sample.
2277
2278 It turns out that the number of messages required for the smoothed rate
2279 to reach the limit when they are sent in a burst is equal to the limit.
2280 This can be seen by analysing the value of the smoothed rate after N
2281 messages sent at even intervals. Let k = (1 - a) * p/i
2282
2283 rate_1 = (1 - a) * p/i + a * rate_0
2284 = k + a * rate_0
2285 rate_2 = k + a * rate_1
2286 = k + a * k + a^2 * rate_0
2287 rate_3 = k + a * k + a^2 * k + a^3 * rate_0
2288 rate_N = rate_0 * a^N + k * SUM(x=0..N-1)(a^x)
2289 = rate_0 * a^N + k * (1 - a^N) / (1 - a)
2290 = rate_0 * a^N + p/i * (1 - a^N)
2291
2292 When N is large, a^N -> 0 so rate_N -> p/i as desired.
2293
2294 rate_N = p/i + (rate_0 - p/i) * a^N
2295 a^N = (rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i)
2296 N * -i/p = log((rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i))
2297 N = p/i * log((rate_0 - p/i) / (rate_N - p/i))
2298
2299 Numerical analysis of the above equation, setting the computed rate to
2300 increase from rate_0 = 0 to rate_N = limit, shows that for large sending
2301 rates, p/i, the number of messages N = limit. So limit serves as both the
2302 maximum rate measured in messages per period, and the maximum number of
2303 messages that can be sent in a fast burst. */
2304
2305 double this_time = (double)tv.tv_sec
2306 + (double)tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0;
2307 double prev_time = (double)dbd->time_stamp
2308 + (double)dbd->time_usec / 1000000.0;
2309
2310 /* We must avoid division by zero, and deal gracefully with the clock going
2311 backwards. If we blunder ahead when time is in reverse then the computed
2312 rate will be bogus. To be safe we clamp interval to a very small number. */
2313
2314 double interval = this_time - prev_time <= 0.0 ? 1e-9
2315 : this_time - prev_time;
2316
2317 double i_over_p = interval / period;
2318 double a = exp(-i_over_p);
2319
2320 dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
2321 dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
2322
2323 /* If we are measuring the rate in bytes per period, multiply the
2324 measured rate by the message size. If we don't know the message size
2325 then it's safe to just use a value of zero and let the recorded rate
2326 decay as if nothing happened. */
2327
2328 if (per_byte)
2329 dbd->rate = (message_size < 0 ? 0.0 : (double)message_size)
2330 * (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
2331 else if (per_cmd && where == ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
2332 dbd->rate = (double)recipients_count
2333 * (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
2334 else
2335 dbd->rate = (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
2336 }
2337
2338 /* Clients sending at the limit are considered to be over the limit. This
2339 matters for edge cases such the first message sent by a client (which gets
2340 the initial rate of 0.0) when the rate limit is zero (i.e. the client should
2341 be completely blocked). */
2342
2343 if (dbd->rate < limit) rc = FAIL;
2344 else rc = OK;
2345
2346 /* Update the state if the rate is low or if we are being strict. If we
2347 are in leaky mode and the sender's rate is too high, we do not update
2348 the recorded rate in order to avoid an over-aggressive sender's retry
2349 rate preventing them from getting any email through. */
2350
2351 if (rc == FAIL || !leaky)
2352 dbfn_write(dbm, key, dbd, sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit));
2353 dbfn_close(dbm);
2354
2355 /* Store the result in the tree for future reference, if necessary. */
2356
2357 if (anchor != NULL)
2358 {
2359 t = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(key));
2360 t->data.ptr = dbd;
2361 Ustrcpy(t->name, key);
2362 (void)tree_insertnode(anchor, t);
2363 }
2364
2365 /* We create the formatted version of the sender's rate very late in
2366 order to ensure that it is done using the correct storage pool. */
2367
2368 store_pool = old_pool;
2369 sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
2370
2371 HDEBUG(D_acl)
2372 debug_printf("ratelimit computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
2373
2374 return rc;
2375 }
2376
2377
2378
2379 /*************************************************
2380 * Handle conditions/modifiers on an ACL item *
2381 *************************************************/
2382
2383 /* Called from acl_check() below.
2384
2385 Arguments:
2386 verb ACL verb
2387 cb ACL condition block - if NULL, result is OK
2388 where where called from
2389 addr the address being checked for RCPT, or NULL
2390 level the nesting level
2391 epp pointer to pass back TRUE if "endpass" encountered
2392 (applies only to "accept" and "discard")
2393 user_msgptr user message pointer
2394 log_msgptr log message pointer
2395 basic_errno pointer to where to put verify error
2396
2397 Returns: OK - all conditions are met
2398 DISCARD - an "acl" condition returned DISCARD - only allowed
2399 for "accept" or "discard" verbs
2400 FAIL - at least one condition fails
2401 FAIL_DROP - an "acl" condition returned FAIL_DROP
2402 DEFER - can't tell at the moment (typically, lookup defer,
2403 but can be temporary callout problem)
2404 ERROR - ERROR from nested ACL or expansion failure or other
2405 error
2406 */
2407
2408 static int
2409 acl_check_condition(int verb, acl_condition_block *cb, int where,
2410 address_item *addr, int level, BOOL *epp, uschar **user_msgptr,
2411 uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
2412 {
2413 uschar *user_message = NULL;
2414 uschar *log_message = NULL;
2415 uschar *p = NULL;
2416 int rc = OK;
2417 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2418 int sep = '/';
2419 #endif
2420
2421 for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next)
2422 {
2423 uschar *arg;
2424 int control_type;
2425
2426 /* The message and log_message items set up messages to be used in
2427 case of rejection. They are expanded later. */
2428
2429 if (cb->type == ACLC_MESSAGE)
2430 {
2431 user_message = cb->arg;
2432 continue;
2433 }
2434
2435 if (cb->type == ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE)
2436 {
2437 log_message = cb->arg;
2438 continue;
2439 }
2440
2441 /* The endpass "condition" just sets a flag to show it occurred. This is
2442 checked at compile time to be on an "accept" or "discard" item. */
2443
2444 if (cb->type == ACLC_ENDPASS)
2445 {
2446 *epp = TRUE;
2447 continue;
2448 }
2449
2450 /* For other conditions and modifiers, the argument is expanded now for some
2451 of them, but not for all, because expansion happens down in some lower level
2452 checking functions in some cases. */
2453
2454 if (cond_expand_at_top[cb->type])
2455 {
2456 arg = expand_string(cb->arg);
2457 if (arg == NULL)
2458 {
2459 if (expand_string_forcedfail) continue;
2460 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s",
2461 cb->arg, expand_string_message);
2462 return search_find_defer? DEFER : ERROR;
2463 }
2464 }
2465 else arg = cb->arg;
2466
2467 /* Show condition, and expanded condition if it's different */
2468
2469 HDEBUG(D_acl)
2470 {
2471 int lhswidth = 0;
2472 debug_printf("check %s%s %n",
2473 (!cond_modifiers[cb->type] && cb->u.negated)? "!":"",
2474 conditions[cb->type], &lhswidth);
2475
2476 if (cb->type == ACLC_SET)
2477 {
2478 debug_printf("acl_%s ", cb->u.varname);
2479 lhswidth += 5 + Ustrlen(cb->u.varname);
2480 }
2481
2482 debug_printf("= %s\n", cb->arg);
2483
2484 if (arg != cb->arg)
2485 debug_printf("%.*s= %s\n", lhswidth,
2486 US" ", CS arg);
2487 }
2488
2489 /* Check that this condition makes sense at this time */
2490
2491 if ((cond_forbids[cb->type] & (1 << where)) != 0)
2492 {
2493 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot %s %s condition in %s ACL",
2494 cond_modifiers[cb->type]? "use" : "test",
2495 conditions[cb->type], acl_wherenames[where]);
2496 return ERROR;
2497 }
2498
2499 /* Run the appropriate test for each condition, or take the appropriate
2500 action for the remaining modifiers. */
2501
2502 switch(cb->type)
2503 {
2504 case ACLC_ADD_HEADER:
2505 setup_header(arg);
2506 break;
2507
2508 /* A nested ACL that returns "discard" makes sense only for an "accept" or
2509 "discard" verb. */
2510
2511 case ACLC_ACL:
2512 rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, arg, level+1, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
2513 if (rc == DISCARD && verb != ACL_ACCEPT && verb != ACL_DISCARD)
2514 {
2515 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("nested ACL returned \"discard\" for "
2516 "\"%s\" command (only allowed with \"accept\" or \"discard\")",
2517 verbs[verb]);
2518 return ERROR;
2519 }
2520 break;
2521
2522 case ACLC_AUTHENTICATED:
2523 rc = (sender_host_authenticated == NULL)? FAIL :
2524 match_isinlist(sender_host_authenticated, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING,
2525 TRUE, NULL);
2526 break;
2527
2528 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
2529 case ACLC_BMI_OPTIN:
2530 {
2531 int old_pool = store_pool;
2532 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2533 bmi_current_optin = string_copy(arg);
2534 store_pool = old_pool;
2535 }
2536 break;
2537 #endif
2538
2539 case ACLC_CONDITION:
2540 if (Ustrspn(arg, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg)) /* Digits, or empty */
2541 rc = (Uatoi(arg) == 0)? FAIL : OK;
2542 else
2543 rc = (strcmpic(arg, US"no") == 0 ||
2544 strcmpic(arg, US"false") == 0)? FAIL :
2545 (strcmpic(arg, US"yes") == 0 ||
2546 strcmpic(arg, US"true") == 0)? OK : DEFER;
2547 if (rc == DEFER)
2548 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("invalid \"condition\" value \"%s\"", arg);
2549 break;
2550
2551 case ACLC_CONTROL:
2552 control_type = decode_control(arg, &p, where, log_msgptr);
2553
2554 /* Check if this control makes sense at this time */
2555
2556 if ((control_forbids[control_type] & (1 << where)) != 0)
2557 {
2558 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot use \"control=%s\" in %s ACL",
2559 controls[control_type], acl_wherenames[where]);
2560 return ERROR;
2561 }
2562
2563 switch(control_type)
2564 {
2565 case CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED:
2566 allow_auth_unadvertised = TRUE;
2567 break;
2568
2569 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
2570 case CONTROL_BMI_RUN:
2571 bmi_run = 1;
2572 break;
2573 #endif
2574
2575 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
2576 case CONTROL_DK_VERIFY:
2577 dk_do_verify = 1;
2578 break;
2579 #endif
2580
2581 case CONTROL_ERROR:
2582 return ERROR;
2583
2584 case CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART:
2585 deliver_localpart = addr->cc_local_part;
2586 break;
2587
2588 case CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART:
2589 deliver_localpart = addr->lc_local_part;
2590 break;
2591
2592 case CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC:
2593 smtp_enforce_sync = TRUE;
2594 break;
2595
2596 case CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC:
2597 smtp_enforce_sync = FALSE;
2598 break;
2599
2600 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2601 case CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL:
2602 no_mbox_unspool = TRUE;
2603 break;
2604 #endif
2605
2606 case CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE:
2607 no_multiline_responses = TRUE;
2608 break;
2609
2610 case CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING:
2611 pipelining_enable = FALSE;
2612 break;
2613
2614 case CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH:
2615 disable_delay_flush = TRUE;
2616 break;
2617
2618 case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER:
2619 case CONTROL_FAKEREJECT:
2620 fake_response = (control_type == CONTROL_FAKEDEFER) ? DEFER : FAIL;
2621 if (*p == '/')
2622 {
2623 uschar *pp = p + 1;
2624 while (*pp != 0) pp++;
2625 fake_response_text = expand_string(string_copyn(p+1, pp-p-1));
2626 p = pp;
2627 }
2628 else
2629 {
2630 /* Explicitly reset to default string */
2631 fake_response_text = US"Your message has been rejected but is being kept for evaluation.\nIf it was a legitimate message, it may still be delivered to the target recipient(s).";
2632 }
2633 break;
2634
2635 case CONTROL_FREEZE:
2636 deliver_freeze = TRUE;
2637 deliver_frozen_at = time(NULL);
2638 freeze_tell = freeze_tell_config; /* Reset to configured value */
2639 if (Ustrncmp(p, "/no_tell", 8) == 0)
2640 {
2641 p += 8;
2642 freeze_tell = NULL;
2643 }
2644 if (*p != 0)
2645 {
2646 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
2647 return ERROR;
2648 }
2649 break;
2650
2651 case CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY:
2652 queue_only_policy = TRUE;
2653 break;
2654
2655 case CONTROL_SUBMISSION:
2656 originator_name = US"";
2657 submission_mode = TRUE;
2658 while (*p == '/')
2659 {
2660 if (Ustrncmp(p, "/sender_retain", 14) == 0)
2661 {
2662 p += 14;
2663 active_local_sender_retain = TRUE;
2664 active_local_from_check = FALSE;
2665 }
2666 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/domain=", 8) == 0)
2667 {
2668 uschar *pp = p + 8;
2669 while (*pp != 0 && *pp != '/') pp++;
2670 submission_domain = string_copyn(p+8, pp-p-8);
2671 p = pp;
2672 }
2673 /* The name= option must be last, because it swallows the rest of
2674 the string. */
2675 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/name=", 6) == 0)
2676 {
2677 uschar *pp = p + 6;
2678 while (*pp != 0) pp++;
2679 submission_name = string_copy(parse_fix_phrase(p+6, pp-p-6,
2680 big_buffer, big_buffer_size));
2681 p = pp;
2682 }
2683 else break;
2684 }
2685 if (*p != 0)
2686 {
2687 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
2688 return ERROR;
2689 }
2690 break;
2691
2692 case CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS:
2693 suppress_local_fixups = TRUE;
2694 break;
2695 }
2696 break;
2697
2698 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2699 case ACLC_DECODE:
2700 rc = mime_decode(&arg);
2701 break;
2702 #endif
2703
2704 case ACLC_DELAY:
2705 {
2706 int delay = readconf_readtime(arg, 0, FALSE);
2707 if (delay < 0)
2708 {
2709 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for \"delay\" "
2710 "modifier: \"%s\" is not a time value", arg);
2711 return ERROR;
2712 }
2713 else
2714 {
2715 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("delay modifier requests %d-second delay\n",
2716 delay);
2717 if (host_checking)
2718 {
2719 HDEBUG(D_acl)
2720 debug_printf("delay skipped in -bh checking mode\n");
2721 }
2722
2723 /* It appears to be impossible to detect that a TCP/IP connection has
2724 gone away without reading from it. This means that we cannot shorten
2725 the delay below if the client goes away, because we cannot discover
2726 that the client has closed its end of the connection. (The connection
2727 is actually in a half-closed state, waiting for the server to close its
2728 end.) It would be nice to be able to detect this state, so that the
2729 Exim process is not held up unnecessarily. However, it seems that we
2730 can't. The poll() function does not do the right thing, and in any case
2731 it is not always available.
2732
2733 NOTE 1: If ever this state of affairs changes, remember that we may be
2734 dealing with stdin/stdout here, in addition to TCP/IP connections.
2735 Also, delays may be specified for non-SMTP input, where smtp_out and
2736 smtp_in will be NULL. Whatever is done must work in all cases.
2737
2738 NOTE 2: The added feature of flushing the output before a delay must
2739 apply only to SMTP input. Hence the test for smtp_out being non-NULL.
2740 */
2741
2742 else
2743 {
2744 if (smtp_out != NULL && !disable_delay_flush) fflush(smtp_out);
2745 while (delay > 0) delay = sleep(delay);
2746 }
2747 }
2748 }
2749 break;
2750
2751 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
2752 case ACLC_DEMIME:
2753 rc = demime(&arg);
2754 break;
2755 #endif
2756
2757 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
2758 case ACLC_DK_DOMAIN_SOURCE:
2759 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2760 /* check header source of domain against given string */
2761 switch (dk_verify_block->address_source) {
2762 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_FROM_FROM:
2763 rc = match_isinlist(US"from", &arg, 0, NULL,
2764 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2765 break;
2766 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_FROM_SENDER:
2767 rc = match_isinlist(US"sender", &arg, 0, NULL,
2768 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2769 break;
2770 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_NONE:
2771 rc = match_isinlist(US"none", &arg, 0, NULL,
2772 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2773 break;
2774 }
2775 break;
2776
2777 case ACLC_DK_POLICY:
2778 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2779 /* check policy against given string, default FAIL */
2780 rc = FAIL;
2781 if (dk_verify_block->signsall)
2782 rc = match_isinlist(US"signsall", &arg, 0, NULL,
2783 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2784 if (dk_verify_block->testing)
2785 rc = match_isinlist(US"testing", &arg, 0, NULL,
2786 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2787 break;
2788
2789 case ACLC_DK_SENDER_DOMAINS:
2790 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2791 if (dk_verify_block->domain != NULL)
2792 rc = match_isinlist(dk_verify_block->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
2793 NULL, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL);
2794 else rc = FAIL;
2795 break;
2796
2797 case ACLC_DK_SENDER_LOCAL_PARTS:
2798 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2799 if (dk_verify_block->local_part != NULL)
2800 rc = match_isinlist(dk_verify_block->local_part, &arg, 0, &localpartlist_anchor,
2801 NULL, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE, NULL);
2802 else rc = FAIL;
2803 break;
2804
2805 case ACLC_DK_SENDERS:
2806 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2807 if (dk_verify_block->address != NULL)
2808 rc = match_address_list(dk_verify_block->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0, NULL);
2809 else rc = FAIL;
2810 break;
2811
2812 case ACLC_DK_STATUS:
2813 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2814 if (dk_verify_block->result > 0) {
2815 switch(dk_verify_block->result) {
2816 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_BAD_FORMAT:
2817 rc = match_isinlist(US"bad format", &arg, 0, NULL,
2818 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2819 break;
2820 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NO_KEY:
2821 rc = match_isinlist(US"no key", &arg, 0, NULL,
2822 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2823 break;
2824 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NO_SIGNATURE:
2825 rc = match_isinlist(US"no signature", &arg, 0, NULL,
2826 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2827 break;
2828 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_REVOKED:
2829 rc = match_isinlist(US"revoked", &arg, 0, NULL,
2830 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2831 break;
2832 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NON_PARTICIPANT:
2833 rc = match_isinlist(US"non-participant", &arg, 0, NULL,
2834 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2835 break;
2836 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_GOOD:
2837 rc = match_isinlist(US"good", &arg, 0, NULL,
2838 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2839 break;
2840 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_BAD:
2841 rc = match_isinlist(US"bad", &arg, 0, NULL,
2842 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2843 break;
2844 }
2845 }
2846 break;
2847 #endif
2848
2849 case ACLC_DNSLISTS:
2850 rc = verify_check_dnsbl(&arg);
2851 break;
2852
2853 case ACLC_DOMAINS:
2854 rc = match_isinlist(addr->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
2855 addr->domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, &deliver_domain_data);
2856 break;
2857
2858 /* The value in tls_cipher is the full cipher name, for example,
2859 TLSv1:DES-CBC3-SHA:168, whereas the values to test for are just the
2860 cipher names such as DES-CBC3-SHA. But program defensively. We don't know
2861 what may in practice come out of the SSL library - which at the time of
2862 writing is poorly documented. */
2863
2864 case ACLC_ENCRYPTED:
2865 if (tls_cipher == NULL) rc = FAIL; else
2866 {
2867 uschar *endcipher = NULL;
2868 uschar *cipher = Ustrchr(tls_cipher, ':');
2869 if (cipher == NULL) cipher = tls_cipher; else
2870 {
2871 endcipher = Ustrchr(++cipher, ':');
2872 if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = 0;
2873 }
2874 rc = match_isinlist(cipher, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2875 if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = ':';
2876 }
2877 break;
2878
2879 /* Use verify_check_this_host() instead of verify_check_host() so that
2880 we can pass over &host_data to catch any looked up data. Once it has been
2881 set, it retains its value so that it's still there if another ACL verb
2882 comes through here and uses the cache. However, we must put it into
2883 permanent store in case it is also expected to be used in a subsequent
2884 message in the same SMTP connection. */
2885
2886 case ACLC_HOSTS:
2887 rc = verify_check_this_host(&arg, sender_host_cache, NULL,
2888 (sender_host_address == NULL)? US"" : sender_host_address, &host_data);
2889 if (host_data != NULL) host_data = string_copy_malloc(host_data);
2890 break;
2891
2892 case ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS:
2893 rc = match_isinlist(addr->cc_local_part, &arg, 0,
2894 &localpartlist_anchor, addr->localpart_cache, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE,
2895 &deliver_localpart_data);
2896 break;
2897
2898 case ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET:
2899 {
2900 int logbits = 0;
2901 int sep = 0;
2902 uschar *s = arg;
2903 uschar *ss;
2904 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&s, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2905 != NULL)
2906 {
2907 if (Ustrcmp(ss, "main") == 0) logbits |= LOG_MAIN;
2908 else if (Ustrcmp(ss, "panic") == 0) logbits |= LOG_PANIC;
2909 else if (Ustrcmp(ss, "reject") == 0) logbits |= LOG_REJECT;
2910 else
2911 {
2912 logbits |= LOG_MAIN|LOG_REJECT;
2913 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "unknown log name \"%s\" in "
2914 "\"log_reject_target\" in %s ACL", ss, acl_wherenames[where]);
2915 }
2916 }
2917 log_reject_target = logbits;
2918 }
2919 break;
2920
2921 case ACLC_LOGWRITE:
2922 {
2923 int logbits = 0;
2924 uschar *s = arg;
2925 if (*s == ':')
2926 {
2927 s++;
2928 while (*s != ':')
2929 {
2930 if (Ustrncmp(s, "main", 4) == 0)
2931 { logbits |= LOG_MAIN; s += 4; }
2932 else if (Ustrncmp(s, "panic", 5) == 0)
2933 { logbits |= LOG_PANIC; s += 5; }
2934 else if (Ustrncmp(s, "reject", 6) == 0)
2935 { logbits |= LOG_REJECT; s += 6; }
2936 else
2937 {
2938 logbits = LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC;
2939 s = string_sprintf(":unknown log name in \"%s\" in "
2940 "\"logwrite\" in %s ACL", arg, acl_wherenames[where]);
2941 }
2942 if (*s == ',') s++;
2943 }
2944 s++;
2945 }
2946 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
2947
2948
2949 if (logbits == 0) logbits = LOG_MAIN;
2950 log_write(0, logbits, "%s", string_printing(s));
2951 }
2952 break;
2953
2954 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2955 case ACLC_MALWARE:
2956 {
2957 /* Separate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
2958 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
2959 /* Run the malware backend. */
2960 rc = malware(&ss);
2961 /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
2962 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2963 != NULL) {
2964 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
2965 {
2966 /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
2967 rc = FAIL;
2968 }
2969 }
2970 }
2971 break;
2972
2973 case ACLC_MIME_REGEX:
2974 rc = mime_regex(&arg);
2975 break;
2976 #endif
2977
2978 case ACLC_RATELIMIT:
2979 rc = acl_ratelimit(arg, where, log_msgptr);
2980 break;
2981
2982 case ACLC_RECIPIENTS:
2983 rc = match_address_list(addr->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0,
2984 &recipient_data);
2985 break;
2986
2987 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2988 case ACLC_REGEX:
2989 rc = regex(&arg);
2990 break;
2991 #endif
2992
2993 case ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS:
2994 {
2995 uschar *sdomain;
2996 sdomain = Ustrrchr(sender_address, '@');
2997 sdomain = (sdomain == NULL)? US"" : sdomain + 1;
2998 rc = match_isinlist(sdomain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
2999 sender_domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL);
3000 }
3001 break;
3002
3003 case ACLC_SENDERS:
3004 rc = match_address_list(sender_address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg,
3005 sender_address_cache, -1, 0, &sender_data);
3006 break;
3007
3008 /* Connection variables must persist forever */
3009
3010 case ACLC_SET:
3011 {
3012 int old_pool = store_pool;
3013 if (cb->u.varname[0] == 'c') store_pool = POOL_PERM;
3014 acl_var_create(cb->u.varname)->data.ptr = string_copy(arg);
3015 store_pool = old_pool;
3016 }
3017 break;
3018
3019 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
3020 case ACLC_SPAM:
3021 {
3022 /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
3023 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
3024 /* Run the spam backend. */
3025 rc = spam(&ss);
3026 /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
3027 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
3028 != NULL) {
3029 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
3030 {
3031 /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
3032 rc = FAIL;
3033 }
3034 }
3035 }
3036 break;
3037 #endif
3038
3039 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
3040 case ACLC_SPF:
3041 rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address);
3042 break;
3043 #endif
3044
3045 /* If the verb is WARN, discard any user message from verification, because
3046 such messages are SMTP responses, not header additions. The latter come
3047 only from explicit "message" modifiers. However, put the user message into
3048 $acl_verify_message so it can be used in subsequent conditions or modifiers
3049 (until something changes it). */
3050
3051 case ACLC_VERIFY:
3052 rc = acl_verify(where, addr, arg, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, basic_errno);
3053 acl_verify_message = *user_msgptr;
3054 if (verb == ACL_WARN) *user_msgptr = NULL;
3055 break;
3056
3057 default:
3058 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown "
3059 "condition %d", cb->type);
3060 break;
3061 }
3062
3063 /* If a condition was negated, invert OK/FAIL. */
3064
3065 if (!cond_modifiers[cb->type] && cb->u.negated)
3066 {
3067 if (rc == OK) rc = FAIL;
3068 else if (rc == FAIL || rc == FAIL_DROP) rc = OK;
3069 }
3070
3071 if (rc != OK) break; /* Conditions loop */
3072 }
3073
3074
3075 /* If the result is the one for which "message" and/or "log_message" are used,
3076 handle the values of these modifiers. If there isn't a log message set, we make
3077 it the same as the user message.
3078
3079 "message" is a user message that will be included in an SMTP response. Unless
3080 it is empty, it overrides any previously set user message.
3081
3082 "log_message" is a non-user message, and it adds to any existing non-user
3083 message that is already set.
3084
3085 Most verbs have but a single return for which the messages are relevant, but
3086 for "discard", it's useful to have the log message both when it succeeds and
3087 when it fails. For "accept", the message is used in the OK case if there is no
3088 "endpass", but (for backwards compatibility) in the FAIL case if "endpass" is
3089 present. */
3090
3091 if (*epp && rc == OK) user_message = NULL;
3092
3093 if (((1<<rc) & msgcond[verb]) != 0)
3094 {
3095 uschar *expmessage;
3096 uschar *old_user_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
3097 uschar *old_log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr != NULL)? *log_msgptr : old_user_msgptr;
3098
3099 /* If the verb is "warn", messages generated by conditions (verification or
3100 nested ACLs) are always discarded. This also happens for acceptance verbs
3101 when they actually do accept. Only messages specified at this level are used.
3102 However, the value of an existing message is available in $acl_verify_message
3103 during expansions. */
3104
3105 if (verb == ACL_WARN ||
3106 (rc == OK && (verb == ACL_ACCEPT || verb == ACL_DISCARD)))
3107 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
3108
3109 if (user_message != NULL)
3110 {
3111 acl_verify_message = old_user_msgptr;
3112 expmessage = expand_string(user_message);
3113 if (expmessage == NULL)
3114 {
3115 if (!expand_string_forcedfail)
3116 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
3117 user_message, expand_string_message);
3118 }
3119 else if (expmessage[0] != 0) *user_msgptr = expmessage;
3120 }
3121
3122 if (log_message != NULL)
3123 {
3124 acl_verify_message = old_log_msgptr;
3125 expmessage = expand_string(log_message);
3126 if (expmessage == NULL)
3127 {
3128 if (!expand_string_forcedfail)
3129 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
3130 log_message, expand_string_message);
3131 }
3132 else if (expmessage[0] != 0)
3133 {
3134 *log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr == NULL)? expmessage :
3135 string_sprintf("%s: %s", expmessage, *log_msgptr);
3136 }
3137 }
3138
3139 /* If no log message, default it to the user message */
3140
3141 if (*log_msgptr == NULL) *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
3142 }
3143
3144 acl_verify_message = NULL;
3145 return rc;
3146 }
3147
3148
3149
3150
3151
3152 /*************************************************
3153 * Get line from a literal ACL *
3154 *************************************************/
3155
3156 /* This function is passed to acl_read() in order to extract individual lines
3157 of a literal ACL, which we access via static pointers. We can destroy the
3158 contents because this is called only once (the compiled ACL is remembered).
3159
3160 This code is intended to treat the data in the same way as lines in the main
3161 Exim configuration file. That is:
3162
3163 . Leading spaces are ignored.
3164
3165 . A \ at the end of a line is a continuation - trailing spaces after the \
3166 are permitted (this is because I don't believe in making invisible things
3167 significant). Leading spaces on the continued part of a line are ignored.
3168
3169 . Physical lines starting (significantly) with # are totally ignored, and
3170 may appear within a sequence of backslash-continued lines.
3171
3172 . Blank lines are ignored, but will end a sequence of continuations.
3173
3174 Arguments: none
3175 Returns: a pointer to the next line
3176 */
3177
3178
3179 static uschar *acl_text; /* Current pointer in the text */
3180 static uschar *acl_text_end; /* Points one past the terminating '0' */
3181
3182
3183 static uschar *
3184 acl_getline(void)
3185 {
3186 uschar *yield;
3187
3188 /* This loop handles leading blank lines and comments. */
3189
3190 for(;;)
3191 {
3192 while (isspace(*acl_text)) acl_text++; /* Leading spaces/empty lines */
3193 if (*acl_text == 0) return NULL; /* No more data */
3194 yield = acl_text; /* Potential data line */
3195
3196 while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
3197
3198 /* If we hit the end before a newline, we have the whole logical line. If
3199 it's a comment, there's no more data to be given. Otherwise, yield it. */
3200
3201 if (*acl_text == 0) return (*yield == '#')? NULL : yield;
3202
3203 /* After reaching a newline, end this loop if the physical line does not
3204 start with '#'. If it does, it's a comment, and the loop continues. */
3205
3206 if (*yield != '#') break;
3207 }
3208
3209 /* This loop handles continuations. We know we have some real data, ending in
3210 newline. See if there is a continuation marker at the end (ignoring trailing
3211 white space). We know that *yield is not white space, so no need to test for
3212 cont > yield in the backwards scanning loop. */
3213
3214 for(;;)
3215 {
3216 uschar *cont;
3217 for (cont = acl_text - 1; isspace(*cont); cont--);
3218
3219 /* If no continuation follows, we are done. Mark the end of the line and
3220 return it. */
3221
3222 if (*cont != '\\')
3223 {
3224 *acl_text++ = 0;
3225 return yield;
3226 }
3227
3228 /* We have encountered a continuation. Skip over whitespace at the start of
3229 the next line, and indeed the whole of the next line or lines if they are
3230 comment lines. */
3231
3232 for (;;)
3233 {
3234 while (*(++acl_text) == ' ' || *acl_text == '\t');
3235 if (*acl_text != '#') break;
3236 while (*(++acl_text) != 0 && *acl_text != '\n');
3237 }
3238
3239 /* We have the start of a continuation line. Move all the rest of the data
3240 to join onto the previous line, and then find its end. If the end is not a
3241 newline, we are done. Otherwise loop to look for another continuation. */
3242
3243 memmove(cont, acl_text, acl_text_end - acl_text);
3244 acl_text_end -= acl_text - cont;
3245 acl_text = cont;
3246 while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
3247 if (*acl_text == 0) return yield;
3248 }
3249
3250 /* Control does not reach here */
3251 }
3252
3253
3254
3255
3256
3257 /*************************************************
3258 * Check access using an ACL *
3259 *************************************************/
3260
3261 /* This function is called from address_check. It may recurse via
3262 acl_check_condition() - hence the use of a level to stop looping. The ACL is
3263 passed as a string which is expanded. A forced failure implies no access check
3264 is required. If the result is a single word, it is taken as the name of an ACL
3265 which is sought in the global ACL tree. Otherwise, it is taken as literal ACL
3266 text, complete with newlines, and parsed as such. In both cases, the ACL check
3267 is then run. This function uses an auxiliary function for acl_read() to call
3268 for reading individual lines of a literal ACL. This is acl_getline(), which
3269 appears immediately above.
3270
3271 Arguments:
3272 where where called from
3273 addr address item when called from RCPT; otherwise NULL
3274 s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
3275 level the nesting level
3276 user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
3277 log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
3278
3279 Returns: OK access is granted
3280 DISCARD access is apparently granted...
3281 FAIL access is denied
3282 FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection
3283 DEFER can't tell at the moment
3284 ERROR disaster
3285 */
3286
3287 static int
3288 acl_check_internal(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *s, int level,
3289 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
3290 {
3291 int fd = -1;
3292 acl_block *acl = NULL;
3293 uschar *acl_name = US"inline ACL";
3294 uschar *ss;
3295
3296 /* Catch configuration loops */
3297
3298 if (level > 20)
3299 {
3300 *log_msgptr = US"ACL nested too deep: possible loop";
3301 return ERROR;
3302 }
3303
3304 if (s == NULL)
3305 {
3306 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ACL is NULL: implicit DENY\n");
3307 return FAIL;
3308 }
3309
3310 /* At top level, we expand the incoming string. At lower levels, it has already
3311 been expanded as part of condition processing. */
3312
3313 if (level == 0)
3314 {
3315 ss = expand_string(s);
3316 if (ss == NULL)
3317 {
3318 if (expand_string_forcedfail) return OK;
3319 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s", s,
3320 expand_string_message);
3321 return ERROR;
3322 }
3323 }
3324 else ss = s;
3325
3326 while (isspace(*ss))ss++;
3327
3328 /* If we can't find a named ACL, the default is to parse it as an inline one.
3329 (Unless it begins with a slash; non-existent files give rise to an error.) */
3330
3331 acl_text = ss;
3332
3333 /* Handle the case of a string that does not contain any spaces. Look for a
3334 named ACL among those read from the configuration, or a previously read file.
3335 It is possible that the pointer to the ACL is NULL if the configuration
3336 contains a name with no data. If not found, and the text begins with '/',
3337 read an ACL from a file, and save it so it can be re-used. */
3338
3339 if (Ustrchr(ss, ' ') == NULL)
3340 {
3341 tree_node *t = tree_search(acl_anchor, ss);
3342 if (t != NULL)
3343 {
3344 acl = (acl_block *)(t->data.ptr);
3345 if (acl == NULL)
3346 {
3347 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ACL \"%s\" is empty: implicit DENY\n", ss);
3348 return FAIL;
3349 }
3350 acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
3351 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("using ACL \"%s\"\n", ss);
3352 }
3353
3354 else if (*ss == '/')
3355 {
3356 struct stat statbuf;
3357 fd = Uopen(ss, O_RDONLY, 0);
3358 if (fd < 0)
3359 {
3360 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to open ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
3361 strerror(errno));
3362 return ERROR;
3363 }
3364
3365 if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) != 0)
3366 {
3367 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to fstat ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
3368 strerror(errno));
3369 return ERROR;
3370 }
3371
3372 acl_text = store_get(statbuf.st_size + 1);
3373 acl_text_end = acl_text + statbuf.st_size + 1;
3374
3375 if (read(fd, acl_text, statbuf.st_size) != statbuf.st_size)
3376 {
3377 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to read ACL file \"%s\": %s",
3378 ss, strerror(errno));
3379 return ERROR;
3380 }
3381 acl_text[statbuf.st_size] = 0;
3382 (void)close(fd);
3383
3384 acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
3385 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("read ACL from file %s\n", ss);
3386 }
3387 }
3388
3389 /* Parse an ACL that is still in text form. If it came from a file, remember it
3390 in the ACL tree, having read it into the POOL_PERM store pool so that it
3391 persists between multiple messages. */
3392
3393 if (acl == NULL)
3394 {
3395 int old_pool = store_pool;
3396 if (fd >= 0) store_pool = POOL_PERM;
3397 acl = acl_read(acl_getline, log_msgptr);
3398 store_pool = old_pool;
3399 if (acl == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL) return ERROR;
3400 if (fd >= 0)
3401 {
3402 tree_node *t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(ss));
3403 Ustrcpy(t->name, ss);
3404 t->data.ptr = acl;
3405 (void)tree_insertnode(&acl_anchor, t);
3406 }
3407 }
3408
3409 /* Now we have an ACL to use. It's possible it may be NULL. */
3410
3411 while (acl != NULL)
3412 {
3413 int cond;
3414 int basic_errno = 0;
3415 BOOL endpass_seen = FALSE;
3416
3417 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
3418 acl_temp_details = FALSE;
3419
3420 if (where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT &&
3421 acl->verb != ACL_ACCEPT &&
3422 acl->verb != ACL_WARN)
3423 {
3424 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"%s\" is not allowed in a QUIT ACL",
3425 verbs[acl->verb]);
3426 return ERROR;
3427 }
3428
3429 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("processing \"%s\"\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3430
3431 /* Clear out any search error message from a previous check before testing
3432 this condition. */
3433
3434 search_error_message = NULL;
3435 cond = acl_check_condition(acl->verb, acl->condition, where, addr, level,
3436 &endpass_seen, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, &basic_errno);
3437
3438 /* Handle special returns: DEFER causes a return except on a WARN verb;
3439 ERROR always causes a return. */
3440
3441 switch (cond)
3442 {
3443 case DEFER:
3444 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test deferred\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3445 if (basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
3446 {
3447 if (search_error_message != NULL && *search_error_message != 0)
3448 *log_msgptr = search_error_message;
3449 if (smtp_return_error_details) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
3450 }
3451 else
3452 {
3453 acl_temp_details = TRUE;
3454 }
3455 if (acl->verb != ACL_WARN) return DEFER;
3456 break;
3457
3458 default: /* Paranoia */
3459 case ERROR:
3460 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test error\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3461 return ERROR;
3462
3463 case OK:
3464 HDEBUG<