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29aba418 | 1 | /* $Cambridge: exim/src/src/acl.c,v 1.33 2005/05/23 15:28:38 fanf2 Exp $ */ |
059ec3d9 PH |
2 | |
3 | /************************************************* | |
4 | * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent * | |
5 | *************************************************/ | |
6 | ||
c988f1f4 | 7 | /* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2005 */ |
059ec3d9 PH |
8 | /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */ |
9 | ||
10 | /* Code for handling Access Control Lists (ACLs) */ | |
11 | ||
12 | #include "exim.h" | |
13 | ||
14 | ||
15 | /* Default callout timeout */ | |
16 | ||
17 | #define CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT 30 | |
18 | ||
19 | /* ACL verb codes - keep in step with the table of verbs that follows */ | |
20 | ||
21 | enum { ACL_ACCEPT, ACL_DEFER, ACL_DENY, ACL_DISCARD, ACL_DROP, ACL_REQUIRE, | |
22 | ACL_WARN }; | |
23 | ||
24 | /* ACL verbs */ | |
25 | ||
26 | static uschar *verbs[] = | |
27 | { US"accept", US"defer", US"deny", US"discard", US"drop", US"require", | |
28 | US"warn" }; | |
29 | ||
30 | /* For each verb, the condition for which "message" is used */ | |
31 | ||
32 | static int msgcond[] = { FAIL, OK, OK, FAIL, OK, FAIL, OK }; | |
33 | ||
34 | /* ACL condition and modifier codes - keep in step with the table that | |
35 | follows. */ | |
36 | ||
8523533c TK |
37 | enum { ACLC_ACL, ACLC_AUTHENTICATED, |
38 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL | |
39 | ACLC_BMI_OPTIN, | |
40 | #endif | |
41 | ACLC_CONDITION, ACLC_CONTROL, | |
42 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN | |
43 | ACLC_DECODE, | |
44 | #endif | |
45 | ACLC_DELAY, | |
46 | #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME | |
47 | ACLC_DEMIME, | |
fb2274d4 TK |
48 | #endif |
49 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS | |
50 | ACLC_DK_DOMAIN_SOURCE, | |
51 | ACLC_DK_POLICY, | |
52 | ACLC_DK_SENDER_DOMAINS, | |
53 | ACLC_DK_SENDER_LOCAL_PARTS, | |
54 | ACLC_DK_SENDERS, | |
55 | ACLC_DK_STATUS, | |
8e669ac1 | 56 | #endif |
8523533c TK |
57 | ACLC_DNSLISTS, ACLC_DOMAINS, ACLC_ENCRYPTED, ACLC_ENDPASS, |
58 | ACLC_HOSTS, ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS, ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE, ACLC_LOGWRITE, | |
59 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN | |
60 | ACLC_MALWARE, | |
61 | #endif | |
62 | ACLC_MESSAGE, | |
63 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN | |
64 | ACLC_MIME_REGEX, | |
65 | #endif | |
66 | ACLC_RECIPIENTS, | |
67 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN | |
68 | ACLC_REGEX, | |
69 | #endif | |
70 | ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS, ACLC_SENDERS, ACLC_SET, | |
71 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN | |
8e669ac1 | 72 | ACLC_SPAM, |
8523533c TK |
73 | #endif |
74 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF | |
75 | ACLC_SPF, | |
76 | #endif | |
77 | ACLC_VERIFY }; | |
059ec3d9 PH |
78 | |
79 | /* ACL conditions/modifiers: "delay", "control", "endpass", "message", | |
80 | "log_message", "logwrite", and "set" are modifiers that look like conditions | |
81 | but always return TRUE. They are used for their side effects. */ | |
82 | ||
8523533c TK |
83 | static uschar *conditions[] = { US"acl", US"authenticated", |
84 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL | |
85 | US"bmi_optin", | |
86 | #endif | |
87 | US"condition", | |
8e669ac1 | 88 | US"control", |
8523533c TK |
89 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN |
90 | US"decode", | |
91 | #endif | |
92 | US"delay", | |
93 | #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME | |
94 | US"demime", | |
fb2274d4 TK |
95 | #endif |
96 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS | |
7f45268c PH |
97 | US"dk_domain_source", |
98 | US"dk_policy", | |
99 | US"dk_sender_domains", | |
100 | US"dk_sender_local_parts", | |
101 | US"dk_senders", | |
102 | US"dk_status", | |
8523533c TK |
103 | #endif |
104 | US"dnslists", US"domains", US"encrypted", | |
059ec3d9 | 105 | US"endpass", US"hosts", US"local_parts", US"log_message", US"logwrite", |
8523533c TK |
106 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN |
107 | US"malware", | |
108 | #endif | |
109 | US"message", | |
110 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN | |
111 | US"mime_regex", | |
112 | #endif | |
113 | US"recipients", | |
114 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN | |
115 | US"regex", | |
116 | #endif | |
117 | US"sender_domains", US"senders", US"set", | |
118 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN | |
119 | US"spam", | |
120 | #endif | |
121 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF | |
122 | US"spf", | |
123 | #endif | |
059ec3d9 | 124 | US"verify" }; |
8e669ac1 | 125 | |
c5fcb476 PH |
126 | /* ACL control names */ |
127 | ||
128 | static uschar *controls[] = { US"error", US"caseful_local_part", | |
129 | US"caselower_local_part", US"enforce_sync", US"no_enforce_sync", US"freeze", | |
8e669ac1 | 130 | US"queue_only", US"submission", US"no_multiline"}; |
059ec3d9 PH |
131 | |
132 | /* Flags to indicate for which conditions /modifiers a string expansion is done | |
133 | at the outer level. In the other cases, expansion already occurs in the | |
134 | checking functions. */ | |
135 | ||
136 | static uschar cond_expand_at_top[] = { | |
137 | TRUE, /* acl */ | |
138 | FALSE, /* authenticated */ | |
8523533c TK |
139 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL |
140 | TRUE, /* bmi_optin */ | |
8e669ac1 | 141 | #endif |
059ec3d9 PH |
142 | TRUE, /* condition */ |
143 | TRUE, /* control */ | |
8523533c TK |
144 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN |
145 | TRUE, /* decode */ | |
146 | #endif | |
059ec3d9 | 147 | TRUE, /* delay */ |
8523533c TK |
148 | #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME |
149 | TRUE, /* demime */ | |
fb2274d4 TK |
150 | #endif |
151 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS | |
7f45268c PH |
152 | TRUE, /* dk_domain_source */ |
153 | TRUE, /* dk_policy */ | |
154 | TRUE, /* dk_sender_domains */ | |
e715ad22 | 155 | TRUE, /* dk_sender_local_parts */ |
7f45268c PH |
156 | TRUE, /* dk_senders */ |
157 | TRUE, /* dk_status */ | |
8523533c | 158 | #endif |
059ec3d9 PH |
159 | TRUE, /* dnslists */ |
160 | FALSE, /* domains */ | |
161 | FALSE, /* encrypted */ | |
162 | TRUE, /* endpass */ | |
163 | FALSE, /* hosts */ | |
164 | FALSE, /* local_parts */ | |
165 | TRUE, /* log_message */ | |
166 | TRUE, /* logwrite */ | |
8523533c TK |
167 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN |
168 | TRUE, /* malware */ | |
169 | #endif | |
059ec3d9 | 170 | TRUE, /* message */ |
8523533c TK |
171 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN |
172 | TRUE, /* mime_regex */ | |
173 | #endif | |
059ec3d9 | 174 | FALSE, /* recipients */ |
8523533c TK |
175 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN |
176 | TRUE, /* regex */ | |
177 | #endif | |
059ec3d9 PH |
178 | FALSE, /* sender_domains */ |
179 | FALSE, /* senders */ | |
180 | TRUE, /* set */ | |
8523533c TK |
181 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN |
182 | TRUE, /* spam */ | |
183 | #endif | |
184 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF | |
185 | TRUE, /* spf */ | |
186 | #endif | |
059ec3d9 PH |
187 | TRUE /* verify */ |
188 | }; | |
189 | ||
190 | /* Flags to identify the modifiers */ | |
191 | ||
192 | static uschar cond_modifiers[] = { | |
193 | FALSE, /* acl */ | |
194 | FALSE, /* authenticated */ | |
8523533c TK |
195 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL |
196 | TRUE, /* bmi_optin */ | |
8e669ac1 | 197 | #endif |
059ec3d9 PH |
198 | FALSE, /* condition */ |
199 | TRUE, /* control */ | |
8523533c TK |
200 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN |
201 | FALSE, /* decode */ | |
202 | #endif | |
059ec3d9 | 203 | TRUE, /* delay */ |
8523533c TK |
204 | #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME |
205 | FALSE, /* demime */ | |
fb2274d4 TK |
206 | #endif |
207 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS | |
7f45268c PH |
208 | FALSE, /* dk_domain_source */ |
209 | FALSE, /* dk_policy */ | |
210 | FALSE, /* dk_sender_domains */ | |
e715ad22 | 211 | FALSE, /* dk_sender_local_parts */ |
7f45268c PH |
212 | FALSE, /* dk_senders */ |
213 | FALSE, /* dk_status */ | |
8523533c | 214 | #endif |
059ec3d9 PH |
215 | FALSE, /* dnslists */ |
216 | FALSE, /* domains */ | |
217 | FALSE, /* encrypted */ | |
218 | TRUE, /* endpass */ | |
219 | FALSE, /* hosts */ | |
220 | FALSE, /* local_parts */ | |
221 | TRUE, /* log_message */ | |
8523533c TK |
222 | TRUE, /* logwrite */ |
223 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN | |
224 | FALSE, /* malware */ | |
225 | #endif | |
059ec3d9 | 226 | TRUE, /* message */ |
8523533c TK |
227 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN |
228 | FALSE, /* mime_regex */ | |
229 | #endif | |
059ec3d9 | 230 | FALSE, /* recipients */ |
8523533c TK |
231 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN |
232 | FALSE, /* regex */ | |
233 | #endif | |
059ec3d9 PH |
234 | FALSE, /* sender_domains */ |
235 | FALSE, /* senders */ | |
236 | TRUE, /* set */ | |
8523533c TK |
237 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN |
238 | FALSE, /* spam */ | |
239 | #endif | |
240 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF | |
241 | FALSE, /* spf */ | |
242 | #endif | |
059ec3d9 PH |
243 | FALSE /* verify */ |
244 | }; | |
245 | ||
c5fcb476 | 246 | /* Bit map vector of which conditions are not allowed at certain times. For |
2f079f46 PH |
247 | each condition, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier |
248 | to specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */ | |
059ec3d9 PH |
249 | |
250 | static unsigned int cond_forbids[] = { | |
251 | 0, /* acl */ | |
8e669ac1 | 252 | |
059ec3d9 PH |
253 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* authenticated */ |
254 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO), | |
8e669ac1 | 255 | |
8523533c | 256 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL |
3864bb8e | 257 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* bmi_optin */ |
8523533c TK |
258 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)| |
259 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)| | |
8e669ac1 | 260 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)| |
8523533c TK |
261 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)| |
262 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)| | |
263 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA), | |
264 | #endif | |
8e669ac1 | 265 | |
059ec3d9 | 266 | 0, /* condition */ |
8e669ac1 | 267 | |
059ec3d9 | 268 | /* Certain types of control are always allowed, so we let it through |
2f079f46 | 269 | always and check in the control processing itself. */ |
8e669ac1 | 270 | |
059ec3d9 | 271 | 0, /* control */ |
8e669ac1 | 272 | |
8523533c | 273 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN |
2f079f46 PH |
274 | (unsigned int) |
275 | ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* decode */ | |
8523533c TK |
276 | #endif |
277 | ||
059ec3d9 | 278 | 0, /* delay */ |
8e669ac1 | 279 | |
f7b63901 | 280 | #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME |
2f079f46 PH |
281 | (unsigned int) |
282 | ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* demime */ | |
8523533c | 283 | #endif |
8e669ac1 | 284 | |
fb2274d4 | 285 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS |
2f079f46 | 286 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_domain_source */ |
fb2274d4 TK |
287 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)| |
288 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)| | |
289 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)| | |
290 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)| | |
291 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)| | |
292 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY), | |
84330b7b | 293 | |
2f079f46 | 294 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_policy */ |
fb2274d4 TK |
295 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)| |
296 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)| | |
297 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)| | |
298 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)| | |
299 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)| | |
300 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY), | |
84330b7b | 301 | |
2f079f46 | 302 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_sender_domains */ |
fb2274d4 TK |
303 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)| |
304 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)| | |
305 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)| | |
306 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)| | |
307 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)| | |
308 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY), | |
84330b7b | 309 | |
2f079f46 | 310 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_sender_local_parts */ |
fb2274d4 TK |
311 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)| |
312 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)| | |
313 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)| | |
314 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)| | |
315 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)| | |
316 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY), | |
84330b7b | 317 | |
2f079f46 | 318 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_senders */ |
fb2274d4 TK |
319 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)| |
320 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)| | |
321 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)| | |
322 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)| | |
323 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)| | |
324 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY), | |
84330b7b | 325 | |
2f079f46 | 326 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)| /* dk_status */ |
fb2274d4 TK |
327 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)| |
328 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)| | |
329 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)| | |
330 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)| | |
331 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)| | |
332 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY), | |
333 | #endif | |
334 | ||
059ec3d9 PH |
335 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* dnslists */ |
336 | ||
2f079f46 PH |
337 | (unsigned int) |
338 | ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* domains */ | |
059ec3d9 PH |
339 | |
340 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* encrypted */ | |
341 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO), | |
8e669ac1 | 342 | |
059ec3d9 | 343 | 0, /* endpass */ |
8e669ac1 | 344 | |
059ec3d9 PH |
345 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* hosts */ |
346 | ||
2f079f46 PH |
347 | (unsigned int) |
348 | ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* local_parts */ | |
059ec3d9 PH |
349 | |
350 | 0, /* log_message */ | |
8e669ac1 | 351 | |
059ec3d9 | 352 | 0, /* logwrite */ |
8e669ac1 | 353 | |
8523533c | 354 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN |
2f079f46 PH |
355 | (unsigned int) |
356 | ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* malware */ | |
8523533c TK |
357 | #endif |
358 | ||
059ec3d9 PH |
359 | 0, /* message */ |
360 | ||
8523533c | 361 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN |
2f079f46 PH |
362 | (unsigned int) |
363 | ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME), /* mime_regex */ | |
8523533c TK |
364 | #endif |
365 | ||
2f079f46 PH |
366 | (unsigned int) |
367 | ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* recipients */ | |
059ec3d9 | 368 | |
8523533c | 369 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN |
2f079f46 PH |
370 | (unsigned int) |
371 | ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)| /* regex */ | |
372 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)), | |
8523533c TK |
373 | #endif |
374 | ||
059ec3d9 PH |
375 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* sender_domains */ |
376 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)| | |
377 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)| | |
378 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)| | |
379 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY), | |
380 | ||
381 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* senders */ | |
382 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)| | |
383 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_QUIT)| | |
384 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)| | |
385 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY), | |
386 | ||
387 | 0, /* set */ | |
388 | ||
8523533c | 389 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN |
2f079f46 PH |
390 | (unsigned int) |
391 | ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)), /* spam */ | |
8523533c TK |
392 | #endif |
393 | ||
394 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF | |
395 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_AUTH)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_CONNECT)| /* spf */ | |
396 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_HELO)| | |
397 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH)| | |
398 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_ETRN)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_EXPN)| | |
399 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_STARTTLS)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_VRFY), | |
400 | #endif | |
401 | ||
059ec3d9 PH |
402 | /* Certain types of verify are always allowed, so we let it through |
403 | always and check in the verify function itself */ | |
404 | ||
405 | 0 /* verify */ | |
059ec3d9 PH |
406 | }; |
407 | ||
408 | ||
409 | /* Return values from decode_control() */ | |
410 | ||
8e669ac1 | 411 | enum { |
8523533c TK |
412 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL |
413 | CONTROL_BMI_RUN, | |
fb2274d4 TK |
414 | #endif |
415 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS | |
416 | CONTROL_DK_VERIFY, | |
8e669ac1 | 417 | #endif |
8523533c | 418 | CONTROL_ERROR, CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART, |
059ec3d9 | 419 | CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, CONTROL_FREEZE, |
8523533c TK |
420 | CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY, CONTROL_SUBMISSION, |
421 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN | |
8e669ac1 | 422 | CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL, |
8523533c | 423 | #endif |
29aba418 | 424 | CONTROL_FAKEDEFER, CONTROL_FAKEREJECT, CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE }; |
059ec3d9 | 425 | |
c5fcb476 PH |
426 | /* Bit map vector of which controls are not allowed at certain times. For |
427 | each control, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier to | |
428 | specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */ | |
429 | ||
430 | static unsigned int control_forbids[] = { | |
8523533c TK |
431 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL |
432 | 0, /* bmi_run */ | |
433 | #endif | |
fb2274d4 | 434 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS |
e715ad22 | 435 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* dk_verify */ |
fb2274d4 | 436 | #endif |
3e11c26b | 437 | |
c5fcb476 | 438 | 0, /* error */ |
8e669ac1 PH |
439 | |
440 | (unsigned int) | |
c5fcb476 | 441 | ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* caseful_local_part */ |
8e669ac1 PH |
442 | |
443 | (unsigned int) | |
c5fcb476 | 444 | ~(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT), /* caselower_local_part */ |
8e669ac1 | 445 | |
c5fcb476 | 446 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* enforce_sync */ |
8e669ac1 | 447 | |
c5fcb476 | 448 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP), /* no_enforce_sync */ |
8e669ac1 PH |
449 | |
450 | (unsigned int) | |
c5fcb476 PH |
451 | ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* freeze */ |
452 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)| | |
e715ad22 | 453 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)), |
8e669ac1 PH |
454 | |
455 | (unsigned int) | |
c5fcb476 PH |
456 | ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* queue_only */ |
457 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)| | |
e715ad22 | 458 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)), |
8e669ac1 PH |
459 | |
460 | (unsigned int) | |
c5fcb476 | 461 | ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* submission */ |
8e669ac1 | 462 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)), |
8523533c TK |
463 | |
464 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN | |
8e669ac1 | 465 | (unsigned int) |
14d57970 | 466 | ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* no_mbox_unspool */ |
e715ad22 TK |
467 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)| |
468 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)), | |
8523533c | 469 | #endif |
a6c4ab60 | 470 | |
29aba418 TF |
471 | (unsigned int) |
472 | ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakedefer */ | |
473 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)| | |
474 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)), | |
475 | ||
8e669ac1 | 476 | (unsigned int) |
a6c4ab60 | 477 | ~((1<<ACL_WHERE_MAIL)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_RCPT)| /* fakereject */ |
e715ad22 TK |
478 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_PREDATA)|(1<<ACL_WHERE_DATA)| |
479 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_MIME)), | |
8523533c | 480 | |
c5fcb476 PH |
481 | (1<<ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) /* no_multiline */ |
482 | }; | |
483 | ||
484 | /* Structure listing various control arguments, with their characteristics. */ | |
059ec3d9 PH |
485 | |
486 | typedef struct control_def { | |
487 | uschar *name; | |
488 | int value; /* CONTROL_xxx value */ | |
059ec3d9 PH |
489 | BOOL has_option; /* Has /option(s) following */ |
490 | } control_def; | |
491 | ||
492 | static control_def controls_list[] = { | |
8523533c TK |
493 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL |
494 | { US"bmi_run", CONTROL_BMI_RUN, FALSE}, | |
fb2274d4 TK |
495 | #endif |
496 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS | |
497 | { US"dk_verify", CONTROL_DK_VERIFY, FALSE}, | |
8523533c | 498 | #endif |
c5fcb476 PH |
499 | { US"caseful_local_part", CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART, FALSE}, |
500 | { US"caselower_local_part", CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART, FALSE}, | |
501 | { US"enforce_sync", CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE}, | |
502 | { US"freeze", CONTROL_FREEZE, FALSE}, | |
503 | { US"no_enforce_sync", CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC, FALSE}, | |
504 | { US"no_multiline_responses", CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE, FALSE}, | |
505 | { US"queue_only", CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY, FALSE}, | |
8523533c TK |
506 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN |
507 | { US"no_mbox_unspool", CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL, FALSE}, | |
8523533c | 508 | #endif |
29aba418 | 509 | { US"fakedefer", CONTROL_FAKEDEFER, TRUE}, |
0f9b0483 | 510 | { US"fakereject", CONTROL_FAKEREJECT, TRUE}, |
c5fcb476 | 511 | { US"submission", CONTROL_SUBMISSION, TRUE} |
059ec3d9 PH |
512 | }; |
513 | ||
e5a9dba6 PH |
514 | /* Support data structures for Client SMTP Authorization. acl_verify_csa() |
515 | caches its result in a tree to avoid repeated DNS queries. The result is an | |
516 | integer code which is used as an index into the following tables of | |
517 | explanatory strings and verification return codes. */ | |
518 | ||
519 | static tree_node *csa_cache = NULL; | |
520 | ||
521 | enum { CSA_UNKNOWN, CSA_OK, CSA_DEFER_SRV, CSA_DEFER_ADDR, | |
522 | CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT, CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN, CSA_FAIL_NOADDR, CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH }; | |
523 | ||
524 | /* The acl_verify_csa() return code is translated into an acl_verify() return | |
525 | code using the following table. It is OK unless the client is definitely not | |
526 | authorized. This is because CSA is supposed to be optional for sending sites, | |
527 | so recipients should not be too strict about checking it - especially because | |
528 | DNS problems are quite likely to occur. It's possible to use $csa_status in | |
529 | further ACL conditions to distinguish ok, unknown, and defer if required, but | |
530 | the aim is to make the usual configuration simple. */ | |
531 | ||
532 | static int csa_return_code[] = { | |
533 | OK, OK, OK, OK, | |
534 | FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL | |
535 | }; | |
536 | ||
537 | static uschar *csa_status_string[] = { | |
538 | US"unknown", US"ok", US"defer", US"defer", | |
539 | US"fail", US"fail", US"fail", US"fail" | |
540 | }; | |
541 | ||
542 | static uschar *csa_reason_string[] = { | |
543 | US"unknown", | |
544 | US"ok", | |
545 | US"deferred (SRV lookup failed)", | |
546 | US"deferred (target address lookup failed)", | |
547 | US"failed (explicit authorization required)", | |
548 | US"failed (host name not authorized)", | |
549 | US"failed (no authorized addresses)", | |
550 | US"failed (client address mismatch)" | |
551 | }; | |
552 | ||
059ec3d9 PH |
553 | /* Enable recursion between acl_check_internal() and acl_check_condition() */ |
554 | ||
555 | static int acl_check_internal(int, address_item *, uschar *, int, uschar **, | |
556 | uschar **); | |
557 | ||
558 | ||
559 | /************************************************* | |
560 | * Pick out name from list * | |
561 | *************************************************/ | |
562 | ||
563 | /* Use a binary chop method | |
564 | ||
565 | Arguments: | |
566 | name name to find | |
567 | list list of names | |
568 | end size of list | |
569 | ||
570 | Returns: offset in list, or -1 if not found | |
571 | */ | |
572 | ||
573 | static int | |
574 | acl_checkname(uschar *name, uschar **list, int end) | |
575 | { | |
576 | int start = 0; | |
577 | ||
578 | while (start < end) | |
579 | { | |
580 | int mid = (start + end)/2; | |
581 | int c = Ustrcmp(name, list[mid]); | |
582 | if (c == 0) return mid; | |
583 | if (c < 0) end = mid; else start = mid + 1; | |
584 | } | |
585 | ||
586 | return -1; | |
587 | } | |
588 | ||
589 | ||
590 | /************************************************* | |
591 | * Read and parse one ACL * | |
592 | *************************************************/ | |
593 | ||
594 | /* This function is called both from readconf in order to parse the ACLs in the | |
595 | configuration file, and also when an ACL is encountered dynamically (e.g. as | |
596 | the result of an expansion). It is given a function to call in order to | |
597 | retrieve the lines of the ACL. This function handles skipping comments and | |
598 | blank lines (where relevant). | |
599 | ||
600 | Arguments: | |
601 | func function to get next line of ACL | |
602 | error where to put an error message | |
603 | ||
604 | Returns: pointer to ACL, or NULL | |
605 | NULL can be legal (empty ACL); in this case error will be NULL | |
606 | */ | |
607 | ||
608 | acl_block * | |
609 | acl_read(uschar *(*func)(void), uschar **error) | |
610 | { | |
611 | acl_block *yield = NULL; | |
612 | acl_block **lastp = &yield; | |
613 | acl_block *this = NULL; | |
614 | acl_condition_block *cond; | |
615 | acl_condition_block **condp = NULL; | |
616 | uschar *s; | |
617 | ||
618 | *error = NULL; | |
619 | ||
620 | while ((s = (*func)()) != NULL) | |
621 | { | |
622 | int v, c; | |
623 | BOOL negated = FALSE; | |
624 | uschar *saveline = s; | |
625 | uschar name[64]; | |
626 | ||
627 | /* Conditions (but not verbs) are allowed to be negated by an initial | |
628 | exclamation mark. */ | |
629 | ||
630 | while (isspace(*s)) s++; | |
631 | if (*s == '!') | |
632 | { | |
633 | negated = TRUE; | |
634 | s++; | |
635 | } | |
636 | ||
cf00dad6 PH |
637 | /* Read the name of a verb or a condition, or the start of a new ACL, which |
638 | can be started by a name, or by a macro definition. */ | |
059ec3d9 PH |
639 | |
640 | s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s); | |
cf00dad6 | 641 | if (*s == ':' || isupper(name[0] && *s == '=')) return yield; |
059ec3d9 PH |
642 | |
643 | /* If a verb is unrecognized, it may be another condition or modifier that | |
644 | continues the previous verb. */ | |
645 | ||
646 | v = acl_checkname(name, verbs, sizeof(verbs)/sizeof(char *)); | |
647 | if (v < 0) | |
648 | { | |
649 | if (this == NULL) | |
650 | { | |
651 | *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL verb in \"%s\"", saveline); | |
652 | return NULL; | |
653 | } | |
654 | } | |
655 | ||
656 | /* New verb */ | |
657 | ||
658 | else | |
659 | { | |
660 | if (negated) | |
661 | { | |
662 | *error = string_sprintf("malformed ACL line \"%s\"", saveline); | |
663 | return NULL; | |
664 | } | |
665 | this = store_get(sizeof(acl_block)); | |
666 | *lastp = this; | |
667 | lastp = &(this->next); | |
668 | this->next = NULL; | |
669 | this->verb = v; | |
670 | this->condition = NULL; | |
671 | condp = &(this->condition); | |
672 | if (*s == 0) continue; /* No condition on this line */ | |
673 | if (*s == '!') | |
674 | { | |
675 | negated = TRUE; | |
676 | s++; | |
677 | } | |
678 | s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s); /* Condition name */ | |
679 | } | |
680 | ||
681 | /* Handle a condition or modifier. */ | |
682 | ||
683 | c = acl_checkname(name, conditions, sizeof(conditions)/sizeof(char *)); | |
684 | if (c < 0) | |
685 | { | |
686 | *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL condition/modifier in \"%s\"", | |
687 | saveline); | |
688 | return NULL; | |
689 | } | |
690 | ||
691 | /* The modifiers may not be negated */ | |
692 | ||
693 | if (negated && cond_modifiers[c]) | |
694 | { | |
695 | *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: negation is not allowed with " | |
696 | "\"%s\"", conditions[c]); | |
697 | return NULL; | |
698 | } | |
699 | ||
700 | /* ENDPASS may occur only with ACCEPT or DISCARD. */ | |
701 | ||
702 | if (c == ACLC_ENDPASS && | |
703 | this->verb != ACL_ACCEPT && | |
704 | this->verb != ACL_DISCARD) | |
705 | { | |
706 | *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: \"%s\" is not allowed with \"%s\"", | |
707 | conditions[c], verbs[this->verb]); | |
708 | return NULL; | |
709 | } | |
710 | ||
711 | cond = store_get(sizeof(acl_condition_block)); | |
712 | cond->next = NULL; | |
713 | cond->type = c; | |
714 | cond->u.negated = negated; | |
715 | ||
716 | *condp = cond; | |
717 | condp = &(cond->next); | |
718 | ||
719 | /* The "set" modifier is different in that its argument is "name=value" | |
720 | rather than just a value, and we can check the validity of the name, which | |
721 | gives us a variable number to insert into the data block. */ | |
722 | ||
723 | if (c == ACLC_SET) | |
724 | { | |
725 | if (Ustrncmp(s, "acl_", 4) != 0 || (s[4] != 'c' && s[4] != 'm') || | |
726 | !isdigit(s[5]) || (!isspace(s[6]) && s[6] != '=')) | |
727 | { | |
728 | *error = string_sprintf("unrecognized name after \"set\" in ACL " | |
729 | "modifier \"set %s\"", s); | |
730 | return NULL; | |
731 | } | |
732 | ||
733 | cond->u.varnumber = s[5] - '0'; | |
734 | if (s[4] == 'm') cond->u.varnumber += ACL_C_MAX; | |
735 | s += 6; | |
736 | while (isspace(*s)) s++; | |
737 | } | |
738 | ||
739 | /* For "set", we are now positioned for the data. For the others, only | |
740 | "endpass" has no data */ | |
741 | ||
742 | if (c != ACLC_ENDPASS) | |
743 | { | |
744 | if (*s++ != '=') | |
745 | { | |
746 | *error = string_sprintf("\"=\" missing after ACL \"%s\" %s", name, | |
747 | cond_modifiers[c]? US"modifier" : US"condition"); | |
748 | return NULL; | |
749 | } | |
750 | while (isspace(*s)) s++; | |
751 | cond->arg = string_copy(s); | |
752 | } | |
753 | } | |
754 | ||
755 | return yield; | |
756 | } | |
757 | ||
758 | ||
759 | ||
760 | /************************************************* | |
761 | * Handle warnings * | |
762 | *************************************************/ | |
763 | ||
764 | /* This function is called when a WARN verb's conditions are true. It adds to | |
765 | the message's headers, and/or writes information to the log. In each case, this | |
766 | only happens once (per message for headers, per connection for log). | |
767 | ||
768 | Arguments: | |
769 | where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is | |
770 | user_message message for adding to headers | |
771 | log_message message for logging, if different | |
772 | ||
773 | Returns: nothing | |
774 | */ | |
775 | ||
776 | static void | |
777 | acl_warn(int where, uschar *user_message, uschar *log_message) | |
778 | { | |
779 | int hlen; | |
780 | ||
781 | if (log_message != NULL && log_message != user_message) | |
782 | { | |
783 | uschar *text; | |
784 | string_item *logged; | |
785 | ||
786 | text = string_sprintf("%s Warning: %s", host_and_ident(TRUE), | |
787 | string_printing(log_message)); | |
788 | ||
789 | /* If a sender verification has failed, and the log message is "sender verify | |
790 | failed", add the failure message. */ | |
791 | ||
792 | if (sender_verified_failed != NULL && | |
793 | sender_verified_failed->message != NULL && | |
794 | strcmpic(log_message, US"sender verify failed") == 0) | |
795 | text = string_sprintf("%s: %s", text, sender_verified_failed->message); | |
796 | ||
9c7a242c PH |
797 | /* Search previously logged warnings. They are kept in malloc |
798 | store so they can be freed at the start of a new message. */ | |
059ec3d9 PH |
799 | |
800 | for (logged = acl_warn_logged; logged != NULL; logged = logged->next) | |
801 | if (Ustrcmp(logged->text, text) == 0) break; | |
802 | ||
803 | if (logged == NULL) | |
804 | { | |
805 | int length = Ustrlen(text) + 1; | |
806 | log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s", text); | |
807 | logged = store_malloc(sizeof(string_item) + length); | |
808 | logged->text = (uschar *)logged + sizeof(string_item); | |
809 | memcpy(logged->text, text, length); | |
810 | logged->next = acl_warn_logged; | |
811 | acl_warn_logged = logged; | |
812 | } | |
813 | } | |
814 | ||
815 | /* If there's no user message, we are done. */ | |
816 | ||
817 | if (user_message == NULL) return; | |
818 | ||
819 | /* If this isn't a message ACL, we can't do anything with a user message. | |
820 | Log an error. */ | |
821 | ||
822 | if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) | |
823 | { | |
824 | log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "ACL \"warn\" with \"message\" setting " | |
825 | "found in a non-message (%s) ACL: cannot specify header lines here: " | |
826 | "message ignored", acl_wherenames[where]); | |
827 | return; | |
828 | } | |
829 | ||
830 | /* Treat the user message as a sequence of one or more header lines. */ | |
831 | ||
832 | hlen = Ustrlen(user_message); | |
833 | if (hlen > 0) | |
834 | { | |
835 | uschar *text, *p, *q; | |
836 | ||
837 | /* Add a final newline if not present */ | |
838 | ||
839 | text = ((user_message)[hlen-1] == '\n')? user_message : | |
840 | string_sprintf("%s\n", user_message); | |
841 | ||
842 | /* Loop for multiple header lines, taking care about continuations */ | |
843 | ||
844 | for (p = q = text; *p != 0; ) | |
845 | { | |
846 | uschar *s; | |
847 | int newtype = htype_add_bot; | |
848 | header_line **hptr = &acl_warn_headers; | |
849 | ||
850 | /* Find next header line within the string */ | |
851 | ||
852 | for (;;) | |
853 | { | |
854 | q = Ustrchr(q, '\n'); | |
855 | if (*(++q) != ' ' && *q != '\t') break; | |
856 | } | |
857 | ||
858 | /* If the line starts with a colon, interpret the instruction for where to | |
859 | add it. This temporarily sets up a new type. */ | |
860 | ||
861 | if (*p == ':') | |
862 | { | |
863 | if (strncmpic(p, US":after_received:", 16) == 0) | |
864 | { | |
865 | newtype = htype_add_rec; | |
866 | p += 16; | |
867 | } | |
8523533c TK |
868 | else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start_rfc:", 14) == 0) |
869 | { | |
870 | newtype = htype_add_rfc; | |
871 | p += 14; | |
8e669ac1 | 872 | } |
059ec3d9 PH |
873 | else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start:", 10) == 0) |
874 | { | |
875 | newtype = htype_add_top; | |
876 | p += 10; | |
877 | } | |
878 | else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_end:", 8) == 0) | |
879 | { | |
880 | newtype = htype_add_bot; | |
881 | p += 8; | |
882 | } | |
883 | while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') p++; | |
884 | } | |
885 | ||
886 | /* See if this line starts with a header name, and if not, add X-ACL-Warn: | |
887 | to the front of it. */ | |
888 | ||
889 | for (s = p; s < q - 1; s++) | |
890 | { | |
891 | if (*s == ':' || !isgraph(*s)) break; | |
892 | } | |
893 | ||
894 | s = string_sprintf("%s%.*s", (*s == ':')? "" : "X-ACL-Warn: ", q - p, p); | |
895 | hlen = Ustrlen(s); | |
896 | ||
897 | /* See if this line has already been added */ | |
898 | ||
899 | while (*hptr != NULL) | |
900 | { | |
901 | if (Ustrncmp((*hptr)->text, s, hlen) == 0) break; | |
902 | hptr = &((*hptr)->next); | |
903 | } | |
904 | ||
905 | /* Add if not previously present */ | |
906 | ||
907 | if (*hptr == NULL) | |
908 | { | |
909 | header_line *h = store_get(sizeof(header_line)); | |
910 | h->text = s; | |
911 | h->next = NULL; | |
912 | h->type = newtype; | |
913 | h->slen = hlen; | |
914 | *hptr = h; | |
915 | hptr = &(h->next); | |
916 | } | |
917 | ||
918 | /* Advance for next header line within the string */ | |
919 | ||
920 | p = q; | |
921 | } | |
922 | } | |
923 | } | |
924 | ||
925 | ||
926 | ||
927 | /************************************************* | |
928 | * Verify and check reverse DNS * | |
929 | *************************************************/ | |
930 | ||
931 | /* Called from acl_verify() below. We look up the host name(s) of the client IP | |
932 | address if this has not yet been done. The host_name_lookup() function checks | |
933 | that one of these names resolves to an address list that contains the client IP | |
934 | address, so we don't actually have to do the check here. | |
935 | ||
936 | Arguments: | |
937 | user_msgptr pointer for user message | |
938 | log_msgptr pointer for log message | |
939 | ||
940 | Returns: OK verification condition succeeded | |
941 | FAIL verification failed | |
942 | DEFER there was a problem verifying | |
943 | */ | |
944 | ||
945 | static int | |
946 | acl_verify_reverse(uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr) | |
947 | { | |
948 | int rc; | |
949 | ||
950 | user_msgptr = user_msgptr; /* stop compiler warning */ | |
951 | ||
952 | /* Previous success */ | |
953 | ||
954 | if (sender_host_name != NULL) return OK; | |
955 | ||
956 | /* Previous failure */ | |
957 | ||
958 | if (host_lookup_failed) | |
959 | { | |
960 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("host lookup failed%s", host_lookup_msg); | |
961 | return FAIL; | |
962 | } | |
963 | ||
964 | /* Need to do a lookup */ | |
965 | ||
966 | HDEBUG(D_acl) | |
967 | debug_printf("looking up host name to force name/address consistency check\n"); | |
968 | ||
969 | if ((rc = host_name_lookup()) != OK) | |
970 | { | |
971 | *log_msgptr = (rc == DEFER)? | |
972 | US"host lookup deferred for reverse lookup check" | |
973 | : | |
974 | string_sprintf("host lookup failed for reverse lookup check%s", | |
975 | host_lookup_msg); | |
976 | return rc; /* DEFER or FAIL */ | |
977 | } | |
978 | ||
979 | host_build_sender_fullhost(); | |
980 | return OK; | |
981 | } | |
982 | ||
983 | ||
984 | ||
e5a9dba6 PH |
985 | /************************************************* |
986 | * Check client IP address matches CSA target * | |
987 | *************************************************/ | |
988 | ||
989 | /* Called from acl_verify_csa() below. This routine scans a section of a DNS | |
990 | response for address records belonging to the CSA target hostname. The section | |
991 | is specified by the reset argument, either RESET_ADDITIONAL or RESET_ANSWERS. | |
992 | If one of the addresses matches the client's IP address, then the client is | |
993 | authorized by CSA. If there are target IP addresses but none of them match | |
994 | then the client is using an unauthorized IP address. If there are no target IP | |
995 | addresses then the client cannot be using an authorized IP address. (This is | |
996 | an odd configuration - why didn't the SRV record have a weight of 1 instead?) | |
997 | ||
998 | Arguments: | |
999 | dnsa the DNS answer block | |
1000 | dnss a DNS scan block for us to use | |
1001 | reset option specifing what portion to scan, as described above | |
1002 | target the target hostname to use for matching RR names | |
1003 | ||
1004 | Returns: CSA_OK successfully authorized | |
1005 | CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH addresses found but none matched | |
1006 | CSA_FAIL_NOADDR no target addresses found | |
1007 | */ | |
1008 | ||
1009 | static int | |
1010 | acl_verify_csa_address(dns_answer *dnsa, dns_scan *dnss, int reset, | |
1011 | uschar *target) | |
1012 | { | |
1013 | dns_record *rr; | |
1014 | dns_address *da; | |
1015 | ||
1016 | BOOL target_found = FALSE; | |
1017 | ||
1018 | for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, reset); | |
1019 | rr != NULL; | |
1020 | rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, RESET_NEXT)) | |
1021 | { | |
1022 | /* Check this is an address RR for the target hostname. */ | |
1023 | ||
1024 | if (rr->type != T_A | |
1025 | #if HAVE_IPV6 | |
1026 | && rr->type != T_AAAA | |
1027 | #ifdef SUPPORT_A6 | |
1028 | && rr->type != T_A6 | |
1029 | #endif | |
1030 | #endif | |
1031 | ) continue; | |
1032 | ||
1033 | if (strcmpic(target, rr->name) != 0) continue; | |
1034 | ||
1035 | target_found = TRUE; | |
1036 | ||
1037 | /* Turn the target address RR into a list of textual IP addresses and scan | |
1038 | the list. There may be more than one if it is an A6 RR. */ | |
1039 | ||
1040 | for (da = dns_address_from_rr(dnsa, rr); da != NULL; da = da->next) | |
1041 | { | |
1042 | /* If the client IP address matches the target IP address, it's good! */ | |
1043 | ||
1044 | DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target address is %s\n", da->address); | |
1045 | ||
1046 | if (strcmpic(sender_host_address, da->address) == 0) return CSA_OK; | |
1047 | } | |
1048 | } | |
1049 | ||
1050 | /* If we found some target addresses but none of them matched, the client is | |
1051 | using an unauthorized IP address, otherwise the target has no authorized IP | |
1052 | addresses. */ | |
1053 | ||
1054 | if (target_found) return CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH; | |
1055 | else return CSA_FAIL_NOADDR; | |
1056 | } | |
1057 | ||
1058 | ||
1059 | ||
1060 | /************************************************* | |
1061 | * Verify Client SMTP Authorization * | |
1062 | *************************************************/ | |
1063 | ||
1064 | /* Called from acl_verify() below. This routine calls dns_lookup_special() | |
1065 | to find the CSA SRV record corresponding to the domain argument, or | |
1066 | $sender_helo_name if no argument is provided. It then checks that the | |
1067 | client is authorized, and that its IP address corresponds to the SRV | |
1068 | target's address by calling acl_verify_csa_address() above. The address | |
1069 | should have been returned in the DNS response's ADDITIONAL section, but if | |
1070 | not we perform another DNS lookup to get it. | |
1071 | ||
1072 | Arguments: | |
1073 | domain pointer to optional parameter following verify = csa | |
1074 | ||
1075 | Returns: CSA_UNKNOWN no valid CSA record found | |
1076 | CSA_OK successfully authorized | |
1077 | CSA_FAIL_* client is definitely not authorized | |
1078 | CSA_DEFER_* there was a DNS problem | |
1079 | */ | |
1080 | ||
1081 | static int | |
1082 | acl_verify_csa(uschar *domain) | |
1083 | { | |
1084 | tree_node *t; | |
1085 | uschar *found, *p; | |
1086 | int priority, weight, port; | |
1087 | dns_answer dnsa; | |
1088 | dns_scan dnss; | |
1089 | dns_record *rr; | |
1090 | int rc, type; | |
1091 | uschar target[256]; | |
1092 | ||
1093 | /* Work out the domain we are using for the CSA lookup. The default is the | |
1094 | client's HELO domain. If the client has not said HELO, use its IP address | |
1095 | instead. If it's a local client (exim -bs), CSA isn't applicable. */ | |
1096 | ||
1097 | while (isspace(*domain) && *domain != '\0') ++domain; | |
1098 | if (*domain == '\0') domain = sender_helo_name; | |
1099 | if (domain == NULL) domain = sender_host_address; | |
1100 | if (sender_host_address == NULL) return CSA_UNKNOWN; | |
1101 | ||
1102 | /* If we have an address literal, strip off the framing ready for turning it | |
1103 | into a domain. The framing consists of matched square brackets possibly | |
1104 | containing a keyword and a colon before the actual IP address. */ | |
1105 | ||
1106 | if (domain[0] == '[') | |
1107 | { | |
1108 | uschar *start = Ustrchr(domain, ':'); | |
1109 | if (start == NULL) start = domain; | |
1110 | domain = string_copyn(start + 1, Ustrlen(start) - 2); | |
1111 | } | |
1112 | ||
1113 | /* Turn domains that look like bare IP addresses into domains in the reverse | |
1114 | DNS. This code also deals with address literals and $sender_host_address. It's | |
1115 | not quite kosher to treat bare domains such as EHLO 192.0.2.57 the same as | |
1116 | address literals, but it's probably the most friendly thing to do. This is an | |
1117 | extension to CSA, so we allow it to be turned off for proper conformance. */ | |
1118 | ||
1119 | if (string_is_ip_address(domain, NULL)) | |
1120 | { | |
1121 | if (!dns_csa_use_reverse) return CSA_UNKNOWN; | |
1122 | dns_build_reverse(domain, target); | |
1123 | domain = target; | |
1124 | } | |
1125 | ||
1126 | /* Find out if we've already done the CSA check for this domain. If we have, | |
1127 | return the same result again. Otherwise build a new cached result structure | |
1128 | for this domain. The name is filled in now, and the value is filled in when | |
1129 | we return from this function. */ | |
1130 | ||
1131 | t = tree_search(csa_cache, domain); | |
1132 | if (t != NULL) return t->data.val; | |
1133 | ||
1134 | t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(domain)); | |
1135 | Ustrcpy(t->name, domain); | |
1136 | (void)tree_insertnode(&csa_cache, t); | |
1137 | ||
1138 | /* Now we are ready to do the actual DNS lookup(s). */ | |
1139 | ||
1140 | switch (dns_special_lookup(&dnsa, domain, T_CSA, &found)) | |
1141 | { | |
1142 | /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */ | |
1143 | ||
1144 | default: | |
1145 | return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_SRV; | |
1146 | ||
1147 | /* If we found nothing, the client's authorization is unknown. */ | |
1148 | ||
1149 | case DNS_NOMATCH: | |
1150 | case DNS_NODATA: | |
1151 | return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN; | |
1152 | ||
1153 | /* We got something! Go on to look at the reply in more detail. */ | |
1154 | ||
1155 | case DNS_SUCCEED: | |
1156 | break; | |
1157 | } | |
1158 | ||
1159 | /* Scan the reply for well-formed CSA SRV records. */ | |
1160 | ||
1161 | for (rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS); | |
1162 | rr != NULL; | |
1163 | rr = dns_next_rr(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT)) | |
1164 | { | |
1165 | if (rr->type != T_SRV) continue; | |
1166 | ||
1167 | /* Extract the numerical SRV fields (p is incremented) */ | |
1168 | ||
1169 | p = rr->data; | |
1170 | GETSHORT(priority, p); | |
1171 | GETSHORT(weight, p); | |
1172 | GETSHORT(port, p); | |
1173 | ||
1174 | DEBUG(D_acl) | |
1175 | debug_printf("CSA priority=%d weight=%d port=%d\n", priority, weight, port); | |
1176 | ||
1177 | /* Check the CSA version number */ | |
1178 | ||
1179 | if (priority != 1) continue; | |
1180 | ||
1181 | /* If the domain does not have a CSA SRV record of its own (i.e. the domain | |
1182 | found by dns_special_lookup() is a parent of the one we asked for), we check | |
1183 | the subdomain assertions in the port field. At the moment there's only one | |
1184 | assertion: legitimate SMTP clients are all explicitly authorized with CSA | |
1185 | SRV records of their own. */ | |
1186 | ||
1187 | if (found != domain) | |
1188 | { | |
1189 | if (port & 1) | |
1190 | return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT; | |
1191 | else | |
1192 | return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN; | |
1193 | } | |
1194 | ||
1195 | /* This CSA SRV record refers directly to our domain, so we check the value | |
1196 | in the weight field to work out the domain's authorization. 0 and 1 are | |
1197 | unauthorized; 3 means the client is authorized but we can't check the IP | |
1198 | address in order to authenticate it, so we treat it as unknown; values | |
1199 | greater than 3 are undefined. */ | |
1200 | ||
1201 | if (weight < 2) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN; | |
1202 | ||
1203 | if (weight > 2) continue; | |
1204 | ||
1205 | /* Weight == 2, which means the domain is authorized. We must check that the | |
1206 | client's IP address is listed as one of the SRV target addresses. Save the | |
1207 | target hostname then break to scan the additional data for its addresses. */ | |
1208 | ||
1209 | (void)dn_expand(dnsa.answer, dnsa.answer + dnsa.answerlen, p, | |
1210 | (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)target, sizeof(target)); | |
1211 | ||
1212 | DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA target is %s\n", target); | |
1213 | ||
1214 | break; | |
1215 | } | |
1216 | ||
1217 | /* If we didn't break the loop then no appropriate records were found. */ | |
1218 | ||
1219 | if (rr == NULL) return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN; | |
1220 | ||
1221 | /* Do not check addresses if the target is ".", in accordance with RFC 2782. | |
1222 | A target of "." indicates there are no valid addresses, so the client cannot | |
1223 | be authorized. (This is an odd configuration because weight=2 target=. is | |
1224 | equivalent to weight=1, but we check for it in order to keep load off the | |
1225 | root name servers.) Note that dn_expand() turns "." into "". */ | |
1226 | ||
1227 | if (Ustrcmp(target, "") == 0) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR; | |
1228 | ||
1229 | /* Scan the additional section of the CSA SRV reply for addresses belonging | |
1230 | to the target. If the name server didn't return any additional data (e.g. | |
1231 | because it does not fully support SRV records), we need to do another lookup | |
1232 | to obtain the target addresses; otherwise we have a definitive result. */ | |
1233 | ||
1234 | rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ADDITIONAL, target); | |
1235 | if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc; | |
1236 | ||
1237 | /* The DNS lookup type corresponds to the IP version used by the client. */ | |
1238 | ||
1239 | #if HAVE_IPV6 | |
1240 | if (Ustrchr(sender_host_address, ':') != NULL) | |
1241 | type = T_AAAA; | |
1242 | else | |
1243 | #endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */ | |
1244 | type = T_A; | |
1245 | ||
1246 | ||
1247 | #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6) | |
1248 | DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN: | |
1249 | #endif | |
1250 | ||
1251 | switch (dns_lookup(&dnsa, target, type, NULL)) | |
1252 | { | |
1253 | /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */ | |
1254 | ||
1255 | default: | |
1256 | return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_ADDR; | |
1257 | ||
1258 | /* If the query succeeded, scan the addresses and return the result. */ | |
1259 | ||
1260 | case DNS_SUCCEED: | |
1261 | rc = acl_verify_csa_address(&dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS, target); | |
1262 | if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc; | |
1263 | /* else fall through */ | |
1264 | ||
1265 | /* If the target has no IP addresses, the client cannot have an authorized | |
1266 | IP address. However, if the target site uses A6 records (not AAAA records) | |
1267 | we have to do yet another lookup in order to check them. */ | |
1268 | ||
1269 | case DNS_NOMATCH: | |
1270 | case DNS_NODATA: | |
1271 | ||
1272 | #if HAVE_IPV6 && defined(SUPPORT_A6) | |
1273 | if (type == T_AAAA) { type = T_A6; goto DNS_LOOKUP_AGAIN; } | |
1274 | #endif | |
1275 | ||
1276 | return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR; | |
1277 | } | |
1278 | } | |
1279 | ||
1280 | ||
1281 | ||
059ec3d9 PH |
1282 | /************************************************* |
1283 | * Handle verification (address & other) * | |
1284 | *************************************************/ | |
1285 | ||
1286 | /* This function implements the "verify" condition. It is called when | |
1287 | encountered in any ACL, because some tests are almost always permitted. Some | |
1288 | just don't make sense, and always fail (for example, an attempt to test a host | |
1289 | lookup for a non-TCP/IP message). Others are restricted to certain ACLs. | |
1290 | ||
1291 | Arguments: | |
1292 | where where called from | |
1293 | addr the recipient address that the ACL is handling, or NULL | |
1294 | arg the argument of "verify" | |
1295 | user_msgptr pointer for user message | |
1296 | log_msgptr pointer for log message | |
1297 | basic_errno where to put verify errno | |
1298 | ||
1299 | Returns: OK verification condition succeeded | |
1300 | FAIL verification failed | |
1301 | DEFER there was a problem verifying | |
1302 | ERROR syntax error | |
1303 | */ | |
1304 | ||
1305 | static int | |
1306 | acl_verify(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *arg, | |
1307 | uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno) | |
1308 | { | |
1309 | int sep = '/'; | |
1310 | int callout = -1; | |
1311 | int callout_overall = -1; | |
4deaf07d | 1312 | int callout_connect = -1; |
059ec3d9 PH |
1313 | int verify_options = 0; |
1314 | int rc; | |
1315 | BOOL verify_header_sender = FALSE; | |
1316 | BOOL defer_ok = FALSE; | |
1317 | BOOL callout_defer_ok = FALSE; | |
1318 | BOOL no_details = FALSE; | |
1319 | address_item *sender_vaddr = NULL; | |
1320 | uschar *verify_sender_address = NULL; | |
1321 | uschar *pm_mailfrom = NULL; | |
1322 | uschar *se_mailfrom = NULL; | |
596875b3 PH |
1323 | |
1324 | /* Some of the verify items have slash-separated options; some do not. Diagnose | |
1325 | an error if options are given for items that don't expect them. This code has | |
1326 | now got very message. Refactoring to use a table would be a good idea one day. | |
1327 | */ | |
1328 | ||
1329 | uschar *slash = Ustrchr(arg, '/'); | |
059ec3d9 PH |
1330 | uschar *list = arg; |
1331 | uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size); | |
1332 | ||
1333 | if (ss == NULL) goto BAD_VERIFY; | |
1334 | ||
1335 | /* Handle name/address consistency verification in a separate function. */ | |
1336 | ||
1337 | if (strcmpic(ss, US"reverse_host_lookup") == 0) | |
1338 | { | |
596875b3 | 1339 | if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS; |
059ec3d9 PH |
1340 | if (sender_host_address == NULL) return OK; |
1341 | return acl_verify_reverse(user_msgptr, log_msgptr); | |
1342 | } | |
1343 | ||
1344 | /* TLS certificate verification is done at STARTTLS time; here we just | |
1345 | test whether it was successful or not. (This is for optional verification; for | |
1346 | mandatory verification, the connection doesn't last this long.) */ | |
1347 | ||
1348 | if (strcmpic(ss, US"certificate") == 0) | |
1349 | { | |
596875b3 | 1350 | if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS; |
059ec3d9 PH |
1351 | if (tls_certificate_verified) return OK; |
1352 | *user_msgptr = US"no verified certificate"; | |
1353 | return FAIL; | |
1354 | } | |
1355 | ||
1356 | /* We can test the result of optional HELO verification */ | |
1357 | ||
596875b3 PH |
1358 | if (strcmpic(ss, US"helo") == 0) |
1359 | { | |
1360 | if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS; | |
1361 | return helo_verified? OK : FAIL; | |
1362 | } | |
059ec3d9 | 1363 | |
e5a9dba6 PH |
1364 | /* Do Client SMTP Authorization checks in a separate function, and turn the |
1365 | result code into user-friendly strings. */ | |
1366 | ||
1367 | if (strcmpic(ss, US"csa") == 0) | |
1368 | { | |
1369 | rc = acl_verify_csa(list); | |
1370 | *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("client SMTP authorization %s", | |
1371 | csa_reason_string[rc]); | |
1372 | csa_status = csa_status_string[rc]; | |
1373 | DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("CSA result %s\n", csa_status); | |
1374 | return csa_return_code[rc]; | |
1375 | } | |
1376 | ||
596875b3 PH |
1377 | /* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct syntax. If there is |
1378 | a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to | |
1379 | send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as | |
1380 | always). */ | |
059ec3d9 | 1381 | |
596875b3 | 1382 | if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_syntax") == 0) |
059ec3d9 | 1383 | { |
596875b3 | 1384 | if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS; |
059ec3d9 PH |
1385 | if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) |
1386 | { | |
1387 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s " | |
1388 | "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames[where]); | |
1389 | return ERROR; | |
1390 | } | |
596875b3 PH |
1391 | rc = verify_check_headers(log_msgptr); |
1392 | if (rc != OK && smtp_return_error_details && *log_msgptr != NULL) | |
1393 | *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr); | |
1394 | return rc; | |
1395 | } | |
059ec3d9 | 1396 | |
059ec3d9 | 1397 | |
596875b3 PH |
1398 | /* The remaining verification tests check recipient and sender addresses, |
1399 | either from the envelope or from the header. There are a number of | |
1400 | slash-separated options that are common to all of them. */ | |
059ec3d9 | 1401 | |
059ec3d9 | 1402 | |
596875b3 PH |
1403 | /* Check that there is at least one verifiable sender address in the relevant |
1404 | header lines. This can be followed by callout and defer options, just like | |
1405 | sender and recipient. */ | |
059ec3d9 | 1406 | |
596875b3 PH |
1407 | if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_sender") == 0) |
1408 | { | |
1409 | if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) | |
1410 | { | |
1411 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s " | |
1412 | "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames[where]); | |
1413 | return ERROR; | |
1414 | } | |
1415 | verify_header_sender = TRUE; | |
059ec3d9 PH |
1416 | } |
1417 | ||
1418 | /* Otherwise, first item in verify argument must be "sender" or "recipient". | |
1419 | In the case of a sender, this can optionally be followed by an address to use | |
1420 | in place of the actual sender (rare special-case requirement). */ | |
1421 | ||
1422 | else if (strncmpic(ss, US"sender", 6) == 0) | |
1423 | { | |
1424 | uschar *s = ss + 6; | |
1425 | if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) | |
1426 | { | |
1427 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify sender in ACL for %s " | |
1428 | "(only possible for MAIL, RCPT, PREDATA, or DATA)", | |
1429 | acl_wherenames[where]); | |
1430 | return ERROR; | |
1431 | } | |
1432 | if (*s == 0) | |
1433 | verify_sender_address = sender_address; | |
1434 | else | |
1435 | { | |
1436 | while (isspace(*s)) s++; | |
1437 | if (*s++ != '=') goto BAD_VERIFY; | |
1438 | while (isspace(*s)) s++; | |
1439 | verify_sender_address = string_copy(s); | |
1440 | } | |
1441 | } | |
1442 | else | |
1443 | { | |
1444 | if (strcmpic(ss, US"recipient") != 0) goto BAD_VERIFY; | |
1445 | if (addr == NULL) | |
1446 | { | |
1447 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify recipient in ACL for %s " | |
1448 | "(only possible for RCPT)", acl_wherenames[where]); | |
1449 | return ERROR; | |
1450 | } | |
1451 | } | |
1452 | ||
596875b3 PH |
1453 | /* Remaining items are optional; they apply to sender and recipient |
1454 | verification, including "header sender" verification. */ | |
059ec3d9 PH |
1455 | |
1456 | while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)) | |
1457 | != NULL) | |
1458 | { | |
1459 | if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0) defer_ok = TRUE; | |
1460 | else if (strcmpic(ss, US"no_details") == 0) no_details = TRUE; | |
1461 | ||
1462 | /* These two old options are left for backwards compatibility */ | |
1463 | ||
1464 | else if (strcmpic(ss, US"callout_defer_ok") == 0) | |
1465 | { | |
1466 | callout_defer_ok = TRUE; | |
1467 | if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT; | |
1468 | } | |
1469 | ||
1470 | else if (strcmpic(ss, US"check_postmaster") == 0) | |
1471 | { | |
1472 | pm_mailfrom = US""; | |
1473 | if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT; | |
1474 | } | |
1475 | ||
1476 | /* The callout option has a number of sub-options, comma separated */ | |
1477 | ||
1478 | else if (strncmpic(ss, US"callout", 7) == 0) | |
1479 | { | |
1480 | callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT; | |
1481 | ss += 7; | |
1482 | if (*ss != 0) | |
1483 | { | |
1484 | while (isspace(*ss)) ss++; | |
1485 | if (*ss++ == '=') | |
1486 | { | |
1487 | int optsep = ','; | |
1488 | uschar *opt; | |
1489 | uschar buffer[256]; | |
1490 | while (isspace(*ss)) ss++; | |
8e669ac1 PH |
1491 | |
1492 | /* This callout option handling code has become a mess as new options | |
1493 | have been added in an ad hoc manner. It should be tidied up into some | |
4deaf07d | 1494 | kind of table-driven thing. */ |
8e669ac1 | 1495 | |
059ec3d9 PH |
1496 | while ((opt = string_nextinlist(&ss, &optsep, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) |
1497 | != NULL) | |
1498 | { | |
1499 | if (strcmpic(opt, US"defer_ok") == 0) callout_defer_ok = TRUE; | |
1500 | else if (strcmpic(opt, US"no_cache") == 0) | |
1501 | verify_options |= vopt_callout_no_cache; | |
1502 | else if (strcmpic(opt, US"random") == 0) | |
1503 | verify_options |= vopt_callout_random; | |
1504 | else if (strcmpic(opt, US"use_sender") == 0) | |
1505 | verify_options |= vopt_callout_recipsender; | |
1506 | else if (strcmpic(opt, US"use_postmaster") == 0) | |
1507 | verify_options |= vopt_callout_recippmaster; | |
1508 | else if (strcmpic(opt, US"postmaster") == 0) pm_mailfrom = US""; | |
1509 | ||
1510 | else if (strncmpic(opt, US"mailfrom", 8) == 0) | |
1511 | { | |
1512 | if (!verify_header_sender) | |
1513 | { | |
1514 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"mailfrom\" is allowed as a " | |
1515 | "callout option only for verify=header_sender (detected in ACL " | |
1516 | "condition \"%s\")", arg); | |
1517 | return ERROR; | |
1518 | } | |
1519 | opt += 8; | |
1520 | while (isspace(*opt)) opt++; | |
1521 | if (*opt++ != '=') | |
1522 | { | |
1523 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after " | |
1524 | "\"mailfrom\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg); | |
1525 | return ERROR; | |
1526 | } | |
1527 | while (isspace(*opt)) opt++; | |
1528 | se_mailfrom = string_copy(opt); | |
1529 | } | |
1530 | ||
1531 | else if (strncmpic(opt, US"postmaster_mailfrom", 19) == 0) | |
1532 | { | |
1533 | opt += 19; | |
1534 | while (isspace(*opt)) opt++; | |
1535 | if (*opt++ != '=') | |
1536 | { | |
1537 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after " | |
1538 | "\"postmaster_mailfrom\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg); | |
1539 | return ERROR; | |
1540 | } | |
1541 | while (isspace(*opt)) opt++; | |
1542 | pm_mailfrom = string_copy(opt); | |
1543 | } | |
1544 | ||
1545 | else if (strncmpic(opt, US"maxwait", 7) == 0) | |
1546 | { | |
1547 | opt += 7; | |
1548 | while (isspace(*opt)) opt++; | |
1549 | if (*opt++ != '=') | |
1550 | { | |
1551 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"maxwait\" in " | |
1552 | "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg); | |
1553 | return ERROR; | |
1554 | } | |
1555 | while (isspace(*opt)) opt++; | |
1556 | callout_overall = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE); | |
1557 | if (callout_overall < 0) | |
1558 | { | |
1559 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition " | |
1560 | "\"verify %s\"", arg); | |
1561 | return ERROR; | |
1562 | } | |
1563 | } | |
4deaf07d PH |
1564 | else if (strncmpic(opt, US"connect", 7) == 0) |
1565 | { | |
1566 | opt += 7; | |
1567 | while (isspace(*opt)) opt++; | |
1568 | if (*opt++ != '=') | |
1569 | { | |
1570 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after " | |
1571 | "\"callout_overaall\" in ACL condition \"%s\"", arg); | |
1572 | return ERROR; | |
1573 | } | |
1574 | while (isspace(*opt)) opt++; | |
1575 | callout_connect = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE); | |
1576 | if (callout_connect < 0) | |
1577 | { | |
1578 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition " | |
1579 | "\"verify %s\"", arg); | |
1580 | return ERROR; | |
1581 | } | |
1582 | } | |
059ec3d9 PH |
1583 | else /* Plain time is callout connect/command timeout */ |
1584 | { | |
1585 | callout = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE); | |
1586 | if (callout < 0) | |
1587 | { | |
1588 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition " | |
1589 | "\"verify %s\"", arg); | |
1590 | return ERROR; | |
1591 | } | |
1592 | } | |
1593 | } | |
1594 | } | |
1595 | else | |
1596 | { | |
1597 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"callout\" in " | |
1598 | "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg); | |
1599 | return ERROR; | |
1600 | } | |
1601 | } | |
1602 | } | |
1603 | ||
1604 | /* Option not recognized */ | |
1605 | ||
1606 | else | |
1607 | { | |
1608 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unknown option \"%s\" in ACL " | |
1609 | "condition \"verify %s\"", ss, arg); | |
1610 | return ERROR; | |
1611 | } | |
1612 | } | |
1613 | ||
1614 | if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster)) == | |
1615 | (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster)) | |
1616 | { | |
1617 | *log_msgptr = US"only one of use_sender and use_postmaster can be set " | |
1618 | "for a recipient callout"; | |
1619 | return ERROR; | |
1620 | } | |
1621 | ||
1622 | /* Handle sender-in-header verification. Default the user message to the log | |
1623 | message if giving out verification details. */ | |
1624 | ||
1625 | if (verify_header_sender) | |
1626 | { | |
8e669ac1 | 1627 | int verrno; |
059ec3d9 | 1628 | rc = verify_check_header_address(user_msgptr, log_msgptr, callout, |
fe5b5d0b PH |
1629 | callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, verify_options, |
1630 | &verrno); | |
1631 | if (rc != OK) | |
8e669ac1 | 1632 | { |
fe5b5d0b PH |
1633 | *basic_errno = verrno; |
1634 | if (smtp_return_error_details) | |
1635 | { | |
1636 | if (*user_msgptr == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL) | |
1637 | *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr); | |
1638 | if (rc == DEFER) acl_temp_details = TRUE; | |
1639 | } | |
8e669ac1 | 1640 | } |
059ec3d9 PH |
1641 | } |
1642 | ||
1643 | /* Handle a sender address. The default is to verify *the* sender address, but | |
1644 | optionally a different address can be given, for special requirements. If the | |
1645 | address is empty, we are dealing with a bounce message that has no sender, so | |
1646 | we cannot do any checking. If the real sender address gets rewritten during | |
1647 | verification (e.g. DNS widening), set the flag to stop it being rewritten again | |
1648 | during message reception. | |
1649 | ||
1650 | A list of verified "sender" addresses is kept to try to avoid doing to much | |
1651 | work repetitively when there are multiple recipients in a message and they all | |
1652 | require sender verification. However, when callouts are involved, it gets too | |
1653 | complicated because different recipients may require different callout options. | |
1654 | Therefore, we always do a full sender verify when any kind of callout is | |
1655 | specified. Caching elsewhere, for instance in the DNS resolver and in the | |
1656 | callout handling, should ensure that this is not terribly inefficient. */ | |
1657 | ||
1658 | else if (verify_sender_address != NULL) | |
1659 | { | |
1660 | if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster)) | |
1661 | != 0) | |
1662 | { | |
1663 | *log_msgptr = US"use_sender or use_postmaster cannot be used for a " | |
1664 | "sender verify callout"; | |
1665 | return ERROR; | |
1666 | } | |
1667 | ||
1668 | sender_vaddr = verify_checked_sender(verify_sender_address); | |
1669 | if (sender_vaddr != NULL && /* Previously checked */ | |
1670 | callout <= 0) /* No callout needed this time */ | |
1671 | { | |
1672 | /* If the "routed" flag is set, it means that routing worked before, so | |
1673 | this check can give OK (the saved return code value, if set, belongs to a | |
1674 | callout that was done previously). If the "routed" flag is not set, routing | |
1675 | must have failed, so we use the saved return code. */ | |
1676 | ||
1677 | if (testflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed)) rc = OK; else | |
1678 | { | |
1679 | rc = sender_vaddr->special_action; | |
1680 | *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno; | |
1681 | } | |
1682 | HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("using cached sender verify result\n"); | |
1683 | } | |
1684 | ||
1685 | /* Do a new verification, and cache the result. The cache is used to avoid | |
1686 | verifying the sender multiple times for multiple RCPTs when callouts are not | |
1687 | specified (see comments above). | |
1688 | ||
1689 | The cache is also used on failure to give details in response to the first | |
1690 | RCPT that gets bounced for this reason. However, this can be suppressed by | |
1691 | the no_details option, which sets the flag that says "this detail has already | |
1692 | been sent". The cache normally contains just one address, but there may be | |
1693 | more in esoteric circumstances. */ | |
1694 | ||
1695 | else | |
1696 | { | |
1697 | BOOL routed = TRUE; | |
2a3eea10 | 1698 | uschar *save_address_data = deliver_address_data; |
8e669ac1 | 1699 | |
059ec3d9 PH |
1700 | sender_vaddr = deliver_make_addr(verify_sender_address, TRUE); |
1701 | if (no_details) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_sverify_told); | |
1702 | if (verify_sender_address[0] != 0) | |
1703 | { | |
1704 | /* If this is the real sender address, save the unrewritten version | |
1705 | for use later in receive. Otherwise, set a flag so that rewriting the | |
1706 | sender in verify_address() does not update sender_address. */ | |
1707 | ||
1708 | if (verify_sender_address == sender_address) | |
1709 | sender_address_unrewritten = sender_address; | |
1710 | else | |
1711 | verify_options |= vopt_fake_sender; | |
1712 | ||
1713 | /* The recipient, qualify, and expn options are never set in | |
1714 | verify_options. */ | |
1715 | ||
1716 | rc = verify_address(sender_vaddr, NULL, verify_options, callout, | |
4deaf07d | 1717 | callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, &routed); |
059ec3d9 PH |
1718 | |
1719 | HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n"); | |
1720 | ||
1721 | if (rc == OK) | |
1722 | { | |
1723 | if (Ustrcmp(sender_vaddr->address, verify_sender_address) != 0) | |
1724 | { | |
1725 | DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("sender %s verified ok as %s\n", | |
1726 | verify_sender_address, sender_vaddr->address); | |
1727 | } | |
1728 | else | |
1729 | { | |
1730 | DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("sender %s verified ok\n", | |
1731 | verify_sender_address); | |
1732 | } | |
1733 | } | |
1734 | else *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno; | |
1735 | } | |
1736 | else rc = OK; /* Null sender */ | |
1737 | ||
1738 | /* Cache the result code */ | |
1739 | ||
1740 | if (routed) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed); | |
1741 | if (callout > 0) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_callout); | |
1742 | sender_vaddr->special_action = rc; | |
1743 | sender_vaddr->next = sender_verified_list; | |
1744 | sender_verified_list = sender_vaddr; | |
8e669ac1 PH |
1745 | |
1746 | /* Restore the recipient address data, which might have been clobbered by | |
2a3eea10 | 1747 | the sender verification. */ |
8e669ac1 | 1748 | |
2a3eea10 | 1749 | deliver_address_data = save_address_data; |
059ec3d9 | 1750 | } |
8e669ac1 | 1751 | |
2a3eea10 PH |
1752 | /* Put the sender address_data value into $sender_address_data */ |
1753 | ||
8e669ac1 | 1754 | sender_address_data = sender_vaddr->p.address_data; |
059ec3d9 PH |
1755 | } |
1756 | ||
1757 | /* A recipient address just gets a straightforward verify; again we must handle | |
1758 | the DEFER overrides. */ | |
1759 | ||
1760 | else | |
1761 | { | |
1762 | address_item addr2; | |
1763 | ||
1764 | /* We must use a copy of the address for verification, because it might | |
1765 | get rewritten. */ | |
1766 | ||
1767 | addr2 = *addr; | |
1768 | rc = verify_address(&addr2, NULL, verify_options|vopt_is_recipient, callout, | |
4deaf07d | 1769 | callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, NULL); |
059ec3d9 | 1770 | HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("----------- end verify ------------\n"); |
8e669ac1 | 1771 | |
059ec3d9 | 1772 | *log_msgptr = addr2.message; |
8e669ac1 | 1773 | *user_msgptr = (addr2.user_message != NULL)? |
6729cf78 | 1774 | addr2.user_message : addr2.message; |
059ec3d9 PH |
1775 | *basic_errno = addr2.basic_errno; |
1776 | ||
1777 | /* Make $address_data visible */ | |
1778 | deliver_address_data = addr2.p.address_data; | |
1779 | } | |
1780 | ||
1781 | /* We have a result from the relevant test. Handle defer overrides first. */ | |
1782 | ||
1783 | if (rc == DEFER && (defer_ok || | |
1784 | (callout_defer_ok && *basic_errno == ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER))) | |
1785 | { | |
1786 | HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("verify defer overridden by %s\n", | |
1787 | defer_ok? "defer_ok" : "callout_defer_ok"); | |
1788 | rc = OK; | |
1789 | } | |
1790 | ||
1791 | /* If we've failed a sender, set up a recipient message, and point | |
1792 | sender_verified_failed to the address item that actually failed. */ | |
1793 | ||
1794 | if (rc != OK && verify_sender_address != NULL) | |
1795 | { | |
1796 | if (rc != DEFER) | |
1797 | { | |
1798 | *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Sender verify failed"; | |
1799 | } | |
1800 | else if (*basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER) | |
1801 | { | |
1802 | *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify"; | |
1803 | } | |
1804 | else | |
1805 | { | |
1806 | *log_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify callout"; | |
1807 | *user_msgptr = smtp_return_error_details? sender_vaddr->user_message : | |
1808 | *log_msgptr; | |
1809 | } | |
1810 | ||
1811 | sender_verified_failed = sender_vaddr; | |
1812 | } | |
1813 | ||
1814 | /* Verifying an address messes up the values of $domain and $local_part, | |
1815 | so reset them before returning if this is a RCPT ACL. */ | |
1816 | ||
1817 | if (addr != NULL) | |
1818 | { | |
1819 | deliver_domain = addr->domain; | |
1820 | deliver_localpart = addr->local_part; | |
1821 | } | |
1822 | return rc; | |
1823 | ||
1824 | /* Syntax errors in the verify argument come here. */ | |
1825 | ||
1826 | BAD_VERIFY: | |
1827 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("expected \"sender[=address]\", \"recipient\", " | |
596875b3 PH |
1828 | "\"helo\", \"header_syntax\", \"header_sender\" or " |
1829 | "\"reverse_host_lookup\" at start of ACL condition " | |
059ec3d9 PH |
1830 | "\"verify %s\"", arg); |
1831 | return ERROR; | |
596875b3 PH |
1832 | |
1833 | /* Options supplied when not allowed come here */ | |
1834 | ||
1835 | NO_OPTIONS: | |
1836 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unexpected '/' found in \"%s\" " | |
1837 | "(this verify item has no options)", arg); | |
1838 | return ERROR; | |
059ec3d9 PH |
1839 | } |
1840 | ||
1841 | ||
1842 | ||
1843 | ||
1844 | /************************************************* | |
1845 | * Check argument for control= modifier * | |
1846 | *************************************************/ | |
1847 | ||
1848 | /* Called from acl_check_condition() below | |
1849 | ||
1850 | Arguments: | |
1851 | arg the argument string for control= | |
1852 | pptr set to point to the terminating character | |
1853 | where which ACL we are in | |
1854 | log_msgptr for error messages | |
1855 | ||
1856 | Returns: CONTROL_xxx value | |
1857 | */ | |
1858 | ||
1859 | static int | |
1860 | decode_control(uschar *arg, uschar **pptr, int where, uschar **log_msgptr) | |
1861 | { | |
1862 | int len; | |
1863 | control_def *d; | |
1864 | ||
1865 | for (d = controls_list; | |
1866 | d < controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def); | |
1867 | d++) | |
1868 | { | |
1869 | len = Ustrlen(d->name); | |
1870 | if (Ustrncmp(d->name, arg, len) == 0) break; | |
1871 | } | |
1872 | ||
1873 | if (d >= controls_list + sizeof(controls_list)/sizeof(control_def) || | |
1874 | (arg[len] != 0 && (!d->has_option || arg[len] != '/'))) | |
1875 | { | |
1876 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg); | |
1877 | return CONTROL_ERROR; | |
1878 | } | |
1879 | ||
059ec3d9 PH |
1880 | *pptr = arg + len; |
1881 | return d->value; | |
1882 | } | |
1883 | ||
1884 | ||
1885 | ||
1886 | /************************************************* | |
1887 | * Handle conditions/modifiers on an ACL item * | |
1888 | *************************************************/ | |
1889 | ||
1890 | /* Called from acl_check() below. | |
1891 | ||
1892 | Arguments: | |
1893 | verb ACL verb | |
1894 | cb ACL condition block - if NULL, result is OK | |
1895 | where where called from | |
1896 | addr the address being checked for RCPT, or NULL | |
1897 | level the nesting level | |
1898 | epp pointer to pass back TRUE if "endpass" encountered | |
1899 | (applies only to "accept" and "discard") | |
1900 | user_msgptr user message pointer | |
1901 | log_msgptr log message pointer | |
1902 | basic_errno pointer to where to put verify error | |
1903 | ||
1904 | Returns: OK - all conditions are met | |
1905 | DISCARD - an "acl" condition returned DISCARD - only allowed | |
1906 | for "accept" or "discard" verbs | |
1907 | FAIL - at least one condition fails | |
1908 | FAIL_DROP - an "acl" condition returned FAIL_DROP | |
1909 | DEFER - can't tell at the moment (typically, lookup defer, | |
1910 | but can be temporary callout problem) | |
1911 | ERROR - ERROR from nested ACL or expansion failure or other | |
1912 | error | |
1913 | */ | |
1914 | ||
1915 | static int | |
1916 | acl_check_condition(int verb, acl_condition_block *cb, int where, | |
1917 | address_item *addr, int level, BOOL *epp, uschar **user_msgptr, | |
1918 | uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno) | |
1919 | { | |
1920 | uschar *user_message = NULL; | |
1921 | uschar *log_message = NULL; | |
1922 | uschar *p; | |
1923 | int rc = OK; | |
8523533c TK |
1924 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN |
1925 | int sep = '/'; | |
1926 | #endif | |
059ec3d9 PH |
1927 | |
1928 | for (; cb != NULL; cb = cb->next) | |
1929 | { | |
1930 | uschar *arg; | |
8e669ac1 | 1931 | int control_type; |
059ec3d9 PH |
1932 | |
1933 | /* The message and log_message items set up messages to be used in | |
1934 | case of rejection. They are expanded later. */ | |
1935 | ||
1936 | if (cb->type == ACLC_MESSAGE) | |
1937 | { | |
1938 | user_message = cb->arg; | |
1939 | continue; | |
1940 | } | |
1941 | ||
1942 | if (cb->type == ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE) | |
1943 | { | |
1944 | log_message = cb->arg; | |
1945 | continue; | |
1946 | } | |
1947 | ||
1948 | /* The endpass "condition" just sets a flag to show it occurred. This is | |
1949 | checked at compile time to be on an "accept" or "discard" item. */ | |
1950 | ||
1951 | if (cb->type == ACLC_ENDPASS) | |
1952 | { | |
1953 | *epp = TRUE; | |
1954 | continue; | |
1955 | } | |
1956 | ||
1957 | /* For other conditions and modifiers, the argument is expanded now for some | |
1958 | of them, but not for all, because expansion happens down in some lower level | |
1959 | checking functions in some cases. */ | |
1960 | ||
1961 | if (cond_expand_at_top[cb->type]) | |
1962 | { | |
1963 | arg = expand_string(cb->arg); | |
1964 | if (arg == NULL) | |
1965 | { | |
1966 | if (expand_string_forcedfail) continue; | |
1967 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s", | |
1968 | cb->arg, expand_string_message); | |
1969 | return search_find_defer? DEFER : ERROR; | |
1970 | } | |
1971 | } | |
1972 | else arg = cb->arg; | |
1973 | ||
1974 | /* Show condition, and expanded condition if it's different */ | |
1975 | ||
1976 | HDEBUG(D_acl) | |
1977 | { | |
1978 | int lhswidth = 0; | |
1979 | debug_printf("check %s%s %n", | |
1980 | (!cond_modifiers[cb->type] && cb->u.negated)? "!":"", | |
1981 | conditions[cb->type], &lhswidth); | |
1982 | ||
1983 | if (cb->type == ACLC_SET) | |
1984 | { | |
1985 | int n = cb->u.varnumber; | |
1986 | int t = (n < ACL_C_MAX)? 'c' : 'm'; | |
1987 | if (n >= ACL_C_MAX) n -= ACL_C_MAX; | |
1988 | debug_printf("acl_%c%d ", t, n); | |
1989 | lhswidth += 7; | |
1990 | } | |
1991 | ||
1992 | debug_printf("= %s\n", cb->arg); | |
1993 | ||
1994 | if (arg != cb->arg) | |
1995 | debug_printf("%.*s= %s\n", lhswidth, | |
1996 | US" ", CS arg); | |
1997 | } | |
1998 | ||
1999 | /* Check that this condition makes sense at this time */ | |
2000 | ||
2001 | if ((cond_forbids[cb->type] & (1 << where)) != 0) | |
2002 | { | |
2003 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot %s %s condition in %s ACL", | |
2004 | cond_modifiers[cb->type]? "use" : "test", | |
2005 | conditions[cb->type], acl_wherenames[where]); | |
2006 | return ERROR; | |
2007 | } | |
2008 | ||
2009 | /* Run the appropriate test for each condition, or take the appropriate | |
2010 | action for the remaining modifiers. */ | |
2011 | ||
2012 | switch(cb->type) | |
2013 | { | |
2014 | /* A nested ACL that returns "discard" makes sense only for an "accept" or | |
2015 | "discard" verb. */ | |
2016 | ||
2017 | case ACLC_ACL: | |
2018 | rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, arg, level+1, user_msgptr, log_msgptr); | |
2019 | if (rc == DISCARD && verb != ACL_ACCEPT && verb != ACL_DISCARD) | |
2020 | { | |
2021 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("nested ACL returned \"discard\" for " | |
2022 | "\"%s\" command (only allowed with \"accept\" or \"discard\")", | |
2023 | verbs[verb]); | |
2024 | return ERROR; | |
2025 | } | |
2026 | break; | |
2027 | ||
2028 | case ACLC_AUTHENTICATED: | |
2029 | rc = (sender_host_authenticated == NULL)? FAIL : | |
2030 | match_isinlist(sender_host_authenticated, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, | |
2031 | TRUE, NULL); | |
2032 | break; | |
2033 | ||
8523533c TK |
2034 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL |
2035 | case ACLC_BMI_OPTIN: | |
2036 | { | |
2037 | int old_pool = store_pool; | |
2038 | store_pool = POOL_PERM; | |
2039 | bmi_current_optin = string_copy(arg); | |
2040 | store_pool = old_pool; | |
2041 | } | |
2042 | break; | |
2043 | #endif | |
2044 | ||
059ec3d9 PH |
2045 | case ACLC_CONDITION: |
2046 | if (Ustrspn(arg, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg)) /* Digits, or empty */ | |
2047 | rc = (Uatoi(arg) == 0)? FAIL : OK; | |
2048 | else | |
2049 | rc = (strcmpic(arg, US"no") == 0 || | |
2050 | strcmpic(arg, US"false") == 0)? FAIL : | |
2051 | (strcmpic(arg, US"yes") == 0 || | |
2052 | strcmpic(arg, US"true") == 0)? OK : DEFER; | |
2053 | if (rc == DEFER) | |
2054 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("invalid \"condition\" value \"%s\"", arg); | |
2055 | break; | |
2056 | ||
2057 | case ACLC_CONTROL: | |
c5fcb476 PH |
2058 | control_type = decode_control(arg, &p, where, log_msgptr); |
2059 | ||
8523533c | 2060 | /* Check if this control makes sense at this time */ |
c5fcb476 PH |
2061 | |
2062 | if ((control_forbids[control_type] & (1 << where)) != 0) | |
2063 | { | |
2064 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot use \"control=%s\" in %s ACL", | |
2065 | controls[control_type], acl_wherenames[where]); | |
2066 | return ERROR; | |
8e669ac1 | 2067 | } |
c5fcb476 PH |
2068 | |
2069 | switch(control_type) | |
059ec3d9 | 2070 | { |
8523533c TK |
2071 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL |
2072 | case CONTROL_BMI_RUN: | |
2073 | bmi_run = 1; | |
2074 | break; | |
2075 | #endif | |
fb2274d4 TK |
2076 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS |
2077 | case CONTROL_DK_VERIFY: | |
2078 | dk_do_verify = 1; | |
2079 | break; | |
2080 | #endif | |
059ec3d9 PH |
2081 | case CONTROL_ERROR: |
2082 | return ERROR; | |
2083 | ||
2084 | case CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART: | |
2085 | deliver_localpart = addr->cc_local_part; | |
2086 | break; | |
2087 | ||
2088 | case CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART: | |
2089 | deliver_localpart = addr->lc_local_part; | |
2090 | break; | |
2091 | ||
2092 | case CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC: | |
2093 | smtp_enforce_sync = TRUE; | |
2094 | break; | |
2095 | ||
2096 | case CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC: | |
2097 | smtp_enforce_sync = FALSE; | |
2098 | break; | |
2099 | ||
8523533c TK |
2100 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN |
2101 | case CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL: | |
2102 | no_mbox_unspool = TRUE; | |
2103 | break; | |
2104 | #endif | |
2105 | ||
059ec3d9 PH |
2106 | case CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE: |
2107 | no_multiline_responses = TRUE; | |
2108 | break; | |
2109 | ||
29aba418 | 2110 | case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER: |
8523533c | 2111 | case CONTROL_FAKEREJECT: |
29aba418 | 2112 | fake_response = (control_type == CONTROL_FAKEDEFER) ? DEFER : FAIL; |
8523533c | 2113 | if (*p == '/') |
8e669ac1 | 2114 | { |
8523533c | 2115 | uschar *pp = p + 1; |
8e669ac1 | 2116 | while (*pp != 0) pp++; |
29aba418 | 2117 | fake_response_text = expand_string(string_copyn(p+1, pp-p-1)); |
8523533c TK |
2118 | p = pp; |
2119 | } | |
2120 | else | |
2121 | { | |
2122 | /* Explicitly reset to default string */ | |
29aba418 | 2123 | fake_response_text = US"Your message has been rejected but is being kept for evaluation.\nIf it was a legitimate message, it may still be delivered to the target recipient(s)."; |
8523533c TK |
2124 | } |
2125 | break; | |
8523533c | 2126 | |
059ec3d9 PH |
2127 | case CONTROL_FREEZE: |
2128 | deliver_freeze = TRUE; | |
2129 | deliver_frozen_at = time(NULL); | |
2130 | break; | |
2131 | ||
2132 | case CONTROL_QUEUE_ONLY: | |
2133 | queue_only_policy = TRUE; | |
2134 | break; | |
2135 | ||
2136 | case CONTROL_SUBMISSION: | |
87ba3f5f | 2137 | originator_name = US""; |
059ec3d9 | 2138 | submission_mode = TRUE; |
69358f02 | 2139 | while (*p == '/') |
8e669ac1 | 2140 | { |
69358f02 PH |
2141 | if (Ustrncmp(p, "/sender_retain", 14) == 0) |
2142 | { | |
2143 | p += 14; | |
2144 | active_local_sender_retain = TRUE; | |
8e669ac1 PH |
2145 | active_local_from_check = FALSE; |
2146 | } | |
69358f02 PH |
2147 | else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/domain=", 8) == 0) |
2148 | { | |
2149 | uschar *pp = p + 8; | |
8e669ac1 | 2150 | while (*pp != 0 && *pp != '/') pp++; |
87ba3f5f PH |
2151 | submission_domain = string_copyn(p+8, pp-p-8); |
2152 | p = pp; | |
2153 | } | |
2154 | else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/name=", 6) == 0) | |
2155 | { | |
2156 | uschar *pp = p + 6; | |
2157 | while (*pp != 0 && *pp != '/') pp++; | |
2158 | originator_name = string_copy(parse_fix_phrase(p+6, pp-p-6, | |
2159 | big_buffer, big_buffer_size)); | |
8e669ac1 | 2160 | p = pp; |
69358f02 | 2161 | } |
8e669ac1 PH |
2162 | else break; |
2163 | } | |
69358f02 | 2164 | if (*p != 0) |
059ec3d9 | 2165 | { |
69358f02 | 2166 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg); |
059ec3d9 PH |
2167 | return ERROR; |
2168 | } | |
2169 | break; | |
2170 | } | |
2171 | break; | |
2172 | ||
8523533c TK |
2173 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN |
2174 | case ACLC_DECODE: | |
2175 | rc = mime_decode(&arg); | |
2176 | break; | |
2177 | #endif | |
2178 | ||
059ec3d9 PH |
2179 | case ACLC_DELAY: |
2180 | { | |
2181 | int delay = readconf_readtime(arg, 0, FALSE); | |
2182 | if (delay < 0) | |
2183 | { | |
2184 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for \"delay\" " | |
2185 | "modifier: \"%s\" is not a time value", arg); | |
2186 | return ERROR; | |
2187 | } | |
2188 | else | |
2189 | { | |
2190 | HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("delay modifier requests %d-second delay\n", | |
2191 | delay); | |
2192 | if (host_checking) | |
2193 | { | |
2194 | HDEBUG(D_acl) | |
2195 | debug_printf("delay skipped in -bh checking mode\n"); | |
2196 | } | |
010c2d14 PH |
2197 | |
2198 | /* It appears to be impossible to detect that a TCP/IP connection has | |
2199 | gone away without reading from it. This means that we cannot shorten | |
2200 | the delay below if the client goes away, because we cannot discover | |
2201 | that the client has closed its end of the connection. (The connection | |
2202 | is actually in a half-closed state, waiting for the server to close its | |
2203 | end.) It would be nice to be able to detect this state, so that the | |
2204 | Exim process is not held up unnecessarily. However, it seems that we | |
2205 | can't. The poll() function does not do the right thing, and in any case | |
2206 | it is not always available. | |
2207 | ||
2208 | NOTE: If ever this state of affairs changes, remember that we may be | |
2209 | dealing with stdin/stdout here, in addition to TCP/IP connections. | |
2210 | Whatever is done must work in both cases. To detected the stdin/stdout | |
2211 | case, check for smtp_in or smtp_out being NULL. */ | |
2212 | ||
8e669ac1 | 2213 | else |
86b8287f PH |
2214 | { |
2215 | while (delay > 0) delay = sleep(delay); | |
8e669ac1 | 2216 | } |
059ec3d9 PH |
2217 | } |
2218 | } | |
2219 | break; | |
2220 | ||
8523533c TK |
2221 | #ifdef WITH_OLD_DEMIME |
2222 | case ACLC_DEMIME: | |
2223 | rc = demime(&arg); | |
2224 | break; | |
2225 | #endif | |
2226 | ||
fb2274d4 TK |
2227 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DOMAINKEYS |
2228 | case ACLC_DK_DOMAIN_SOURCE: | |
2229 | if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; }; | |
2230 | /* check header source of domain against given string */ | |
2231 | switch (dk_verify_block->address_source) { | |
2232 | case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_FROM_FROM: | |
2233 | rc = match_isinlist(US"from", &arg, 0, NULL, | |
2234 | NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); | |
2235 | break; | |
2236 | case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_FROM_SENDER: | |
2237 | rc = match_isinlist(US"sender", &arg, 0, NULL, | |
2238 | NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); | |
2239 | break; | |
2240 | case DK_EXIM_ADDRESS_NONE: | |
2241 | rc = match_isinlist(US"none", &arg, 0, NULL, | |
2242 | NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); | |
2243 | break; | |
2244 | } | |
2245 | break; | |
2246 | case ACLC_DK_POLICY: | |
2247 | if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; }; | |
2248 | /* check policy against given string, default FAIL */ | |
2249 | rc = FAIL; | |
2250 | if (dk_verify_block->signsall) | |
2251 | rc = match_isinlist(US"signsall", &arg, 0, NULL, | |
2252 | NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); | |
2253 | if (dk_verify_block->testing) | |
2254 | rc = match_isinlist(US"testing", &arg, 0, NULL, | |
2255 | NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); | |
2256 | break; | |
2257 | case ACLC_DK_SENDER_DOMAINS: | |
2258 | if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; }; | |
2259 | if (dk_verify_block->domain != NULL) | |
2260 | rc = match_isinlist(dk_verify_block->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor, | |
2261 | NULL, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL); | |
2262 | else rc = FAIL; | |
2263 | break; | |
2264 | case ACLC_DK_SENDER_LOCAL_PARTS: | |
2265 | if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; }; | |
2266 | if (dk_verify_block->local_part != NULL) | |
2267 | rc = match_isinlist(dk_verify_block->local_part, &arg, 0, &localpartlist_anchor, | |
2268 | NULL, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE, NULL); | |
2269 | else rc = FAIL; | |
2270 | break; | |
2271 | case ACLC_DK_SENDERS: | |
2272 | if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; }; | |
2273 | if (dk_verify_block->address != NULL) | |
2274 | rc = match_address_list(dk_verify_block->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0, NULL); | |
2275 | else rc = FAIL; | |
2276 | break; | |
2277 | case ACLC_DK_STATUS: | |
2278 | if (dk_verify_block == NULL) { rc = FAIL; break; }; | |
2279 | if (dk_verify_block->result > 0) { | |
2280 | switch(dk_verify_block->result) { | |
2281 | case DK_EXIM_RESULT_BAD_FORMAT: | |
2282 | rc = match_isinlist(US"bad format", &arg, 0, NULL, | |
2283 | NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); | |
2284 | break; | |
2285 | case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NO_KEY: | |
2286 | rc = match_isinlist(US"no key", &arg, 0, NULL, | |
2287 | NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); | |
2288 | break; | |
2289 | case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NO_SIGNATURE: | |
2290 | rc = match_isinlist(US"no signature", &arg, 0, NULL, | |
2291 | NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); | |
2292 | break; | |
2293 | case DK_EXIM_RESULT_REVOKED: | |
2294 | rc = match_isinlist(US"revoked", &arg, 0, NULL, | |
2295 | NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); | |
2296 | break; | |
2297 | case DK_EXIM_RESULT_NON_PARTICIPANT: | |
2298 | rc = match_isinlist(US"non-participant", &arg, 0, NULL, | |
2299 | NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); | |
2300 | break; | |
2301 | case DK_EXIM_RESULT_GOOD: | |
2302 | rc = match_isinlist(US"good", &arg, 0, NULL, | |
2303 | NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); | |
2304 | break; | |
2305 | case DK_EXIM_RESULT_BAD: | |
2306 | rc = match_isinlist(US"bad", &arg, 0, NULL, | |
2307 | NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); | |
2308 | break; | |
2309 | } | |
2310 | } | |
2311 | break; | |
2312 | #endif | |
2313 | ||
059ec3d9 PH |
2314 | case ACLC_DNSLISTS: |
2315 | rc = verify_check_dnsbl(&arg); | |
2316 | break; | |
2317 | ||
2318 | case ACLC_DOMAINS: | |
2319 | rc = match_isinlist(addr->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor, | |
2320 | addr->domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, &deliver_domain_data); | |
2321 | break; | |
2322 | ||
2323 | /* The value in tls_cipher is the full cipher name, for example, | |
2324 | TLSv1:DES-CBC3-SHA:168, whereas the values to test for are just the | |
2325 | cipher names such as DES-CBC3-SHA. But program defensively. We don't know | |
2326 | what may in practice come out of the SSL library - which at the time of | |
2327 | writing is poorly documented. */ | |
2328 | ||
2329 | case ACLC_ENCRYPTED: | |
2330 | if (tls_cipher == NULL) rc = FAIL; else | |
2331 | { | |
2332 | uschar *endcipher = NULL; | |
2333 | uschar *cipher = Ustrchr(tls_cipher, ':'); | |
2334 | if (cipher == NULL) cipher = tls_cipher; else | |
2335 | { | |
2336 | endcipher = Ustrchr(++cipher, ':'); | |
2337 | if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = 0; | |
2338 | } | |
2339 | rc = match_isinlist(cipher, &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL); | |
2340 | if (endcipher != NULL) *endcipher = ':'; | |
2341 | } | |
2342 | break; | |
2343 | ||
2344 | /* Use verify_check_this_host() instead of verify_check_host() so that | |
2345 | we can pass over &host_data to catch any looked up data. Once it has been | |
2346 | set, it retains its value so that it's still there if another ACL verb | |
2347 | comes through here and uses the cache. However, we must put it into | |
2348 | permanent store in case it is also expected to be used in a subsequent | |
2349 | message in the same SMTP connection. */ | |
2350 | ||
2351 | case ACLC_HOSTS: | |
2352 | rc = verify_check_this_host(&arg, sender_host_cache, NULL, | |
2353 | (sender_host_address == NULL)? US"" : sender_host_address, &host_data); | |
2354 | if (host_data != NULL) host_data = string_copy_malloc(host_data); | |
2355 | break; | |
2356 | ||
2357 | case ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS: | |
2358 | rc = match_isinlist(addr->cc_local_part, &arg, 0, | |
2359 | &localpartlist_anchor, addr->localpart_cache, MCL_LOCALPART, TRUE, | |
2360 | &deliver_localpart_data); | |
2361 | break; | |
2362 | ||
2363 | case ACLC_LOGWRITE: | |
2364 | { | |
2365 | int logbits = 0; | |
2366 | uschar *s = arg; | |
2367 | if (*s == ':') | |
2368 | { | |
2369 | s++; | |
2370 | while (*s != ':') | |
2371 | { | |
2372 | if (Ustrncmp(s, "main", 4) == 0) | |
2373 | { logbits |= LOG_MAIN; s += 4; } | |
2374 | else if (Ustrncmp(s, "panic", 5) == 0) | |
2375 | { logbits |= LOG_PANIC; s += 5; } | |
2376 | else if (Ustrncmp(s, "reject", 6) == 0) | |
2377 | { logbits |= LOG_REJECT; s += 6; } | |
2378 | else | |
2379 | { | |
2380 | logbits = LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC; | |
2381 | s = string_sprintf(":unknown log name in \"%s\" in " | |
2382 | "\"logwrite\" in %s ACL", arg, acl_wherenames[where]); | |
2383 | } | |
2384 | if (*s == ',') s++; | |
2385 | } | |
2386 | s++; | |
2387 | } | |
2388 | while (isspace(*s)) s++; | |
2389 | if (logbits == 0) logbits = LOG_MAIN; | |
2390 | log_write(0, logbits, "%s", string_printing(s)); | |
2391 | } | |
2392 | break; | |
8e669ac1 | 2393 | |
8523533c TK |
2394 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN |
2395 | case ACLC_MALWARE: | |
2396 | { | |
2397 | /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */ | |
2398 | uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size); | |
2399 | /* Run the malware backend. */ | |
2400 | rc = malware(&ss); | |
2401 | /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */ | |
2402 | while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)) | |
2403 | != NULL) { | |
2404 | if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER) | |
2405 | { | |
2406 | /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */ | |
2407 | rc = FAIL; | |
2408 | } | |
2409 | } | |
2410 | } | |
2411 | break; | |
2412 | ||
2413 | case ACLC_MIME_REGEX: | |
2414 | rc = mime_regex(&arg); | |
2415 | break; | |
2416 | #endif | |
059ec3d9 PH |
2417 | |
2418 | case ACLC_RECIPIENTS: | |
2419 | rc = match_address_list(addr->address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, NULL, -1, 0, | |
2420 | &recipient_data); | |
2421 | break; | |
2422 | ||
8523533c TK |
2423 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN |
2424 | case ACLC_REGEX: | |
2425 | rc = regex(&arg); | |
2426 | break; | |
2427 | #endif | |
2428 | ||
059ec3d9 PH |
2429 | case ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS: |
2430 | { | |
2431 | uschar *sdomain; | |
2432 | sdomain = Ustrrchr(sender_address, '@'); | |
2433 | sdomain = (sdomain == NULL)? US"" : sdomain + 1; | |
2434 | rc = match_isinlist(sdomain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor, | |
2435 | sender_domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, NULL); | |
2436 | } | |
2437 | break; | |
2438 | ||
2439 | case ACLC_SENDERS: | |
2440 | rc = match_address_list(sender_address, TRUE, TRUE, &arg, | |
2441 | sender_address_cache, -1, 0, &sender_data); | |
2442 | break; | |
2443 | ||
2444 | /* Connection variables must persist forever */ | |
2445 | ||
2446 | case ACLC_SET: | |
2447 | { | |
2448 | int old_pool = store_pool; | |
2449 | if (cb->u.varnumber < ACL_C_MAX) store_pool = POOL_PERM; | |
2450 | acl_var[cb->u.varnumber] = string_copy(arg); | |
2451 | store_pool = old_pool; | |
2452 | } | |
2453 | break; | |
2454 | ||
8523533c TK |
2455 | #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN |
2456 | case ACLC_SPAM: | |
2457 | { | |
2458 | /* Seperate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */ | |
2459 | uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size); | |
2460 | /* Run the spam backend. */ | |
2461 | rc = spam(&ss); | |
2462 | /* Modify return code based upon the existance of options. */ | |
2463 | while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)) | |
2464 | != NULL) { | |
2465 | if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER) | |
2466 | { | |
2467 | /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */ | |
2468 | rc = FAIL; | |
2469 | } | |
2470 | } | |
2471 | } | |
2472 | break; | |
2473 | #endif | |
2474 | ||
2475 | #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_SPF | |
2476 | case ACLC_SPF: | |
2477 | rc = spf_process(&arg, sender_address); | |
2478 | break; | |
2479 | #endif | |
2480 | ||
059ec3d9 PH |
2481 | /* If the verb is WARN, discard any user message from verification, because |
2482 | such messages are SMTP responses, not header additions. The latter come | |
475fe28a PH |
2483 | only from explicit "message" modifiers. However, put the user message into |
2484 | $acl_verify_message so it can be used in subsequent conditions or modifiers | |
2485 | (until something changes it). */ | |
059ec3d9 PH |
2486 | |
2487 | case ACLC_VERIFY: | |
2488 | rc = acl_verify(where, addr, arg, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, basic_errno); | |
475fe28a | 2489 | acl_verify_message = *user_msgptr; |
059ec3d9 PH |
2490 | if (verb == ACL_WARN) *user_msgptr = NULL; |
2491 | break; | |
2492 | ||
2493 | default: | |
2494 | log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown " | |
2495 | "condition %d", cb->type); | |
2496 | break; | |
2497 | } | |
2498 | ||
2499 | /* If a condition was negated, invert OK/FAIL. */ | |
2500 | ||
2501 | if (!cond_modifiers[cb->type] && cb->u.negated) | |
2502 | { | |
2503 | if (rc == OK) rc = FAIL; | |
2504 | else if (rc == FAIL || rc == FAIL_DROP) rc = OK; | |
2505 | } | |
2506 | ||
2507 | if (rc != OK) break; /* Conditions loop */ | |
2508 | } | |
2509 | ||
2510 | ||
2511 | /* If the result is the one for which "message" and/or "log_message" are used, | |
2512 | handle the values of these options. Most verbs have but a single return for | |
2513 | which the messages are relevant, but for "discard", it's useful to have the log | |
2514 | message both when it succeeds and when it fails. Also, for an "accept" that | |
2515 | appears in a QUIT ACL, we want to handle the user message. Since only "accept" | |
2516 | and "warn" are permitted in that ACL, we don't need to test the verb. | |
2517 | ||
2518 | These modifiers act in different ways: | |
2519 | ||
2520 | "message" is a user message that will be included in an SMTP response. Unless | |
2521 | it is empty, it overrides any previously set user message. | |
2522 | ||
2523 | "log_message" is a non-user message, and it adds to any existing non-user | |
2524 | message that is already set. | |
2525 | ||
2526 | If there isn't a log message set, we make it the same as the user message. */ | |
2527 | ||
2528 | if (((rc == FAIL_DROP)? FAIL : rc) == msgcond[verb] || | |
2529 | (verb == ACL_DISCARD && rc == OK) || | |
2530 | (where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT)) | |
2531 | { | |
2532 | uschar *expmessage; | |
2533 | ||
2534 | /* If the verb is "warn", messages generated by conditions (verification or | |
2535 | nested ACLs) are discarded. Only messages specified at this level are used. | |
2536 | However, the value of an existing message is available in $acl_verify_message | |
2537 | during expansions. */ | |
2538 | ||
2539 | uschar *old_user_msgptr = *user_msgptr; | |
2540 | uschar *old_log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr != NULL)? *log_msgptr : old_user_msgptr; | |
2541 | ||
2542 | if (verb == ACL_WARN) *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL; | |
2543 | ||
2544 | if (user_message != NULL) | |
2545 | { | |
2546 | acl_verify_message = old_user_msgptr; | |
2547 | expmessage = expand_string(user_message); | |
2548 | if (expmessage == NULL) | |
2549 | { | |
2550 | if (!expand_string_forcedfail) | |
2551 | log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s", | |
2552 | user_message, expand_string_message); | |
2553 | } | |
2554 | else if (expmessage[0] != 0) *user_msgptr = expmessage; | |
2555 | } | |
2556 | ||
2557 | if (log_message != NULL) | |
2558 | { | |
2559 | acl_verify_message = old_log_msgptr; | |
2560 | expmessage = expand_string(log_message); | |
2561 | if (expmessage == NULL) | |
2562 | { | |
2563 | if (!expand_string_forcedfail) | |
2564 | log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "failed to expand ACL message \"%s\": %s", | |
2565 | log_message, expand_string_message); | |
2566 | } | |
2567 | else if (expmessage[0] != 0) | |
2568 | { | |
2569 | *log_msgptr = (*log_msgptr == NULL)? expmessage : | |
2570 | string_sprintf("%s: %s", expmessage, *log_msgptr); | |
2571 | } | |
2572 | } | |
2573 | ||
2574 | /* If no log message, default it to the user message */ | |
2575 | ||
2576 | if (*log_msgptr == NULL) *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr; | |
2577 | } | |
2578 | ||
2579 | acl_verify_message = NULL; | |
2580 | return rc; | |
2581 | } | |
2582 | ||
2583 | ||
2584 | ||
2585 | ||
2586 | ||
2587 | /************************************************* | |
2588 | * Get line from a literal ACL * | |
2589 | *************************************************/ | |
2590 | ||
2591 | /* This function is passed to acl_read() in order to extract individual lines | |
2592 | of a literal ACL, which we access via static pointers. We can destroy the | |
2593 | contents because this is called only once (the compiled ACL is remembered). | |
2594 | ||
2595 | This code is intended to treat the data in the same way as lines in the main | |
2596 | Exim configuration file. That is: | |
2597 | ||
2598 | . Leading spaces are ignored. | |
2599 | ||
2600 | . A \ at the end of a line is a continuation - trailing spaces after the \ | |
2601 | are permitted (this is because I don't believe in making invisible things | |
2602 | significant). Leading spaces on the continued part of a line are ignored. | |
2603 | ||
2604 | . Physical lines starting (significantly) with # are totally ignored, and | |
2605 | may appear within a sequence of backslash-continued lines. | |
2606 | ||
2607 | . Blank lines are ignored, but will end a sequence of continuations. | |
2608 | ||
2609 | Arguments: none | |
2610 | Returns: a pointer to the next line | |
2611 | */ | |
2612 | ||
2613 | ||
2614 | static uschar *acl_text; /* Current pointer in the text */ | |
2615 | static uschar *acl_text_end; /* Points one past the terminating '0' */ | |
2616 | ||
2617 | ||
2618 | static uschar * | |
2619 | acl_getline(void) | |
2620 | { | |
2621 | uschar *yield; | |
2622 | ||
2623 | /* This loop handles leading blank lines and comments. */ | |
2624 | ||
2625 | for(;;) | |
2626 | { | |
2627 | while (isspace(*acl_text)) acl_text++; /* Leading spaces/empty lines */ | |
2628 | if (*acl_text == 0) return NULL; /* No more data */ | |
2629 | yield = acl_text; /* Potential data line */ | |
2630 | ||
2631 | while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++; | |
2632 | ||
2633 | /* If we hit the end before a newline, we have the whole logical line. If | |
2634 | it's a comment, there's no more data to be given. Otherwise, yield it. */ | |
2635 | ||
2636 | if (*acl_text == 0) return (*yield == '#')? NULL : yield; | |
2637 | ||
2638 | /* After reaching a newline, end this loop if the physical line does not | |
2639 | start with '#'. If it does, it's a comment, and the loop continues. */ | |
2640 | ||
2641 | if (*yield != '#') break; | |
2642 | } | |
2643 | ||
2644 | /* This loop handles continuations. We know we have some real data, ending in | |
2645 | newline. See if there is a continuation marker at the end (ignoring trailing | |
2646 | white space). We know that *yield is not white space, so no need to test for | |
2647 | cont > yield in the backwards scanning loop. */ | |
2648 | ||
2649 | for(;;) | |
2650 | { | |
2651 | uschar *cont; | |
2652 | for (cont = acl_text - 1; isspace(*cont); cont--); | |
2653 | ||
2654 | /* If no continuation follows, we are done. Mark the end of the line and | |
2655 | return it. */ | |
2656 | ||
2657 | if (*cont != '\\') | |
2658 | { | |
2659 | *acl_text++ = 0; | |
2660 | return yield; | |
2661 | } | |
2662 | ||
2663 | /* We have encountered a continuation. Skip over whitespace at the start of | |
2664 | the next line, and indeed the whole of the next line or lines if they are | |
2665 | comment lines. */ | |
2666 | ||
2667 | for (;;) | |
2668 | { | |
2669 | while (*(++acl_text) == ' ' || *acl_text == '\t'); | |
2670 | if (*acl_text != '#') break; | |
2671 | while (*(++acl_text) != 0 && *acl_text != '\n'); | |
2672 | } | |
2673 | ||
2674 | /* We have the start of a continuation line. Move all the rest of the data | |
2675 | to join onto the previous line, and then find its end. If the end is not a | |
2676 | newline, we are done. Otherwise loop to look for another continuation. */ | |
2677 | ||
2678 | memmove(cont, acl_text, acl_text_end - acl_text); | |
2679 | acl_text_end -= acl_text - cont; | |
2680 | acl_text = cont; | |
2681 | while (*acl_text != 0 && *acl_text != '\n') acl_text++; | |
2682 | if (*acl_text == 0) return yield; | |
2683 | } | |
2684 | ||
2685 | /* Control does not reach here */ | |
2686 | } | |
2687 | ||
2688 | ||
2689 | ||
2690 | ||
2691 | ||
2692 | /************************************************* | |
2693 | * Check access using an ACL * | |
2694 | *************************************************/ | |
2695 | ||
2696 | /* This function is called from address_check. It may recurse via | |
2697 | acl_check_condition() - hence the use of a level to stop looping. The ACL is | |
2698 | passed as a string which is expanded. A forced failure implies no access check | |
2699 | is required. If the result is a single word, it is taken as the name of an ACL | |
2700 | which is sought in the global ACL tree. Otherwise, it is taken as literal ACL | |
2701 | text, complete with newlines, and parsed as such. In both cases, the ACL check | |
2702 | is then run. This function uses an auxiliary function for acl_read() to call | |
2703 | for reading individual lines of a literal ACL. This is acl_getline(), which | |
2704 | appears immediately above. | |
2705 | ||
2706 | Arguments: | |
2707 | where where called from | |
2708 | addr address item when called from RCPT; otherwise NULL | |
2709 | s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY | |
2710 | level the nesting level | |
2711 | user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response) | |
2712 | log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response) | |
2713 | ||
2714 | Returns: OK access is granted | |
2715 | DISCARD access is apparently granted... | |
2716 | FAIL access is denied | |
2717 | FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection | |
2718 | DEFER can't tell at the moment | |
2719 | ERROR disaster | |
2720 | */ | |
2721 | ||
2722 | static int | |
2723 | acl_check_internal(int where, address_item *addr, uschar *s, int level, | |
2724 | uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr) | |
2725 | { | |
2726 | int fd = -1; | |
2727 | acl_block *acl = NULL; | |
2728 | uschar *acl_name = US"inline ACL"; | |
2729 | uschar *ss; | |
2730 | ||
2731 | /* Catch configuration loops */ | |
2732 | ||
2733 | if (level > 20) | |
2734 | { | |
2735 | *log_msgptr = US"ACL nested too deep: possible loop"; | |
2736 | return ERROR; | |
2737 | } | |
2738 | ||
2739 | if (s == NULL) | |
2740 | { | |
2741 | HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ACL is NULL: implicit DENY\n"); | |
2742 | return FAIL; | |
2743 | } | |
2744 | ||
2745 | /* At top level, we expand the incoming string. At lower levels, it has already | |
2746 | been expanded as part of condition processing. */ | |
2747 | ||
2748 | if (level == 0) | |
2749 | { | |
2750 | ss = expand_string(s); | |
2751 | if (ss == NULL) | |
2752 | { | |
2753 | if (expand_string_forcedfail) return OK; | |
2754 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s", s, | |
2755 | expand_string_message); | |
2756 | return ERROR; | |
2757 | } | |
2758 | } | |
2759 | else ss = s; | |
2760 | ||
2761 | while (isspace(*ss))ss++; | |
2762 | ||
2763 | /* If we can't find a named ACL, the default is to parse it as an inline one. | |
2764 | (Unless it begins with a slash; non-existent files give rise to an error.) */ | |
2765 | ||
2766 | acl_text = ss; | |
2767 | ||
2768 | /* Handle the case of a string that does not contain any spaces. Look for a | |
2769 | named ACL among those read from the configuration, or a previously read file. | |
2770 | It is possible that the pointer to the ACL is NULL if the configuration | |
2771 | contains a name with no data. If not found, and the text begins with '/', | |
2772 | read an ACL from a file, and save it so it can be re-used. */ | |
2773 | ||
2774 | if (Ustrchr(ss, ' ') == NULL) | |
2775 | { | |
2776 | tree_node *t = tree_search(acl_anchor, ss); | |
2777 | if (t != NULL) | |
2778 | { | |
2779 | acl = (acl_block *)(t->data.ptr); | |
2780 | if (acl == NULL) | |
2781 | { | |
2782 | HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("ACL \"%s\" is empty: implicit DENY\n", ss); | |
2783 | return FAIL; | |
2784 | } | |
2785 | acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss); | |
2786 | HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("using ACL \"%s\"\n", ss); | |
2787 | } | |
2788 | ||
2789 | else if (*ss == '/') | |
2790 | { | |
2791 | struct stat statbuf; | |
2792 | fd = Uopen(ss, O_RDONLY, 0); | |
2793 | if (fd < 0) | |
2794 | { | |
2795 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to open ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss, | |
2796 | strerror(errno)); | |
2797 | return ERROR; | |
2798 | } | |
2799 | ||
2800 | if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) != 0) | |
2801 | { | |
2802 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to fstat ACL file \"%s\": %s", ss, | |
2803 | strerror(errno)); | |
2804 | return ERROR; | |
2805 | } | |
2806 | ||
2807 | acl_text = store_get(statbuf.st_size + 1); | |
2808 | acl_text_end = acl_text + statbuf.st_size + 1; | |
2809 | ||
2810 | if (read(fd, acl_text, statbuf.st_size) != statbuf.st_size) | |
2811 | { | |
2812 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to read ACL file \"%s\": %s", | |
2813 | ss, strerror(errno)); | |
2814 | return ERROR; | |
2815 | } | |
2816 | acl_text[statbuf.st_size] = 0; | |
2817 | close(fd); | |
2818 | ||
2819 | acl_name = string_sprintf("ACL \"%s\"", ss); | |
2820 | HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("read ACL from file %s\n", ss); | |
2821 | } | |
2822 | } | |
2823 | ||
2824 | /* Parse an ACL that is still in text form. If it came from a file, remember it | |
2825 | in the ACL tree, having read it into the POOL_PERM store pool so that it | |
2826 | persists between multiple messages. */ | |
2827 | ||
2828 | if (acl == NULL) | |
2829 | { | |
2830 | int old_pool = store_pool; | |
2831 | if (fd >= 0) store_pool = POOL_PERM; | |
2832 | acl = acl_read(acl_getline, log_msgptr); | |
2833 | store_pool = old_pool; | |
2834 | if (acl == NULL && *log_msgptr != NULL) return ERROR; | |
2835 | if (fd >= 0) | |
2836 | { | |
2837 | tree_node *t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(ss)); | |
2838 | Ustrcpy(t->name, ss); | |
2839 | t->data.ptr = acl; | |
2840 | (void)tree_insertnode(&acl_anchor, t); | |
2841 | } | |
2842 | } | |
2843 | ||
2844 | /* Now we have an ACL to use. It's possible it may be NULL. */ | |
2845 | ||
2846 | while (acl != NULL) | |
2847 | { | |
2848 | int cond; | |
2849 | int basic_errno = 0; | |
2850 | BOOL endpass_seen = FALSE; | |
2851 | ||
2852 | *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL; | |
2853 | acl_temp_details = FALSE; | |
2854 | ||
2855 | if (where == ACL_WHERE_QUIT && | |
2856 | acl->verb != ACL_ACCEPT && | |
2857 | acl->verb != ACL_WARN) | |
2858 | { | |
2859 | *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"%s\" is not allowed in a QUIT ACL", | |
2860 | verbs[acl->verb]); | |
2861 | return ERROR; | |
2862 | } | |
2863 | ||
2864 | HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("processing \"%s\"\n", verbs[acl->verb]); | |
2865 | ||
2866 | /* Clear out any search error message from a previous check before testing | |
2867 | this condition. */ | |
2868 | ||
2869 | search_error_message = NULL; | |
2870 | cond = acl_check_condition(acl->verb, acl->condition, where, addr, level, | |
2871 | &endpass_seen, user_msgptr, log_msgptr, &basic_errno); | |
2872 | ||
2873 | /* Handle special returns: DEFER causes a return except on a WARN verb; | |
2874 | ERROR always causes a return. */ | |
2875 | ||
2876 | switch (cond) | |
2877 | { | |
2878 | case DEFER: | |
2879 | HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test deferred\n", verbs[acl->verb]); | |
2880 | if (basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER) | |
2881 | { | |
2882 | if (search_error_message != NULL && *search_error_message != 0) | |
2883 | *log_msgptr = search_error_message; | |
2884 | if (smtp_return_error_details) acl_temp_details = TRUE; | |
2885 | } | |
2886 | else | |
2887 | { | |
2888 | acl_temp_details = TRUE; | |
2889 | } | |
2890 | if (acl->verb != ACL_WARN) return DEFER; | |
2891 | break; | |
2892 | ||
2893 | default: /* Paranoia */ | |
2894 | case ERROR: | |
2895 | HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test error\n", verbs[acl->verb]); | |
2896 | return ERROR; | |
2897 | ||
2898 | case OK: | |
2899 | HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test succeeded\n", | |
2900 | verbs[acl->verb]); | |
2901 | break; | |
2902 | ||
2903 | case FAIL: | |
2904 | HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test failed\n", verbs[acl->verb]); | |
2905 | break; | |
2906 | ||
2907 | /* DISCARD and DROP can happen only from a nested ACL condition, and | |
2908 | DISCARD can happen only for an "accept" or "discard" verb. */ | |
2909 | ||
2910 | case DISCARD: | |
2911 | HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test yielded \"discard\"\n", | |
2912 | verbs[acl->verb]); | |
2913 | break; | |
2914 | ||
2915 | case FAIL_DROP: | |
2916 | HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("%s: condition test yielded \"drop\"\n", | |
2917 | verbs[acl->verb]); | |
2918 | break; | |
2919 | } | |
2920 | ||
2921 | /* At this point, cond for most verbs is either OK or FAIL or (as a result of | |
2922 | a nested ACL condition) FAIL_DROP. However, for WARN, cond may be DEFER, and | |
2923 | for ACCEPT and DISCARD, it may be DISCARD after a nested ACL call. */ | |
2924 | ||
2925 | switch(acl->verb) | |
2926 | { | |
2927 | case ACL_ACCEPT: | |
2928 | if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD) return cond; | |
2929 | if (endpass_seen) | |
2930 | { | |
2931 | HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("accept: endpass encountered - denying access\n"); | |
2932 | return cond; | |
2933 | } | |
2934 | break; | |
2935 | ||
2936 | case ACL_DEFER: | |
2937 | if (cond == OK) | |
2938 | { | |
2939 | acl_temp_details = TRUE; | |
2940 | return DEFER; | |
2941 | } | |
2942 | break; | |
2943 | ||
2944 | case ACL_DENY: | |
2945 | if (cond == OK) return FAIL; | |
2946 | break; | |
2947 | ||
2948 | case ACL_DISCARD: | |
2949 | if (cond == OK || cond == DISCARD) return DISCARD; | |
2950 | if (endpass_seen) | |
2951 | { | |
2952 | HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("discard: endpass encountered - denying access\n"); | |
2953 | return cond; | |
2954 | } | |
2955 | break; | |
2956 | ||
2957 | case ACL_DROP: | |
2958 | if (cond == OK) return FAIL_DROP; | |
2959 | break; | |
2960 | ||
2961 | case ACL_REQUIRE: | |
2962 | if (cond != OK) return cond; | |
2963 | break; | |
2964 | ||
2965 | case ACL_WARN: | |
2966 | if (cond == OK) | |
2967 | acl_warn(where, *user_msgptr, *log_msgptr); | |
2968 | else if (cond == DEFER) | |
9c7a242c PH |
2969 | log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s Warning: ACL \"warn\" statement skipped: " |
2970 | "condition test deferred%s%s", host_and_ident(TRUE), | |
2971 | (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : US": ", | |
2972 | (*log_msgptr == NULL)? US"" : *log_msgptr); | |
059ec3d9 PH |
2973 | *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = NULL; /* In case implicit DENY follows */ |
2974 | break; | |
2975 | ||
2976 | default: | |
2977 | log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE, "internal ACL error: unknown verb %d", | |
2978 | acl->verb); | |
2979 | break; | |
2980 | } | |
2981 | ||
2982 | /* Pass to the next ACL item */ | |
2983 | ||
2984 | acl = acl->next; | |
2985 | } | |
2986 | ||
2987 | /* We have reached the end of the ACL. This is an implicit DENY. */ | |
2988 | ||
2989 | HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("end of %s: implicit DENY\n", acl_name); | |
2990 | return FAIL; | |
2991 | } | |
2992 | ||
2993 | ||
2994 | /************************************************* | |
2995 | * Check access using an ACL * | |
2996 | *************************************************/ | |
2997 | ||
2998 | /* This is the external interface for ACL checks. It sets up an address and the | |
2999 | expansions for $domain and $local_part when called after RCPT, then calls | |
3000 | acl_check_internal() to do the actual work. | |
3001 | ||
3002 | Arguments: | |
3003 | where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating where called from | |
3004 | data_string RCPT address, or SMTP command argument, or NULL | |
3005 | s the input string; NULL is the same as an empty ACL => DENY | |
3006 | user_msgptr where to put a user error (for SMTP response) | |
3007 | log_msgptr where to put a logging message (not for SMTP response) | |
3008 | ||
3009 | Returns: OK access is granted by an ACCEPT verb | |
3010 | DISCARD access is granted by a DISCARD verb | |
3011 | FAIL access is denied | |
3012 | FAIL_DROP access is denied; drop the connection | |
3013 | DEFER can't tell at the moment | |
3014 | ERROR disaster | |
3015 | */ | |
3016 | ||
3017 | int | |
3018 | acl_check(int where, uschar *data_string, uschar *s, uschar **user_msgptr, | |
3019 | uschar **log_msgptr) | |
3020 | { | |
3021 | int rc; | |
3022 | address_item adb; | |
3023 | address_item *addr; | |
3024 | ||
3025 | *user_msgptr = *log_msgptr = NULL; | |
3026 | sender_verified_failed = NULL; | |
3027 | ||
3028 | if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT) | |
3029 | { | |
3030 | adb = address_defaults; | |
3031 | addr = &adb; | |
3032 | addr->address = data_string; | |
3033 | if (deliver_split_address(addr) == DEFER) | |
3034 | { | |
3035 | *log_msgptr = US"defer in percent_hack_domains check"; | |
3036 | return DEFER; | |
3037 | } | |
3038 | deliver_domain = addr->domain; | |
3039 | deliver_localpart = addr->local_part; | |
3040 | } | |
3041 | else | |
3042 | { | |
3043 | addr = NULL; | |
3044 | smtp_command_argument = data_string; | |
3045 | } | |
3046 | ||
3047 | rc = acl_check_internal(where, addr, s, 0, user_msgptr, log_msgptr); | |
3048 | ||
3049 | smtp_command_argument = deliver_domain = | |
2a3eea10 | 3050 | deliver_localpart = deliver_address_data = sender_address_data = NULL; |
059ec3d9 PH |
3051 | |
3052 | /* A DISCARD response is permitted only for message ACLs, excluding the PREDATA | |
3053 | ACL, which is really in the middle of an SMTP command. */ | |
3054 | ||
3055 | if (rc == DISCARD) | |
3056 | { | |
3057 | if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP || where == ACL_WHERE_PREDATA) | |
3058 | { | |
3059 | log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "\"discard\" verb not allowed in %s " | |
3060 | "ACL", acl_wherenames[where]); | |
3061 | return ERROR; | |
3062 | } | |
3063 | return DISCARD; | |
3064 | } | |
3065 | ||
3066 | /* A DROP response is not permitted from MAILAUTH */ | |
3067 | ||
3068 | if (rc == FAIL_DROP && where == ACL_WHERE_MAILAUTH) | |
3069 | { | |
3070 | log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "\"drop\" verb not allowed in %s " | |
3071 | "ACL", acl_wherenames[where]); | |
3072 | return ERROR; | |
3073 | } | |
3074 | ||
3075 | /* Before giving an error response, take a look at the length of any user | |
3076 | message, and split it up into multiple lines if possible. */ | |
3077 | ||
3078 | if (rc != OK && *user_msgptr != NULL && Ustrlen(*user_msgptr) > 75) | |
3079 | { | |
3080 | uschar *s = *user_msgptr = string_copy(*user_msgptr); | |
3081 | uschar *ss = s; | |
3082 | ||
3083 | for (;;) | |
3084 | { | |
3085 | int i = 0; | |
3086 | while (i < 75 && *ss != 0 && *ss != '\n') ss++, i++; | |
3087 | if (*ss == 0) break; | |
3088 | if (*ss == '\n') | |
3089 | s = ++ss; | |
3090 | else | |
3091 | { | |
3092 | uschar *t = ss + 1; | |
3093 | uschar *tt = NULL; | |
3094 | while (--t > s + 35) | |
3095 | { | |
3096 | if (*t == ' ') | |
3097 | { | |
3098 | if (t[-1] == ':') { tt = t; break; } | |
3099 | if (tt == NULL) tt = t; | |
3100 | } | |
3101 | } | |
3102 | ||
3103 | if (tt == NULL) /* Can't split behind - try ahead */ | |
3104 | { | |
3105 | t = ss + 1; | |
3106 | while (*t != 0) | |
3107 | { | |
3108 | if (*t == ' ' || *t == '\n') | |
3109 | { tt = t; break; } | |
3110 | t++; | |
3111 | } | |
3112 | } | |
3113 | ||
3114 | if (tt == NULL) break; /* Can't find anywhere to split */ | |
3115 | *tt = '\n'; | |
3116 | s = ss = tt+1; | |
3117 | } | |
3118 | } | |
3119 | } | |
3120 | ||
3121 | return rc; | |
3122 | } | |
3123 | ||
3124 | /* End of acl.c */ |