Another ratelimit tweak. I didn't anticipate people using per_cmd
[exim.git] / src / src / acl.c
CommitLineData
fe0dab11 1/* $Cambridge: exim/src/src/acl.c,v 1.39 2005/06/10 19:27:05 fanf2 Exp $ */
059ec3d9
PH
2
3/*************************************************
4* Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
5*************************************************/
6
c988f1f4 7/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2005 */
059ec3d9
PH
8/* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
9
10/* Code for handling Access Control Lists (ACLs) */
11
12#include "exim.h"
13
14
15/* Default callout timeout */
16
17#define CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT 30
18
19/* ACL verb codes - keep in step with the table of verbs that follows */
20
21enum { ACL_ACCEPT, ACL_DEFER, ACL_DENY, ACL_DISCARD, ACL_DROP, ACL_REQUIRE,
22 ACL_WARN };
23
24/* ACL verbs */
25
26static uschar *verbs[] =
27 { US"accept", US"defer", US"deny", US"discard", US"drop", US"require",
28 US"warn" };
29
30/* For each verb, the condition for which "message" is used */
31
32static int msgcond[] = { FAIL, OK, OK, FAIL, OK, FAIL, OK };
33
34/* ACL condition and modifier codes - keep in step with the table that
35follows. */
36
8523533c
TK
37enum { ACLC_ACL, ACLC_AUTHENTICATED,
38#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
39 ACLC_BMI_OPTIN,
40#endif
41ACLC_CONDITION, ACLC_CONTROL,
42#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
43 ACLC_DECODE,
44#endif
45 ACLC_DELAY,
46#ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
47 ACLC_DEMIME,
8e669ac1 48#endif
fb2274d4
TK
49#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
50 ACLC_DK_DOMAIN_SOURCE,
51 ACLC_DK_POLICY,
52 ACLC_DK_SENDER_DOMAINS,
53 ACLC_DK_SENDER_LOCAL_PARTS,
54 ACLC_DK_SENDERS,
55 ACLC_DK_STATUS,
56#endif
8523533c
TK
57 ACLC_DNSLISTS, ACLC_DOMAINS, ACLC_ENCRYPTED, ACLC_ENDPASS,
58 ACLC_HOSTS, ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS, ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE, ACLC_LOGWRITE,
59#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
60 ACLC_MALWARE,
61#endif
62 ACLC_MESSAGE,
63#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
64 ACLC_MIME_REGEX,
65#endif
870f6ba8 66 ACLC_RATELIMIT,
8523533c
TK
67 ACLC_RECIPIENTS,
68#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
69 ACLC_REGEX,
70#endif
71 ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS, ACLC_SENDERS, ACLC_SET,
72#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
8e669ac1 73 ACLC_SPAM,
8523533c
TK
74#endif
75#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
76 ACLC_SPF,
77#endif
78 ACLC_VERIFY };
059ec3d9
PH
79
80/* ACL conditions/modifiers: "delay", "control", "endpass", "message",
81"log_message", "logwrite", and "set" are modifiers that look like conditions
82but always return TRUE. They are used for their side effects. */
83
8523533c
TK
84static uschar *conditions[] = { US"acl", US"authenticated",
85#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
86 US"bmi_optin",
87#endif
88 US"condition",
8e669ac1 89 US"control",
8523533c
TK
90#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
91 US"decode",
92#endif
93 US"delay",
94#ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
95 US"demime",
96#endif
fb2274d4 97#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
7f45268c
PH
98 US"dk_domain_source",
99 US"dk_policy",
100 US"dk_sender_domains",
101 US"dk_sender_local_parts",
102 US"dk_senders",
103 US"dk_status",
fb2274d4 104#endif
8523533c 105 US"dnslists", US"domains", US"encrypted",
059ec3d9 106 US"endpass", US"hosts", US"local_parts", US"log_message", US"logwrite",
8523533c
TK
107#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
108 US"malware",
109#endif
110 US"message",
111#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
112 US"mime_regex",
113#endif
870f6ba8 114 US"ratelimit",
8523533c
TK
115 US"recipients",
116#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
117 US"regex",
118#endif
119 US"sender_domains", US"senders", US"set",
120#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
121 US"spam",
122#endif
123#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
124 US"spf",
125#endif
059ec3d9 126 US"verify" };
8e669ac1 127
c5fcb476
PH
128/* ACL control names */
129
130static uschar *controls[] = { US"error", US"caseful_local_part",
131 US"caselower_local_part", US"enforce_sync", US"no_enforce_sync", US"freeze",
8e669ac1 132 US"queue_only", US"submission", US"no_multiline"};
059ec3d9
PH
133
134/* Flags to indicate for which conditions /modifiers a string expansion is done
135at the outer level. In the other cases, expansion already occurs in the
136checking functions. */
137
138static uschar cond_expand_at_top[] = {
139 TRUE, /* acl */
140 FALSE, /* authenticated */
8523533c
TK
141#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
142 TRUE, /* bmi_optin */
8e669ac1 143#endif
059ec3d9
PH
144 TRUE, /* condition */
145 TRUE, /* control */
8523533c
TK
146#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
147 TRUE, /* decode */
148#endif
059ec3d9 149 TRUE, /* delay */
8523533c
TK
150#ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
151 TRUE, /* demime */
152#endif
fb2274d4 153#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
7f45268c
PH
154 TRUE, /* dk_domain_source */
155 TRUE, /* dk_policy */
156 TRUE, /* dk_sender_domains */
e715ad22 157 TRUE, /* dk_sender_local_parts */
7f45268c
PH
158 TRUE, /* dk_senders */
159 TRUE, /* dk_status */
fb2274d4 160#endif
059ec3d9
PH
161 TRUE, /* dnslists */
162 FALSE, /* domains */
163 FALSE, /* encrypted */
164 TRUE, /* endpass */
165 FALSE, /* hosts */
166 FALSE, /* local_parts */
167 TRUE, /* log_message */
168 TRUE, /* logwrite */
8523533c
TK
169#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
170 TRUE, /* malware */
171#endif
059ec3d9 172 TRUE, /* message */
8523533c
TK
173#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
174 TRUE, /* mime_regex */
175#endif
870f6ba8 176 TRUE, /* ratelimit */
059ec3d9 177 FALSE, /* recipients */
8523533c
TK
178#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
179 TRUE, /* regex */
180#endif
059ec3d9
PH
181 FALSE, /* sender_domains */
182 FALSE, /* senders */
183 TRUE, /* set */
8523533c
TK
184#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
185 TRUE, /* spam */
186#endif
187#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
188 TRUE, /* spf */
189#endif
059ec3d9
PH
190 TRUE /* verify */
191};
192
193/* Flags to identify the modifiers */
194
195static uschar cond_modifiers[] = {
196 FALSE, /* acl */
197 FALSE, /* authenticated */
8523533c
TK
198#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
199 TRUE, /* bmi_optin */
8e669ac1 200#endif
059ec3d9
PH
201 FALSE, /* condition */
202 TRUE, /* control */
8523533c
TK
203#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
204 FALSE, /* decode */
205#endif
059ec3d9 206 TRUE, /* delay */
8523533c
TK
207#ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
208 FALSE, /* demime */
209#endif
fb2274d4 210#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
7f45268c
PH
211 FALSE, /* dk_domain_source */
212 FALSE, /* dk_policy */
213 FALSE, /* dk_sender_domains */
e715ad22 214 FALSE, /* dk_sender_local_parts */
7f45268c
PH
215 FALSE, /* dk_senders */
216 FALSE, /* dk_status */
fb2274d4 217#endif
059ec3d9
PH
218 FALSE, /* dnslists */
219 FALSE, /* domains */
220 FALSE, /* encrypted */
221 TRUE, /* endpass */
222 FALSE, /* hosts */
223 FALSE, /* local_parts */
224 TRUE, /* log_message */
8523533c
TK
225 TRUE, /* logwrite */
226#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
227 FALSE, /* malware */
228#endif
059ec3d9 229 TRUE, /* message */
8523533c
TK
230#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
231 FALSE, /* mime_regex */
232#endif
870f6ba8 233 FALSE, /* ratelimit */
059ec3d9 234 FALSE, /* recipients */
8523533c
TK
235#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
236 FALSE, /* regex */
237#endif
059ec3d9
PH
238 FALSE, /* sender_domains */
239 FALSE, /* senders */
240 TRUE, /* set */
8523533c
TK
241#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
242 FALSE, /* spam */
243#endif
244#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
245 FALSE, /* spf */
246#endif
059ec3d9
PH
247 FALSE /* verify */
248};
249
c5fcb476 250/* Bit map vector of which conditions are not allowed at certain times. For
2f079f46
PH
251each condition, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier
252to specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
059ec3d9
PH
253
254static unsigned int cond_forbids[] = {
255 0, /* acl */
8e669ac1 256
059ec3d9
PH
257 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* authenticated */
258 (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO),
8e669ac1 259
8523533c 260#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
3864bb8e 261 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* bmi_optin */
8523533c
TK
262 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
263 (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)|
8e669ac1 264 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
8523533c
TK
265 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
266 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
267 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA),
268#endif
8e669ac1 269
059ec3d9 270 0, /* condition */
8e669ac1 271
059ec3d9 272 /* Certain types of control are always allowed, so we let it through
2f079f46 273 always and check in the control processing itself. */
8e669ac1 274
059ec3d9 275 0, /* control */
8e669ac1 276
8523533c 277#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2f079f46
PH
278 (unsigned int)
279 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* decode */
8523533c
TK
280#endif
281
059ec3d9 282 0, /* delay */
8e669ac1 283
f7b63901 284#ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
2f079f46
PH
285 (unsigned int)
286 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* demime */
8523533c 287#endif
8e669ac1 288
fb2274d4 289#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
2f079f46 290 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_domain_source */
fb2274d4
TK
291 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
292 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
293 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
294 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
295 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
296 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
84330b7b 297
2f079f46 298 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_policy */
fb2274d4
TK
299 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
300 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
301 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
302 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
303 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
304 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
84330b7b 305
2f079f46 306 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_sender_domains */
fb2274d4
TK
307 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
308 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
309 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
310 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
311 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
312 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
84330b7b 313
2f079f46 314 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_sender_local_parts */
fb2274d4
TK
315 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
316 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
317 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
318 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
319 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
320 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
84330b7b 321
2f079f46 322 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_senders */
fb2274d4
TK
323 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
324 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
325 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
326 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
327 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
328 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
84330b7b 329
2f079f46 330 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_status */
fb2274d4
TK
331 (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
332 (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|
333 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
334 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
335 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|
336 (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
337#endif
338
059ec3d9
PH
339 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* dnslists */
340
2f079f46
PH
341 (unsigned int)
342 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* domains */
059ec3d9
PH
343
344 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* encrypted */
345 (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO),
8e669ac1 346
059ec3d9 347 0, /* endpass */
8e669ac1 348
059ec3d9
PH
349 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* hosts */
350
2f079f46
PH
351 (unsigned int)
352 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* local_parts */
059ec3d9
PH
353
354 0, /* log_message */
8e669ac1 355
059ec3d9 356 0, /* logwrite */
8e669ac1 357
8523533c 358#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2f079f46
PH
359 (unsigned int)
360 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* malware */
8523533c
TK
361#endif
362
059ec3d9
PH
363 0, /* message */
364
8523533c 365#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2f079f46
PH
366 (unsigned int)
367 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* mime_regex */
8523533c
TK
368#endif
369
870f6ba8
TF
370 0, /* ratelimit */
371
2f079f46
PH
372 (unsigned int)
373 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* recipients */
059ec3d9 374
8523533c 375#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2f079f46
PH
376 (unsigned int)
377 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* regex */
378 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
8523533c
TK
379#endif
380
059ec3d9
PH
381 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* sender_domains */
382 (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
383 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
384 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
385 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
386
387 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* senders */
388 (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
389 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)|
390 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
391 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
392
393 0, /* set */
394
8523533c 395#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2f079f46
PH
396 (unsigned int)
397 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* spam */
8523533c
TK
398#endif
399
400#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
401 (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* spf */
402 (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)|
403 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|
404 (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)|
405 (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY),
406#endif
407
059ec3d9
PH
408 /* Certain types of verify are always allowed, so we let it through
409 always and check in the verify function itself */
410
411 0 /* verify */
059ec3d9
PH
412};
413
414
415/* Return values from decode_control() */
416
8e669ac1 417enum {
8523533c
TK
418#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
419 CONTROL_BMI_RUN,
8e669ac1 420#endif
fb2274d4
TK
421#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
422 CONTROL_DK_VERIFY,
423#endif
8523533c 424 CONTROL_ERROR, CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART,
059ec3d9 425 CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, CONTROL_FREEZE,
8523533c
TK
426 CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY, CONTROL_SUBMISSION,
427#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
8e669ac1 428 CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL,
8523533c 429#endif
29aba418 430 CONTROL_FAKEDEFER, CONTROL_FAKEREJECT, CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE };
059ec3d9 431
c5fcb476
PH
432/* Bit map vector of which controls are not allowed at certain times. For
433each control, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier to
434specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
435
436static unsigned int control_forbids[] = {
8523533c
TK
437#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
438 0, /* bmi_run */
439#endif
fb2274d4 440#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
e715ad22 441 (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* dk_verify */
fb2274d4 442#endif
3e11c26b 443
c5fcb476 444 0, /* error */
8e669ac1
PH
445
446 (unsigned int)
c5fcb476 447 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* caseful_local_part */
8e669ac1
PH
448
449 (unsigned int)
c5fcb476 450 ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* caselower_local_part */
8e669ac1 451
c5fcb476 452 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* enforce_sync */
8e669ac1 453
c5fcb476 454 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* no_enforce_sync */
8e669ac1
PH
455
456 (unsigned int)
c5fcb476
PH
457 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* freeze */
458 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
e715ad22 459 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
8e669ac1
PH
460
461 (unsigned int)
c5fcb476
PH
462 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* queue_only */
463 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
e715ad22 464 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
8e669ac1
PH
465
466 (unsigned int)
c5fcb476 467 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* submission */
8e669ac1 468 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)),
8523533c
TK
469
470#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
8e669ac1 471 (unsigned int)
14d57970 472 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* no_mbox_unspool */
e715ad22
TK
473 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
474 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
8523533c 475#endif
a6c4ab60 476
8e669ac1 477 (unsigned int)
29aba418
TF
478 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakedefer */
479 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
480 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
481
482 (unsigned int)
a6c4ab60 483 ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakereject */
e715ad22
TK
484 (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|
485 (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)),
8523533c 486
c5fcb476
PH
487 (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) /* no_multiline */
488};
489
490/* Structure listing various control arguments, with their characteristics. */
059ec3d9
PH
491
492typedef struct control_def {
493 uschar *name;
494 int value; /* CONTROL_xxx value */
059ec3d9
PH
495 BOOL has_option; /* Has /option(s) following */
496} control_def;
497
498static control_def controls_list[] = {
8523533c
TK
499#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
500 { US"bmi_run", CONTROL_BMI_RUN, FALSE},
501#endif
fb2274d4
TK
502#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
503 { US"dk_verify", CONTROL_DK_VERIFY, FALSE},
504#endif
c5fcb476
PH
505 { US"caseful_local_part", CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, FALSE},
506 { US"caselower_local_part", CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART, FALSE},
507 { US"enforce_sync", CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE},
508 { US"freeze", CONTROL_FREEZE, FALSE},
509 { US"no_enforce_sync", CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE},
510 { US"no_multiline_responses", CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE, FALSE},
511 { US"queue_only", CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY, FALSE},
8523533c
TK
512#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
513 { US"no_mbox_unspool", CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL, FALSE},
8523533c 514#endif
29aba418 515 { US"fakedefer", CONTROL_FAKEDEFER, TRUE},
0f9b0483 516 { US"fakereject", CONTROL_FAKEREJECT, TRUE},
c5fcb476 517 { US"submission", CONTROL_SUBMISSION, TRUE}
059ec3d9
PH
518 };
519
e5a9dba6
PH
520/* Support data structures for Client SMTP Authorization. acl_verify_csa()
521caches its result in a tree to avoid repeated DNS queries. The result is an
522integer code which is used as an index into the following tables of
523explanatory strings and verification return codes. */
524
525static tree_node *csa_cache = NULL;
526
527enum { CSA_UNKNOWN, CSA_OK, CSA_DEFER_SRV, CSA_DEFER_ADDR,
528 CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT, CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN, CSA_FAIL_NOADDR, CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH };
529
530/* The acl_verify_csa() return code is translated into an acl_verify() return
531code using the following table. It is OK unless the client is definitely not
532authorized. This is because CSA is supposed to be optional for sending sites,
533so recipients should not be too strict about checking it - especially because
534DNS problems are quite likely to occur. It's possible to use $csa_status in
535further ACL conditions to distinguish ok, unknown, and defer if required, but
536the aim is to make the usual configuration simple. */
537
538static int csa_return_code[] = {
539 OK, OK, OK, OK,
540 FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL
541};
542
543static uschar *csa_status_string[] = {
544 US"unknown", US"ok", US"defer", US"defer",
545 US"fail", US"fail", US"fail", US"fail"
546};
547
548static uschar *csa_reason_string[] = {
549 US"unknown",
550 US"ok",
551 US"deferred (SRV lookup failed)",
552 US"deferred (target address lookup failed)",
553 US"failed (explicit authorization required)",
554 US"failed (host name not authorized)",
555 US"failed (no authorized addresses)",
556 US"failed (client address mismatch)"
557};
558
059ec3d9
PH
559/* Enable recursion between acl_check_internal() and acl_check_condition() */
560
561static int acl_check_internal(int, address_item *, uschar *, int, uschar **,
562 uschar **);
563
564
565/*************************************************
566* Pick out name from list *
567*************************************************/
568
569/* Use a binary chop method
570
571Arguments:
572 name name to find
573 list list of names
574 end size of list
575
576Returns: offset in list, or -1 if not found
577*/
578
579static int
580acl_checkname(uschar *name, uschar **list, int end)
581{
582int start = 0;
583
584while (start < end)
585 {
586 int mid = (start + end)/2;
587 int c = Ustrcmp(name, list[mid]);
588 if (c == 0) return mid;
589 if (c < 0) end = mid; else start = mid + 1;
590 }
591
592return -1;
593}
594
595
596/*************************************************
597* Read and parse one ACL *
598*************************************************/
599
600/* This function is called both from readconf in order to parse the ACLs in the
601configuration file, and also when an ACL is encountered dynamically (e.g. as
602the result of an expansion). It is given a function to call in order to
603retrieve the lines of the ACL. This function handles skipping comments and
604blank lines (where relevant).
605
606Arguments:
607 func function to get next line of ACL
608 error where to put an error message
609
610Returns: pointer to ACL, or NULL
611 NULL can be legal (empty ACL); in this case error will be NULL
612*/
613
614acl_block *
615acl_read(uschar *(*func)(void), uschar **error)
616{
617acl_block *yield = NULL;
618acl_block **lastp = &yield;
619acl_block *this = NULL;
620acl_condition_block *cond;
621acl_condition_block **condp = NULL;
622uschar *s;
623
624*error = NULL;
625
626while ((s = (*func)()) != NULL)
627 {
628 int v, c;
629 BOOL negated = FALSE;
630 uschar *saveline = s;
631 uschar name[64];
632
633 /* Conditions (but not verbs) are allowed to be negated by an initial
634 exclamation mark. */
635
636 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
637 if (*s == '!')
638 {
639 negated = TRUE;
640 s++;
641 }
642
cf00dad6
PH
643 /* Read the name of a verb or a condition, or the start of a new ACL, which
644 can be started by a name, or by a macro definition. */
059ec3d9
PH
645
646 s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s);
cf00dad6 647 if (*s == ':' || isupper(name[0] && *s == '=')) return yield;
059ec3d9
PH
648
649 /* If a verb is unrecognized, it may be another condition or modifier that
650 continues the previous verb. */
651
652 v = acl_checkname(name, verbs, sizeof(verbs)/sizeof(char *));
653 if (v < 0)
654 {
655 if (this == NULL)
656 {
657 *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL verb in \"%s\"", saveline);
658 return NULL;
659 }
660 }
661
662 /* New verb */
663
664 else
665 {
666 if (negated)
667 {
668 *error = string_sprintf("malformed ACL line \"%s\"", saveline);
669 return NULL;
670 }
671 this = store_get(sizeof(acl_block));
672 *lastp = this;
673 lastp = &(this->next);
674 this->next = NULL;
675 this->verb = v;
676 this->condition = NULL;
677 condp = &(this->condition);
678 if (*s == 0) continue; /* No condition on this line */
679 if (*s == '!')
680 {
681 negated = TRUE;
682 s++;
683 }
684 s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s); /* Condition name */
685 }
686
687 /* Handle a condition or modifier. */
688
689 c = acl_checkname(name, conditions, sizeof(conditions)/sizeof(char *));
690 if (c < 0)
691 {
692 *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL condition/modifier in \"%s\"",
693 saveline);
694 return NULL;
695 }
696
697 /* The modifiers may not be negated */
698
699 if (negated && cond_modifiers[c])
700 {
701 *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: negation is not allowed with "
702 "\"%s\"", conditions[c]);
703 return NULL;
704 }
705
706 /* ENDPASS may occur only with ACCEPT or DISCARD. */
707
708 if (c == ACLC_ENDPASS &&
709 this->verb != ACL_ACCEPT &&
710 this->verb != ACL_DISCARD)
711 {
712 *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: \"%s\" is not allowed with \"%s\"",
713 conditions[c], verbs[this->verb]);
714 return NULL;
715 }
716
717 cond = store_get(sizeof(acl_condition_block));
718 cond->next = NULL;
719 cond->type = c;
720 cond->u.negated = negated;
721
722 *condp = cond;
723 condp = &(cond->next);
724
725 /* The "set" modifier is different in that its argument is "name=value"
726 rather than just a value, and we can check the validity of the name, which
727 gives us a variable number to insert into the data block. */
728
729 if (c == ACLC_SET)
730 {
731 if (Ustrncmp(s, "acl_", 4) != 0 || (s[4] != 'c' && s[4] != 'm') ||
732 !isdigit(s[5]) || (!isspace(s[6]) && s[6] != '='))
733 {
734 *error = string_sprintf("unrecognized name after \"set\" in ACL "
735 "modifier \"set %s\"", s);
736 return NULL;
737 }
738
739 cond->u.varnumber = s[5] - '0';
740 if (s[4] == 'm') cond->u.varnumber += ACL_C_MAX;
741 s += 6;
742 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
743 }
744
745 /* For "set", we are now positioned for the data. For the others, only
746 "endpass" has no data */
747
748 if (c != ACLC_ENDPASS)
749 {
750 if (*s++ != '=')
751 {
752 *error = string_sprintf("\"=\" missing after ACL \"%s\" %s", name,
753 cond_modifiers[c]? US"modifier" : US"condition");
754 return NULL;
755 }
756 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
757 cond->arg = string_copy(s);
758 }
759 }
760
761return yield;
762}
763
764
765
766/*************************************************
767* Handle warnings *
768*************************************************/
769
770/* This function is called when a WARN verb's conditions are true. It adds to
771the message's headers, and/or writes information to the log. In each case, this
772only happens once (per message for headers, per connection for log).
773
774Arguments:
775 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
776 user_message message for adding to headers
777 log_message message for logging, if different
778
779Returns: nothing
780*/
781
782static void
783acl_warn(int where, uschar *user_message, uschar *log_message)
784{
785int hlen;
786
787if (log_message != NULL && log_message != user_message)
788 {
789 uschar *text;
790 string_item *logged;
791
792 text = string_sprintf("%s Warning: %s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
793 string_printing(log_message));
794
795 /* If a sender verification has failed, and the log message is "sender verify
796 failed", add the failure message. */
797
798 if (sender_verified_failed != NULL &&
799 sender_verified_failed->message != NULL &&
800 strcmpic(log_message, US"sender verify failed") == 0)
801 text = string_sprintf("%s: %s", text, sender_verified_failed->message);
802
9c7a242c
PH
803 /* Search previously logged warnings. They are kept in malloc
804 store so they can be freed at the start of a new message. */
059ec3d9
PH
805
806 for (logged = acl_warn_logged; logged != NULL; logged = logged->next)
807 if (Ustrcmp(logged->text, text) == 0) break;
808
809 if (logged == NULL)
810 {
811 int length = Ustrlen(text) + 1;
812 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s", text);
813 logged = store_malloc(sizeof(string_item) + length);
814 logged->text = (uschar *)logged + sizeof(string_item);
815 memcpy(logged->text, text, length);
816 logged->next = acl_warn_logged;
817 acl_warn_logged = logged;
818 }
819 }
820
821/* If there's no user message, we are done. */
822
823if (user_message == NULL) return;
824
825/* If this isn't a message ACL, we can't do anything with a user message.
826Log an error. */
827
828if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
829 {
830 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "ACL \"warn\" with \"message\" setting "
831 "found in a non-message (%s) ACL: cannot specify header lines here: "
832 "message ignored", acl_wherenames[where]);
833 return;
834 }
835
836/* Treat the user message as a sequence of one or more header lines. */
837
838hlen = Ustrlen(user_message);
839if (hlen > 0)
840 {
841 uschar *text, *p, *q;
842
843 /* Add a final newline if not present */
844
845 text = ((user_message)[hlen-1] == '\n')? user_message :
846 string_sprintf("%s\n", user_message);
847
848 /* Loop for multiple header lines, taking care about continuations */
849
850 for (p = q = text; *p != 0; )
851 {
852 uschar *s;
853 int newtype = htype_add_bot;
854 header_line **hptr = &acl_warn_headers;
855
856 /* Find next header line within the string */
857
858 for (;;)
859 {
860 q = Ustrchr(q, '\n');
861 if (*(++q) != ' ' && *q != '\t') break;
862 }
863
864 /* If the line starts with a colon, interpret the instruction for where to
865 add it. This temporarily sets up a new type. */
866
867 if (*p == ':')
868 {
869 if (strncmpic(p, US":after_received:", 16) == 0)
870 {
871 newtype = htype_add_rec;
872 p += 16;
873 }
8523533c
TK
874 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start_rfc:", 14) == 0)
875 {
876 newtype = htype_add_rfc;
877 p += 14;
8e669ac1 878 }
059ec3d9
PH
879 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start:", 10) == 0)
880 {
881 newtype = htype_add_top;
882 p += 10;
883 }
884 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_end:", 8) == 0)
885 {
886 newtype = htype_add_bot;
887 p += 8;
888 }
889 while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') p++;
890 }
891
892 /* See if this line starts with a header name, and if not, add X-ACL-Warn:
893 to the front of it. */
894
895 for (s = p; s < q - 1; s++)
896 {
897 if (*s == ':' || !isgraph(*s)) break;
898 }
899
900 s = string_sprintf("%s%.*s", (*s == ':')? "" : "X-ACL-Warn: ", q - p, p);
901 hlen = Ustrlen(s);
902
903 /* See if this line has already been added */
904
905 while (*hptr != NULL)
906 {
907 if (Ustrncmp((*hptr)->text, s, hlen) == 0) break;
908 hptr = &((*hptr)->next);
909 }
910
911 /* Add if not previously present */
912
913 if (*hptr == NULL)
914 {
915 header_line *h = store_get(sizeof(header_line));
916 h->text = s;
917 h->next = NULL;
918 h->type = newtype;
919 h->slen = hlen;
920 *hptr = h;
921 hptr = &(h->next);
922 }
923
924 /* Advance for next header line within the string */
925
926 p = q;
927 }
928 }
929}
930
931
932
933/*************************************************
934* Verify and check reverse DNS *
935*************************************************/
936
937/* Called from acl_verify() below. We look up the host name(s) of the client IP
938address if this has not yet been done. The host_name_lookup() function checks
939that one of these names resolves to an address list that contains the client IP
940address, so we don't actually have to do the check here.
941
942Arguments:
943 user_msgptr pointer for user message
944 log_msgptr pointer for log message
945
946Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
947 FAIL verification failed
948 DEFER there was a problem verifying
949*/
950
951static int
952acl_verify_reverse(uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
953{
954int rc;
955
956user_msgptr = user_msgptr; /* stop compiler warning */
957
958/* Previous success */
959
960if (sender_host_name != NULL) return OK;
961
962/* Previous failure */
963
964if (host_lookup_failed)
965 {
966 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("host lookup failed%s", host_lookup_msg);
967 return FAIL;
968 }
969
970/* Need to do a lookup */
971
972HDEBUG(D_acl)
973 debug_printf("looking up host name to force name/address consistency check\n");
974
975if ((rc = host_name_lookup()) != OK)
976 {
977 *log_msgptr = (rc == DEFER)?
978 US"host lookup deferred for reverse lookup check"
979 :
980 string_sprintf("host lookup failed for reverse lookup check%s",
981 host_lookup_msg);
982 return rc; /* DEFER or FAIL */
983 }
984
985host_build_sender_fullhost();
986return OK;
987}
988
989
990
991/*************************************************
e5a9dba6
PH
992* Check client IP address matches CSA target *
993*************************************************/
994
995/* Called from acl_verify_csa() below. This routine scans a section of a DNS
996response for address records belonging to the CSA target hostname. The section
997is specified by the reset argument, either RESET_ADDITIONAL or RESET_ANSWERS.
998If one of the addresses matches the client's IP address, then the client is
999authorized by CSA. If there are target IP addresses but none of them match
1000then the client is using an unauthorized IP address. If there are no target IP
1001addresses then the client cannot be using an authorized IP address. (This is
1002an odd configuration - why didn't the SRV record have a weight of 1 instead?)
1003
1004Arguments:
1005 dnsa the DNS answer block
1006 dnss a DNS scan block for us to use
1007 reset option specifing what portion to scan, as described above
1008 target the target hostname to use for matching RR names
1009
1010Returns: CSA_OK successfully authorized
1011 CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH addresses found but none matched
1012 CSA_FAIL_NOADDR no target addresses found
1013*/
1014
1015static int
1016acl_verify_csa_address(dns_answer *dnsa, dns_scan *dnss, int reset,
1017 uschar *target)
1018{
1019dns_record *rr;
1020dns_address *da;
1021
1022BOOL target_found = FALSE;
1023
1024for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, reset);
1025 rr != NULL;
1026 rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, RESET_NEXT))
1027 {
1028 /* Check this is an address RR for the target hostname. */
1029
1030 if (rr->type != T_A
1031 #if HAVE_IPV6
1032 && rr->type != T_AAAA
1033 #ifdef SUPPORT_A6
1034 && rr->type != T_A6
1035 #endif
1036 #endif
1037 ) continue;
1038
1039 if (strcmpic(target, rr->name) != 0) continue;
1040
1041 target_found = TRUE;
1042
1043 /* Turn the target address RR into a list of textual IP addresses and scan
1044 the list. There may be more than one if it is an A6 RR. */
1045
1046 for (da = dns_address_from_rr(dnsa, rr); da != NULL; da = da->next)
1047 {
1048 /* If the client IP address matches the target IP address, it's good! */
1049
1050 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target address is %s\n", da->address);
1051
1052 if (strcmpic(sender_host_address, da->address) == 0) return CSA_OK;
1053 }
1054 }
1055
1056/* If we found some target addresses but none of them matched, the client is
1057using an unauthorized IP address, otherwise the target has no authorized IP
1058addresses. */
1059
1060if (target_found) return CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH;
1061else return CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1062}
1063
1064
1065
1066/*************************************************
1067* Verify Client SMTP Authorization *
1068*************************************************/
1069
1070/* Called from acl_verify() below. This routine calls dns_lookup_special()
1071to find the CSA SRV record corresponding to the domain argument, or
1072$sender_helo_name if no argument is provided. It then checks that the
1073client is authorized, and that its IP address corresponds to the SRV
1074target's address by calling acl_verify_csa_address() above. The address
1075should have been returned in the DNS response's ADDITIONAL section, but if
1076not we perform another DNS lookup to get it.
1077
1078Arguments:
1079 domain pointer to optional parameter following verify = csa
1080
1081Returns: CSA_UNKNOWN no valid CSA record found
1082 CSA_OK successfully authorized
1083 CSA_FAIL_* client is definitely not authorized
1084 CSA_DEFER_* there was a DNS problem
1085*/
1086
1087static int
1088acl_verify_csa(uschar *domain)
1089{
1090tree_node *t;
1091uschar *found, *p;
1092int priority, weight, port;
1093dns_answer dnsa;
1094dns_scan dnss;
1095dns_record *rr;
1096int rc, type;
1097uschar target[256];
1098
1099/* Work out the domain we are using for the CSA lookup. The default is the
1100client's HELO domain. If the client has not said HELO, use its IP address
1101instead. If it's a local client (exim -bs), CSA isn't applicable. */
1102
1103while (isspace(*domain) && *domain != '\0') ++domain;
1104if (*domain == '\0') domain = sender_helo_name;
1105if (domain == NULL) domain = sender_host_address;
1106if (sender_host_address == NULL) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
1107
1108/* If we have an address literal, strip off the framing ready for turning it
1109into a domain. The framing consists of matched square brackets possibly
1110containing a keyword and a colon before the actual IP address. */
1111
1112if (domain[0] == '[')
1113 {
1114 uschar *start = Ustrchr(domain, ':');
1115 if (start == NULL) start = domain;
1116 domain = string_copyn(start + 1, Ustrlen(start) - 2);
1117 }
1118
1119/* Turn domains that look like bare IP addresses into domains in the reverse
1120DNS. This code also deals with address literals and $sender_host_address. It's
1121not quite kosher to treat bare domains such as EHLO 192.0.2.57 the same as
1122address literals, but it's probably the most friendly thing to do. This is an
1123extension to CSA, so we allow it to be turned off for proper conformance. */
1124
1125if (string_is_ip_address(domain, NULL))
1126 {
1127 if (!dns_csa_use_reverse) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
1128 dns_build_reverse(domain, target);
1129 domain = target;
1130 }
1131
1132/* Find out if we've already done the CSA check for this domain. If we have,
1133return the same result again. Otherwise build a new cached result structure
1134for this domain. The name is filled in now, and the value is filled in when
1135we return from this function. */
1136
1137t = tree_search(csa_cache, domain);
1138if (t != NULL) return t->data.val;
1139
1140t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(domain));
1141Ustrcpy(t->name, domain);
1142(void)tree_insertnode(&csa_cache, t);
1143
1144/* Now we are ready to do the actual DNS lookup(s). */
1145
28e6ef29 1146found = domain;
e5a9dba6
PH
1147switch (dns_special_lookup(&dnsa, domain, T_CSA, &found))
1148 {
1149 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1150
1151 default:
1152 return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_SRV;
1153
1154 /* If we found nothing, the client's authorization is unknown. */
1155
1156 case DNS_NOMATCH:
1157 case DNS_NODATA:
1158 return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1159
1160 /* We got something! Go on to look at the reply in more detail. */
1161
1162 case DNS_SUCCEED:
1163 break;
1164 }
1165
1166/* Scan the reply for well-formed CSA SRV records. */
1167
1168for (rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
1169 rr != NULL;
1170 rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT))
1171 {
1172 if (rr->type != T_SRV) continue;
1173
1174 /* Extract the numerical SRV fields (p is incremented) */
1175
1176 p = rr->data;
1177 GETSHORT(priority, p);
1178 GETSHORT(weight, p);
1179 GETSHORT(port, p);
1180
1181 DEBUG(D_acl)
1182 debug_printf("CSA priority=%d weight=%d port=%d\n", priority, weight, port);
1183
1184 /* Check the CSA version number */
1185
1186 if (priority != 1) continue;
1187
1188 /* If the domain does not have a CSA SRV record of its own (i.e. the domain
1189 found by dns_special_lookup() is a parent of the one we asked for), we check
1190 the subdomain assertions in the port field. At the moment there's only one
1191 assertion: legitimate SMTP clients are all explicitly authorized with CSA
1192 SRV records of their own. */
1193
1194 if (found != domain)
1195 {
1196 if (port & 1)
1197 return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT;
1198 else
1199 return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1200 }
1201
1202 /* This CSA SRV record refers directly to our domain, so we check the value
1203 in the weight field to work out the domain's authorization. 0 and 1 are
1204 unauthorized; 3 means the client is authorized but we can't check the IP
1205 address in order to authenticate it, so we treat it as unknown; values
1206 greater than 3 are undefined. */
1207
1208 if (weight < 2) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN;
1209
1210 if (weight > 2) continue;
1211
1212 /* Weight == 2, which means the domain is authorized. We must check that the
1213 client's IP address is listed as one of the SRV target addresses. Save the
1214 target hostname then break to scan the additional data for its addresses. */
1215
1216 (void)dn_expand(dnsa.answer, dnsa.answer + dnsa.answerlen, p,
1217 (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)target, sizeof(target));
1218
1219 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target is %s\n", target);
1220
1221 break;
1222 }
1223
1224/* If we didn't break the loop then no appropriate records were found. */
1225
1226if (rr == NULL) return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1227
1228/* Do not check addresses if the target is ".", in accordance with RFC 2782.
1229A target of "." indicates there are no valid addresses, so the client cannot
1230be authorized. (This is an odd configuration because weight=2 target=. is
1231equivalent to weight=1, but we check for it in order to keep load off the
1232root name servers.) Note that dn_expand() turns "." into "". */
1233
1234if (Ustrcmp(target, "") == 0) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1235
1236/* Scan the additional section of the CSA SRV reply for addresses belonging
1237to the target. If the name server didn't return any additional data (e.g.
1238because it does not fully support SRV records), we need to do another lookup
1239to obtain the target addresses; otherwise we have a definitive result. */
1240
1241rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ADDITIONAL, target);
1242if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
1243
1244/* The DNS lookup type corresponds to the IP version used by the client. */
1245
1246#if HAVE_IPV6
1247if (Ustrchr(sender_host_address, ':') != NULL)
1248 type = T_AAAA;
1249else
1250#endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */
1251 type = T_A;
1252
1253
1254#if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
1255DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN:
1256#endif
1257
1258switch (dns_lookup(&dnsa, target, type, NULL))
1259 {
1260 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1261
1262 default:
1263 return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_ADDR;
1264
1265 /* If the query succeeded, scan the addresses and return the result. */
1266
1267 case DNS_SUCCEED:
1268 rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS, target);
1269 if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
1270 /* else fall through */
1271
1272 /* If the target has no IP addresses, the client cannot have an authorized
1273 IP address. However, if the target site uses A6 records (not AAAA records)
1274 we have to do yet another lookup in order to check them. */
1275
1276 case DNS_NOMATCH:
1277 case DNS_NODATA:
1278
1279 #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6)
1280 if (type == T_AAAA) { type = T_A6; goto DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN; }
1281 #endif
1282
1283 return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1284 }
1285}
1286
1287
1288
1289/*************************************************
059ec3d9
PH
1290* Handle verification (address & other) *
1291*************************************************/
1292
1293/* This function implements the "verify" condition. It is called when
1294encountered in any ACL, because some tests are almost always permitted. Some
1295just don't make sense, and always fail (for example, an attempt to test a host
1296lookup for a non-TCP/IP message). Others are restricted to certain ACLs.
1297
1298Arguments:
1299 where where called from
1300 addr the recipient address that the ACL is handling, or NULL
1301 arg the argument of "verify"
1302 user_msgptr pointer for user message
1303 log_msgptr pointer for log message
1304 basic_errno where to put verify errno
1305
1306Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
1307 FAIL verification failed
1308 DEFER there was a problem verifying
1309 ERROR syntax error
1310*/
1311
1312static int
1313acl_verify(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *arg,
1314 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
1315{
1316int sep = '/';
1317int callout = -1;
1318int callout_overall = -1;
4deaf07d 1319int callout_connect = -1;
059ec3d9
PH
1320int verify_options = 0;
1321int rc;
1322BOOL verify_header_sender = FALSE;
1323BOOL defer_ok = FALSE;
1324BOOL callout_defer_ok = FALSE;
1325BOOL no_details = FALSE;
1326address_item *sender_vaddr = NULL;
1327uschar *verify_sender_address = NULL;
1328uschar *pm_mailfrom = NULL;
1329uschar *se_mailfrom = NULL;
596875b3
PH
1330
1331/* Some of the verify items have slash-separated options; some do not. Diagnose
1332an error if options are given for items that don't expect them. This code has
1333now got very message. Refactoring to use a table would be a good idea one day.
1334*/
1335
1336uschar *slash = Ustrchr(arg, '/');
059ec3d9
PH
1337uschar *list = arg;
1338uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
1339
1340if (ss == NULL) goto BAD_VERIFY;
1341
1342/* Handle name/address consistency verification in a separate function. */
1343
1344if (strcmpic(ss, US"reverse_host_lookup") == 0)
1345 {
596875b3 1346 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
059ec3d9
PH
1347 if (sender_host_address == NULL) return OK;
1348 return acl_verify_reverse(user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
1349 }
1350
1351/* TLS certificate verification is done at STARTTLS time; here we just
1352test whether it was successful or not. (This is for optional verification; for
1353mandatory verification, the connection doesn't last this long.) */
1354
1355if (strcmpic(ss, US"certificate") == 0)
1356 {
596875b3 1357 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
059ec3d9
PH
1358 if (tls_certificate_verified) return OK;
1359 *user_msgptr = US"no verified certificate";
1360 return FAIL;
1361 }
1362
1363/* We can test the result of optional HELO verification */
1364
596875b3
PH
1365if (strcmpic(ss, US"helo") == 0)
1366 {
1367 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
1368 return helo_verified? OK : FAIL;
1369 }
059ec3d9 1370
e5a9dba6
PH
1371/* Do Client SMTP Authorization checks in a separate function, and turn the
1372result code into user-friendly strings. */
1373
1374if (strcmpic(ss, US"csa") == 0)
1375 {
1376 rc = acl_verify_csa(list);
1377 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("client SMTP authorization %s",
1378 csa_reason_string[rc]);
1379 csa_status = csa_status_string[rc];
1380 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA result %s\n", csa_status);
1381 return csa_return_code[rc];
1382 }
1383
596875b3
PH
1384/* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct syntax. If there is
1385a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to
1386send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as
1387always). */
059ec3d9 1388
596875b3 1389if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_syntax") == 0)
059ec3d9 1390 {
596875b3 1391 if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
059ec3d9
PH
1392 if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
1393 {
1394 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s "
1395 "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames[where]);
1396 return ERROR;
1397 }
596875b3
PH
1398 rc = verify_check_headers(log_msgptr);
1399 if (rc != OK && smtp_return_error_details && *log_msgptr != NULL)
1400 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1401 return rc;
1402 }
059ec3d9 1403
059ec3d9 1404
596875b3
PH
1405/* The remaining verification tests check recipient and sender addresses,
1406either from the envelope or from the header. There are a number of
1407slash-separated options that are common to all of them. */
059ec3d9 1408
059ec3d9 1409
596875b3
PH
1410/* Check that there is at least one verifiable sender address in the relevant
1411header lines. This can be followed by callout and defer options, just like
1412sender and recipient. */
059ec3d9 1413
596875b3
PH
1414if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_sender") == 0)
1415 {
1416 if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
1417 {
1418 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s "
1419 "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames[where]);
1420 return ERROR;
1421 }
1422 verify_header_sender = TRUE;
059ec3d9
PH
1423 }
1424
1425/* Otherwise, first item in verify argument must be "sender" or "recipient".
1426In the case of a sender, this can optionally be followed by an address to use
1427in place of the actual sender (rare special-case requirement). */
1428
1429else if (strncmpic(ss, US"sender", 6) == 0)
1430 {
1431 uschar *s = ss + 6;
1432 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
1433 {
1434 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify sender in ACL for %s "
1435 "(only possible for MAIL, RCPT, PREDATA, or DATA)",
1436 acl_wherenames[where]);
1437 return ERROR;
1438 }
1439 if (*s == 0)
1440 verify_sender_address = sender_address;
1441 else
1442 {
1443 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1444 if (*s++ != '=') goto BAD_VERIFY;
1445 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1446 verify_sender_address = string_copy(s);
1447 }
1448 }
1449else
1450 {
1451 if (strcmpic(ss, US"recipient") != 0) goto BAD_VERIFY;
1452 if (addr == NULL)
1453 {
1454 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify recipient in ACL for %s "
1455 "(only possible for RCPT)", acl_wherenames[where]);
1456 return ERROR;
1457 }
1458 }
1459
596875b3
PH
1460/* Remaining items are optional; they apply to sender and recipient
1461verification, including "header sender" verification. */
059ec3d9
PH
1462
1463while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
1464 != NULL)
1465 {
1466 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0) defer_ok = TRUE;
1467 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"no_details") == 0) no_details = TRUE;
1468
1469 /* These two old options are left for backwards compatibility */
1470
1471 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"callout_defer_ok") == 0)
1472 {
1473 callout_defer_ok = TRUE;
1474 if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1475 }
1476
1477 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"check_postmaster") == 0)
1478 {
1479 pm_mailfrom = US"";
1480 if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1481 }
1482
1483 /* The callout option has a number of sub-options, comma separated */
1484
1485 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"callout", 7) == 0)
1486 {
1487 callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1488 ss += 7;
1489 if (*ss != 0)
1490 {
1491 while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
1492 if (*ss++ == '=')
1493 {
1494 int optsep = ',';
1495 uschar *opt;
1496 uschar buffer[256];
1497 while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
8e669ac1
PH
1498
1499 /* This callout option handling code has become a mess as new options
1500 have been added in an ad hoc manner. It should be tidied up into some
4deaf07d 1501 kind of table-driven thing. */
8e669ac1 1502
059ec3d9
PH
1503 while ((opt = string_nextinlist(&ss, &optsep, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
1504 != NULL)
1505 {
1506 if (strcmpic(opt, US"defer_ok") == 0) callout_defer_ok = TRUE;
1507 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"no_cache") == 0)
1508 verify_options |= vopt_callout_no_cache;
1509 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"random") == 0)
1510 verify_options |= vopt_callout_random;
1511 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"use_sender") == 0)
1512 verify_options |= vopt_callout_recipsender;
1513 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"use_postmaster") == 0)
1514 verify_options |= vopt_callout_recippmaster;
1515 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"postmaster") == 0) pm_mailfrom = US"";
2a4be8f9
PH
1516 else if (strcmpic(opt, US"fullpostmaster") == 0)
1517 {
1518 pm_mailfrom = US"";
1519 verify_options |= vopt_callout_fullpm;
1520 }
059ec3d9
PH
1521
1522 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"mailfrom", 8) == 0)
1523 {
1524 if (!verify_header_sender)
1525 {
1526 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"mailfrom\" is allowed as a "
1527 "callout option only for verify=header_sender (detected in ACL "
1528 "condition \"%s\")", arg);
1529 return ERROR;
1530 }
1531 opt += 8;
1532 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1533 if (*opt++ != '=')
1534 {
1535 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1536 "\"mailfrom\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1537 return ERROR;
1538 }
1539 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1540 se_mailfrom = string_copy(opt);
1541 }
1542
1543 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"postmaster_mailfrom", 19) == 0)
1544 {
1545 opt += 19;
1546 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1547 if (*opt++ != '=')
1548 {
1549 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1550 "\"postmaster_mailfrom\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1551 return ERROR;
1552 }
1553 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1554 pm_mailfrom = string_copy(opt);
1555 }
1556
1557 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"maxwait", 7) == 0)
1558 {
1559 opt += 7;
1560 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1561 if (*opt++ != '=')
1562 {
1563 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"maxwait\" in "
1564 "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1565 return ERROR;
1566 }
1567 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1568 callout_overall = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1569 if (callout_overall < 0)
1570 {
1571 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1572 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1573 return ERROR;
1574 }
1575 }
4deaf07d
PH
1576 else if (strncmpic(opt, US"connect", 7) == 0)
1577 {
1578 opt += 7;
1579 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1580 if (*opt++ != '=')
1581 {
1582 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
1583 "\"callout_overaall\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1584 return ERROR;
1585 }
1586 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1587 callout_connect = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1588 if (callout_connect < 0)
1589 {
1590 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1591 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1592 return ERROR;
1593 }
1594 }
059ec3d9
PH
1595 else /* Plain time is callout connect/command timeout */
1596 {
1597 callout = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE);
1598 if (callout < 0)
1599 {
1600 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1601 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1602 return ERROR;
1603 }
1604 }
1605 }
1606 }
1607 else
1608 {
1609 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"callout\" in "
1610 "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1611 return ERROR;
1612 }
1613 }
1614 }
1615
1616 /* Option not recognized */
1617
1618 else
1619 {
1620 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unknown option \"%s\" in ACL "
1621 "condition \"verify %s\"", ss, arg);
1622 return ERROR;
1623 }
1624 }
1625
1626if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster)) ==
1627 (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster))
1628 {
1629 *log_msgptr = US"only one of use_sender and use_postmaster can be set "
1630 "for a recipient callout";
1631 return ERROR;
1632 }
1633
1634/* Handle sender-in-header verification. Default the user message to the log
1635message if giving out verification details. */
1636
1637if (verify_header_sender)
1638 {
8e669ac1 1639 int verrno;
059ec3d9 1640 rc = verify_check_header_address(user_msgptr, log_msgptr, callout,
fe5b5d0b
PH
1641 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, verify_options,
1642 &verrno);
1643 if (rc != OK)
8e669ac1 1644 {
fe5b5d0b
PH
1645 *basic_errno = verrno;
1646 if (smtp_return_error_details)
1647 {
1648 if (*user_msgptr == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL)
1649 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1650 if (rc == DEFER) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
1651 }
8e669ac1 1652 }
059ec3d9
PH
1653 }
1654
1655/* Handle a sender address. The default is to verify *the* sender address, but
1656optionally a different address can be given, for special requirements. If the
1657address is empty, we are dealing with a bounce message that has no sender, so
1658we cannot do any checking. If the real sender address gets rewritten during
1659verification (e.g. DNS widening), set the flag to stop it being rewritten again
1660during message reception.
1661
1662A list of verified "sender" addresses is kept to try to avoid doing to much
1663work repetitively when there are multiple recipients in a message and they all
1664require sender verification. However, when callouts are involved, it gets too
1665complicated because different recipients may require different callout options.
1666Therefore, we always do a full sender verify when any kind of callout is
1667specified. Caching elsewhere, for instance in the DNS resolver and in the
1668callout handling, should ensure that this is not terribly inefficient. */
1669
1670else if (verify_sender_address != NULL)
1671 {
1672 if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster))
1673 != 0)
1674 {
1675 *log_msgptr = US"use_sender or use_postmaster cannot be used for a "
1676 "sender verify callout";
1677 return ERROR;
1678 }
1679
1680 sender_vaddr = verify_checked_sender(verify_sender_address);
1681 if (sender_vaddr != NULL && /* Previously checked */
1682 callout <= 0) /* No callout needed this time */
1683 {
1684 /* If the "routed" flag is set, it means that routing worked before, so
1685 this check can give OK (the saved return code value, if set, belongs to a
1686 callout that was done previously). If the "routed" flag is not set, routing
1687 must have failed, so we use the saved return code. */
1688
1689 if (testflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed)) rc = OK; else
1690 {
1691 rc = sender_vaddr->special_action;
1692 *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
1693 }
1694 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("using cached sender verify result\n");
1695 }
1696
1697 /* Do a new verification, and cache the result. The cache is used to avoid
1698 verifying the sender multiple times for multiple RCPTs when callouts are not
1699 specified (see comments above).
1700
1701 The cache is also used on failure to give details in response to the first
1702 RCPT that gets bounced for this reason. However, this can be suppressed by
1703 the no_details option, which sets the flag that says "this detail has already
1704 been sent". The cache normally contains just one address, but there may be
1705 more in esoteric circumstances. */
1706
1707 else
1708 {
1709 BOOL routed = TRUE;
2a3eea10 1710 uschar *save_address_data = deliver_address_data;
8e669ac1 1711
059ec3d9
PH
1712 sender_vaddr = deliver_make_addr(verify_sender_address, TRUE);
1713 if (no_details) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_sverify_told);
1714 if (verify_sender_address[0] != 0)
1715 {
1716 /* If this is the real sender address, save the unrewritten version
1717 for use later in receive. Otherwise, set a flag so that rewriting the
1718 sender in verify_address() does not update sender_address. */
1719
1720 if (verify_sender_address == sender_address)
1721 sender_address_unrewritten = sender_address;
1722 else
1723 verify_options |= vopt_fake_sender;
1724
1725 /* The recipient, qualify, and expn options are never set in
1726 verify_options. */
1727
1728 rc = verify_address(sender_vaddr, NULL, verify_options, callout,
4deaf07d 1729 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, &routed);
059ec3d9
PH
1730
1731 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
1732
1733 if (rc == OK)
1734 {
1735 if (Ustrcmp(sender_vaddr->address, verify_sender_address) != 0)
1736 {
1737 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("sender %s verified ok as %s\n",
1738 verify_sender_address, sender_vaddr->address);
1739 }
1740 else
1741 {
1742 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("sender %s verified ok\n",
1743 verify_sender_address);
1744 }
1745 }
1746 else *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
1747 }
1748 else rc = OK; /* Null sender */
1749
1750 /* Cache the result code */
1751
1752 if (routed) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed);
1753 if (callout > 0) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_callout);
1754 sender_vaddr->special_action = rc;
1755 sender_vaddr->next = sender_verified_list;
1756 sender_verified_list = sender_vaddr;
8e669ac1
PH
1757
1758 /* Restore the recipient address data, which might have been clobbered by
2a3eea10 1759 the sender verification. */
8e669ac1 1760
2a3eea10 1761 deliver_address_data = save_address_data;
059ec3d9 1762 }
8e669ac1 1763
2a3eea10
PH
1764 /* Put the sender address_data value into $sender_address_data */
1765
8e669ac1 1766 sender_address_data = sender_vaddr->p.address_data;
059ec3d9
PH
1767 }
1768
1769/* A recipient address just gets a straightforward verify; again we must handle
1770the DEFER overrides. */
1771
1772else
1773 {
1774 address_item addr2;
1775
1776 /* We must use a copy of the address for verification, because it might
1777 get rewritten. */
1778
1779 addr2 = *addr;
1780 rc = verify_address(&addr2, NULL, verify_options|vopt_is_recipient, callout,
4deaf07d 1781 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, NULL);
059ec3d9 1782 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n");
8e669ac1 1783
059ec3d9 1784 *log_msgptr = addr2.message;
8e669ac1 1785 *user_msgptr = (addr2.user_message != NULL)?
6729cf78 1786 addr2.user_message : addr2.message;
059ec3d9
PH
1787 *basic_errno = addr2.basic_errno;
1788
1789 /* Make $address_data visible */
1790 deliver_address_data = addr2.p.address_data;
1791 }
1792
1793/* We have a result from the relevant test. Handle defer overrides first. */
1794
1795if (rc == DEFER && (defer_ok ||
1796 (callout_defer_ok && *basic_errno == ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)))
1797 {
1798 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("verify defer overridden by %s\n",
1799 defer_ok? "defer_ok" : "callout_defer_ok");
1800 rc = OK;
1801 }
1802
1803/* If we've failed a sender, set up a recipient message, and point
1804sender_verified_failed to the address item that actually failed. */
1805
1806if (rc != OK && verify_sender_address != NULL)
1807 {
1808 if (rc != DEFER)
1809 {
1810 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Sender verify failed";
1811 }
1812 else if (*basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
1813 {
1814 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify";
1815 }
1816 else
1817 {
1818 *log_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify callout";
1819 *user_msgptr = smtp_return_error_details? sender_vaddr->user_message :
1820 *log_msgptr;
1821 }
1822
1823 sender_verified_failed = sender_vaddr;
1824 }
1825
1826/* Verifying an address messes up the values of $domain and $local_part,
1827so reset them before returning if this is a RCPT ACL. */
1828
1829if (addr != NULL)
1830 {
1831 deliver_domain = addr->domain;
1832 deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
1833 }
1834return rc;
1835
1836/* Syntax errors in the verify argument come here. */
1837
1838BAD_VERIFY:
1839*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("expected \"sender[=address]\", \"recipient\", "
596875b3
PH
1840 "\"helo\", \"header_syntax\", \"header_sender\" or "
1841 "\"reverse_host_lookup\" at start of ACL condition "
059ec3d9
PH
1842 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1843return ERROR;
596875b3
PH
1844
1845/* Options supplied when not allowed come here */
1846
1847NO_OPTIONS:
1848*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unexpected '/' found in \"%s\" "
1849 "(this verify item has no options)", arg);
1850return ERROR;
059ec3d9
PH
1851}
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856/*************************************************
1857* Check argument for control= modifier *
1858*************************************************/
1859
1860/* Called from acl_check_condition() below
1861
1862Arguments:
1863 arg the argument string for control=
1864 pptr set to point to the terminating character
1865 where which ACL we are in
1866 log_msgptr for error messages
1867
1868Returns: CONTROL_xxx value
1869*/
1870
1871static int
1872decode_control(uschar *arg, uschar **pptr, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
1873{
1874int len;
1875control_def *d;
1876
1877for (d = controls_list;
1878 d < controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def);
1879 d++)
1880 {
1881 len = Ustrlen(d->name);
1882 if (Ustrncmp(d->name, arg, len) == 0) break;
1883 }
1884
1885if (d >= controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def) ||
1886 (arg[len] != 0 && (!d->has_option || arg[len] != '/')))
1887 {
1888 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
1889 return CONTROL_ERROR;
1890 }
1891
059ec3d9
PH
1892*pptr = arg + len;
1893return d->value;
1894}
1895
1896
1897
1898/*************************************************
870f6ba8
TF
1899* Handle rate limiting *
1900*************************************************/
1901
1902/* Called by acl_check_condition() below to calculate the result
1903of the ACL ratelimit condition.
1904
1905Note that the return value might be slightly unexpected: if the
1906sender's rate is above the limit then the result is OK. This is
1907similar to the dnslists condition, and is so that you can write
1908ACL clauses like: defer ratelimit = 15 / 1h
1909
1910Arguments:
1911 arg the option string for ratelimit=
1912 log_msgptr for error messages
1913
1914Returns: OK - Sender's rate is above limit
1915 FAIL - Sender's rate is below limit
1916 DEFER - Problem opening ratelimit database
1917 ERROR - Syntax error in options.
1918*/
1919
1920static int
1921acl_ratelimit(uschar *arg, uschar **log_msgptr)
1922{
1923double limit, period;
f3dcf4a2 1924uschar *ss, *key;
870f6ba8
TF
1925int sep = '/';
1926BOOL have_key = FALSE, leaky = FALSE, strict = FALSE;
1927BOOL per_byte = FALSE, per_cmd = FALSE, per_conn = FALSE, per_mail = FALSE;
1928int old_pool, rc;
1929tree_node **anchor, *t;
1930open_db dbblock, *dbm;
1931dbdata_ratelimit *dbd;
1932struct timeval tv;
1933
1934/* Parse the first two options and record their values in expansion
1935variables. These variables allow the configuration to have informative
1936error messages based on rate limits obtained from a table lookup. */
1937
1938/* First is the maximum number of messages per period and maximum burst
1939size, which must be greater than or equal to zero. Zero is useful for
1940rate measurement as opposed to rate limiting. */
1941
1942sender_rate_limit = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
1943if (sender_rate_limit == NULL)
1944 limit = -1.0;
1945else
1946 {
1947 limit = Ustrtod(sender_rate_limit, &ss);
1948 if (tolower(*ss) == 'k') { limit *= 1024.0; ss++; }
1949 else if (tolower(*ss) == 'm') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
1950 else if (tolower(*ss) == 'g') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
1951 }
1952if (limit < 0.0 || *ss != 0)
1953 {
1954 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for "
1955 "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a positive number",
1956 sender_rate_limit);
1957 return ERROR;
1958 }
1959
f3dcf4a2
TF
1960/* We use the rest of the argument list following the limit as the
1961lookup key, because it doesn't make sense to use the same stored data
1962if the period or options are different. */
1963
1964key = arg;
1965
870f6ba8
TF
1966/* Second is the rate measurement period and exponential smoothing time
1967constant. This must be strictly greater than zero, because zero leads to
1968run-time division errors. */
1969
1970sender_rate_period = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
1971if (sender_rate_period == NULL) period = -1.0;
1972else period = readconf_readtime(sender_rate_period, 0, FALSE);
1973if (period <= 0.0)
1974 {
1975 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for "
1976 "\"ratelimit\" condition: \"%s\" is not a time value",
1977 sender_rate_period);
1978 return ERROR;
1979 }
1980
1981/* Parse the other options. Should we check if the per_* options are being
1982used in ACLs where they don't make sense, e.g. per_mail in the connect ACL? */
1983
1984while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
1985 != NULL)
1986 {
1987 if (strcmpic(ss, US"leaky") == 0) leaky = TRUE;
1988 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"strict") == 0) strict = TRUE;
1989 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_byte") == 0) per_byte = TRUE;
1990 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_cmd") == 0) per_cmd = TRUE;
1991 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_conn") == 0) per_conn = TRUE;
1992 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_mail") == 0) per_mail = TRUE;
1993 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_rcpt") == 0) per_cmd = TRUE; /* alias */
1994 else have_key = TRUE;
1995 }
1996if (leaky + strict > 1 || per_byte + per_cmd + per_conn + per_mail > 1)
1997 {
1998 *log_msgptr = US"conflicting options for \"ratelimit\" condition";
1999 return ERROR;
2000 }
2001
2002/* Default option values */
2003if (!strict) leaky = TRUE;
2004if (!per_byte && !per_cmd && !per_conn) per_mail = TRUE;
2005
f3dcf4a2 2006/* If there is no explicit key, use the sender_host_address. If there is no
870f6ba8
TF
2007sender_host_address (e.g. -bs or acl_not_smtp) then we simply omit it. */
2008
2009if (!have_key && sender_host_address != NULL)
2010 key = string_sprintf("%s / %s", key, sender_host_address);
2011
2012HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit condition limit=%.0f period=%.0f key=%s\n",
2013 limit, period, key);
2014
fe0dab11 2015/* See if we have already computed the rate by looking in the relevant tree. For
870f6ba8
TF
2016per-connection rate limiting, store tree nodes and dbdata in the permanent pool
2017so that they survive across resets. */
2018
2019anchor = NULL;
2020old_pool = store_pool;
2021
2022if (per_conn)
2023 {
2024 anchor = &ratelimiters_conn;
2025 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2026 }
fe0dab11 2027else if (per_mail || per_byte)
870f6ba8 2028 anchor = &ratelimiters_mail;
fe0dab11
TF
2029else if (per_cmd)
2030 anchor = &ratelimiters_cmd;
870f6ba8
TF
2031
2032if (anchor != NULL && (t = tree_search(*anchor, key)) != NULL)
2033 {
2034 dbd = t->data.ptr;
2035 /* The following few lines duplicate some of the code below. */
3348576f
TF
2036 if (dbd->rate < limit) rc = FAIL;
2037 else rc = OK;
870f6ba8
TF
2038 store_pool = old_pool;
2039 sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
2040 HDEBUG(D_acl)
2041 debug_printf("ratelimit found pre-computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
2042 return rc;
2043 }
2044
2045/* We aren't using a pre-computed rate, so get a previously recorded
2046rate from the database, update it, and write it back. If there's no
2047previous rate for this key, create one. */
2048
2049dbm = dbfn_open(US"ratelimit", O_RDWR, &dbblock, TRUE);
2050if (dbm == NULL)
2051 {
2052 store_pool = old_pool;
2053 sender_rate = NULL;
2054 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit database not available\n");
2055 *log_msgptr = US"ratelimit database not available";
2056 return DEFER;
2057 }
2058dbd = dbfn_read(dbm, key);
2059
2060gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
2061
2062if (dbd == NULL)
2063 {
2064 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ratelimit initializing new key's data\n");
2065 dbd = store_get(sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit));
2066 dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
2067 dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
2068 dbd->rate = 0.0;
2069 }
2070else
2071 {
2072 /* The smoothed rate is computed using an exponentially weighted moving
2073 average adjusted for variable sampling intervals. The standard EWMA for
2074 a fixed sampling interval is: f'(t) = (1 - a) * f(t) + a * f'(t - 1)
2075 where f() is the measured value and f'() is the smoothed value.
2076
2077 Old data decays out of the smoothed value exponentially, such that data n
2078 samples old is multiplied by a^n. The exponential decay time constant p
2079 is defined such that data p samples old is multiplied by 1/e, which means
2080 that a = exp(-1/p). We can maintain the same time constant for a variable
2081 sampling interval i by using a = exp(-i/p).
2082
2083 The rate we are measuring is messages per period, suitable for directly
2084 comparing with the limit. The average rate between now and the previous
2085 message is period / interval, which we feed into the EWMA as the sample.
2086
2087 It turns out that the number of messages required for the smoothed rate
2088 to reach the limit when they are sent in a burst is equal to the limit.
2089 This can be seen by analysing the value of the smoothed rate after N
2090 messages sent at even intervals. Let k = (1 - a) * p/i
2091
2092 rate_1 = (1 - a) * p/i + a * rate_0
2093 = k + a * rate_0
2094 rate_2 = k + a * rate_1
2095 = k + a * k + a^2 * rate_0
2096 rate_3 = k + a * k + a^2 * k + a^3 * rate_0
2097 rate_N = rate_0 * a^N + k * SUM(x=0..N-1)(a^x)
2098 = rate_0 * a^N + k * (1 - a^N) / (1 - a)
2099 = rate_0 * a^N + p/i * (1 - a^N)
2100
2101 When N is large, a^N -> 0 so rate_N -> p/i as desired.
2102
2103 rate_N = p/i + (rate_0 - p/i) * a^N
2104 a^N = (rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i)
2105 N * -i/p = log((rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i))
2106 N = p/i * log((rate_0 - p/i) / (rate_N - p/i))
2107
2108 Numerical analysis of the above equation, setting the computed rate to
2109 increase from rate_0 = 0 to rate_N = limit, shows that for large sending
2110 rates, p/i, the number of messages N = limit. So limit serves as both the
2111 maximum rate measured in messages per period, and the maximum number of
2112 messages that can be sent in a fast burst. */
2113
2114 double this_time = (double)tv.tv_sec
2115 + (double)tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0;
2116 double prev_time = (double)dbd->time_stamp
2117 + (double)dbd->time_usec / 1000000.0;
2118 double interval = this_time - prev_time;
2119
2120 double i_over_p = interval / period;
2121 double a = exp(-i_over_p);
2122
2123 /* We must avoid division by zero, and deal gracefully with the clock going
2124 backwards. If we blunder ahead when time is in reverse then the computed
2125 rate will become bogusly huge. Clamp i/p to a very small number instead. */
2126
2127 if (i_over_p <= 0.0) i_over_p = 1e-9;
2128
2129 dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
2130 dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
2131
2132 /* If we are measuring the rate in bytes per period, multiply the
2133 measured rate by the message size. If we don't know the message size
2134 then it's safe to just use a value of zero and let the recorded rate
2135 decay as if nothing happened. */
2136
2137 if (per_byte)
2138 dbd->rate = (message_size < 0 ? 0.0 : (double)message_size)
2139 * (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
2140 else
2141 dbd->rate = (1 - a) / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
2142 }
2143
3348576f
TF
2144/* Clients sending at the limit are considered to be over the limit. This
2145matters for edge cases such the first message sent by a client (which gets
2146the initial rate of 0.0) when the rate limit is zero (i.e. the client should
2147be completely blocked). */
2148
2149if (dbd->rate < limit) rc = FAIL;
2150 else rc = OK;
870f6ba8
TF
2151
2152/* Update the state if the rate is low or if we are being strict. If we
2153are in leaky mode and the sender's rate is too high, we do not update
2154the recorded rate in order to avoid an over-aggressive sender's retry
2155rate preventing them from getting any email through. */
2156
2157if (rc == FAIL || !leaky)
2158 dbfn_write(dbm, key, dbd, sizeof(dbdata_ratelimit));
2159dbfn_close(dbm);
2160
2161/* Store the result in the tree for future reference, if necessary. */
2162
2163if (anchor != NULL)
2164 {
2165 t = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(key));
2166 t->data.ptr = dbd;
2167 Ustrcpy(t->name, key);
2168 (void)tree_insertnode(anchor, t);
2169 }
2170
2171/* We create the formatted version of the sender's rate very late in
2172order to ensure that it is done using the correct storage pool. */
2173
2174store_pool = old_pool;
2175sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
2176
2177HDEBUG(D_acl)
2178 debug_printf("ratelimit computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
2179
2180return rc;
2181}
2182
2183
2184
2185/*************************************************
059ec3d9
PH
2186* Handle conditions/modifiers on an ACL item *
2187*************************************************/
2188
2189/* Called from acl_check() below.
2190
2191Arguments:
2192 verb ACL verb
2193 cb ACL condition block - if NULL, result is OK
2194 where where called from
2195 addr the address being checked for RCPT, or NULL
2196 level the nesting level
2197 epp pointer to pass back TRUE if "endpass" encountered
2198 (applies only to "accept" and "discard")
2199 user_msgptr user message pointer
2200 log_msgptr log message pointer
2201 basic_errno pointer to where to put verify error
2202
2203Returns: OK - all conditions are met
2204 DISCARD - an "acl" condition returned DISCARD - only allowed
2205 for "accept" or "discard" verbs
2206 FAIL - at least one condition fails
2207 FAIL_DROP - an "acl" condition returned FAIL_DROP
2208 DEFER - can't tell at the moment (typically, lookup defer,
2209 but can be temporary callout problem)
2210 ERROR - ERROR from nested ACL or expansion failure or other
2211 error
2212*/
2213
2214static int
2215acl_check_condition(int verb, acl_condition_block *cb, int where,
2216 address_item *addr, int level, BOOL *epp, uschar **user_msgptr,
2217 uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
2218{
2219uschar *user_message = NULL;
2220uschar *log_message = NULL;
2221uschar *p;
2222int rc = OK;
8523533c
TK
2223#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2224int sep = '/';
2225#endif
059ec3d9
PH
2226
2227for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next)
2228 {
2229 uschar *arg;
8e669ac1 2230 int control_type;
059ec3d9
PH
2231
2232 /* The message and log_message items set up messages to be used in
2233 case of rejection. They are expanded later. */
2234
2235 if (cb->type == ACLC_MESSAGE)
2236 {
2237 user_message = cb->arg;
2238 continue;
2239 }
2240
2241 if (cb->type == ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE)
2242 {
2243 log_message = cb->arg;
2244 continue;
2245 }
2246
2247 /* The endpass "condition" just sets a flag to show it occurred. This is
2248 checked at compile time to be on an "accept" or "discard" item. */
2249
2250 if (cb->type == ACLC_ENDPASS)
2251 {
2252 *epp = TRUE;
2253 continue;
2254 }
2255
2256 /* For other conditions and modifiers, the argument is expanded now for some
2257 of them, but not for all, because expansion happens down in some lower level
2258 checking functions in some cases. */
2259
2260 if (cond_expand_at_top[cb->type])
2261 {
2262 arg = expand_string(cb->arg);
2263 if (arg == NULL)
2264 {
2265 if (expand_string_forcedfail) continue;
2266 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s",
2267 cb->arg, expand_string_message);
2268 return search_find_defer? DEFER : ERROR;
2269 }
2270 }
2271 else arg = cb->arg;
2272
2273 /* Show condition, and expanded condition if it's different */
2274
2275 HDEBUG(D_acl)
2276 {
2277 int lhswidth = 0;
2278 debug_printf("check %s%s %n",
2279 (!cond_modifiers[cb->type] && cb->u.negated)? "!":"",
2280 conditions[cb->type], &lhswidth);
2281
2282 if (cb->type == ACLC_SET)
2283 {
2284 int n = cb->u.varnumber;
2285 int t = (n < ACL_C_MAX)? 'c' : 'm';
2286 if (n >= ACL_C_MAX) n -= ACL_C_MAX;
2287 debug_printf("acl_%c%d ", t, n);
2288 lhswidth += 7;
2289 }
2290
2291 debug_printf("= %s\n", cb->arg);
2292
2293 if (arg != cb->arg)
2294 debug_printf("%.*s= %s\n", lhswidth,
2295 US" ", CS arg);
2296 }
2297
2298 /* Check that this condition makes sense at this time */
2299
2300 if ((cond_forbids[cb->type] & (1 << where)) != 0)
2301 {
2302 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot %s %s condition in %s ACL",
2303 cond_modifiers[cb->type]? "use" : "test",
2304 conditions[cb->type], acl_wherenames[where]);
2305 return ERROR;
2306 }
2307
2308 /* Run the appropriate test for each condition, or take the appropriate
2309 action for the remaining modifiers. */
2310
2311 switch(cb->type)
2312 {
2313 /* A nested ACL that returns "discard" makes sense only for an "accept" or
2314 "discard" verb. */
2315
2316 case ACLC_ACL:
2317 rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, arg, level+1, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
2318 if (rc == DISCARD && verb != ACL_ACCEPT && verb != ACL_DISCARD)
2319 {
2320 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("nested ACL returned \"discard\" for "
2321 "\"%s\" command (only allowed with \"accept\" or \"discard\")",
2322 verbs[verb]);
2323 return ERROR;
2324 }
2325 break;
2326
2327 case ACLC_AUTHENTICATED:
2328 rc = (sender_host_authenticated == NULL)? FAIL :
2329 match_isinlist(sender_host_authenticated, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING,
2330 TRUE, NULL);
2331 break;
2332
8523533c
TK
2333#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
2334 case ACLC_BMI_OPTIN:
2335 {
2336 int old_pool = store_pool;
2337 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2338 bmi_current_optin = string_copy(arg);
2339 store_pool = old_pool;
2340 }
2341 break;
2342#endif
2343
059ec3d9
PH
2344 case ACLC_CONDITION:
2345 if (Ustrspn(arg, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg)) /* Digits, or empty */
2346 rc = (Uatoi(arg) == 0)? FAIL : OK;
2347 else
2348 rc = (strcmpic(arg, US"no") == 0 ||
2349 strcmpic(arg, US"false") == 0)? FAIL :
2350 (strcmpic(arg, US"yes") == 0 ||
2351 strcmpic(arg, US"true") == 0)? OK : DEFER;
2352 if (rc == DEFER)
2353 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("invalid \"condition\" value \"%s\"", arg);
2354 break;
2355
2356 case ACLC_CONTROL:
c5fcb476
PH
2357 control_type = decode_control(arg, &p, where, log_msgptr);
2358
8523533c 2359 /* Check if this control makes sense at this time */
c5fcb476
PH
2360
2361 if ((control_forbids[control_type] & (1 << where)) != 0)
2362 {
2363 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot use \"control=%s\" in %s ACL",
2364 controls[control_type], acl_wherenames[where]);
2365 return ERROR;
8e669ac1 2366 }
c5fcb476
PH
2367
2368 switch(control_type)
059ec3d9 2369 {
8523533c
TK
2370#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
2371 case CONTROL_BMI_RUN:
2372 bmi_run = 1;
2373 break;
2374#endif
fb2274d4
TK
2375#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
2376 case CONTROL_DK_VERIFY:
2377 dk_do_verify = 1;
2378 break;
2379#endif
059ec3d9
PH
2380 case CONTROL_ERROR:
2381 return ERROR;
2382
2383 case CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART:
2384 deliver_localpart = addr->cc_local_part;
2385 break;
2386
2387 case CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART:
2388 deliver_localpart = addr->lc_local_part;
2389 break;
2390
2391 case CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC:
2392 smtp_enforce_sync = TRUE;
2393 break;
2394
2395 case CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC:
2396 smtp_enforce_sync = FALSE;
2397 break;
2398
8523533c
TK
2399#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2400 case CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL:
2401 no_mbox_unspool = TRUE;
2402 break;
2403#endif
2404
059ec3d9
PH
2405 case CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE:
2406 no_multiline_responses = TRUE;
2407 break;
2408
29aba418 2409 case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER:
8523533c 2410 case CONTROL_FAKEREJECT:
29aba418 2411 fake_response = (control_type == CONTROL_FAKEDEFER) ? DEFER : FAIL;
8523533c 2412 if (*p == '/')
8e669ac1 2413 {
8523533c 2414 uschar *pp = p + 1;
8e669ac1 2415 while (*pp != 0) pp++;
29aba418 2416 fake_response_text = expand_string(string_copyn(p+1, pp-p-1));
8523533c
TK
2417 p = pp;
2418 }
2419 else
2420 {
2421 /* Explicitly reset to default string */
29aba418 2422 fake_response_text = US"Your message has been rejected but is being kept for evaluation.\nIf it was a legitimate message, it may still be delivered to the target recipient(s).";
8523533c
TK
2423 }
2424 break;
8523533c 2425
059ec3d9
PH
2426 case CONTROL_FREEZE:
2427 deliver_freeze = TRUE;
2428 deliver_frozen_at = time(NULL);
2429 break;
2430
2431 case CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY:
2432 queue_only_policy = TRUE;
2433 break;
2434
2435 case CONTROL_SUBMISSION:
87ba3f5f 2436 originator_name = US"";
059ec3d9 2437 submission_mode = TRUE;
69358f02 2438 while (*p == '/')
8e669ac1 2439 {
69358f02
PH
2440 if (Ustrncmp(p, "/sender_retain", 14) == 0)
2441 {
2442 p += 14;
2443 active_local_sender_retain = TRUE;
8e669ac1
PH
2444 active_local_from_check = FALSE;
2445 }
69358f02
PH
2446 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/domain=", 8) == 0)
2447 {
2448 uschar *pp = p + 8;
8e669ac1 2449 while (*pp != 0 && *pp != '/') pp++;
87ba3f5f
PH
2450 submission_domain = string_copyn(p+8, pp-p-8);
2451 p = pp;
2452 }
2453 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/name=", 6) == 0)
2454 {
2455 uschar *pp = p + 6;
2456 while (*pp != 0 && *pp != '/') pp++;
2457 originator_name = string_copy(parse_fix_phrase(p+6, pp-p-6,
2458 big_buffer, big_buffer_size));
8e669ac1 2459 p = pp;
69358f02 2460 }
8e669ac1
PH
2461 else break;
2462 }
69358f02 2463 if (*p != 0)
059ec3d9 2464 {
69358f02 2465 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
059ec3d9
PH
2466 return ERROR;
2467 }
2468 break;
2469 }
2470 break;
2471
8523533c
TK
2472#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2473 case ACLC_DECODE:
2474 rc = mime_decode(&arg);
2475 break;
2476#endif
2477
059ec3d9
PH
2478 case ACLC_DELAY:
2479 {
2480 int delay = readconf_readtime(arg, 0, FALSE);
2481 if (delay < 0)
2482 {
2483 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for \"delay\" "
2484 "modifier: \"%s\" is not a time value", arg);
2485 return ERROR;
2486 }
2487 else
2488 {
2489 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("delay modifier requests %d-second delay\n",
2490 delay);
2491 if (host_checking)
2492 {
2493 HDEBUG(D_acl)
2494 debug_printf("delay skipped in -bh checking mode\n");
2495 }
010c2d14
PH
2496
2497 /* It appears to be impossible to detect that a TCP/IP connection has
2498 gone away without reading from it. This means that we cannot shorten
2499 the delay below if the client goes away, because we cannot discover
2500 that the client has closed its end of the connection. (The connection
2501 is actually in a half-closed state, waiting for the server to close its
2502 end.) It would be nice to be able to detect this state, so that the
2503 Exim process is not held up unnecessarily. However, it seems that we
2504 can't. The poll() function does not do the right thing, and in any case
2505 it is not always available.
2506
2507 NOTE: If ever this state of affairs changes, remember that we may be
2508 dealing with stdin/stdout here, in addition to TCP/IP connections.
2509 Whatever is done must work in both cases. To detected the stdin/stdout
2510 case, check for smtp_in or smtp_out being NULL. */
2511
8e669ac1 2512 else
86b8287f
PH
2513 {
2514 while (delay > 0) delay = sleep(delay);
8e669ac1 2515 }
059ec3d9
PH
2516 }
2517 }
2518 break;
2519
8523533c
TK
2520#ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME
2521 case ACLC_DEMIME:
2522 rc = demime(&arg);
2523 break;
2524#endif
2525
fb2274d4
TK
2526#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS
2527 case ACLC_DK_DOMAIN_SOURCE:
2528 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2529 /* check header source of domain against given string */
2530 switch (dk_verify_block->address_source) {
2531 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_FROM_FROM:
2532 rc = match_isinlist(US"from", &arg, 0, NULL,
2533 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2534 break;
2535 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_FROM_SENDER:
2536 rc = match_isinlist(US"sender", &arg, 0, NULL,
2537 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2538 break;
2539 case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_NONE:
2540 rc = match_isinlist(US"none", &arg, 0, NULL,
2541 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2542 break;
2543 }
2544 break;
2545 case ACLC_DK_POLICY:
2546 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2547 /* check policy against given string, default FAIL */
2548 rc = FAIL;
2549 if (dk_verify_block->signsall)
2550 rc = match_isinlist(US"signsall", &arg, 0, NULL,
2551 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2552 if (dk_verify_block->testing)
2553 rc = match_isinlist(US"testing", &arg, 0, NULL,
2554 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2555 break;
2556 case ACLC_DK_SENDER_DOMAINS:
2557 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2558 if (dk_verify_block->domain != NULL)
2559 rc = match_isinlist(dk_verify_block->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
2560 NULL, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL);
2561 else rc = FAIL;
2562 break;
2563 case ACLC_DK_SENDER_LOCAL_PARTS:
2564 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2565 if (dk_verify_block->local_part != NULL)
2566 rc = match_isinlist(dk_verify_block->local_part, &arg, 0, &localpartlist_anchor,
2567 NULL, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE, NULL);
2568 else rc = FAIL;
2569 break;
2570 case ACLC_DK_SENDERS:
2571 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2572 if (dk_verify_block->address != NULL)
2573 rc = match_address_list(dk_verify_block->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0, NULL);
2574 else rc = FAIL;
2575 break;
2576 case ACLC_DK_STATUS:
2577 if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; };
2578 if (dk_verify_block->result > 0) {
2579 switch(dk_verify_block->result) {
2580 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_BAD_FORMAT:
2581 rc = match_isinlist(US"bad format", &arg, 0, NULL,
2582 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2583 break;
2584 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NO_KEY:
2585 rc = match_isinlist(US"no key", &arg, 0, NULL,
2586 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2587 break;
2588 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NO_SIGNATURE:
2589 rc = match_isinlist(US"no signature", &arg, 0, NULL,
2590 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2591 break;
2592 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_REVOKED:
2593 rc = match_isinlist(US"revoked", &arg, 0, NULL,
2594 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2595 break;
2596 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NON_PARTICIPANT:
2597 rc = match_isinlist(US"non-participant", &arg, 0, NULL,
2598 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2599 break;
2600 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_GOOD:
2601 rc = match_isinlist(US"good", &arg, 0, NULL,
2602 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2603 break;
2604 case DK_EXIM_RESULT_BAD:
2605 rc = match_isinlist(US"bad", &arg, 0, NULL,
2606 NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2607 break;
2608 }
2609 }
2610 break;
2611#endif
2612
059ec3d9
PH
2613 case ACLC_DNSLISTS:
2614 rc = verify_check_dnsbl(&arg);
2615 break;
2616
2617 case ACLC_DOMAINS:
2618 rc = match_isinlist(addr->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
2619 addr->domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, &deliver_domain_data);
2620 break;
2621
2622 /* The value in tls_cipher is the full cipher name, for example,
2623 TLSv1:DES-CBC3-SHA:168, whereas the values to test for are just the
2624 cipher names such as DES-CBC3-SHA. But program defensively. We don't know
2625 what may in practice come out of the SSL library - which at the time of
2626 writing is poorly documented. */
2627
2628 case ACLC_ENCRYPTED:
2629 if (tls_cipher == NULL) rc = FAIL; else
2630 {
2631 uschar *endcipher = NULL;
2632 uschar *cipher = Ustrchr(tls_cipher, ':');
2633 if (cipher == NULL) cipher = tls_cipher; else
2634 {
2635 endcipher = Ustrchr(++cipher, ':');
2636 if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = 0;
2637 }
2638 rc = match_isinlist(cipher, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL);
2639 if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = ':';
2640 }
2641 break;
2642
2643 /* Use verify_check_this_host() instead of verify_check_host() so that
2644 we can pass over &host_data to catch any looked up data. Once it has been
2645 set, it retains its value so that it's still there if another ACL verb
2646 comes through here and uses the cache. However, we must put it into
2647 permanent store in case it is also expected to be used in a subsequent
2648 message in the same SMTP connection. */
2649
2650 case ACLC_HOSTS:
2651 rc = verify_check_this_host(&arg, sender_host_cache, NULL,
2652 (sender_host_address == NULL)? US"" : sender_host_address, &host_data);
2653 if (host_data != NULL) host_data = string_copy_malloc(host_data);
2654 break;
2655
2656 case ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS:
2657 rc = match_isinlist(addr->cc_local_part, &arg, 0,
2658 &localpartlist_anchor, addr->localpart_cache, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE,
2659 &deliver_localpart_data);
2660 break;
2661
2662 case ACLC_LOGWRITE:
2663 {
2664 int logbits = 0;
2665 uschar *s = arg;
2666 if (*s == ':')
2667 {
2668 s++;
2669 while (*s != ':')
2670 {
2671 if (Ustrncmp(s, "main", 4) == 0)
2672 { logbits |= LOG_MAIN; s += 4; }
2673 else if (Ustrncmp(s, "panic", 5) == 0)
2674 { logbits |= LOG_PANIC; s += 5; }
2675 else if (Ustrncmp(s, "reject", 6) == 0)
2676 { logbits |= LOG_REJECT; s += 6; }
2677 else
2678 {
2679 logbits = LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC;
2680 s = string_sprintf(":unknown log name in \"%s\" in "
2681 "\"logwrite\" in %s ACL", arg, acl_wherenames[where]);
2682 }
2683 if (*s == ',') s++;
2684 }
2685 s++;
2686 }
2687 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
2688 if (logbits == 0) logbits = LOG_MAIN;
2689 log_write(0, logbits, "%s", string_printing(s));
2690 }
2691 break;
8e669ac1 2692
8523533c
TK
2693#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2694 case ACLC_MALWARE:
2695 {
2696 /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
2697 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
2698 /* Run the malware backend. */
2699 rc = malware(&ss);
2700 /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
2701 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2702 != NULL) {
2703 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
2704 {
2705 /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
2706 rc = FAIL;
2707 }
2708 }
2709 }
2710 break;
2711
2712 case ACLC_MIME_REGEX:
2713 rc = mime_regex(&arg);
2714 break;
2715#endif
059ec3d9 2716
870f6ba8
TF
2717 case ACLC_RATELIMIT:
2718 rc = acl_ratelimit(arg, log_msgptr);
2719 break;
2720
059ec3d9
PH
2721 case ACLC_RECIPIENTS:
2722 rc = match_address_list(addr->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0,
2723 &recipient_data);
2724 break;
2725
8523533c
TK
2726#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2727 case ACLC_REGEX:
2728 rc = regex(&arg);
2729 break;
2730#endif
2731
059ec3d9
PH
2732 case ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS:
2733 {
2734 uschar *sdomain;
2735 sdomain = Ustrrchr(sender_address, '@');
2736 sdomain = (sdomain == NULL)? US"" : sdomain + 1;
2737 rc = match_isinlist(sdomain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
2738 sender_domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL);
2739 }
2740 break;
2741
2742 case ACLC_SENDERS:
2743 rc = match_address_list(sender_address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg,
2744 sender_address_cache, -1, 0, &sender_data);
2745 break;
2746
2747 /* Connection variables must persist forever */
2748
2749 case ACLC_SET:
2750 {
2751 int old_pool = store_pool;
2752 if (cb->u.varnumber < ACL_C_MAX) store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2753 acl_var[cb->u.varnumber] = string_copy(arg);
2754 store_pool = old_pool;
2755 }
2756 break;
2757
8523533c
TK
2758#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
2759 case ACLC_SPAM:
2760 {
2761 /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
2762 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
2763 /* Run the spam backend. */
2764 rc = spam(&ss);
2765 /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */
2766 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
2767 != NULL) {
2768 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
2769 {
2770 /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
2771 rc = FAIL;
2772 }
2773 }
2774 }
2775 break;
2776#endif
2777
2778#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF
2779 case ACLC_SPF:
2780 rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address);
2781 break;
2782#endif
2783
059ec3d9
PH
2784 /* If the verb is WARN, discard any user message from verification, because
2785 such messages are SMTP responses, not header additions. The latter come
475fe28a
PH
2786 only from explicit "message" modifiers. However, put the user message into
2787 $acl_verify_message so it can be used in subsequent conditions or modifiers
2788 (until something changes it). */
059ec3d9
PH
2789
2790 case ACLC_VERIFY:
2791 rc = acl_verify(where, addr, arg, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, basic_errno);
475fe28a 2792 acl_verify_message = *user_msgptr;
059ec3d9
PH
2793 if (verb == ACL_WARN) *user_msgptr = NULL;
2794 break;
2795
2796 default:
2797 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown "
2798 "condition %d", cb->type);
2799 break;
2800 }
2801
2802 /* If a condition was negated, invert OK/FAIL. */
2803
2804 if (!cond_modifiers[cb->type] && cb->u.negated)
2805 {
2806 if (rc == OK) rc = FAIL;
2807 else if (rc == FAIL || rc == FAIL_DROP) rc = OK;
2808 }
2809
2810 if (rc != OK) break; /* Conditions loop */
2811 }
2812
2813
2814/* If the result is the one for which "message" and/or "log_message" are used,
2815handle the values of these options. Most verbs have but a single return for
2816which the messages are relevant, but for "discard", it's useful to have the log
2817message both when it succeeds and when it fails. Also, for an "accept" that
2818appears in a QUIT ACL, we want to handle the user message. Since only "accept"
2819and "warn" are permitted in that ACL, we don't need to test the verb.
2820
2821These modifiers act in different ways:
2822
2823"message" is a user message that will be included in an SMTP response. Unless
2824it is empty, it overrides any previously set user message.
2825
2826"log_message" is a non-user message, and it adds to any existing non-user
2827message that is already set.
2828
2829If there isn't a log message set, we make it the same as the user message. */
2830
2831if (((rc == FAIL_DROP)? FAIL : rc) == msgcond[verb] ||
2832 (verb == ACL_DISCARD && rc == OK) ||
2833 (where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT))
2834 {
2835 uschar *expmessage;
2836
2837 /* If the verb is "warn", messages generated by conditions (verification or
2838 nested ACLs) are discarded. Only messages specified at this level are used.
2839 However, the value of an existing message is available in $acl_verify_message
2840 during expansions. */
2841
2842 uschar *old_user_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
2843 uschar *old_log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr != NULL)? *log_msgptr : old_user_msgptr;
2844
2845 if (verb == ACL_WARN) *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
2846
2847 if (user_message != NULL)
2848 {
2849 acl_verify_message = old_user_msgptr;
2850 expmessage = expand_string(user_message);
2851 if (expmessage == NULL)
2852 {
2853 if (!expand_string_forcedfail)
2854 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
2855 user_message, expand_string_message);
2856 }
2857 else if (expmessage[0] != 0) *user_msgptr = expmessage;
2858 }
2859
2860 if (log_message != NULL)
2861 {
2862 acl_verify_message = old_log_msgptr;
2863 expmessage = expand_string(log_message);
2864 if (expmessage == NULL)
2865 {
2866 if (!expand_string_forcedfail)
2867 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s",
2868 log_message, expand_string_message);
2869 }
2870 else if (expmessage[0] != 0)
2871 {
2872 *log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr == NULL)? expmessage :
2873 string_sprintf("%s: %s", expmessage, *log_msgptr);
2874 }
2875 }
2876
2877 /* If no log message, default it to the user message */
2878
2879 if (*log_msgptr == NULL) *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr;
2880 }
2881
2882acl_verify_message = NULL;
2883return rc;
2884}
2885
2886
2887
2888
2889
2890/*************************************************
2891* Get line from a literal ACL *
2892*************************************************/
2893
2894/* This function is passed to acl_read() in order to extract individual lines
2895of a literal ACL, which we access via static pointers. We can destroy the
2896contents because this is called only once (the compiled ACL is remembered).
2897
2898This code is intended to treat the data in the same way as lines in the main
2899Exim configuration file. That is:
2900
2901 . Leading spaces are ignored.
2902
2903 . A \ at the end of a line is a continuation - trailing spaces after the \
2904 are permitted (this is because I don't believe in making invisible things
2905 significant). Leading spaces on the continued part of a line are ignored.
2906
2907 . Physical lines starting (significantly) with # are totally ignored, and
2908 may appear within a sequence of backslash-continued lines.
2909
2910 . Blank lines are ignored, but will end a sequence of continuations.
2911
2912Arguments: none
2913Returns: a pointer to the next line
2914*/
2915
2916
2917static uschar *acl_text; /* Current pointer in the text */
2918static uschar *acl_text_end; /* Points one past the terminating '0' */
2919
2920
2921static uschar *
2922acl_getline(void)
2923{
2924uschar *yield;
2925
2926/* This loop handles leading blank lines and comments. */
2927
2928for(;;)
2929 {
2930 while (isspace(*acl_text)) acl_text++; /* Leading spaces/empty lines */
2931 if (*acl_text == 0) return NULL; /* No more data */
2932 yield = acl_text; /* Potential data line */
2933
2934 while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
2935
2936 /* If we hit the end before a newline, we have the whole logical line. If
2937 it's a comment, there's no more data to be given. Otherwise, yield it. */
2938
2939 if (*acl_text == 0) return (*yield == '#')? NULL : yield;
2940
2941 /* After reaching a newline, end this loop if the physical line does not
2942 start with '#'. If it does, it's a comment, and the loop continues. */
2943
2944 if (*yield != '#') break;
2945 }
2946
2947/* This loop handles continuations. We know we have some real data, ending in
2948newline. See if there is a continuation marker at the end (ignoring trailing
2949white space). We know that *yield is not white space, so no need to test for
2950cont > yield in the backwards scanning loop. */
2951
2952for(;;)
2953 {
2954 uschar *cont;
2955 for (cont = acl_text - 1; isspace(*cont); cont--);
2956
2957 /* If no continuation follows, we are done. Mark the end of the line and
2958 return it. */
2959
2960 if (*cont != '\\')
2961 {
2962 *acl_text++ = 0;
2963 return yield;
2964 }
2965
2966 /* We have encountered a continuation. Skip over whitespace at the start of
2967 the next line, and indeed the whole of the next line or lines if they are
2968 comment lines. */
2969
2970 for (;;)
2971 {
2972 while (*(++acl_text) == ' ' || *acl_text == '\t');
2973 if (*acl_text != '#') break;
2974 while (*(++acl_text) != 0 && *acl_text != '\n');
2975 }
2976
2977 /* We have the start of a continuation line. Move all the rest of the data
2978 to join onto the previous line, and then find its end. If the end is not a
2979 newline, we are done. Otherwise loop to look for another continuation. */
2980
2981 memmove(cont, acl_text, acl_text_end - acl_text);
2982 acl_text_end -= acl_text - cont;
2983 acl_text = cont;
2984 while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++;
2985 if (*acl_text == 0) return yield;
2986 }
2987
2988/* Control does not reach here */
2989}
2990
2991
2992
2993
2994
2995/*************************************************
2996* Check access using an ACL *
2997*************************************************/
2998
2999/* This function is called from address_check. It may recurse via
3000acl_check_condition() - hence the use of a level to stop looping. The ACL is
3001passed as a string which is expanded. A forced failure implies no access check
3002is required. If the result is a single word, it is taken as the name of an ACL
3003which is sought in the global ACL tree. Otherwise, it is taken as literal ACL
3004text, complete with newlines, and parsed as such. In both cases, the ACL check
3005is then run. This function uses an auxiliary function for acl_read() to call
3006for reading individual lines of a literal ACL. This is acl_getline(), which
3007appears immediately above.
3008
3009Arguments:
3010 where where called from
3011 addr address item when called from RCPT; otherwise NULL
3012 s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
3013 level the nesting level
3014 user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
3015 log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
3016
3017Returns: OK access is granted
3018 DISCARD access is apparently granted...
3019 FAIL access is denied
3020 FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection
3021 DEFER can't tell at the moment
3022 ERROR disaster
3023*/
3024
3025static int
3026acl_check_internal(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *s, int level,
3027 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
3028{
3029int fd = -1;
3030acl_block *acl = NULL;
3031uschar *acl_name = US"inline ACL";
3032uschar *ss;
3033
3034/* Catch configuration loops */
3035
3036if (level > 20)
3037 {
3038 *log_msgptr = US"ACL nested too deep: possible loop";
3039 return ERROR;
3040 }
3041
3042if (s == NULL)
3043 {
3044 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ACL is NULL: implicit DENY\n");
3045 return FAIL;
3046 }
3047
3048/* At top level, we expand the incoming string. At lower levels, it has already
3049been expanded as part of condition processing. */
3050
3051if (level == 0)
3052 {
3053 ss = expand_string(s);
3054 if (ss == NULL)
3055 {
3056 if (expand_string_forcedfail) return OK;
3057 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s", s,
3058 expand_string_message);
3059 return ERROR;
3060 }
3061 }
3062else ss = s;
3063
3064while (isspace(*ss))ss++;
3065
3066/* If we can't find a named ACL, the default is to parse it as an inline one.
3067(Unless it begins with a slash; non-existent files give rise to an error.) */
3068
3069acl_text = ss;
3070
3071/* Handle the case of a string that does not contain any spaces. Look for a
3072named ACL among those read from the configuration, or a previously read file.
3073It is possible that the pointer to the ACL is NULL if the configuration
3074contains a name with no data. If not found, and the text begins with '/',
3075read an ACL from a file, and save it so it can be re-used. */
3076
3077if (Ustrchr(ss, ' ') == NULL)
3078 {
3079 tree_node *t = tree_search(acl_anchor, ss);
3080 if (t != NULL)
3081 {
3082 acl = (acl_block *)(t->data.ptr);
3083 if (acl == NULL)
3084 {
3085 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ACL \"%s\" is empty: implicit DENY\n", ss);
3086 return FAIL;
3087 }
3088 acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
3089 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("using ACL \"%s\"\n", ss);
3090 }
3091
3092 else if (*ss == '/')
3093 {
3094 struct stat statbuf;
3095 fd = Uopen(ss, O_RDONLY, 0);
3096 if (fd < 0)
3097 {
3098 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to open ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
3099 strerror(errno));
3100 return ERROR;
3101 }
3102
3103 if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) != 0)
3104 {
3105 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to fstat ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss,
3106 strerror(errno));
3107 return ERROR;
3108 }
3109
3110 acl_text = store_get(statbuf.st_size + 1);
3111 acl_text_end = acl_text + statbuf.st_size + 1;
3112
3113 if (read(fd, acl_text, statbuf.st_size) != statbuf.st_size)
3114 {
3115 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to read ACL file \"%s\": %s",
3116 ss, strerror(errno));
3117 return ERROR;
3118 }
3119 acl_text[statbuf.st_size] = 0;
3120 close(fd);
3121
3122 acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss);
3123 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("read ACL from file %s\n", ss);
3124 }
3125 }
3126
3127/* Parse an ACL that is still in text form. If it came from a file, remember it
3128in the ACL tree, having read it into the POOL_PERM store pool so that it
3129persists between multiple messages. */
3130
3131if (acl == NULL)
3132 {
3133 int old_pool = store_pool;
3134 if (fd >= 0) store_pool = POOL_PERM;
3135 acl = acl_read(acl_getline, log_msgptr);
3136 store_pool = old_pool;
3137 if (acl == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL) return ERROR;
3138 if (fd >= 0)
3139 {
3140 tree_node *t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(ss));
3141 Ustrcpy(t->name, ss);
3142 t->data.ptr = acl;
3143 (void)tree_insertnode(&acl_anchor, t);
3144 }
3145 }
3146
3147/* Now we have an ACL to use. It's possible it may be NULL. */
3148
3149while (acl != NULL)
3150 {
3151 int cond;
3152 int basic_errno = 0;
3153 BOOL endpass_seen = FALSE;
3154
3155 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL;
3156 acl_temp_details = FALSE;
3157
3158 if (where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT &&
3159 acl->verb != ACL_ACCEPT &&
3160 acl->verb != ACL_WARN)
3161 {
3162 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"%s\" is not allowed in a QUIT ACL",
3163 verbs[acl->verb]);
3164 return ERROR;
3165 }
3166
3167 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("processing \"%s\"\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3168
3169 /* Clear out any search error message from a previous check before testing
3170 this condition. */
3171
3172 search_error_message = NULL;
3173 cond = acl_check_condition(acl->verb, acl->condition, where, addr, level,
3174 &endpass_seen, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, &basic_errno);
3175
3176 /* Handle special returns: DEFER causes a return except on a WARN verb;
3177 ERROR always causes a return. */
3178
3179 switch (cond)
3180 {
3181 case DEFER:
3182 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test deferred\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3183 if (basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
3184 {
3185 if (search_error_message != NULL && *search_error_message != 0)
3186 *log_msgptr = search_error_message;
3187 if (smtp_return_error_details) acl_temp_details = TRUE;
3188 }
3189 else
3190 {
3191 acl_temp_details = TRUE;
3192 }
3193 if (acl->verb != ACL_WARN) return DEFER;
3194 break;
3195
3196 default: /* Paranoia */
3197 case ERROR:
3198 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test error\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3199 return ERROR;
3200
3201 case OK:
3202 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test succeeded\n",
3203 verbs[acl->verb]);
3204 break;
3205
3206 case FAIL:
3207 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test failed\n", verbs[acl->verb]);
3208 break;
3209
3210 /* DISCARD and DROP can happen only from a nested ACL condition, and
3211 DISCARD can happen only for an "accept" or "discard" verb. */
3212
3213 case DISCARD:
3214 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test yielded \"discard\"\n",
3215 verbs[acl->verb]);
3216 break;
3217
3218 case FAIL_DROP:
3219 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test yielded \"drop\"\n",
3220 verbs[acl->verb]);
3221 break;
3222 }
3223
3224 /* At this point, cond for most verbs is either OK or FAIL or (as a result of
3225 a nested ACL condition) FAIL_DROP. However, for WARN, cond may be DEFER, and
3226 for ACCEPT and DISCARD, it may be DISCARD after a nested ACL call. */
3227
3228 switch(acl->verb)
3229 {
3230 case ACL_ACCEPT:
3231 if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD) return cond;
3232 if (endpass_seen)
3233 {
3234 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("accept: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
3235 return cond;
3236 }
3237 break;
3238
3239 case ACL_DEFER:
3240 if (cond == OK)
3241 {
3242 acl_temp_details = TRUE;
3243 return DEFER;
3244 }
3245 break;
3246
3247 case ACL_DENY:
3248 if (cond == OK) return FAIL;
3249 break;
3250
3251 case ACL_DISCARD:
3252 if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD) return DISCARD;
3253 if (endpass_seen)
3254 {
3255 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("discard: endpass encountered - denying access\n");
3256 return cond;
3257 }
3258 break;
3259
3260 case ACL_DROP:
3261 if (cond == OK) return FAIL_DROP;
3262 break;
3263
3264 case ACL_REQUIRE:
3265 if (cond != OK) return cond;
3266 break;
3267
3268 case ACL_WARN:
3269 if (cond == OK)
3270 acl_warn(where, *user_msgptr, *log_msgptr);
3271 else if (cond == DEFER)
9c7a242c
PH
3272 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s Warning: ACL \"warn\" statement skipped: "
3273 "condition test deferred%s%s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
3274 (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : US": ",
3275 (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : *log_msgptr);
059ec3d9
PH
3276 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL; /* In case implicit DENY follows */
3277 break;
3278
3279 default:
3280 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown verb %d",
3281 acl->verb);
3282 break;
3283 }
3284
3285 /* Pass to the next ACL item */
3286
3287 acl = acl->next;
3288 }
3289
3290/* We have reached the end of the ACL. This is an implicit DENY. */
3291
3292HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("end of %s: implicit DENY\n", acl_name);
3293return FAIL;
3294}
3295
3296
3297/*************************************************
3298* Check access using an ACL *
3299*************************************************/
3300
3301/* This is the external interface for ACL checks. It sets up an address and the
3302expansions for $domain and $local_part when called after RCPT, then calls
3303acl_check_internal() to do the actual work.
3304
3305Arguments:
3306 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating where called from
3307 data_string RCPT address, or SMTP command argument, or NULL
3308 s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY
3309 user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response)
3310 log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response)
3311
3312Returns: OK access is granted by an ACCEPT verb
3313 DISCARD access is granted by a DISCARD verb
3314 FAIL access is denied
3315 FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection
3316 DEFER can't tell at the moment
3317 ERROR disaster
3318*/
3319
3320int
3321acl_check(int where, uschar *data_string, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr,
3322 uschar **log_msgptr)
3323{
3324int rc;
3325address_item adb;
3326address_item *addr;
3327
3328*user_msgptr = *log_msgptr = NULL;
3329sender_verified_failed = NULL;
fe0dab11 3330ratelimiters_cmd = NULL;
059ec3d9
PH
3331
3332if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT)
3333 {
3334 adb = address_defaults;
3335 addr = &adb;
3336 addr->address = data_string;
3337 if (deliver_split_address(addr) == DEFER)
3338 {
3339 *log_msgptr = US"defer in percent_hack_domains check";
3340 return DEFER;
3341 }
3342 deliver_domain = addr->domain;
3343 deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
3344 }
3345else
3346 {
3347 addr = NULL;
3348 smtp_command_argument = data_string;
3349 }
3350
3351rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, 0, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
3352
3353smtp_command_argument = deliver_domain =
2a3eea10 3354 deliver_localpart = deliver_address_data = sender_address_data = NULL;
059ec3d9
PH
3355
3356/* A DISCARD response is permitted only for message ACLs, excluding the PREDATA
3357ACL, which is really in the middle of an SMTP command. */
3358
3359if (rc == DISCARD)
3360 {
3361 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP || where == ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)
3362 {
3363 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "\"discard\" verb not allowed in %s "
3364 "ACL", acl_wherenames[where]);
3365 return ERROR;
3366 }
3367 return DISCARD;
3368 }
3369
3370/* A DROP response is not permitted from MAILAUTH */
3371
3372if (rc == FAIL_DROP && where == ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)
3373 {
3374 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "\"drop\" verb not allowed in %s "
3375 "ACL", acl_wherenames[where]);
3376 return ERROR;
3377 }
3378
3379/* Before giving an error response, take a look at the length of any user
3380message, and split it up into multiple lines if possible. */
3381
3382if (rc != OK && *user_msgptr != NULL && Ustrlen(*user_msgptr) > 75)
3383 {
3384 uschar *s = *user_msgptr = string_copy(*user_msgptr);
3385 uschar *ss = s;
3386
3387 for (;;)
3388 {
3389 int i = 0;
3390 while (i < 75 && *ss != 0 && *ss != '\n') ss++, i++;
3391 if (*ss == 0) break;
3392 if (*ss == '\n')
3393 s = ++ss;
3394 else
3395 {
3396 uschar *t = ss + 1;
3397 uschar *tt = NULL;
3398 while (--t > s + 35)
3399 {
3400 if (*t == ' ')
3401 {
3402 if (t[-1] == ':') { tt = t; break; }
3403 if (tt == NULL) tt = t;
3404 }
3405 }
3406
3407 if (tt == NULL) /* Can't split behind - try ahead */
3408 {
3409 t = ss + 1;
3410 while (*t != 0)
3411 {
3412 if (*t == ' ' || *t == '\n')
3413 { tt = t; break; }
3414 t++;
3415 }
3416 }
3417
3418 if (tt == NULL) break; /* Can't find anywhere to split */
3419 *tt = '\n';
3420 s = ss = tt+1;
3421 }
3422 }
3423 }
3424
3425return rc;
3426}
3427
3428/* End of acl.c */