1 /* $Cambridge: exim/src/src/acl.c,v 1.36 2005/05/31 10:58:18 ph10 Exp $ */
3 /*************************************************
4 * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
5 *************************************************/
7 /* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2005 */
8 /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
10 /* Code for handling Access Control Lists (ACLs) */
15 /* Default callout timeout */
17 #define CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT 30
19 /* ACL verb codes - keep in step with the table of verbs that follows */
21 enum { ACL_ACCEPT
, ACL_DEFER
, ACL_DENY
, ACL_DISCARD
, ACL_DROP
, ACL_REQUIRE
,
26 static uschar
*verbs
[] =
27 { US
"accept", US
"defer", US
"deny", US
"discard", US
"drop", US
"require",
30 /* For each verb, the condition for which "message" is used */
32 static int msgcond
[] = { FAIL
, OK
, OK
, FAIL
, OK
, FAIL
, OK
};
34 /* ACL condition and modifier codes - keep in step with the table that
37 enum { ACLC_ACL
, ACLC_AUTHENTICATED
,
38 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
41 ACLC_CONDITION
, ACLC_CONTROL
,
42 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
46 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
49 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
50 ACLC_DK_DOMAIN_SOURCE
,
52 ACLC_DK_SENDER_DOMAINS
,
53 ACLC_DK_SENDER_LOCAL_PARTS
,
57 ACLC_DNSLISTS
, ACLC_DOMAINS
, ACLC_ENCRYPTED
, ACLC_ENDPASS
,
58 ACLC_HOSTS
, ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS
, ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE
, ACLC_LOGWRITE
,
59 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
63 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
68 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
71 ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS
, ACLC_SENDERS
, ACLC_SET
,
72 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
75 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
80 /* ACL conditions/modifiers: "delay", "control", "endpass", "message",
81 "log_message", "logwrite", and "set" are modifiers that look like conditions
82 but always return TRUE. They are used for their side effects. */
84 static uschar
*conditions
[] = { US
"acl", US
"authenticated",
85 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
90 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
94 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
97 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
100 US
"dk_sender_domains",
101 US
"dk_sender_local_parts",
105 US
"dnslists", US
"domains", US
"encrypted",
106 US
"endpass", US
"hosts", US
"local_parts", US
"log_message", US
"logwrite",
107 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
111 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
116 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
119 US
"sender_domains", US
"senders", US
"set",
120 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
123 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
128 /* ACL control names */
130 static uschar
*controls
[] = { US
"error", US
"caseful_local_part",
131 US
"caselower_local_part", US
"enforce_sync", US
"no_enforce_sync", US
"freeze",
132 US
"queue_only", US
"submission", US
"no_multiline"};
134 /* Flags to indicate for which conditions /modifiers a string expansion is done
135 at the outer level. In the other cases, expansion already occurs in the
136 checking functions. */
138 static uschar cond_expand_at_top
[] = {
140 FALSE
, /* authenticated */
141 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
142 TRUE
, /* bmi_optin */
144 TRUE
, /* condition */
146 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
150 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
153 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
154 TRUE
, /* dk_domain_source */
155 TRUE
, /* dk_policy */
156 TRUE
, /* dk_sender_domains */
157 TRUE
, /* dk_sender_local_parts */
158 TRUE
, /* dk_senders */
159 TRUE
, /* dk_status */
163 FALSE
, /* encrypted */
166 FALSE
, /* local_parts */
167 TRUE
, /* log_message */
169 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
173 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
174 TRUE
, /* mime_regex */
176 TRUE
, /* ratelimit */
177 FALSE
, /* recipients */
178 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
181 FALSE
, /* sender_domains */
184 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
187 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
193 /* Flags to identify the modifiers */
195 static uschar cond_modifiers
[] = {
197 FALSE
, /* authenticated */
198 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
199 TRUE
, /* bmi_optin */
201 FALSE
, /* condition */
203 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
207 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
210 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
211 FALSE
, /* dk_domain_source */
212 FALSE
, /* dk_policy */
213 FALSE
, /* dk_sender_domains */
214 FALSE
, /* dk_sender_local_parts */
215 FALSE
, /* dk_senders */
216 FALSE
, /* dk_status */
218 FALSE
, /* dnslists */
220 FALSE
, /* encrypted */
223 FALSE
, /* local_parts */
224 TRUE
, /* log_message */
226 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
230 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
231 FALSE
, /* mime_regex */
233 FALSE
, /* ratelimit */
234 FALSE
, /* recipients */
235 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
238 FALSE
, /* sender_domains */
241 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
244 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
250 /* Bit map vector of which conditions are not allowed at certain times. For
251 each condition, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier
252 to specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
254 static unsigned int cond_forbids
[] = {
257 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)| /* authenticated */
260 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
261 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH
)| /* bmi_optin */
262 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO
)|
263 (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME
)|
264 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN
)|
265 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH
)|
266 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS
)|
267 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
),
272 /* Certain types of control are always allowed, so we let it through
273 always and check in the control processing itself. */
277 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
279 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME
), /* decode */
284 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
286 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)), /* demime */
289 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
290 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH
)| /* dk_domain_source */
291 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO
)|
292 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|
293 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN
)|
294 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT
)|
295 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS
)|
298 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH
)| /* dk_policy */
299 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO
)|
300 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|
301 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN
)|
302 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT
)|
303 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS
)|
306 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH
)| /* dk_sender_domains */
307 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO
)|
308 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|
309 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN
)|
310 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT
)|
311 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS
)|
314 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH
)| /* dk_sender_local_parts */
315 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO
)|
316 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|
317 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN
)|
318 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT
)|
319 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS
)|
322 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH
)| /* dk_senders */
323 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO
)|
324 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|
325 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN
)|
326 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT
)|
327 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS
)|
330 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH
)| /* dk_status */
331 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO
)|
332 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|
333 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN
)|
334 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT
)|
335 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS
)|
339 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
), /* dnslists */
342 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
), /* domains */
344 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)| /* encrypted */
349 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
), /* hosts */
352 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
), /* local_parts */
358 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
360 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)), /* malware */
365 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
367 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME
), /* mime_regex */
373 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
), /* recipients */
375 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
377 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)| /* regex */
378 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME
)),
381 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)| /* sender_domains */
383 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT
)|
384 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN
)|
385 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY
),
387 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)| /* senders */
389 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT
)|
390 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN
)|
391 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY
),
395 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
397 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)), /* spam */
400 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
401 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT
)| /* spf */
403 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH
)|
404 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN
)|
405 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY
),
408 /* Certain types of verify are always allowed, so we let it through
409 always and check in the verify function itself */
415 /* Return values from decode_control() */
418 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
421 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
424 CONTROL_ERROR
, CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART
, CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART
,
425 CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC
, CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC
, CONTROL_FREEZE
,
426 CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY
, CONTROL_SUBMISSION
,
427 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
428 CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL
,
430 CONTROL_FAKEDEFER
, CONTROL_FAKEREJECT
, CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE
};
432 /* Bit map vector of which controls are not allowed at certain times. For
433 each control, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier to
434 specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
436 static unsigned int control_forbids
[] = {
437 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
440 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
441 (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
), /* dk_verify */
447 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
), /* caseful_local_part */
450 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
), /* caselower_local_part */
452 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
), /* enforce_sync */
454 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
), /* no_enforce_sync */
457 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)| /* freeze */
458 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA
)|
459 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME
)),
462 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)| /* queue_only */
463 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA
)|
464 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME
)),
467 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)| /* submission */
468 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)),
470 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
472 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)| /* no_mbox_unspool */
473 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA
)|
474 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME
)),
478 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)| /* fakedefer */
479 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA
)|
480 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME
)),
483 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)| /* fakereject */
484 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA
)|
485 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME
)),
487 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
) /* no_multiline */
490 /* Structure listing various control arguments, with their characteristics. */
492 typedef struct control_def
{
494 int value
; /* CONTROL_xxx value */
495 BOOL has_option
; /* Has /option(s) following */
498 static control_def controls_list
[] = {
499 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
500 { US
"bmi_run", CONTROL_BMI_RUN
, FALSE
},
502 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
503 { US
"dk_verify", CONTROL_DK_VERIFY
, FALSE
},
505 { US
"caseful_local_part", CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART
, FALSE
},
506 { US
"caselower_local_part", CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART
, FALSE
},
507 { US
"enforce_sync", CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC
, FALSE
},
508 { US
"freeze", CONTROL_FREEZE
, FALSE
},
509 { US
"no_enforce_sync", CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC
, FALSE
},
510 { US
"no_multiline_responses", CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE
, FALSE
},
511 { US
"queue_only", CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY
, FALSE
},
512 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
513 { US
"no_mbox_unspool", CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL
, FALSE
},
515 { US
"fakedefer", CONTROL_FAKEDEFER
, TRUE
},
516 { US
"fakereject", CONTROL_FAKEREJECT
, TRUE
},
517 { US
"submission", CONTROL_SUBMISSION
, TRUE
}
520 /* Support data structures for Client SMTP Authorization. acl_verify_csa()
521 caches its result in a tree to avoid repeated DNS queries. The result is an
522 integer code which is used as an index into the following tables of
523 explanatory strings and verification return codes. */
525 static tree_node
*csa_cache
= NULL
;
527 enum { CSA_UNKNOWN
, CSA_OK
, CSA_DEFER_SRV
, CSA_DEFER_ADDR
,
528 CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT
, CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN
, CSA_FAIL_NOADDR
, CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH
};
530 /* The acl_verify_csa() return code is translated into an acl_verify() return
531 code using the following table. It is OK unless the client is definitely not
532 authorized. This is because CSA is supposed to be optional for sending sites,
533 so recipients should not be too strict about checking it - especially because
534 DNS problems are quite likely to occur. It's possible to use $csa_status in
535 further ACL conditions to distinguish ok, unknown, and defer if required, but
536 the aim is to make the usual configuration simple. */
538 static int csa_return_code
[] = {
540 FAIL
, FAIL
, FAIL
, FAIL
543 static uschar
*csa_status_string
[] = {
544 US
"unknown", US
"ok", US
"defer", US
"defer",
545 US
"fail", US
"fail", US
"fail", US
"fail"
548 static uschar
*csa_reason_string
[] = {
551 US
"deferred (SRV lookup failed)",
552 US
"deferred (target address lookup failed)",
553 US
"failed (explicit authorization required)",
554 US
"failed (host name not authorized)",
555 US
"failed (no authorized addresses)",
556 US
"failed (client address mismatch)"
559 /* Enable recursion between acl_check_internal() and acl_check_condition() */
561 static int acl_check_internal(int, address_item
*, uschar
*, int, uschar
**,
565 /*************************************************
566 * Pick out name from list *
567 *************************************************/
569 /* Use a binary chop method
576 Returns: offset in list, or -1 if not found
580 acl_checkname(uschar
*name
, uschar
**list
, int end
)
586 int mid
= (start
+ end
)/2;
587 int c
= Ustrcmp(name
, list
[mid
]);
588 if (c
== 0) return mid
;
589 if (c
< 0) end
= mid
; else start
= mid
+ 1;
596 /*************************************************
597 * Read and parse one ACL *
598 *************************************************/
600 /* This function is called both from readconf in order to parse the ACLs in the
601 configuration file, and also when an ACL is encountered dynamically (e.g. as
602 the result of an expansion). It is given a function to call in order to
603 retrieve the lines of the ACL. This function handles skipping comments and
604 blank lines (where relevant).
607 func function to get next line of ACL
608 error where to put an error message
610 Returns: pointer to ACL, or NULL
611 NULL can be legal (empty ACL); in this case error will be NULL
615 acl_read(uschar
*(*func
)(void), uschar
**error
)
617 acl_block
*yield
= NULL
;
618 acl_block
**lastp
= &yield
;
619 acl_block
*this = NULL
;
620 acl_condition_block
*cond
;
621 acl_condition_block
**condp
= NULL
;
626 while ((s
= (*func
)()) != NULL
)
629 BOOL negated
= FALSE
;
630 uschar
*saveline
= s
;
633 /* Conditions (but not verbs) are allowed to be negated by an initial
636 while (isspace(*s
)) s
++;
643 /* Read the name of a verb or a condition, or the start of a new ACL, which
644 can be started by a name, or by a macro definition. */
646 s
= readconf_readname(name
, sizeof(name
), s
);
647 if (*s
== ':' || isupper(name
[0] && *s
== '=')) return yield
;
649 /* If a verb is unrecognized, it may be another condition or modifier that
650 continues the previous verb. */
652 v
= acl_checkname(name
, verbs
, sizeof(verbs
)/sizeof(char *));
657 *error
= string_sprintf("unknown ACL verb in \"%s\"", saveline
);
668 *error
= string_sprintf("malformed ACL line \"%s\"", saveline
);
671 this = store_get(sizeof(acl_block
));
673 lastp
= &(this->next
);
676 this->condition
= NULL
;
677 condp
= &(this->condition
);
678 if (*s
== 0) continue; /* No condition on this line */
684 s
= readconf_readname(name
, sizeof(name
), s
); /* Condition name */
687 /* Handle a condition or modifier. */
689 c
= acl_checkname(name
, conditions
, sizeof(conditions
)/sizeof(char *));
692 *error
= string_sprintf("unknown ACL condition/modifier in \"%s\"",
697 /* The modifiers may not be negated */
699 if (negated
&& cond_modifiers
[c
])
701 *error
= string_sprintf("ACL error: negation is not allowed with "
702 "\"%s\"", conditions
[c
]);
706 /* ENDPASS may occur only with ACCEPT or DISCARD. */
708 if (c
== ACLC_ENDPASS
&&
709 this->verb
!= ACL_ACCEPT
&&
710 this->verb
!= ACL_DISCARD
)
712 *error
= string_sprintf("ACL error: \"%s\" is not allowed with \"%s\"",
713 conditions
[c
], verbs
[this->verb
]);
717 cond
= store_get(sizeof(acl_condition_block
));
720 cond
->u
.negated
= negated
;
723 condp
= &(cond
->next
);
725 /* The "set" modifier is different in that its argument is "name=value"
726 rather than just a value, and we can check the validity of the name, which
727 gives us a variable number to insert into the data block. */
731 if (Ustrncmp(s
, "acl_", 4) != 0 || (s
[4] != 'c' && s
[4] != 'm') ||
732 !isdigit(s
[5]) || (!isspace(s
[6]) && s
[6] != '='))
734 *error
= string_sprintf("unrecognized name after \"set\" in ACL "
735 "modifier \"set %s\"", s
);
739 cond
->u
.varnumber
= s
[5] - '0';
740 if (s
[4] == 'm') cond
->u
.varnumber
+= ACL_C_MAX
;
742 while (isspace(*s
)) s
++;
745 /* For "set", we are now positioned for the data. For the others, only
746 "endpass" has no data */
748 if (c
!= ACLC_ENDPASS
)
752 *error
= string_sprintf("\"=\" missing after ACL \"%s\" %s", name
,
753 cond_modifiers
[c
]? US
"modifier" : US
"condition");
756 while (isspace(*s
)) s
++;
757 cond
->arg
= string_copy(s
);
766 /*************************************************
768 *************************************************/
770 /* This function is called when a WARN verb's conditions are true. It adds to
771 the message's headers, and/or writes information to the log. In each case, this
772 only happens once (per message for headers, per connection for log).
775 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
776 user_message message for adding to headers
777 log_message message for logging, if different
783 acl_warn(int where
, uschar
*user_message
, uschar
*log_message
)
787 if (log_message
!= NULL
&& log_message
!= user_message
)
792 text
= string_sprintf("%s Warning: %s", host_and_ident(TRUE
),
793 string_printing(log_message
));
795 /* If a sender verification has failed, and the log message is "sender verify
796 failed", add the failure message. */
798 if (sender_verified_failed
!= NULL
&&
799 sender_verified_failed
->message
!= NULL
&&
800 strcmpic(log_message
, US
"sender verify failed") == 0)
801 text
= string_sprintf("%s: %s", text
, sender_verified_failed
->message
);
803 /* Search previously logged warnings. They are kept in malloc
804 store so they can be freed at the start of a new message. */
806 for (logged
= acl_warn_logged
; logged
!= NULL
; logged
= logged
->next
)
807 if (Ustrcmp(logged
->text
, text
) == 0) break;
811 int length
= Ustrlen(text
) + 1;
812 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN
, "%s", text
);
813 logged
= store_malloc(sizeof(string_item
) + length
);
814 logged
->text
= (uschar
*)logged
+ sizeof(string_item
);
815 memcpy(logged
->text
, text
, length
);
816 logged
->next
= acl_warn_logged
;
817 acl_warn_logged
= logged
;
821 /* If there's no user message, we are done. */
823 if (user_message
== NULL
) return;
825 /* If this isn't a message ACL, we can't do anything with a user message.
828 if (where
> ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)
830 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN
|LOG_PANIC
, "ACL \"warn\" with \"message\" setting "
831 "found in a non-message (%s) ACL: cannot specify header lines here: "
832 "message ignored", acl_wherenames
[where
]);
836 /* Treat the user message as a sequence of one or more header lines. */
838 hlen
= Ustrlen(user_message
);
841 uschar
*text
, *p
, *q
;
843 /* Add a final newline if not present */
845 text
= ((user_message
)[hlen
-1] == '\n')? user_message
:
846 string_sprintf("%s\n", user_message
);
848 /* Loop for multiple header lines, taking care about continuations */
850 for (p
= q
= text
; *p
!= 0; )
853 int newtype
= htype_add_bot
;
854 header_line
**hptr
= &acl_warn_headers
;
856 /* Find next header line within the string */
860 q
= Ustrchr(q
, '\n');
861 if (*(++q
) != ' ' && *q
!= '\t') break;
864 /* If the line starts with a colon, interpret the instruction for where to
865 add it. This temporarily sets up a new type. */
869 if (strncmpic(p
, US
":after_received:", 16) == 0)
871 newtype
= htype_add_rec
;
874 else if (strncmpic(p
, US
":at_start_rfc:", 14) == 0)
876 newtype
= htype_add_rfc
;
879 else if (strncmpic(p
, US
":at_start:", 10) == 0)
881 newtype
= htype_add_top
;
884 else if (strncmpic(p
, US
":at_end:", 8) == 0)
886 newtype
= htype_add_bot
;
889 while (*p
== ' ' || *p
== '\t') p
++;
892 /* See if this line starts with a header name, and if not, add X-ACL-Warn:
893 to the front of it. */
895 for (s
= p
; s
< q
- 1; s
++)
897 if (*s
== ':' || !isgraph(*s
)) break;
900 s
= string_sprintf("%s%.*s", (*s
== ':')? "" : "X-ACL-Warn: ", q
- p
, p
);
903 /* See if this line has already been added */
905 while (*hptr
!= NULL
)
907 if (Ustrncmp((*hptr
)->text
, s
, hlen
) == 0) break;
908 hptr
= &((*hptr
)->next
);
911 /* Add if not previously present */
915 header_line
*h
= store_get(sizeof(header_line
));
924 /* Advance for next header line within the string */
933 /*************************************************
934 * Verify and check reverse DNS *
935 *************************************************/
937 /* Called from acl_verify() below. We look up the host name(s) of the client IP
938 address if this has not yet been done. The host_name_lookup() function checks
939 that one of these names resolves to an address list that contains the client IP
940 address, so we don't actually have to do the check here.
943 user_msgptr pointer for user message
944 log_msgptr pointer for log message
946 Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
947 FAIL verification failed
948 DEFER there was a problem verifying
952 acl_verify_reverse(uschar
**user_msgptr
, uschar
**log_msgptr
)
956 user_msgptr
= user_msgptr
; /* stop compiler warning */
958 /* Previous success */
960 if (sender_host_name
!= NULL
) return OK
;
962 /* Previous failure */
964 if (host_lookup_failed
)
966 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("host lookup failed%s", host_lookup_msg
);
970 /* Need to do a lookup */
973 debug_printf("looking up host name to force name/address consistency check\n");
975 if ((rc
= host_name_lookup()) != OK
)
977 *log_msgptr
= (rc
== DEFER
)?
978 US
"host lookup deferred for reverse lookup check"
980 string_sprintf("host lookup failed for reverse lookup check%s",
982 return rc
; /* DEFER or FAIL */
985 host_build_sender_fullhost();
991 /*************************************************
992 * Check client IP address matches CSA target *
993 *************************************************/
995 /* Called from acl_verify_csa() below. This routine scans a section of a DNS
996 response for address records belonging to the CSA target hostname. The section
997 is specified by the reset argument, either RESET_ADDITIONAL or RESET_ANSWERS.
998 If one of the addresses matches the client's IP address, then the client is
999 authorized by CSA. If there are target IP addresses but none of them match
1000 then the client is using an unauthorized IP address. If there are no target IP
1001 addresses then the client cannot be using an authorized IP address. (This is
1002 an odd configuration - why didn't the SRV record have a weight of 1 instead?)
1005 dnsa the DNS answer block
1006 dnss a DNS scan block for us to use
1007 reset option specifing what portion to scan, as described above
1008 target the target hostname to use for matching RR names
1010 Returns: CSA_OK successfully authorized
1011 CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH addresses found but none matched
1012 CSA_FAIL_NOADDR no target addresses found
1016 acl_verify_csa_address(dns_answer
*dnsa
, dns_scan
*dnss
, int reset
,
1022 BOOL target_found
= FALSE
;
1024 for (rr
= dns_next_rr(dnsa
, dnss
, reset
);
1026 rr
= dns_next_rr(dnsa
, dnss
, RESET_NEXT
))
1028 /* Check this is an address RR for the target hostname. */
1032 && rr
->type
!= T_AAAA
1039 if (strcmpic(target
, rr
->name
) != 0) continue;
1041 target_found
= TRUE
;
1043 /* Turn the target address RR into a list of textual IP addresses and scan
1044 the list. There may be more than one if it is an A6 RR. */
1046 for (da
= dns_address_from_rr(dnsa
, rr
); da
!= NULL
; da
= da
->next
)
1048 /* If the client IP address matches the target IP address, it's good! */
1050 DEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("CSA target address is %s\n", da
->address
);
1052 if (strcmpic(sender_host_address
, da
->address
) == 0) return CSA_OK
;
1056 /* If we found some target addresses but none of them matched, the client is
1057 using an unauthorized IP address, otherwise the target has no authorized IP
1060 if (target_found
) return CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH
;
1061 else return CSA_FAIL_NOADDR
;
1066 /*************************************************
1067 * Verify Client SMTP Authorization *
1068 *************************************************/
1070 /* Called from acl_verify() below. This routine calls dns_lookup_special()
1071 to find the CSA SRV record corresponding to the domain argument, or
1072 $sender_helo_name if no argument is provided. It then checks that the
1073 client is authorized, and that its IP address corresponds to the SRV
1074 target's address by calling acl_verify_csa_address() above. The address
1075 should have been returned in the DNS response's ADDITIONAL section, but if
1076 not we perform another DNS lookup to get it.
1079 domain pointer to optional parameter following verify = csa
1081 Returns: CSA_UNKNOWN no valid CSA record found
1082 CSA_OK successfully authorized
1083 CSA_FAIL_* client is definitely not authorized
1084 CSA_DEFER_* there was a DNS problem
1088 acl_verify_csa(uschar
*domain
)
1092 int priority
, weight
, port
;
1099 /* Work out the domain we are using for the CSA lookup. The default is the
1100 client's HELO domain. If the client has not said HELO, use its IP address
1101 instead. If it's a local client (exim -bs), CSA isn't applicable. */
1103 while (isspace(*domain
) && *domain
!= '\0') ++domain
;
1104 if (*domain
== '\0') domain
= sender_helo_name
;
1105 if (domain
== NULL
) domain
= sender_host_address
;
1106 if (sender_host_address
== NULL
) return CSA_UNKNOWN
;
1108 /* If we have an address literal, strip off the framing ready for turning it
1109 into a domain. The framing consists of matched square brackets possibly
1110 containing a keyword and a colon before the actual IP address. */
1112 if (domain
[0] == '[')
1114 uschar
*start
= Ustrchr(domain
, ':');
1115 if (start
== NULL
) start
= domain
;
1116 domain
= string_copyn(start
+ 1, Ustrlen(start
) - 2);
1119 /* Turn domains that look like bare IP addresses into domains in the reverse
1120 DNS. This code also deals with address literals and $sender_host_address. It's
1121 not quite kosher to treat bare domains such as EHLO 192.0.2.57 the same as
1122 address literals, but it's probably the most friendly thing to do. This is an
1123 extension to CSA, so we allow it to be turned off for proper conformance. */
1125 if (string_is_ip_address(domain
, NULL
))
1127 if (!dns_csa_use_reverse
) return CSA_UNKNOWN
;
1128 dns_build_reverse(domain
, target
);
1132 /* Find out if we've already done the CSA check for this domain. If we have,
1133 return the same result again. Otherwise build a new cached result structure
1134 for this domain. The name is filled in now, and the value is filled in when
1135 we return from this function. */
1137 t
= tree_search(csa_cache
, domain
);
1138 if (t
!= NULL
) return t
->data
.val
;
1140 t
= store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node
) + Ustrlen(domain
));
1141 Ustrcpy(t
->name
, domain
);
1142 (void)tree_insertnode(&csa_cache
, t
);
1144 /* Now we are ready to do the actual DNS lookup(s). */
1146 switch (dns_special_lookup(&dnsa
, domain
, T_CSA
, &found
))
1148 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1151 return t
->data
.val
= CSA_DEFER_SRV
;
1153 /* If we found nothing, the client's authorization is unknown. */
1157 return t
->data
.val
= CSA_UNKNOWN
;
1159 /* We got something! Go on to look at the reply in more detail. */
1165 /* Scan the reply for well-formed CSA SRV records. */
1167 for (rr
= dns_next_rr(&dnsa
, &dnss
, RESET_ANSWERS
);
1169 rr
= dns_next_rr(&dnsa
, &dnss
, RESET_NEXT
))
1171 if (rr
->type
!= T_SRV
) continue;
1173 /* Extract the numerical SRV fields (p is incremented) */
1176 GETSHORT(priority
, p
);
1177 GETSHORT(weight
, p
);
1181 debug_printf("CSA priority=%d weight=%d port=%d\n", priority
, weight
, port
);
1183 /* Check the CSA version number */
1185 if (priority
!= 1) continue;
1187 /* If the domain does not have a CSA SRV record of its own (i.e. the domain
1188 found by dns_special_lookup() is a parent of the one we asked for), we check
1189 the subdomain assertions in the port field. At the moment there's only one
1190 assertion: legitimate SMTP clients are all explicitly authorized with CSA
1191 SRV records of their own. */
1193 if (found
!= domain
)
1196 return t
->data
.val
= CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT
;
1198 return t
->data
.val
= CSA_UNKNOWN
;
1201 /* This CSA SRV record refers directly to our domain, so we check the value
1202 in the weight field to work out the domain's authorization. 0 and 1 are
1203 unauthorized; 3 means the client is authorized but we can't check the IP
1204 address in order to authenticate it, so we treat it as unknown; values
1205 greater than 3 are undefined. */
1207 if (weight
< 2) return t
->data
.val
= CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN
;
1209 if (weight
> 2) continue;
1211 /* Weight == 2, which means the domain is authorized. We must check that the
1212 client's IP address is listed as one of the SRV target addresses. Save the
1213 target hostname then break to scan the additional data for its addresses. */
1215 (void)dn_expand(dnsa
.answer
, dnsa
.answer
+ dnsa
.answerlen
, p
,
1216 (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE
)target
, sizeof(target
));
1218 DEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("CSA target is %s\n", target
);
1223 /* If we didn't break the loop then no appropriate records were found. */
1225 if (rr
== NULL
) return t
->data
.val
= CSA_UNKNOWN
;
1227 /* Do not check addresses if the target is ".", in accordance with RFC 2782.
1228 A target of "." indicates there are no valid addresses, so the client cannot
1229 be authorized. (This is an odd configuration because weight=2 target=. is
1230 equivalent to weight=1, but we check for it in order to keep load off the
1231 root name servers.) Note that dn_expand() turns "." into "". */
1233 if (Ustrcmp(target
, "") == 0) return t
->data
.val
= CSA_FAIL_NOADDR
;
1235 /* Scan the additional section of the CSA SRV reply for addresses belonging
1236 to the target. If the name server didn't return any additional data (e.g.
1237 because it does not fully support SRV records), we need to do another lookup
1238 to obtain the target addresses; otherwise we have a definitive result. */
1240 rc
= acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa
, &dnss
, RESET_ADDITIONAL
, target
);
1241 if (rc
!= CSA_FAIL_NOADDR
) return t
->data
.val
= rc
;
1243 /* The DNS lookup type corresponds to the IP version used by the client. */
1246 if (Ustrchr(sender_host_address
, ':') != NULL
)
1249 #endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */
1253 #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
1257 switch (dns_lookup(&dnsa
, target
, type
, NULL
))
1259 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1262 return t
->data
.val
= CSA_DEFER_ADDR
;
1264 /* If the query succeeded, scan the addresses and return the result. */
1267 rc
= acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa
, &dnss
, RESET_ANSWERS
, target
);
1268 if (rc
!= CSA_FAIL_NOADDR
) return t
->data
.val
= rc
;
1269 /* else fall through */
1271 /* If the target has no IP addresses, the client cannot have an authorized
1272 IP address. However, if the target site uses A6 records (not AAAA records)
1273 we have to do yet another lookup in order to check them. */
1278 #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
1279 if (type
== T_AAAA
) { type
= T_A6
; goto DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN
; }
1282 return t
->data
.val
= CSA_FAIL_NOADDR
;
1288 /*************************************************
1289 * Handle verification (address & other) *
1290 *************************************************/
1292 /* This function implements the "verify" condition. It is called when
1293 encountered in any ACL, because some tests are almost always permitted. Some
1294 just don't make sense, and always fail (for example, an attempt to test a host
1295 lookup for a non-TCP/IP message). Others are restricted to certain ACLs.
1298 where where called from
1299 addr the recipient address that the ACL is handling, or NULL
1300 arg the argument of "verify"
1301 user_msgptr pointer for user message
1302 log_msgptr pointer for log message
1303 basic_errno where to put verify errno
1305 Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
1306 FAIL verification failed
1307 DEFER there was a problem verifying
1312 acl_verify(int where
, address_item
*addr
, uschar
*arg
,
1313 uschar
**user_msgptr
, uschar
**log_msgptr
, int *basic_errno
)
1317 int callout_overall
= -1;
1318 int callout_connect
= -1;
1319 int verify_options
= 0;
1321 BOOL verify_header_sender
= FALSE
;
1322 BOOL defer_ok
= FALSE
;
1323 BOOL callout_defer_ok
= FALSE
;
1324 BOOL no_details
= FALSE
;
1325 address_item
*sender_vaddr
= NULL
;
1326 uschar
*verify_sender_address
= NULL
;
1327 uschar
*pm_mailfrom
= NULL
;
1328 uschar
*se_mailfrom
= NULL
;
1330 /* Some of the verify items have slash-separated options; some do not. Diagnose
1331 an error if options are given for items that don't expect them. This code has
1332 now got very message. Refactoring to use a table would be a good idea one day.
1335 uschar
*slash
= Ustrchr(arg
, '/');
1337 uschar
*ss
= string_nextinlist(&list
, &sep
, big_buffer
, big_buffer_size
);
1339 if (ss
== NULL
) goto BAD_VERIFY
;
1341 /* Handle name/address consistency verification in a separate function. */
1343 if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"reverse_host_lookup") == 0)
1345 if (slash
!= NULL
) goto NO_OPTIONS
;
1346 if (sender_host_address
== NULL
) return OK
;
1347 return acl_verify_reverse(user_msgptr
, log_msgptr
);
1350 /* TLS certificate verification is done at STARTTLS time; here we just
1351 test whether it was successful or not. (This is for optional verification; for
1352 mandatory verification, the connection doesn't last this long.) */
1354 if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"certificate") == 0)
1356 if (slash
!= NULL
) goto NO_OPTIONS
;
1357 if (tls_certificate_verified
) return OK
;
1358 *user_msgptr
= US
"no verified certificate";
1362 /* We can test the result of optional HELO verification */
1364 if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"helo") == 0)
1366 if (slash
!= NULL
) goto NO_OPTIONS
;
1367 return helo_verified
? OK
: FAIL
;
1370 /* Do Client SMTP Authorization checks in a separate function, and turn the
1371 result code into user-friendly strings. */
1373 if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"csa") == 0)
1375 rc
= acl_verify_csa(list
);
1376 *log_msgptr
= *user_msgptr
= string_sprintf("client SMTP authorization %s",
1377 csa_reason_string
[rc
]);
1378 csa_status
= csa_status_string
[rc
];
1379 DEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("CSA result %s\n", csa_status
);
1380 return csa_return_code
[rc
];
1383 /* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct syntax. If there is
1384 a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to
1385 send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as
1388 if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"header_syntax") == 0)
1390 if (slash
!= NULL
) goto NO_OPTIONS
;
1391 if (where
!= ACL_WHERE_DATA
&& where
!= ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)
1393 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s "
1394 "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames
[where
]);
1397 rc
= verify_check_headers(log_msgptr
);
1398 if (rc
!= OK
&& smtp_return_error_details
&& *log_msgptr
!= NULL
)
1399 *user_msgptr
= string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr
);
1404 /* The remaining verification tests check recipient and sender addresses,
1405 either from the envelope or from the header. There are a number of
1406 slash-separated options that are common to all of them. */
1409 /* Check that there is at least one verifiable sender address in the relevant
1410 header lines. This can be followed by callout and defer options, just like
1411 sender and recipient. */
1413 if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"header_sender") == 0)
1415 if (where
!= ACL_WHERE_DATA
&& where
!= ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)
1417 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s "
1418 "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames
[where
]);
1421 verify_header_sender
= TRUE
;
1424 /* Otherwise, first item in verify argument must be "sender" or "recipient".
1425 In the case of a sender, this can optionally be followed by an address to use
1426 in place of the actual sender (rare special-case requirement). */
1428 else if (strncmpic(ss
, US
"sender", 6) == 0)
1431 if (where
> ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
)
1433 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("cannot verify sender in ACL for %s "
1434 "(only possible for MAIL, RCPT, PREDATA, or DATA)",
1435 acl_wherenames
[where
]);
1439 verify_sender_address
= sender_address
;
1442 while (isspace(*s
)) s
++;
1443 if (*s
++ != '=') goto BAD_VERIFY
;
1444 while (isspace(*s
)) s
++;
1445 verify_sender_address
= string_copy(s
);
1450 if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"recipient") != 0) goto BAD_VERIFY
;
1453 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("cannot verify recipient in ACL for %s "
1454 "(only possible for RCPT)", acl_wherenames
[where
]);
1459 /* Remaining items are optional; they apply to sender and recipient
1460 verification, including "header sender" verification. */
1462 while ((ss
= string_nextinlist(&list
, &sep
, big_buffer
, big_buffer_size
))
1465 if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"defer_ok") == 0) defer_ok
= TRUE
;
1466 else if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"no_details") == 0) no_details
= TRUE
;
1468 /* These two old options are left for backwards compatibility */
1470 else if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"callout_defer_ok") == 0)
1472 callout_defer_ok
= TRUE
;
1473 if (callout
== -1) callout
= CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT
;
1476 else if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"check_postmaster") == 0)
1479 if (callout
== -1) callout
= CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT
;
1482 /* The callout option has a number of sub-options, comma separated */
1484 else if (strncmpic(ss
, US
"callout", 7) == 0)
1486 callout
= CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT
;
1490 while (isspace(*ss
)) ss
++;
1496 while (isspace(*ss
)) ss
++;
1498 /* This callout option handling code has become a mess as new options
1499 have been added in an ad hoc manner. It should be tidied up into some
1500 kind of table-driven thing. */
1502 while ((opt
= string_nextinlist(&ss
, &optsep
, buffer
, sizeof(buffer
)))
1505 if (strcmpic(opt
, US
"defer_ok") == 0) callout_defer_ok
= TRUE
;
1506 else if (strcmpic(opt
, US
"no_cache") == 0)
1507 verify_options
|= vopt_callout_no_cache
;
1508 else if (strcmpic(opt
, US
"random") == 0)
1509 verify_options
|= vopt_callout_random
;
1510 else if (strcmpic(opt
, US
"use_sender") == 0)
1511 verify_options
|= vopt_callout_recipsender
;
1512 else if (strcmpic(opt
, US
"use_postmaster") == 0)
1513 verify_options
|= vopt_callout_recippmaster
;
1514 else if (strcmpic(opt
, US
"postmaster") == 0) pm_mailfrom
= US
"";
1515 else if (strcmpic(opt
, US
"fullpostmaster") == 0)
1518 verify_options
|= vopt_callout_fullpm
;
1521 else if (strncmpic(opt
, US
"mailfrom", 8) == 0)
1523 if (!verify_header_sender
)
1525 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("\"mailfrom\" is allowed as a "
1526 "callout option only for verify=header_sender (detected in ACL "
1527 "condition \"%s\")", arg
);
1531 while (isspace(*opt
)) opt
++;
1534 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1535 "\"mailfrom\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg
);
1538 while (isspace(*opt
)) opt
++;
1539 se_mailfrom
= string_copy(opt
);
1542 else if (strncmpic(opt
, US
"postmaster_mailfrom", 19) == 0)
1545 while (isspace(*opt
)) opt
++;
1548 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1549 "\"postmaster_mailfrom\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg
);
1552 while (isspace(*opt
)) opt
++;
1553 pm_mailfrom
= string_copy(opt
);
1556 else if (strncmpic(opt
, US
"maxwait", 7) == 0)
1559 while (isspace(*opt
)) opt
++;
1562 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"maxwait\" in "
1563 "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg
);
1566 while (isspace(*opt
)) opt
++;
1567 callout_overall
= readconf_readtime(opt
, 0, FALSE
);
1568 if (callout_overall
< 0)
1570 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1571 "\"verify %s\"", arg
);
1575 else if (strncmpic(opt
, US
"connect", 7) == 0)
1578 while (isspace(*opt
)) opt
++;
1581 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1582 "\"callout_overaall\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg
);
1585 while (isspace(*opt
)) opt
++;
1586 callout_connect
= readconf_readtime(opt
, 0, FALSE
);
1587 if (callout_connect
< 0)
1589 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1590 "\"verify %s\"", arg
);
1594 else /* Plain time is callout connect/command timeout */
1596 callout
= readconf_readtime(opt
, 0, FALSE
);
1599 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1600 "\"verify %s\"", arg
);
1608 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"callout\" in "
1609 "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg
);
1615 /* Option not recognized */
1619 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("unknown option \"%s\" in ACL "
1620 "condition \"verify %s\"", ss
, arg
);
1625 if ((verify_options
& (vopt_callout_recipsender
|vopt_callout_recippmaster
)) ==
1626 (vopt_callout_recipsender
|vopt_callout_recippmaster
))
1628 *log_msgptr
= US
"only one of use_sender and use_postmaster can be set "
1629 "for a recipient callout";
1633 /* Handle sender-in-header verification. Default the user message to the log
1634 message if giving out verification details. */
1636 if (verify_header_sender
)
1639 rc
= verify_check_header_address(user_msgptr
, log_msgptr
, callout
,
1640 callout_overall
, callout_connect
, se_mailfrom
, pm_mailfrom
, verify_options
,
1644 *basic_errno
= verrno
;
1645 if (smtp_return_error_details
)
1647 if (*user_msgptr
== NULL
&& *log_msgptr
!= NULL
)
1648 *user_msgptr
= string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr
);
1649 if (rc
== DEFER
) acl_temp_details
= TRUE
;
1654 /* Handle a sender address. The default is to verify *the* sender address, but
1655 optionally a different address can be given, for special requirements. If the
1656 address is empty, we are dealing with a bounce message that has no sender, so
1657 we cannot do any checking. If the real sender address gets rewritten during
1658 verification (e.g. DNS widening), set the flag to stop it being rewritten again
1659 during message reception.
1661 A list of verified "sender" addresses is kept to try to avoid doing to much
1662 work repetitively when there are multiple recipients in a message and they all
1663 require sender verification. However, when callouts are involved, it gets too
1664 complicated because different recipients may require different callout options.
1665 Therefore, we always do a full sender verify when any kind of callout is
1666 specified. Caching elsewhere, for instance in the DNS resolver and in the
1667 callout handling, should ensure that this is not terribly inefficient. */
1669 else if (verify_sender_address
!= NULL
)
1671 if ((verify_options
& (vopt_callout_recipsender
|vopt_callout_recippmaster
))
1674 *log_msgptr
= US
"use_sender or use_postmaster cannot be used for a "
1675 "sender verify callout";
1679 sender_vaddr
= verify_checked_sender(verify_sender_address
);
1680 if (sender_vaddr
!= NULL
&& /* Previously checked */
1681 callout
<= 0) /* No callout needed this time */
1683 /* If the "routed" flag is set, it means that routing worked before, so
1684 this check can give OK (the saved return code value, if set, belongs to a
1685 callout that was done previously). If the "routed" flag is not set, routing
1686 must have failed, so we use the saved return code. */
1688 if (testflag(sender_vaddr
, af_verify_routed
)) rc
= OK
; else
1690 rc
= sender_vaddr
->special_action
;
1691 *basic_errno
= sender_vaddr
->basic_errno
;
1693 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("using cached sender verify result\n");
1696 /* Do a new verification, and cache the result. The cache is used to avoid
1697 verifying the sender multiple times for multiple RCPTs when callouts are not
1698 specified (see comments above).
1700 The cache is also used on failure to give details in response to the first
1701 RCPT that gets bounced for this reason. However, this can be suppressed by
1702 the no_details option, which sets the flag that says "this detail has already
1703 been sent". The cache normally contains just one address, but there may be
1704 more in esoteric circumstances. */
1709 uschar
*save_address_data
= deliver_address_data
;
1711 sender_vaddr
= deliver_make_addr(verify_sender_address
, TRUE
);
1712 if (no_details
) setflag(sender_vaddr
, af_sverify_told
);
1713 if (verify_sender_address
[0] != 0)
1715 /* If this is the real sender address, save the unrewritten version
1716 for use later in receive. Otherwise, set a flag so that rewriting the
1717 sender in verify_address() does not update sender_address. */
1719 if (verify_sender_address
== sender_address
)
1720 sender_address_unrewritten
= sender_address
;
1722 verify_options
|= vopt_fake_sender
;
1724 /* The recipient, qualify, and expn options are never set in
1727 rc
= verify_address(sender_vaddr
, NULL
, verify_options
, callout
,
1728 callout_overall
, callout_connect
, se_mailfrom
, pm_mailfrom
, &routed
);
1730 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
1734 if (Ustrcmp(sender_vaddr
->address
, verify_sender_address
) != 0)
1736 DEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("sender %s verified ok as %s\n",
1737 verify_sender_address
, sender_vaddr
->address
);
1741 DEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("sender %s verified ok\n",
1742 verify_sender_address
);
1745 else *basic_errno
= sender_vaddr
->basic_errno
;
1747 else rc
= OK
; /* Null sender */
1749 /* Cache the result code */
1751 if (routed
) setflag(sender_vaddr
, af_verify_routed
);
1752 if (callout
> 0) setflag(sender_vaddr
, af_verify_callout
);
1753 sender_vaddr
->special_action
= rc
;
1754 sender_vaddr
->next
= sender_verified_list
;
1755 sender_verified_list
= sender_vaddr
;
1757 /* Restore the recipient address data, which might have been clobbered by
1758 the sender verification. */
1760 deliver_address_data
= save_address_data
;
1763 /* Put the sender address_data value into $sender_address_data */
1765 sender_address_data
= sender_vaddr
->p
.address_data
;
1768 /* A recipient address just gets a straightforward verify; again we must handle
1769 the DEFER overrides. */
1775 /* We must use a copy of the address for verification, because it might
1779 rc
= verify_address(&addr2
, NULL
, verify_options
|vopt_is_recipient
, callout
,
1780 callout_overall
, callout_connect
, se_mailfrom
, pm_mailfrom
, NULL
);
1781 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
1783 *log_msgptr
= addr2
.message
;
1784 *user_msgptr
= (addr2
.user_message
!= NULL
)?
1785 addr2
.user_message
: addr2
.message
;
1786 *basic_errno
= addr2
.basic_errno
;
1788 /* Make $address_data visible */
1789 deliver_address_data
= addr2
.p
.address_data
;
1792 /* We have a result from the relevant test. Handle defer overrides first. */
1794 if (rc
== DEFER
&& (defer_ok
||
1795 (callout_defer_ok
&& *basic_errno
== ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER
)))
1797 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("verify defer overridden by %s\n",
1798 defer_ok
? "defer_ok" : "callout_defer_ok");
1802 /* If we've failed a sender, set up a recipient message, and point
1803 sender_verified_failed to the address item that actually failed. */
1805 if (rc
!= OK
&& verify_sender_address
!= NULL
)
1809 *log_msgptr
= *user_msgptr
= US
"Sender verify failed";
1811 else if (*basic_errno
!= ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER
)
1813 *log_msgptr
= *user_msgptr
= US
"Could not complete sender verify";
1817 *log_msgptr
= US
"Could not complete sender verify callout";
1818 *user_msgptr
= smtp_return_error_details
? sender_vaddr
->user_message
:
1822 sender_verified_failed
= sender_vaddr
;
1825 /* Verifying an address messes up the values of $domain and $local_part,
1826 so reset them before returning if this is a RCPT ACL. */
1830 deliver_domain
= addr
->domain
;
1831 deliver_localpart
= addr
->local_part
;
1835 /* Syntax errors in the verify argument come here. */
1838 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("expected \"sender[=address]\", \"recipient\", "
1839 "\"helo\", \"header_syntax\", \"header_sender\" or "
1840 "\"reverse_host_lookup\" at start of ACL condition "
1841 "\"verify %s\"", arg
);
1844 /* Options supplied when not allowed come here */
1847 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("unexpected '/' found in \"%s\" "
1848 "(this verify item has no options)", arg
);
1855 /*************************************************
1856 * Check argument for control= modifier *
1857 *************************************************/
1859 /* Called from acl_check_condition() below
1862 arg the argument string for control=
1863 pptr set to point to the terminating character
1864 where which ACL we are in
1865 log_msgptr for error messages
1867 Returns: CONTROL_xxx value
1871 decode_control(uschar
*arg
, uschar
**pptr
, int where
, uschar
**log_msgptr
)
1876 for (d
= controls_list
;
1877 d
< controls_list
+ sizeof(controls_list
)/sizeof(control_def
);
1880 len
= Ustrlen(d
->name
);
1881 if (Ustrncmp(d
->name
, arg
, len
) == 0) break;
1884 if (d
>= controls_list
+ sizeof(controls_list
)/sizeof(control_def
) ||
1885 (arg
[len
] != 0 && (!d
->has_option
|| arg
[len
] != '/')))
1887 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg
);
1888 return CONTROL_ERROR
;
1897 /*************************************************
1898 * Handle rate limiting *
1899 *************************************************/
1901 /* Called by acl_check_condition() below to calculate the result
1902 of the ACL ratelimit condition.
1904 Note that the return value might be slightly unexpected: if the
1905 sender's rate is above the limit then the result is OK. This is
1906 similar to the dnslists condition, and is so that you can write
1907 ACL clauses like: defer ratelimit = 15 / 1h
1910 arg the option string for ratelimit=
1911 log_msgptr for error messages
1913 Returns: OK - Sender's rate is above limit
1914 FAIL - Sender's rate is below limit
1915 DEFER - Problem opening ratelimit database
1916 ERROR - Syntax error in options.
1920 acl_ratelimit(uschar
*arg
, uschar
**log_msgptr
)
1922 double limit
, period
;
1923 uschar
*ss
, *key
= arg
;
1925 BOOL have_key
= FALSE
, leaky
= FALSE
, strict
= FALSE
;
1926 BOOL per_byte
= FALSE
, per_cmd
= FALSE
, per_conn
= FALSE
, per_mail
= FALSE
;
1928 tree_node
**anchor
, *t
;
1929 open_db dbblock
, *dbm
;
1930 dbdata_ratelimit
*dbd
;
1933 /* Parse the first two options and record their values in expansion
1934 variables. These variables allow the configuration to have informative
1935 error messages based on rate limits obtained from a table lookup. */
1937 /* First is the maximum number of messages per period and maximum burst
1938 size, which must be greater than or equal to zero. Zero is useful for
1939 rate measurement as opposed to rate limiting. */
1941 sender_rate_limit
= string_nextinlist(&arg
, &sep
, NULL
, 0);
1942 if (sender_rate_limit
== NULL
)
1946 limit
= Ustrtod(sender_rate_limit
, &ss
);
1947 if (tolower(*ss
) == 'k') { limit
*= 1024.0; ss
++; }
1948 else if (tolower(*ss
) == 'm') { limit
*= 1024.0*1024.0; ss
++; }
1949 else if (tolower(*ss
) == 'g') { limit
*= 1024.0*1024.0*1024.0; ss
++; }
1951 if (limit
< 0.0 || *ss
!= 0)
1953 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for "
1954 "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a positive number",
1959 /* Second is the rate measurement period and exponential smoothing time
1960 constant. This must be strictly greater than zero, because zero leads to
1961 run-time division errors. */
1963 sender_rate_period
= string_nextinlist(&arg
, &sep
, NULL
, 0);
1964 if (sender_rate_period
== NULL
) period
= -1.0;
1965 else period
= readconf_readtime(sender_rate_period
, 0, FALSE
);
1968 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for "
1969 "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a time value",
1970 sender_rate_period
);
1974 /* Parse the other options. Should we check if the per_* options are being
1975 used in ACLs where they don't make sense, e.g. per_mail in the connect ACL? */
1977 while ((ss
= string_nextinlist(&arg
, &sep
, big_buffer
, big_buffer_size
))
1980 if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"leaky") == 0) leaky
= TRUE
;
1981 else if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"strict") == 0) strict
= TRUE
;
1982 else if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"per_byte") == 0) per_byte
= TRUE
;
1983 else if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"per_cmd") == 0) per_cmd
= TRUE
;
1984 else if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"per_conn") == 0) per_conn
= TRUE
;
1985 else if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"per_mail") == 0) per_mail
= TRUE
;
1986 else if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"per_rcpt") == 0) per_cmd
= TRUE
; /* alias */
1987 else have_key
= TRUE
;
1989 if (leaky
+ strict
> 1 || per_byte
+ per_cmd
+ per_conn
+ per_mail
> 1)
1991 *log_msgptr
= US
"conflicting options for \"ratelimit\" condition";
1995 /* Default option values */
1996 if (!strict
) leaky
= TRUE
;
1997 if (!per_byte
&& !per_cmd
&& !per_conn
) per_mail
= TRUE
;
1999 /* We use the whole of the argument list as the lookup key, because it doesn't
2000 make sense to use the same stored data if any of the arguments are different.
2001 If there is no explicit key, use the sender_host_address. If there is no
2002 sender_host_address (e.g. -bs or acl_not_smtp) then we simply omit it. */
2004 if (!have_key
&& sender_host_address
!= NULL
)
2005 key
= string_sprintf("%s / %s", key
, sender_host_address
);
2007 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("ratelimit condition limit=%.0f period=%.0f key=%s\n",
2008 limit
, period
, key
);
2010 /* If we are dealing with rate limits per connection, per message, or per byte,
2011 see if we have already computed the rate by looking in the relevant tree. For
2012 per-connection rate limiting, store tree nodes and dbdata in the permanent pool
2013 so that they survive across resets. */
2016 old_pool
= store_pool
;
2020 anchor
= &ratelimiters_conn
;
2021 store_pool
= POOL_PERM
;
2023 if (per_mail
|| per_byte
)
2024 anchor
= &ratelimiters_mail
;
2026 if (anchor
!= NULL
&& (t
= tree_search(*anchor
, key
)) != NULL
)
2029 /* The following few lines duplicate some of the code below. */
2030 if (dbd
->rate
< limit
) rc
= FAIL
;
2032 store_pool
= old_pool
;
2033 sender_rate
= string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd
->rate
);
2035 debug_printf("ratelimit found pre-computed rate %s\n", sender_rate
);
2039 /* We aren't using a pre-computed rate, so get a previously recorded
2040 rate from the database, update it, and write it back. If there's no
2041 previous rate for this key, create one. */
2043 dbm
= dbfn_open(US
"ratelimit", O_RDWR
, &dbblock
, TRUE
);
2046 store_pool
= old_pool
;
2048 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("ratelimit database not available\n");
2049 *log_msgptr
= US
"ratelimit database not available";
2052 dbd
= dbfn_read(dbm
, key
);
2054 gettimeofday(&tv
, NULL
);
2058 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("ratelimit initializing new key's data\n");
2059 dbd
= store_get(sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit
));
2060 dbd
->time_stamp
= tv
.tv_sec
;
2061 dbd
->time_usec
= tv
.tv_usec
;
2066 /* The smoothed rate is computed using an exponentially weighted moving
2067 average adjusted for variable sampling intervals. The standard EWMA for
2068 a fixed sampling interval is: f'(t) = (1 - a) * f(t) + a * f'(t - 1)
2069 where f() is the measured value and f'() is the smoothed value.
2071 Old data decays out of the smoothed value exponentially, such that data n
2072 samples old is multiplied by a^n. The exponential decay time constant p
2073 is defined such that data p samples old is multiplied by 1/e, which means
2074 that a = exp(-1/p). We can maintain the same time constant for a variable
2075 sampling interval i by using a = exp(-i/p).
2077 The rate we are measuring is messages per period, suitable for directly
2078 comparing with the limit. The average rate between now and the previous
2079 message is period / interval, which we feed into the EWMA as the sample.
2081 It turns out that the number of messages required for the smoothed rate
2082 to reach the limit when they are sent in a burst is equal to the limit.
2083 This can be seen by analysing the value of the smoothed rate after N
2084 messages sent at even intervals. Let k = (1 - a) * p/i
2086 rate_1 = (1 - a) * p/i + a * rate_0
2088 rate_2 = k + a * rate_1
2089 = k + a * k + a^2 * rate_0
2090 rate_3 = k + a * k + a^2 * k + a^3 * rate_0
2091 rate_N = rate_0 * a^N + k * SUM(x=0..N-1)(a^x)
2092 = rate_0 * a^N + k * (1 - a^N) / (1 - a)
2093 = rate_0 * a^N + p/i * (1 - a^N)
2095 When N is large, a^N -> 0 so rate_N -> p/i as desired.
2097 rate_N = p/i + (rate_0 - p/i) * a^N
2098 a^N = (rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i)
2099 N * -i/p = log((rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i))
2100 N = p/i * log((rate_0 - p/i) / (rate_N - p/i))
2102 Numerical analysis of the above equation, setting the computed rate to
2103 increase from rate_0 = 0 to rate_N = limit, shows that for large sending
2104 rates, p/i, the number of messages N = limit. So limit serves as both the
2105 maximum rate measured in messages per period, and the maximum number of
2106 messages that can be sent in a fast burst. */
2108 double this_time
= (double)tv
.tv_sec
2109 + (double)tv
.tv_usec
/ 1000000.0;
2110 double prev_time
= (double)dbd
->time_stamp
2111 + (double)dbd
->time_usec
/ 1000000.0;
2112 double interval
= this_time
- prev_time
;
2114 double i_over_p
= interval
/ period
;
2115 double a
= exp(-i_over_p
);
2117 /* We must avoid division by zero, and deal gracefully with the clock going
2118 backwards. If we blunder ahead when time is in reverse then the computed
2119 rate will become bogusly huge. Clamp i/p to a very small number instead. */
2121 if (i_over_p
<= 0.0) i_over_p
= 1e-9;
2123 dbd
->time_stamp
= tv
.tv_sec
;
2124 dbd
->time_usec
= tv
.tv_usec
;
2126 /* If we are measuring the rate in bytes per period, multiply the
2127 measured rate by the message size. If we don't know the message size
2128 then it's safe to just use a value of zero and let the recorded rate
2129 decay as if nothing happened. */
2132 dbd
->rate
= (message_size
< 0 ? 0.0 : (double)message_size
)
2133 * (1 - a
) / i_over_p
+ a
* dbd
->rate
;
2135 dbd
->rate
= (1 - a
) / i_over_p
+ a
* dbd
->rate
;
2138 /* Clients sending at the limit are considered to be over the limit. This
2139 matters for edge cases such the first message sent by a client (which gets
2140 the initial rate of 0.0) when the rate limit is zero (i.e. the client should
2141 be completely blocked). */
2143 if (dbd
->rate
< limit
) rc
= FAIL
;
2146 /* Update the state if the rate is low or if we are being strict. If we
2147 are in leaky mode and the sender's rate is too high, we do not update
2148 the recorded rate in order to avoid an over-aggressive sender's retry
2149 rate preventing them from getting any email through. */
2151 if (rc
== FAIL
|| !leaky
)
2152 dbfn_write(dbm
, key
, dbd
, sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit
));
2155 /* Store the result in the tree for future reference, if necessary. */
2159 t
= store_get(sizeof(tree_node
) + Ustrlen(key
));
2161 Ustrcpy(t
->name
, key
);
2162 (void)tree_insertnode(anchor
, t
);
2165 /* We create the formatted version of the sender's rate very late in
2166 order to ensure that it is done using the correct storage pool. */
2168 store_pool
= old_pool
;
2169 sender_rate
= string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd
->rate
);
2172 debug_printf("ratelimit computed rate %s\n", sender_rate
);
2179 /*************************************************
2180 * Handle conditions/modifiers on an ACL item *
2181 *************************************************/
2183 /* Called from acl_check() below.
2187 cb ACL condition block - if NULL, result is OK
2188 where where called from
2189 addr the address being checked for RCPT, or NULL
2190 level the nesting level
2191 epp pointer to pass back TRUE if "endpass" encountered
2192 (applies only to "accept" and "discard")
2193 user_msgptr user message pointer
2194 log_msgptr log message pointer
2195 basic_errno pointer to where to put verify error
2197 Returns: OK - all conditions are met
2198 DISCARD - an "acl" condition returned DISCARD - only allowed
2199 for "accept" or "discard" verbs
2200 FAIL - at least one condition fails
2201 FAIL_DROP - an "acl" condition returned FAIL_DROP
2202 DEFER - can't tell at the moment (typically, lookup defer,
2203 but can be temporary callout problem)
2204 ERROR - ERROR from nested ACL or expansion failure or other
2209 acl_check_condition(int verb
, acl_condition_block
*cb
, int where
,
2210 address_item
*addr
, int level
, BOOL
*epp
, uschar
**user_msgptr
,
2211 uschar
**log_msgptr
, int *basic_errno
)
2213 uschar
*user_message
= NULL
;
2214 uschar
*log_message
= NULL
;
2217 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2221 for (; cb
!= NULL
; cb
= cb
->next
)
2226 /* The message and log_message items set up messages to be used in
2227 case of rejection. They are expanded later. */
2229 if (cb
->type
== ACLC_MESSAGE
)
2231 user_message
= cb
->arg
;
2235 if (cb
->type
== ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE
)
2237 log_message
= cb
->arg
;
2241 /* The endpass "condition" just sets a flag to show it occurred. This is
2242 checked at compile time to be on an "accept" or "discard" item. */
2244 if (cb
->type
== ACLC_ENDPASS
)
2250 /* For other conditions and modifiers, the argument is expanded now for some
2251 of them, but not for all, because expansion happens down in some lower level
2252 checking functions in some cases. */
2254 if (cond_expand_at_top
[cb
->type
])
2256 arg
= expand_string(cb
->arg
);
2259 if (expand_string_forcedfail
) continue;
2260 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s",
2261 cb
->arg
, expand_string_message
);
2262 return search_find_defer
? DEFER
: ERROR
;
2267 /* Show condition, and expanded condition if it's different */
2272 debug_printf("check %s%s %n",
2273 (!cond_modifiers
[cb
->type
] && cb
->u
.negated
)? "!":"",
2274 conditions
[cb
->type
], &lhswidth
);
2276 if (cb
->type
== ACLC_SET
)
2278 int n
= cb
->u
.varnumber
;
2279 int t
= (n
< ACL_C_MAX
)? 'c' : 'm';
2280 if (n
>= ACL_C_MAX
) n
-= ACL_C_MAX
;
2281 debug_printf("acl_%c%d ", t
, n
);
2285 debug_printf("= %s\n", cb
->arg
);
2288 debug_printf("%.*s= %s\n", lhswidth
,
2292 /* Check that this condition makes sense at this time */
2294 if ((cond_forbids
[cb
->type
] & (1 << where
)) != 0)
2296 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("cannot %s %s condition in %s ACL",
2297 cond_modifiers
[cb
->type
]? "use" : "test",
2298 conditions
[cb
->type
], acl_wherenames
[where
]);
2302 /* Run the appropriate test for each condition, or take the appropriate
2303 action for the remaining modifiers. */
2307 /* A nested ACL that returns "discard" makes sense only for an "accept" or
2311 rc
= acl_check_internal(where
, addr
, arg
, level
+1, user_msgptr
, log_msgptr
);
2312 if (rc
== DISCARD
&& verb
!= ACL_ACCEPT
&& verb
!= ACL_DISCARD
)
2314 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("nested ACL returned \"discard\" for "
2315 "\"%s\" command (only allowed with \"accept\" or \"discard\")",
2321 case ACLC_AUTHENTICATED
:
2322 rc
= (sender_host_authenticated
== NULL
)? FAIL
:
2323 match_isinlist(sender_host_authenticated
, &arg
, 0, NULL
, NULL
, MCL_STRING
,
2327 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
2328 case ACLC_BMI_OPTIN
:
2330 int old_pool
= store_pool
;
2331 store_pool
= POOL_PERM
;
2332 bmi_current_optin
= string_copy(arg
);
2333 store_pool
= old_pool
;
2338 case ACLC_CONDITION
:
2339 if (Ustrspn(arg
, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg
)) /* Digits, or empty */
2340 rc
= (Uatoi(arg
) == 0)? FAIL
: OK
;
2342 rc
= (strcmpic(arg
, US
"no") == 0 ||
2343 strcmpic(arg
, US
"false") == 0)? FAIL
:
2344 (strcmpic(arg
, US
"yes") == 0 ||
2345 strcmpic(arg
, US
"true") == 0)? OK
: DEFER
;
2347 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("invalid \"condition\" value \"%s\"", arg
);
2351 control_type
= decode_control(arg
, &p
, where
, log_msgptr
);
2353 /* Check if this control makes sense at this time */
2355 if ((control_forbids
[control_type
] & (1 << where
)) != 0)
2357 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("cannot use \"control=%s\" in %s ACL",
2358 controls
[control_type
], acl_wherenames
[where
]);
2362 switch(control_type
)
2364 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
2365 case CONTROL_BMI_RUN
:
2369 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
2370 case CONTROL_DK_VERIFY
:
2377 case CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART
:
2378 deliver_localpart
= addr
->cc_local_part
;
2381 case CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART
:
2382 deliver_localpart
= addr
->lc_local_part
;
2385 case CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC
:
2386 smtp_enforce_sync
= TRUE
;
2389 case CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC
:
2390 smtp_enforce_sync
= FALSE
;
2393 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2394 case CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL
:
2395 no_mbox_unspool
= TRUE
;
2399 case CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE
:
2400 no_multiline_responses
= TRUE
;
2403 case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER
:
2404 case CONTROL_FAKEREJECT
:
2405 fake_response
= (control_type
== CONTROL_FAKEDEFER
) ? DEFER
: FAIL
;
2409 while (*pp
!= 0) pp
++;
2410 fake_response_text
= expand_string(string_copyn(p
+1, pp
-p
-1));
2415 /* Explicitly reset to default string */
2416 fake_response_text
= US
"Your message has been rejected but is being kept for evaluation.\nIf it was a legitimate message, it may still be delivered to the target recipient(s).";
2420 case CONTROL_FREEZE
:
2421 deliver_freeze
= TRUE
;
2422 deliver_frozen_at
= time(NULL
);
2425 case CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY
:
2426 queue_only_policy
= TRUE
;
2429 case CONTROL_SUBMISSION
:
2430 originator_name
= US
"";
2431 submission_mode
= TRUE
;
2434 if (Ustrncmp(p
, "/sender_retain", 14) == 0)
2437 active_local_sender_retain
= TRUE
;
2438 active_local_from_check
= FALSE
;
2440 else if (Ustrncmp(p
, "/domain=", 8) == 0)
2443 while (*pp
!= 0 && *pp
!= '/') pp
++;
2444 submission_domain
= string_copyn(p
+8, pp
-p
-8);
2447 else if (Ustrncmp(p
, "/name=", 6) == 0)
2450 while (*pp
!= 0 && *pp
!= '/') pp
++;
2451 originator_name
= string_copy(parse_fix_phrase(p
+6, pp
-p
-6,
2452 big_buffer
, big_buffer_size
));
2459 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg
);
2466 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2468 rc
= mime_decode(&arg
);
2474 int delay
= readconf_readtime(arg
, 0, FALSE
);
2477 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for \"delay\" "
2478 "modifier: \"%s\" is not a time value", arg
);
2483 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("delay modifier requests %d-second delay\n",
2488 debug_printf("delay skipped in -bh checking mode\n");
2491 /* It appears to be impossible to detect that a TCP/IP connection has
2492 gone away without reading from it. This means that we cannot shorten
2493 the delay below if the client goes away, because we cannot discover
2494 that the client has closed its end of the connection. (The connection
2495 is actually in a half-closed state, waiting for the server to close its
2496 end.) It would be nice to be able to detect this state, so that the
2497 Exim process is not held up unnecessarily. However, it seems that we
2498 can't. The poll() function does not do the right thing, and in any case
2499 it is not always available.
2501 NOTE: If ever this state of affairs changes, remember that we may be
2502 dealing with stdin/stdout here, in addition to TCP/IP connections.
2503 Whatever is done must work in both cases. To detected the stdin/stdout
2504 case, check for smtp_in or smtp_out being NULL. */
2508 while (delay
> 0) delay
= sleep(delay
);
2514 #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
2520 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
2521 case ACLC_DK_DOMAIN_SOURCE
:
2522 if (dk_verify_block
== NULL
) { rc
= FAIL
; break; };
2523 /* check header source of domain against given string */
2524 switch (dk_verify_block
->address_source
) {
2525 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_FROM_FROM
:
2526 rc
= match_isinlist(US
"from", &arg
, 0, NULL
,
2527 NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2529 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_FROM_SENDER
:
2530 rc
= match_isinlist(US
"sender", &arg
, 0, NULL
,
2531 NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2533 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_NONE
:
2534 rc
= match_isinlist(US
"none", &arg
, 0, NULL
,
2535 NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2539 case ACLC_DK_POLICY
:
2540 if (dk_verify_block
== NULL
) { rc
= FAIL
; break; };
2541 /* check policy against given string, default FAIL */
2543 if (dk_verify_block
->signsall
)
2544 rc
= match_isinlist(US
"signsall", &arg
, 0, NULL
,
2545 NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2546 if (dk_verify_block
->testing
)
2547 rc
= match_isinlist(US
"testing", &arg
, 0, NULL
,
2548 NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2550 case ACLC_DK_SENDER_DOMAINS
:
2551 if (dk_verify_block
== NULL
) { rc
= FAIL
; break; };
2552 if (dk_verify_block
->domain
!= NULL
)
2553 rc
= match_isinlist(dk_verify_block
->domain
, &arg
, 0, &domainlist_anchor
,
2554 NULL
, MCL_DOMAIN
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2557 case ACLC_DK_SENDER_LOCAL_PARTS
:
2558 if (dk_verify_block
== NULL
) { rc
= FAIL
; break; };
2559 if (dk_verify_block
->local_part
!= NULL
)
2560 rc
= match_isinlist(dk_verify_block
->local_part
, &arg
, 0, &localpartlist_anchor
,
2561 NULL
, MCL_LOCALPART
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2564 case ACLC_DK_SENDERS
:
2565 if (dk_verify_block
== NULL
) { rc
= FAIL
; break; };
2566 if (dk_verify_block
->address
!= NULL
)
2567 rc
= match_address_list(dk_verify_block
->address
, TRUE
, TRUE
, &arg
, NULL
, -1, 0, NULL
);
2570 case ACLC_DK_STATUS
:
2571 if (dk_verify_block
== NULL
) { rc
= FAIL
; break; };
2572 if (dk_verify_block
->result
> 0) {
2573 switch(dk_verify_block
->result
) {
2574 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_BAD_FORMAT
:
2575 rc
= match_isinlist(US
"bad format", &arg
, 0, NULL
,
2576 NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2578 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NO_KEY
:
2579 rc
= match_isinlist(US
"no key", &arg
, 0, NULL
,
2580 NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2582 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NO_SIGNATURE
:
2583 rc
= match_isinlist(US
"no signature", &arg
, 0, NULL
,
2584 NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2586 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_REVOKED
:
2587 rc
= match_isinlist(US
"revoked", &arg
, 0, NULL
,
2588 NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2590 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NON_PARTICIPANT
:
2591 rc
= match_isinlist(US
"non-participant", &arg
, 0, NULL
,
2592 NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2594 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_GOOD
:
2595 rc
= match_isinlist(US
"good", &arg
, 0, NULL
,
2596 NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2598 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_BAD
:
2599 rc
= match_isinlist(US
"bad", &arg
, 0, NULL
,
2600 NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2608 rc
= verify_check_dnsbl(&arg
);
2612 rc
= match_isinlist(addr
->domain
, &arg
, 0, &domainlist_anchor
,
2613 addr
->domain_cache
, MCL_DOMAIN
, TRUE
, &deliver_domain_data
);
2616 /* The value in tls_cipher is the full cipher name, for example,
2617 TLSv1:DES-CBC3-SHA:168, whereas the values to test for are just the
2618 cipher names such as DES-CBC3-SHA. But program defensively. We don't know
2619 what may in practice come out of the SSL library - which at the time of
2620 writing is poorly documented. */
2622 case ACLC_ENCRYPTED
:
2623 if (tls_cipher
== NULL
) rc
= FAIL
; else
2625 uschar
*endcipher
= NULL
;
2626 uschar
*cipher
= Ustrchr(tls_cipher
, ':');
2627 if (cipher
== NULL
) cipher
= tls_cipher
; else
2629 endcipher
= Ustrchr(++cipher
, ':');
2630 if (endcipher
!= NULL
) *endcipher
= 0;
2632 rc
= match_isinlist(cipher
, &arg
, 0, NULL
, NULL
, MCL_STRING
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2633 if (endcipher
!= NULL
) *endcipher
= ':';
2637 /* Use verify_check_this_host() instead of verify_check_host() so that
2638 we can pass over &host_data to catch any looked up data. Once it has been
2639 set, it retains its value so that it's still there if another ACL verb
2640 comes through here and uses the cache. However, we must put it into
2641 permanent store in case it is also expected to be used in a subsequent
2642 message in the same SMTP connection. */
2645 rc
= verify_check_this_host(&arg
, sender_host_cache
, NULL
,
2646 (sender_host_address
== NULL
)? US
"" : sender_host_address
, &host_data
);
2647 if (host_data
!= NULL
) host_data
= string_copy_malloc(host_data
);
2650 case ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS
:
2651 rc
= match_isinlist(addr
->cc_local_part
, &arg
, 0,
2652 &localpartlist_anchor
, addr
->localpart_cache
, MCL_LOCALPART
, TRUE
,
2653 &deliver_localpart_data
);
2665 if (Ustrncmp(s
, "main", 4) == 0)
2666 { logbits
|= LOG_MAIN
; s
+= 4; }
2667 else if (Ustrncmp(s
, "panic", 5) == 0)
2668 { logbits
|= LOG_PANIC
; s
+= 5; }
2669 else if (Ustrncmp(s
, "reject", 6) == 0)
2670 { logbits
|= LOG_REJECT
; s
+= 6; }
2673 logbits
= LOG_MAIN
|LOG_PANIC
;
2674 s
= string_sprintf(":unknown log name in \"%s\" in "
2675 "\"logwrite\" in %s ACL", arg
, acl_wherenames
[where
]);
2681 while (isspace(*s
)) s
++;
2682 if (logbits
== 0) logbits
= LOG_MAIN
;
2683 log_write(0, logbits
, "%s", string_printing(s
));
2687 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2690 /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
2691 uschar
*ss
= string_nextinlist(&arg
, &sep
, big_buffer
, big_buffer_size
);
2692 /* Run the malware backend. */
2694 /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
2695 while ((ss
= string_nextinlist(&arg
, &sep
, big_buffer
, big_buffer_size
))
2697 if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"defer_ok") == 0 && rc
== DEFER
)
2699 /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
2706 case ACLC_MIME_REGEX
:
2707 rc
= mime_regex(&arg
);
2711 case ACLC_RATELIMIT
:
2712 rc
= acl_ratelimit(arg
, log_msgptr
);
2715 case ACLC_RECIPIENTS
:
2716 rc
= match_address_list(addr
->address
, TRUE
, TRUE
, &arg
, NULL
, -1, 0,
2720 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2726 case ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS
:
2729 sdomain
= Ustrrchr(sender_address
, '@');
2730 sdomain
= (sdomain
== NULL
)? US
"" : sdomain
+ 1;
2731 rc
= match_isinlist(sdomain
, &arg
, 0, &domainlist_anchor
,
2732 sender_domain_cache
, MCL_DOMAIN
, TRUE
, NULL
);
2737 rc
= match_address_list(sender_address
, TRUE
, TRUE
, &arg
,
2738 sender_address_cache
, -1, 0, &sender_data
);
2741 /* Connection variables must persist forever */
2745 int old_pool
= store_pool
;
2746 if (cb
->u
.varnumber
< ACL_C_MAX
) store_pool
= POOL_PERM
;
2747 acl_var
[cb
->u
.varnumber
] = string_copy(arg
);
2748 store_pool
= old_pool
;
2752 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2755 /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
2756 uschar
*ss
= string_nextinlist(&arg
, &sep
, big_buffer
, big_buffer_size
);
2757 /* Run the spam backend. */
2759 /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
2760 while ((ss
= string_nextinlist(&arg
, &sep
, big_buffer
, big_buffer_size
))
2762 if (strcmpic(ss
, US
"defer_ok") == 0 && rc
== DEFER
)
2764 /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
2772 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
2774 rc
= spf_process(&arg
, sender_address
);
2778 /* If the verb is WARN, discard any user message from verification, because
2779 such messages are SMTP responses, not header additions. The latter come
2780 only from explicit "message" modifiers. However, put the user message into
2781 $acl_verify_message so it can be used in subsequent conditions or modifiers
2782 (until something changes it). */
2785 rc
= acl_verify(where
, addr
, arg
, user_msgptr
, log_msgptr
, basic_errno
);
2786 acl_verify_message
= *user_msgptr
;
2787 if (verb
== ACL_WARN
) *user_msgptr
= NULL
;
2791 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN
|LOG_PANIC_DIE
, "internal ACL error: unknown "
2792 "condition %d", cb
->type
);
2796 /* If a condition was negated, invert OK/FAIL. */
2798 if (!cond_modifiers
[cb
->type
] && cb
->u
.negated
)
2800 if (rc
== OK
) rc
= FAIL
;
2801 else if (rc
== FAIL
|| rc
== FAIL_DROP
) rc
= OK
;
2804 if (rc
!= OK
) break; /* Conditions loop */
2808 /* If the result is the one for which "message" and/or "log_message" are used,
2809 handle the values of these options. Most verbs have but a single return for
2810 which the messages are relevant, but for "discard", it's useful to have the log
2811 message both when it succeeds and when it fails. Also, for an "accept" that
2812 appears in a QUIT ACL, we want to handle the user message. Since only "accept"
2813 and "warn" are permitted in that ACL, we don't need to test the verb.
2815 These modifiers act in different ways:
2817 "message" is a user message that will be included in an SMTP response. Unless
2818 it is empty, it overrides any previously set user message.
2820 "log_message" is a non-user message, and it adds to any existing non-user
2821 message that is already set.
2823 If there isn't a log message set, we make it the same as the user message. */
2825 if (((rc
== FAIL_DROP
)? FAIL
: rc
) == msgcond
[verb
] ||
2826 (verb
== ACL_DISCARD
&& rc
== OK
) ||
2827 (where
== ACL_WHERE_QUIT
))
2831 /* If the verb is "warn", messages generated by conditions (verification or
2832 nested ACLs) are discarded. Only messages specified at this level are used.
2833 However, the value of an existing message is available in $acl_verify_message
2834 during expansions. */
2836 uschar
*old_user_msgptr
= *user_msgptr
;
2837 uschar
*old_log_msgptr
= (*log_msgptr
!= NULL
)? *log_msgptr
: old_user_msgptr
;
2839 if (verb
== ACL_WARN
) *log_msgptr
= *user_msgptr
= NULL
;
2841 if (user_message
!= NULL
)
2843 acl_verify_message
= old_user_msgptr
;
2844 expmessage
= expand_string(user_message
);
2845 if (expmessage
== NULL
)
2847 if (!expand_string_forcedfail
)
2848 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN
|LOG_PANIC
, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
2849 user_message
, expand_string_message
);
2851 else if (expmessage
[0] != 0) *user_msgptr
= expmessage
;
2854 if (log_message
!= NULL
)
2856 acl_verify_message
= old_log_msgptr
;
2857 expmessage
= expand_string(log_message
);
2858 if (expmessage
== NULL
)
2860 if (!expand_string_forcedfail
)
2861 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN
|LOG_PANIC
, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
2862 log_message
, expand_string_message
);
2864 else if (expmessage
[0] != 0)
2866 *log_msgptr
= (*log_msgptr
== NULL
)? expmessage
:
2867 string_sprintf("%s: %s", expmessage
, *log_msgptr
);
2871 /* If no log message, default it to the user message */
2873 if (*log_msgptr
== NULL
) *log_msgptr
= *user_msgptr
;
2876 acl_verify_message
= NULL
;
2884 /*************************************************
2885 * Get line from a literal ACL *
2886 *************************************************/
2888 /* This function is passed to acl_read() in order to extract individual lines
2889 of a literal ACL, which we access via static pointers. We can destroy the
2890 contents because this is called only once (the compiled ACL is remembered).
2892 This code is intended to treat the data in the same way as lines in the main
2893 Exim configuration file. That is:
2895 . Leading spaces are ignored.
2897 . A \ at the end of a line is a continuation - trailing spaces after the \
2898 are permitted (this is because I don't believe in making invisible things
2899 significant). Leading spaces on the continued part of a line are ignored.
2901 . Physical lines starting (significantly) with # are totally ignored, and
2902 may appear within a sequence of backslash-continued lines.
2904 . Blank lines are ignored, but will end a sequence of continuations.
2907 Returns: a pointer to the next line
2911 static uschar
*acl_text
; /* Current pointer in the text */
2912 static uschar
*acl_text_end
; /* Points one past the terminating '0' */
2920 /* This loop handles leading blank lines and comments. */
2924 while (isspace(*acl_text
)) acl_text
++; /* Leading spaces/empty lines */
2925 if (*acl_text
== 0) return NULL
; /* No more data */
2926 yield
= acl_text
; /* Potential data line */
2928 while (*acl_text
!= 0 && *acl_text
!= '\n') acl_text
++;
2930 /* If we hit the end before a newline, we have the whole logical line. If
2931 it's a comment, there's no more data to be given. Otherwise, yield it. */
2933 if (*acl_text
== 0) return (*yield
== '#')? NULL
: yield
;
2935 /* After reaching a newline, end this loop if the physical line does not
2936 start with '#'. If it does, it's a comment, and the loop continues. */
2938 if (*yield
!= '#') break;
2941 /* This loop handles continuations. We know we have some real data, ending in
2942 newline. See if there is a continuation marker at the end (ignoring trailing
2943 white space). We know that *yield is not white space, so no need to test for
2944 cont > yield in the backwards scanning loop. */
2949 for (cont
= acl_text
- 1; isspace(*cont
); cont
--);
2951 /* If no continuation follows, we are done. Mark the end of the line and
2960 /* We have encountered a continuation. Skip over whitespace at the start of
2961 the next line, and indeed the whole of the next line or lines if they are
2966 while (*(++acl_text
) == ' ' || *acl_text
== '\t');
2967 if (*acl_text
!= '#') break;
2968 while (*(++acl_text
) != 0 && *acl_text
!= '\n');
2971 /* We have the start of a continuation line. Move all the rest of the data
2972 to join onto the previous line, and then find its end. If the end is not a
2973 newline, we are done. Otherwise loop to look for another continuation. */
2975 memmove(cont
, acl_text
, acl_text_end
- acl_text
);
2976 acl_text_end
-= acl_text
- cont
;
2978 while (*acl_text
!= 0 && *acl_text
!= '\n') acl_text
++;
2979 if (*acl_text
== 0) return yield
;
2982 /* Control does not reach here */
2989 /*************************************************
2990 * Check access using an ACL *
2991 *************************************************/
2993 /* This function is called from address_check. It may recurse via
2994 acl_check_condition() - hence the use of a level to stop looping. The ACL is
2995 passed as a string which is expanded. A forced failure implies no access check
2996 is required. If the result is a single word, it is taken as the name of an ACL
2997 which is sought in the global ACL tree. Otherwise, it is taken as literal ACL
2998 text, complete with newlines, and parsed as such. In both cases, the ACL check
2999 is then run. This function uses an auxiliary function for acl_read() to call
3000 for reading individual lines of a literal ACL. This is acl_getline(), which
3001 appears immediately above.
3004 where where called from
3005 addr address item when called from RCPT; otherwise NULL
3006 s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
3007 level the nesting level
3008 user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
3009 log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
3011 Returns: OK access is granted
3012 DISCARD access is apparently granted...
3013 FAIL access is denied
3014 FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection
3015 DEFER can't tell at the moment
3020 acl_check_internal(int where
, address_item
*addr
, uschar
*s
, int level
,
3021 uschar
**user_msgptr
, uschar
**log_msgptr
)
3024 acl_block
*acl
= NULL
;
3025 uschar
*acl_name
= US
"inline ACL";
3028 /* Catch configuration loops */
3032 *log_msgptr
= US
"ACL nested too deep: possible loop";
3038 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("ACL is NULL: implicit DENY\n");
3042 /* At top level, we expand the incoming string. At lower levels, it has already
3043 been expanded as part of condition processing. */
3047 ss
= expand_string(s
);
3050 if (expand_string_forcedfail
) return OK
;
3051 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s", s
,
3052 expand_string_message
);
3058 while (isspace(*ss
))ss
++;
3060 /* If we can't find a named ACL, the default is to parse it as an inline one.
3061 (Unless it begins with a slash; non-existent files give rise to an error.) */
3065 /* Handle the case of a string that does not contain any spaces. Look for a
3066 named ACL among those read from the configuration, or a previously read file.
3067 It is possible that the pointer to the ACL is NULL if the configuration
3068 contains a name with no data. If not found, and the text begins with '/',
3069 read an ACL from a file, and save it so it can be re-used. */
3071 if (Ustrchr(ss
, ' ') == NULL
)
3073 tree_node
*t
= tree_search(acl_anchor
, ss
);
3076 acl
= (acl_block
*)(t
->data
.ptr
);
3079 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("ACL \"%s\" is empty: implicit DENY\n", ss
);
3082 acl_name
= string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss
);
3083 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("using ACL \"%s\"\n", ss
);
3086 else if (*ss
== '/')
3088 struct stat statbuf
;
3089 fd
= Uopen(ss
, O_RDONLY
, 0);
3092 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("failed to open ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss
,
3097 if (fstat(fd
, &statbuf
) != 0)
3099 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("failed to fstat ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss
,
3104 acl_text
= store_get(statbuf
.st_size
+ 1);
3105 acl_text_end
= acl_text
+ statbuf
.st_size
+ 1;
3107 if (read(fd
, acl_text
, statbuf
.st_size
) != statbuf
.st_size
)
3109 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("failed to read ACL file \"%s\": %s",
3110 ss
, strerror(errno
));
3113 acl_text
[statbuf
.st_size
] = 0;
3116 acl_name
= string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss
);
3117 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("read ACL from file %s\n", ss
);
3121 /* Parse an ACL that is still in text form. If it came from a file, remember it
3122 in the ACL tree, having read it into the POOL_PERM store pool so that it
3123 persists between multiple messages. */
3127 int old_pool
= store_pool
;
3128 if (fd
>= 0) store_pool
= POOL_PERM
;
3129 acl
= acl_read(acl_getline
, log_msgptr
);
3130 store_pool
= old_pool
;
3131 if (acl
== NULL
&& *log_msgptr
!= NULL
) return ERROR
;
3134 tree_node
*t
= store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node
) + Ustrlen(ss
));
3135 Ustrcpy(t
->name
, ss
);
3137 (void)tree_insertnode(&acl_anchor
, t
);
3141 /* Now we have an ACL to use. It's possible it may be NULL. */
3146 int basic_errno
= 0;
3147 BOOL endpass_seen
= FALSE
;
3149 *log_msgptr
= *user_msgptr
= NULL
;
3150 acl_temp_details
= FALSE
;
3152 if (where
== ACL_WHERE_QUIT
&&
3153 acl
->verb
!= ACL_ACCEPT
&&
3154 acl
->verb
!= ACL_WARN
)
3156 *log_msgptr
= string_sprintf("\"%s\" is not allowed in a QUIT ACL",
3161 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("processing \"%s\"\n", verbs
[acl
->verb
]);
3163 /* Clear out any search error message from a previous check before testing
3166 search_error_message
= NULL
;
3167 cond
= acl_check_condition(acl
->verb
, acl
->condition
, where
, addr
, level
,
3168 &endpass_seen
, user_msgptr
, log_msgptr
, &basic_errno
);
3170 /* Handle special returns: DEFER causes a return except on a WARN verb;
3171 ERROR always causes a return. */
3176 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("%s: condition test deferred\n", verbs
[acl
->verb
]);
3177 if (basic_errno
!= ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER
)
3179 if (search_error_message
!= NULL
&& *search_error_message
!= 0)
3180 *log_msgptr
= search_error_message
;
3181 if (smtp_return_error_details
) acl_temp_details
= TRUE
;
3185 acl_temp_details
= TRUE
;
3187 if (acl
->verb
!= ACL_WARN
) return DEFER
;
3190 default: /* Paranoia */
3192 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("%s: condition test error\n", verbs
[acl
->verb
]);
3196 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("%s: condition test succeeded\n",
3201 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("%s: condition test failed\n", verbs
[acl
->verb
]);
3204 /* DISCARD and DROP can happen only from a nested ACL condition, and
3205 DISCARD can happen only for an "accept" or "discard" verb. */
3208 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("%s: condition test yielded \"discard\"\n",
3213 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("%s: condition test yielded \"drop\"\n",
3218 /* At this point, cond for most verbs is either OK or FAIL or (as a result of
3219 a nested ACL condition) FAIL_DROP. However, for WARN, cond may be DEFER, and
3220 for ACCEPT and DISCARD, it may be DISCARD after a nested ACL call. */
3225 if (cond
== OK
|| cond
== DISCARD
) return cond
;
3228 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("accept: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
3236 acl_temp_details
= TRUE
;
3242 if (cond
== OK
) return FAIL
;
3246 if (cond
== OK
|| cond
== DISCARD
) return DISCARD
;
3249 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("discard: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
3255 if (cond
== OK
) return FAIL_DROP
;
3259 if (cond
!= OK
) return cond
;
3264 acl_warn(where
, *user_msgptr
, *log_msgptr
);
3265 else if (cond
== DEFER
)
3266 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN
, "%s Warning: ACL \"warn\" statement skipped: "
3267 "condition test deferred%s%s", host_and_ident(TRUE
),
3268 (*log_msgptr
== NULL
)? US
"" : US
": ",
3269 (*log_msgptr
== NULL
)? US
"" : *log_msgptr
);
3270 *log_msgptr
= *user_msgptr
= NULL
; /* In case implicit DENY follows */
3274 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN
|LOG_PANIC_DIE
, "internal ACL error: unknown verb %d",
3279 /* Pass to the next ACL item */
3284 /* We have reached the end of the ACL. This is an implicit DENY. */
3286 HDEBUG(D_acl
) debug_printf("end of %s: implicit DENY\n", acl_name
);
3291 /*************************************************
3292 * Check access using an ACL *
3293 *************************************************/
3295 /* This is the external interface for ACL checks. It sets up an address and the
3296 expansions for $domain and $local_part when called after RCPT, then calls
3297 acl_check_internal() to do the actual work.
3300 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating where called from
3301 data_string RCPT address, or SMTP command argument, or NULL
3302 s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
3303 user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
3304 log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
3306 Returns: OK access is granted by an ACCEPT verb
3307 DISCARD access is granted by a DISCARD verb
3308 FAIL access is denied
3309 FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection
3310 DEFER can't tell at the moment
3315 acl_check(int where
, uschar
*data_string
, uschar
*s
, uschar
**user_msgptr
,
3316 uschar
**log_msgptr
)
3322 *user_msgptr
= *log_msgptr
= NULL
;
3323 sender_verified_failed
= NULL
;
3325 if (where
== ACL_WHERE_RCPT
)
3327 adb
= address_defaults
;
3329 addr
->address
= data_string
;
3330 if (deliver_split_address(addr
) == DEFER
)
3332 *log_msgptr
= US
"defer in percent_hack_domains check";
3335 deliver_domain
= addr
->domain
;
3336 deliver_localpart
= addr
->local_part
;
3341 smtp_command_argument
= data_string
;
3344 rc
= acl_check_internal(where
, addr
, s
, 0, user_msgptr
, log_msgptr
);
3346 smtp_command_argument
= deliver_domain
=
3347 deliver_localpart
= deliver_address_data
= sender_address_data
= NULL
;
3349 /* A DISCARD response is permitted only for message ACLs, excluding the PREDATA
3350 ACL, which is really in the middle of an SMTP command. */
3354 if (where
> ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP
|| where
== ACL_WHERE_PREDATA
)
3356 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN
|LOG_PANIC
, "\"discard\" verb not allowed in %s "
3357 "ACL", acl_wherenames
[where
]);
3363 /* A DROP response is not permitted from MAILAUTH */
3365 if (rc
== FAIL_DROP
&& where
== ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH
)
3367 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN
|LOG_PANIC
, "\"drop\" verb not allowed in %s "
3368 "ACL", acl_wherenames
[where
]);
3372 /* Before giving an error response, take a look at the length of any user
3373 message, and split it up into multiple lines if possible. */
3375 if (rc
!= OK
&& *user_msgptr
!= NULL
&& Ustrlen(*user_msgptr
) > 75)
3377 uschar
*s
= *user_msgptr
= string_copy(*user_msgptr
);
3383 while (i
< 75 && *ss
!= 0 && *ss
!= '\n') ss
++, i
++;
3384 if (*ss
== 0) break;
3391 while (--t
> s
+ 35)
3395 if (t
[-1] == ':') { tt
= t
; break; }
3396 if (tt
== NULL
) tt
= t
;
3400 if (tt
== NULL
) /* Can't split behind - try ahead */
3405 if (*t
== ' ' || *t
== '\n')
3411 if (tt
== NULL
) break; /* Can't find anywhere to split */
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