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[exim.git] / src / src / acl.c
CommitLineData
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1/*************************************************
2* Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
3*************************************************/
4
f9ba5e22 5/* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2018 */
1e1ddfac 6/* Copyright (c) The Exim Maintainers 2020 */
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7/* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
8
9/* Code for handling Access Control Lists (ACLs) */
10
11#include "exim.h"
12
13
14/* Default callout timeout */
15
16#define CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT 30
17
18/* ACL verb codes - keep in step with the table of verbs that follows */
19
20enum { ACL_ACCEPT, ACL_DEFER, ACL_DENY, ACL_DISCARD, ACL_DROP, ACL_REQUIRE,
21 ACL_WARN };
22
23/* ACL verbs */
24
f9d04f08 25static uschar *verbs[] = {
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26 [ACL_ACCEPT] = US"accept",
27 [ACL_DEFER] = US"defer",
28 [ACL_DENY] = US"deny",
29 [ACL_DISCARD] = US"discard",
30 [ACL_DROP] = US"drop",
31 [ACL_REQUIRE] = US"require",
32 [ACL_WARN] = US"warn"
33};
059ec3d9 34
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35/* For each verb, the conditions for which "message" or "log_message" are used
36are held as a bitmap. This is to avoid expanding the strings unnecessarily. For
37"accept", the FAIL case is used only after "endpass", but that is selected in
38the code. */
39
40static int msgcond[] = {
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41 [ACL_ACCEPT] = BIT(OK) | BIT(FAIL) | BIT(FAIL_DROP),
42 [ACL_DEFER] = BIT(OK),
43 [ACL_DENY] = BIT(OK),
44 [ACL_DISCARD] = BIT(OK) | BIT(FAIL) | BIT(FAIL_DROP),
45 [ACL_DROP] = BIT(OK),
46 [ACL_REQUIRE] = BIT(FAIL) | BIT(FAIL_DROP),
47 [ACL_WARN] = BIT(OK)
4e88a19f 48 };
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49
50/* ACL condition and modifier codes - keep in step with the table that
2d009132 51follows.
71fafd95 52down. */
059ec3d9 53
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54enum { ACLC_ACL,
55 ACLC_ADD_HEADER,
56 ACLC_AUTHENTICATED,
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57#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
58 ACLC_BMI_OPTIN,
59#endif
71fafd95 60 ACLC_CONDITION,
c3611384 61 ACLC_CONTINUE,
71fafd95 62 ACLC_CONTROL,
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63#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
64 ACLC_DCC,
65#endif
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66#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
67 ACLC_DECODE,
68#endif
69 ACLC_DELAY,
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70#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
71 ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER,
72 ACLC_DKIM_STATUS,
fb2274d4 73#endif
1a2e76e1 74#ifdef SUPPORT_DMARC
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75 ACLC_DMARC_STATUS,
76#endif
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77 ACLC_DNSLISTS,
78 ACLC_DOMAINS,
79 ACLC_ENCRYPTED,
80 ACLC_ENDPASS,
81 ACLC_HOSTS,
82 ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS,
83 ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE,
6ea85e9a 84 ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET,
71fafd95 85 ACLC_LOGWRITE,
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86#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
87 ACLC_MALWARE,
88#endif
89 ACLC_MESSAGE,
90#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
91 ACLC_MIME_REGEX,
92#endif
b0b9dbb1 93 ACLC_QUEUE,
870f6ba8 94 ACLC_RATELIMIT,
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95 ACLC_RECIPIENTS,
96#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
97 ACLC_REGEX,
98#endif
e7568d51 99 ACLC_REMOVE_HEADER,
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100 ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS,
101 ACLC_SENDERS,
102 ACLC_SET,
8523533c 103#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
8e669ac1 104 ACLC_SPAM,
8523533c 105#endif
7952eef9 106#ifdef SUPPORT_SPF
8523533c 107 ACLC_SPF,
65a7d8c3 108 ACLC_SPF_GUESS,
8523533c 109#endif
b0019c78 110 ACLC_UDPSEND,
8523533c 111 ACLC_VERIFY };
059ec3d9 112
c3611384 113/* ACL conditions/modifiers: "delay", "control", "continue", "endpass",
b0b9dbb1 114"message", "log_message", "log_reject_target", "logwrite", "queue" and "set" are
c3611384 115modifiers that look like conditions but always return TRUE. They are used for
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116their side effects. Do not invent new modifier names that result in one name
117being the prefix of another; the binary-search in the list will go wrong. */
059ec3d9 118
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119typedef struct condition_def {
120 uschar *name;
c5fcb476 121
2d009132 122/* Flag to indicate the condition/modifier has a string expansion done
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123at the outer level. In the other cases, expansion already occurs in the
124checking functions. */
2d009132 125 BOOL expand_at_top:1;
059ec3d9 126
2d009132 127 BOOL is_modifier:1;
059ec3d9 128
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129/* Bit map vector of which conditions and modifiers are not allowed at certain
130times. For each condition and modifier, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times.
131For some, it is easier to specify the negation of a small number of allowed
132times. */
133 unsigned forbids;
134
135} condition_def;
136
137static condition_def conditions[] = {
f2ed27cf 138 [ACLC_ACL] = { US"acl", FALSE, FALSE, 0 },
2d009132 139
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140 [ACLC_ADD_HEADER] = { US"add_header", TRUE, TRUE,
141 (unsigned int)
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142 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
143 ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
2d009132 144#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
e3a69b62 145 ACL_BIT_PRDR |
2d009132 146#endif
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147 ACL_BIT_MIME | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
148 ACL_BIT_DKIM |
149 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START),
2d009132 150 },
059ec3d9 151
f2ed27cf 152 [ACLC_AUTHENTICATED] = { US"authenticated", FALSE, FALSE,
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153 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START |
154 ACL_BIT_CONNECT | ACL_BIT_HELO,
2d009132 155 },
8523533c 156#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
f2ed27cf 157 [ACLC_BMI_OPTIN] = { US"bmi_optin", TRUE, TRUE,
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158 ACL_BIT_AUTH |
159 ACL_BIT_CONNECT | ACL_BIT_HELO |
160 ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_MIME |
2d009132 161# ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
e3a69b62 162 ACL_BIT_PRDR |
2d009132 163# endif
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164 ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
165 ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH |
166 ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_STARTTLS |
167 ACL_BIT_VRFY | ACL_BIT_PREDATA |
168 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START,
2d009132 169 },
8e669ac1 170#endif
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171 [ACLC_CONDITION] = { US"condition", TRUE, FALSE, 0 },
172 [ACLC_CONTINUE] = { US"continue", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
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173
174 /* Certain types of control are always allowed, so we let it through
175 always and check in the control processing itself. */
f2ed27cf 176 [ACLC_CONTROL] = { US"control", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
2d009132 177
6a8f9482 178#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
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179 [ACLC_DCC] = { US"dcc", TRUE, FALSE,
180 (unsigned int)
e3a69b62 181 ~(ACL_BIT_DATA |
2d009132 182# ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
e3a69b62 183 ACL_BIT_PRDR |
2d009132 184# endif
e3a69b62 185 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP),
2d009132 186 },
6a8f9482 187#endif
8523533c 188#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
e3a69b62 189 [ACLC_DECODE] = { US"decode", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_MIME },
2d009132 190
8523533c 191#endif
e3a69b62 192 [ACLC_DELAY] = { US"delay", TRUE, TRUE, ACL_BIT_NOTQUIT },
80a47a2c 193#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
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194 [ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER] = { US"dkim_signers", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_DKIM },
195 [ACLC_DKIM_STATUS] = { US"dkim_status", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_DKIM },
fb2274d4 196#endif
1a2e76e1 197#ifdef SUPPORT_DMARC
e3a69b62 198 [ACLC_DMARC_STATUS] = { US"dmarc_status", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_DATA },
4840604e 199#endif
059ec3d9 200
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201 /* Explicit key lookups can be made in non-smtp ACLs so pass
202 always and check in the verify processing itself. */
f2ed27cf 203 [ACLC_DNSLISTS] = { US"dnslists", TRUE, FALSE, 0 },
c3611384 204
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205 [ACLC_DOMAINS] = { US"domains", FALSE, FALSE,
206 (unsigned int)
e3a69b62 207 ~(ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_VRFY
2d009132 208#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
e3a69b62 209 |ACL_BIT_PRDR
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210#endif
211 ),
212 },
f2ed27cf 213 [ACLC_ENCRYPTED] = { US"encrypted", FALSE, FALSE,
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214 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START |
215 ACL_BIT_HELO,
2d009132 216 },
8e669ac1 217
f2ed27cf 218 [ACLC_ENDPASS] = { US"endpass", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
8e669ac1 219
f2ed27cf 220 [ACLC_HOSTS] = { US"hosts", FALSE, FALSE,
e3a69b62 221 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START,
2d009132 222 },
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223 [ACLC_LOCAL_PARTS] = { US"local_parts", FALSE, FALSE,
224 (unsigned int)
e3a69b62 225 ~(ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_VRFY
f2ed27cf 226#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
e3a69b62 227 | ACL_BIT_PRDR
f2ed27cf 228#endif
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229 ),
230 },
6a8f9482 231
f2ed27cf 232 [ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE] = { US"log_message", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
e3a69b62 233 [ACLC_LOG_REJECT_TARGET] = { US"log_reject_target", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
f2ed27cf 234 [ACLC_LOGWRITE] = { US"logwrite", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
8523533c 235
2d009132 236#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
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237 [ACLC_MALWARE] = { US"malware", TRUE, FALSE,
238 (unsigned int)
e3a69b62 239 ~(ACL_BIT_DATA |
2d009132 240# ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
e3a69b62 241 ACL_BIT_PRDR |
2d009132 242# endif
e3a69b62 243 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP),
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244 },
245#endif
8e669ac1 246
f2ed27cf 247 [ACLC_MESSAGE] = { US"message", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
2d009132 248#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
e3a69b62 249 [ACLC_MIME_REGEX] = { US"mime_regex", TRUE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_MIME },
2d009132 250#endif
84330b7b 251
f2ed27cf 252 [ACLC_QUEUE] = { US"queue", TRUE, TRUE,
e3a69b62 253 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
2d009132 254#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
e3a69b62 255 ACL_BIT_PRDR |
2d009132 256#endif
e3a69b62 257 ACL_BIT_DATA,
2d009132 258 },
fb2274d4 259
f2ed27cf 260 [ACLC_RATELIMIT] = { US"ratelimit", TRUE, FALSE, 0 },
e3a69b62 261 [ACLC_RECIPIENTS] = { US"recipients", FALSE, FALSE, (unsigned int) ~ACL_BIT_RCPT },
4840604e 262
2d009132 263#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
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264 [ACLC_REGEX] = { US"regex", TRUE, FALSE,
265 (unsigned int)
e3a69b62 266 ~(ACL_BIT_DATA |
2d009132 267# ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
e3a69b62 268 ACL_BIT_PRDR |
2d009132 269# endif
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270 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
271 ACL_BIT_MIME),
2d009132 272 },
379ba7d0 273
2d009132 274#endif
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275 [ACLC_REMOVE_HEADER] = { US"remove_header", TRUE, TRUE,
276 (unsigned int)
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277 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL|ACL_BIT_RCPT |
278 ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
2d009132 279#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
e3a69b62 280 ACL_BIT_PRDR |
2d009132 281#endif
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282 ACL_BIT_MIME | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
283 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START),
2d009132 284 },
f2ed27cf 285 [ACLC_SENDER_DOMAINS] = { US"sender_domains", FALSE, FALSE,
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286 ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
287 ACL_BIT_HELO |
288 ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH | ACL_BIT_QUIT |
289 ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
290 ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY,
2d009132 291 },
f2ed27cf 292 [ACLC_SENDERS] = { US"senders", FALSE, FALSE,
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293 ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
294 ACL_BIT_HELO |
295 ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH | ACL_BIT_QUIT |
296 ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
297 ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY,
2d009132 298 },
65a7d8c3 299
f2ed27cf 300 [ACLC_SET] = { US"set", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
8523533c 301
2d009132 302#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
f2ed27cf 303 [ACLC_SPAM] = { US"spam", TRUE, FALSE,
e3a69b62 304 (unsigned int) ~(ACL_BIT_DATA |
2d009132 305# ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
e3a69b62 306 ACL_BIT_PRDR |
2d009132 307# endif
e3a69b62 308 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP),
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309 },
310#endif
7952eef9 311#ifdef SUPPORT_SPF
f2ed27cf 312 [ACLC_SPF] = { US"spf", TRUE, FALSE,
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313 ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
314 ACL_BIT_HELO | ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH |
315 ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
316 ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY |
317 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START,
2d009132 318 },
6e1a8743 319 [ACLC_SPF_GUESS] = { US"spf_guess", TRUE, FALSE,
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320 ACL_BIT_AUTH | ACL_BIT_CONNECT |
321 ACL_BIT_HELO | ACL_BIT_MAILAUTH |
322 ACL_BIT_ETRN | ACL_BIT_EXPN |
323 ACL_BIT_STARTTLS | ACL_BIT_VRFY |
324 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START,
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325 },
326#endif
f2ed27cf 327 [ACLC_UDPSEND] = { US"udpsend", TRUE, TRUE, 0 },
b0019c78 328
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329 /* Certain types of verify are always allowed, so we let it through
330 always and check in the verify function itself */
f2ed27cf 331 [ACLC_VERIFY] = { US"verify", TRUE, FALSE, 0 },
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332};
333
334
2d009132 335
d7bed771
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336/* Return values from decode_control(); used as index so keep in step
337with the controls_list table that follows! */
c46782ef 338
d7bed771
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339enum {
340 CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED,
3c8b3577 341#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
d7bed771 342 CONTROL_BMI_RUN,
3c8b3577 343#endif
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344 CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART,
345 CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART,
346 CONTROL_CUTTHROUGH_DELIVERY,
347 CONTROL_DEBUG,
3c8b3577 348#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
d7bed771 349 CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY,
3c8b3577 350#endif
1a2e76e1 351#ifdef SUPPORT_DMARC
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352 CONTROL_DMARC_VERIFY,
353 CONTROL_DMARC_FORENSIC,
3c8b3577 354#endif
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355 CONTROL_DSCP,
356 CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC,
357 CONTROL_ERROR, /* pseudo-value for decode errors */
358 CONTROL_FAKEDEFER,
359 CONTROL_FAKEREJECT,
360 CONTROL_FREEZE,
4840604e 361
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362 CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH,
363 CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH,
364 CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC,
3c8b3577 365#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
d7bed771 366 CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL,
3c8b3577 367#endif
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368 CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE,
369 CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING,
8523533c 370
9438970c 371 CONTROL_QUEUE,
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372 CONTROL_SUBMISSION,
373 CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS,
8c5d388a 374#ifdef SUPPORT_I18N
d7bed771 375 CONTROL_UTF8_DOWNCONVERT,
3c8b3577 376#endif
d7bed771 377};
3c8b3577 378
4c590bd1 379
c5fcb476 380
d7bed771
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381/* Structure listing various control arguments, with their characteristics.
382For each control, there's a bitmap of dis-allowed times. For some, it is easier
383to specify the negation of a small number of allowed times. */
059ec3d9
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384
385typedef struct control_def {
d7bed771
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386 uschar *name;
387 BOOL has_option; /* Has /option(s) following */
388 unsigned forbids; /* bitmap of dis-allowed times */
059ec3d9
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389} control_def;
390
391static control_def controls_list[] = {
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392 /* name has_option forbids */
393[CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED] =
d7bed771 394 { US"allow_auth_unadvertised", FALSE,
f2ed27cf 395 (unsigned)
e3a69b62 396 ~(ACL_BIT_CONNECT | ACL_BIT_HELO)
d7bed771 397 },
8523533c 398#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
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399[CONTROL_BMI_RUN] =
400 { US"bmi_run", FALSE, 0 },
8523533c 401#endif
f2ed27cf 402[CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART] =
e3a69b62 403 { US"caseful_local_part", FALSE, (unsigned) ~ACL_BIT_RCPT },
f2ed27cf 404[CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART] =
e3a69b62 405 { US"caselower_local_part", FALSE, (unsigned) ~ACL_BIT_RCPT },
f2ed27cf
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406[CONTROL_CUTTHROUGH_DELIVERY] =
407 { US"cutthrough_delivery", TRUE, 0 },
408[CONTROL_DEBUG] =
409 { US"debug", TRUE, 0 },
d7bed771 410
80a47a2c 411#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
f2ed27cf 412[CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY] =
d7bed771 413 { US"dkim_disable_verify", FALSE,
e3a69b62 414 ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP |
d7bed771 415# ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
e3a69b62 416 ACL_BIT_PRDR |
d7bed771 417# endif
e3a69b62 418 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
d7bed771 419 },
f7572e5a 420#endif
d7bed771 421
1a2e76e1 422#ifdef SUPPORT_DMARC
9904d08c 423[CONTROL_DMARC_VERIFY] =
d7bed771 424 { US"dmarc_disable_verify", FALSE,
e3a69b62 425 ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
d7bed771 426 },
9904d08c 427[CONTROL_DMARC_FORENSIC] =
d7bed771 428 { US"dmarc_enable_forensic", FALSE,
e3a69b62 429 ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
d7bed771
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430 },
431#endif
432
f2ed27cf 433[CONTROL_DSCP] =
d7bed771 434 { US"dscp", TRUE,
e3a69b62 435 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START | ACL_BIT_NOTQUIT
d7bed771 436 },
f2ed27cf 437[CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC] =
d7bed771 438 { US"enforce_sync", FALSE,
e3a69b62 439 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
d7bed771
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440 },
441
442 /* Pseudo-value for decode errors */
f2ed27cf 443[CONTROL_ERROR] =
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444 { US"error", FALSE, 0 },
445
f2ed27cf 446[CONTROL_FAKEDEFER] =
d7bed771 447 { US"fakedefer", TRUE,
f2ed27cf 448 (unsigned)
e3a69b62
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449 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
450 ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
d7bed771 451#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
e3a69b62 452 ACL_BIT_PRDR |
d7bed771 453#endif
e3a69b62 454 ACL_BIT_MIME)
d7bed771 455 },
f2ed27cf 456[CONTROL_FAKEREJECT] =
d7bed771 457 { US"fakereject", TRUE,
f2ed27cf 458 (unsigned)
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459 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
460 ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
d7bed771 461#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
e3a69b62 462 ACL_BIT_PRDR |
d7bed771 463#endif
e3a69b62 464 ACL_BIT_MIME)
d7bed771 465 },
f2ed27cf 466[CONTROL_FREEZE] =
d7bed771 467 { US"freeze", TRUE,
f2ed27cf 468 (unsigned)
e3a69b62
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469 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
470 ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
471 // ACL_BIT_PRDR| /* Not allow one user to freeze for all */
472 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_MIME)
d7bed771
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473 },
474
f2ed27cf 475[CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH] =
d7bed771 476 { US"no_callout_flush", FALSE,
e3a69b62 477 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
d7bed771 478 },
f2ed27cf 479[CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH] =
d7bed771 480 { US"no_delay_flush", FALSE,
e3a69b62 481 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
d7bed771
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482 },
483
f2ed27cf 484[CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC] =
d7bed771 485 { US"no_enforce_sync", FALSE,
e3a69b62 486 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
d7bed771 487 },
8523533c 488#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
f2ed27cf 489[CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL] =
d7bed771 490 { US"no_mbox_unspool", FALSE,
f2ed27cf 491 (unsigned)
e3a69b62
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492 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
493 ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
494 // ACL_BIT_PRDR| /* Not allow one user to freeze for all */
495 ACL_BIT_MIME)
d7bed771
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496 },
497#endif
f2ed27cf 498[CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE] =
d7bed771 499 { US"no_multiline_responses", FALSE,
e3a69b62 500 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
d7bed771 501 },
f2ed27cf 502[CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING] =
d7bed771 503 { US"no_pipelining", FALSE,
e3a69b62 504 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START
d7bed771
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505 },
506
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507[CONTROL_QUEUE] =
508 { US"queue", TRUE,
509 (unsigned)
510 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT |
511 ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA |
512 // ACL_BIT_PRDR| /* Not allow one user to freeze for all */
513 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP | ACL_BIT_MIME)
514 },
8ac90765 515
f2ed27cf 516[CONTROL_SUBMISSION] =
d7bed771 517 { US"submission", TRUE,
f2ed27cf 518 (unsigned)
e3a69b62 519 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_PREDATA)
d7bed771 520 },
f2ed27cf 521[CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS] =
d7bed771
JH
522 { US"suppress_local_fixups", FALSE,
523 (unsigned)
e3a69b62
JH
524 ~(ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_PREDATA |
525 ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP_START)
d7bed771 526 },
8c5d388a 527#ifdef SUPPORT_I18N
f2ed27cf 528[CONTROL_UTF8_DOWNCONVERT] =
6741531c
JH
529 { US"utf8_downconvert", TRUE, (unsigned) ~(ACL_BIT_RCPT | ACL_BIT_VRFY)
530 }
3c8b3577 531#endif
d7bed771 532};
059ec3d9 533
e5a9dba6
PH
534/* Support data structures for Client SMTP Authorization. acl_verify_csa()
535caches its result in a tree to avoid repeated DNS queries. The result is an
536integer code which is used as an index into the following tables of
537explanatory strings and verification return codes. */
538
539static tree_node *csa_cache = NULL;
540
541enum { CSA_UNKNOWN, CSA_OK, CSA_DEFER_SRV, CSA_DEFER_ADDR,
542 CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT, CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN, CSA_FAIL_NOADDR, CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH };
543
544/* The acl_verify_csa() return code is translated into an acl_verify() return
545code using the following table. It is OK unless the client is definitely not
546authorized. This is because CSA is supposed to be optional for sending sites,
547so recipients should not be too strict about checking it - especially because
548DNS problems are quite likely to occur. It's possible to use $csa_status in
549further ACL conditions to distinguish ok, unknown, and defer if required, but
550the aim is to make the usual configuration simple. */
551
552static int csa_return_code[] = {
f2ed27cf
JH
553 [CSA_UNKNOWN] = OK,
554 [CSA_OK] = OK,
555 [CSA_DEFER_SRV] = OK,
556 [CSA_DEFER_ADDR] = OK,
557 [CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT] = FAIL,
558 [CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN] = FAIL,
559 [CSA_FAIL_NOADDR] = FAIL,
560 [CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH] = FAIL
e5a9dba6
PH
561};
562
563static uschar *csa_status_string[] = {
f2ed27cf
JH
564 [CSA_UNKNOWN] = US"unknown",
565 [CSA_OK] = US"ok",
566 [CSA_DEFER_SRV] = US"defer",
567 [CSA_DEFER_ADDR] = US"defer",
568 [CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT] = US"fail",
569 [CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN] = US"fail",
570 [CSA_FAIL_NOADDR] = US"fail",
571 [CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH] = US"fail"
e5a9dba6
PH
572};
573
574static uschar *csa_reason_string[] = {
f2ed27cf
JH
575 [CSA_UNKNOWN] = US"unknown",
576 [CSA_OK] = US"ok",
577 [CSA_DEFER_SRV] = US"deferred (SRV lookup failed)",
578 [CSA_DEFER_ADDR] = US"deferred (target address lookup failed)",
579 [CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT] = US"failed (explicit authorization required)",
580 [CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN] = US"failed (host name not authorized)",
581 [CSA_FAIL_NOADDR] = US"failed (no authorized addresses)",
582 [CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH] = US"failed (client address mismatch)"
e5a9dba6
PH
583};
584
c99ce5c9
TF
585/* Options for the ratelimit condition. Note that there are two variants of
586the per_rcpt option, depending on the ACL that is used to measure the rate.
587However any ACL must be able to look up per_rcpt rates in /noupdate mode,
588so the two variants must have the same internal representation as well as
589the same configuration string. */
590
591enum {
592 RATE_PER_WHAT, RATE_PER_CLASH, RATE_PER_ADDR, RATE_PER_BYTE, RATE_PER_CMD,
593 RATE_PER_CONN, RATE_PER_MAIL, RATE_PER_RCPT, RATE_PER_ALLRCPTS
594};
595
596#define RATE_SET(var,new) \
597 (((var) == RATE_PER_WHAT) ? ((var) = RATE_##new) : ((var) = RATE_PER_CLASH))
598
599static uschar *ratelimit_option_string[] = {
f2ed27cf
JH
600 [RATE_PER_WHAT] = US"?",
601 [RATE_PER_CLASH] = US"!",
602 [RATE_PER_ADDR] = US"per_addr",
603 [RATE_PER_BYTE] = US"per_byte",
604 [RATE_PER_CMD] = US"per_cmd",
605 [RATE_PER_CONN] = US"per_conn",
606 [RATE_PER_MAIL] = US"per_mail",
607 [RATE_PER_RCPT] = US"per_rcpt",
608 [RATE_PER_ALLRCPTS] = US"per_rcpt"
c99ce5c9
TF
609};
610
059ec3d9
PH
611/* Enable recursion between acl_check_internal() and acl_check_condition() */
612
e1d04f48 613static int acl_check_wargs(int, address_item *, const uschar *, uschar **,
f60d98e8 614 uschar **);
059ec3d9
PH
615
616
617/*************************************************
d7bed771
JH
618* Find control in list *
619*************************************************/
620
621/* The lists are always in order, so binary chop can be used.
622
623Arguments:
624 name the control name to search for
625 ol the first entry in the control list
626 last one more than the offset of the last entry in the control list
627
628Returns: index of a control entry, or -1 if not found
629*/
630
631static int
632find_control(const uschar * name, control_def * ol, int last)
633{
d7978c0f 634for (int first = 0; last > first; )
d7bed771
JH
635 {
636 int middle = (first + last)/2;
637 uschar * s = ol[middle].name;
638 int c = Ustrncmp(name, s, Ustrlen(s));
639 if (c == 0) return middle;
640 else if (c > 0) first = middle + 1;
641 else last = middle;
642 }
643return -1;
644}
645
646
647
648/*************************************************
2d009132
JH
649* Pick out condition from list *
650*************************************************/
651
652/* Use a binary chop method
653
654Arguments:
655 name name to find
656 list list of conditions
657 end size of list
658
659Returns: offset in list, or -1 if not found
660*/
661
662static int
663acl_checkcondition(uschar * name, condition_def * list, int end)
664{
d7978c0f 665for (int start = 0; start < end; )
2d009132
JH
666 {
667 int mid = (start + end)/2;
668 int c = Ustrcmp(name, list[mid].name);
669 if (c == 0) return mid;
670 if (c < 0) end = mid;
671 else start = mid + 1;
672 }
673return -1;
674}
675
676
677/*************************************************
059ec3d9
PH
678* Pick out name from list *
679*************************************************/
680
681/* Use a binary chop method
682
683Arguments:
684 name name to find
685 list list of names
686 end size of list
687
688Returns: offset in list, or -1 if not found
689*/
690
691static int
692acl_checkname(uschar *name, uschar **list, int end)
693{
d7978c0f 694for (int start = 0; start < end; )
059ec3d9
PH
695 {
696 int mid = (start + end)/2;
697 int c = Ustrcmp(name, list[mid]);
698 if (c == 0) return mid;
699 if (c < 0) end = mid; else start = mid + 1;
700 }
701
702return -1;
703}
704
705
706/*************************************************
707* Read and parse one ACL *
708*************************************************/
709
710/* This function is called both from readconf in order to parse the ACLs in the
711configuration file, and also when an ACL is encountered dynamically (e.g. as
712the result of an expansion). It is given a function to call in order to
713retrieve the lines of the ACL. This function handles skipping comments and
714blank lines (where relevant).
715
716Arguments:
717 func function to get next line of ACL
718 error where to put an error message
719
720Returns: pointer to ACL, or NULL
721 NULL can be legal (empty ACL); in this case error will be NULL
722*/
723
724acl_block *
725acl_read(uschar *(*func)(void), uschar **error)
726{
727acl_block *yield = NULL;
728acl_block **lastp = &yield;
729acl_block *this = NULL;
730acl_condition_block *cond;
731acl_condition_block **condp = NULL;
d7978c0f 732uschar * s;
059ec3d9
PH
733
734*error = NULL;
735
137ae145 736while ((s = (*func)()))
059ec3d9
PH
737 {
738 int v, c;
739 BOOL negated = FALSE;
740 uschar *saveline = s;
741 uschar name[64];
742
743 /* Conditions (but not verbs) are allowed to be negated by an initial
744 exclamation mark. */
745
137ae145 746 if (Uskip_whitespace(&s) == '!')
059ec3d9
PH
747 {
748 negated = TRUE;
749 s++;
750 }
751
cf00dad6
PH
752 /* Read the name of a verb or a condition, or the start of a new ACL, which
753 can be started by a name, or by a macro definition. */
059ec3d9
PH
754
755 s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s);
b8dc3e4a 756 if (*s == ':' || (isupper(name[0]) && *s == '=')) return yield;
059ec3d9
PH
757
758 /* If a verb is unrecognized, it may be another condition or modifier that
759 continues the previous verb. */
760
2d009132 761 if ((v = acl_checkname(name, verbs, nelem(verbs))) < 0)
059ec3d9 762 {
897024f1 763 if (!this)
059ec3d9 764 {
4e167a8c
PH
765 *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL verb \"%s\" in \"%s\"", name,
766 saveline);
059ec3d9
PH
767 return NULL;
768 }
769 }
770
771 /* New verb */
772
773 else
774 {
775 if (negated)
776 {
777 *error = string_sprintf("malformed ACL line \"%s\"", saveline);
778 return NULL;
779 }
f3ebb786 780 this = store_get(sizeof(acl_block), FALSE);
059ec3d9
PH
781 *lastp = this;
782 lastp = &(this->next);
783 this->next = NULL;
059ec3d9 784 this->condition = NULL;
897024f1
JH
785 this->verb = v;
786 this->srcline = config_lineno; /* for debug output */
787 this->srcfile = config_filename; /**/
059ec3d9
PH
788 condp = &(this->condition);
789 if (*s == 0) continue; /* No condition on this line */
790 if (*s == '!')
791 {
792 negated = TRUE;
793 s++;
794 }
795 s = readconf_readname(name, sizeof(name), s); /* Condition name */
796 }
797
798 /* Handle a condition or modifier. */
799
2d009132 800 if ((c = acl_checkcondition(name, conditions, nelem(conditions))) < 0)
059ec3d9
PH
801 {
802 *error = string_sprintf("unknown ACL condition/modifier in \"%s\"",
803 saveline);
804 return NULL;
805 }
806
807 /* The modifiers may not be negated */
808
2d009132 809 if (negated && conditions[c].is_modifier)
059ec3d9
PH
810 {
811 *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: negation is not allowed with "
2d009132 812 "\"%s\"", conditions[c].name);
059ec3d9
PH
813 return NULL;
814 }
815
816 /* ENDPASS may occur only with ACCEPT or DISCARD. */
817
818 if (c == ACLC_ENDPASS &&
819 this->verb != ACL_ACCEPT &&
820 this->verb != ACL_DISCARD)
821 {
822 *error = string_sprintf("ACL error: \"%s\" is not allowed with \"%s\"",
2d009132 823 conditions[c].name, verbs[this->verb]);
059ec3d9
PH
824 return NULL;
825 }
826
f3ebb786 827 cond = store_get(sizeof(acl_condition_block), FALSE);
059ec3d9
PH
828 cond->next = NULL;
829 cond->type = c;
830 cond->u.negated = negated;
831
832 *condp = cond;
833 condp = &(cond->next);
834
835 /* The "set" modifier is different in that its argument is "name=value"
836 rather than just a value, and we can check the validity of the name, which
38a0a95f
PH
837 gives us a variable name to insert into the data block. The original ACL
838 variable names were acl_c0 ... acl_c9 and acl_m0 ... acl_m9. This was
839 extended to 20 of each type, but after that people successfully argued for
641cb756
PH
840 arbitrary names. In the new scheme, the names must start with acl_c or acl_m.
841 After that, we allow alphanumerics and underscores, but the first character
842 after c or m must be a digit or an underscore. This retains backwards
843 compatibility. */
059ec3d9
PH
844
845 if (c == ACLC_SET)
a79d8834
JH
846#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
847 if ( Ustrncmp(s, "dkim_verify_status", 18) == 0
848 || Ustrncmp(s, "dkim_verify_reason", 18) == 0)
849 {
850 uschar * endptr = s+18;
851
852 if (isalnum(*endptr))
853 {
854 *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
855 "modifier \"set %s\" "
856 "(only \"dkim_verify_status\" or \"dkim_verify_reason\" permitted)",
857 s);
858 return NULL;
859 }
860 cond->u.varname = string_copyn(s, 18);
861 s = endptr;
137ae145 862 Uskip_whitespace(&s);
a79d8834
JH
863 }
864 else
865#endif
059ec3d9 866 {
47ca6d6c
PH
867 uschar *endptr;
868
163144aa 869 if (Ustrncmp(s, "acl_c", 5) != 0 && Ustrncmp(s, "acl_m", 5) != 0)
47ca6d6c 870 {
38a0a95f 871 *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
163144aa 872 "modifier \"set %s\" (must start \"acl_c\" or \"acl_m\")", s);
38a0a95f 873 return NULL;
47ca6d6c 874 }
38a0a95f
PH
875
876 endptr = s + 5;
641cb756
PH
877 if (!isdigit(*endptr) && *endptr != '_')
878 {
879 *error = string_sprintf("invalid variable name after \"set\" in ACL "
163144aa
JH
880 "modifier \"set %s\" (digit or underscore must follow acl_c or acl_m)",
881 s);
641cb756
PH
882 return NULL;
883 }
884
163144aa 885 while (*endptr && *endptr != '=' && !isspace(*endptr))
47ca6d6c 886 {
38a0a95f 887 if (!isalnum(*endptr) && *endptr != '_')
163144aa
JH
888 {
889 *error = string_sprintf("invalid character \"%c\" in variable name "
890 "in ACL modifier \"set %s\"", *endptr, s);
891 return NULL;
892 }
38a0a95f 893 endptr++;
47ca6d6c 894 }
47ca6d6c 895
38a0a95f 896 cond->u.varname = string_copyn(s + 4, endptr - s - 4);
47ca6d6c 897 s = endptr;
137ae145 898 Uskip_whitespace(&s);
059ec3d9
PH
899 }
900
901 /* For "set", we are now positioned for the data. For the others, only
902 "endpass" has no data */
903
904 if (c != ACLC_ENDPASS)
905 {
906 if (*s++ != '=')
907 {
908 *error = string_sprintf("\"=\" missing after ACL \"%s\" %s", name,
2d009132 909 conditions[c].is_modifier ? US"modifier" : US"condition");
059ec3d9
PH
910 return NULL;
911 }
137ae145 912 Uskip_whitespace(&s);
059ec3d9
PH
913 cond->arg = string_copy(s);
914 }
915 }
916
917return yield;
918}
919
920
921
922/*************************************************
71fafd95
PH
923* Set up added header line(s) *
924*************************************************/
925
926/* This function is called by the add_header modifier, and also from acl_warn()
927to implement the now-deprecated way of adding header lines using "message" on a
928"warn" verb. The argument is treated as a sequence of header lines which are
929added to a chain, provided there isn't an identical one already there.
930
931Argument: string of header lines
932Returns: nothing
933*/
934
935static void
55414b25 936setup_header(const uschar *hstring)
71fafd95 937{
55414b25 938const uschar *p, *q;
71fafd95
PH
939int hlen = Ustrlen(hstring);
940
b1b05573
JH
941/* Ignore any leading newlines */
942while (*hstring == '\n') hstring++, hlen--;
71fafd95 943
b1b05573 944/* An empty string does nothing; ensure exactly one final newline. */
71fafd95 945if (hlen <= 0) return;
96f5fe4c 946if (hstring[--hlen] != '\n') /* no newline */
55414b25 947 q = string_sprintf("%s\n", hstring);
96f5fe4c 948else if (hstring[hlen-1] == '\n') /* double newline */
55414b25
JH
949 {
950 uschar * s = string_copy(hstring);
951 while(s[--hlen] == '\n')
952 s[hlen+1] = '\0';
953 q = s;
954 }
955else
956 q = hstring;
71fafd95
PH
957
958/* Loop for multiple header lines, taking care about continuations */
959
617d3932 960for (p = q; *p; p = q)
71fafd95 961 {
55414b25
JH
962 const uschar *s;
963 uschar * hdr;
71fafd95
PH
964 int newtype = htype_add_bot;
965 header_line **hptr = &acl_added_headers;
966
967 /* Find next header line within the string */
968
969 for (;;)
970 {
96f5fe4c 971 q = Ustrchr(q, '\n'); /* we know there was a newline */
617d3932 972 if (*++q != ' ' && *q != '\t') break;
71fafd95
PH
973 }
974
975 /* If the line starts with a colon, interpret the instruction for where to
976 add it. This temporarily sets up a new type. */
977
978 if (*p == ':')
979 {
980 if (strncmpic(p, US":after_received:", 16) == 0)
981 {
982 newtype = htype_add_rec;
983 p += 16;
984 }
985 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start_rfc:", 14) == 0)
986 {
987 newtype = htype_add_rfc;
988 p += 14;
989 }
990 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_start:", 10) == 0)
991 {
992 newtype = htype_add_top;
993 p += 10;
994 }
995 else if (strncmpic(p, US":at_end:", 8) == 0)
996 {
997 newtype = htype_add_bot;
998 p += 8;
999 }
1000 while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') p++;
1001 }
1002
1003 /* See if this line starts with a header name, and if not, add X-ACL-Warn:
1004 to the front of it. */
1005
1006 for (s = p; s < q - 1; s++)
71fafd95 1007 if (*s == ':' || !isgraph(*s)) break;
71fafd95 1008
617d3932 1009 hdr = string_sprintf("%s%.*s", *s == ':' ? "" : "X-ACL-Warn: ", (int) (q - p), p);
55414b25 1010 hlen = Ustrlen(hdr);
71fafd95
PH
1011
1012 /* See if this line has already been added */
1013
617d3932 1014 while (*hptr)
71fafd95 1015 {
55414b25 1016 if (Ustrncmp((*hptr)->text, hdr, hlen) == 0) break;
617d3932 1017 hptr = &(*hptr)->next;
71fafd95
PH
1018 }
1019
1020 /* Add if not previously present */
1021
617d3932 1022 if (!*hptr)
71fafd95 1023 {
f3ebb786 1024 /* The header_line struct itself is not tainted, though it points to
ba5120a4
JH
1025 possibly tainted data. */
1026 header_line * h = store_get(sizeof(header_line), FALSE);
55414b25 1027 h->text = hdr;
71fafd95
PH
1028 h->next = NULL;
1029 h->type = newtype;
1030 h->slen = hlen;
1031 *hptr = h;
617d3932 1032 hptr = &h->next;
71fafd95 1033 }
71fafd95
PH
1034 }
1035}
1036
1037
1038
e7568d51 1039/*************************************************
362145b5
JH
1040* List the added header lines *
1041*************************************************/
1042uschar *
1043fn_hdrs_added(void)
1044{
acec9514 1045gstring * g = NULL;
362145b5 1046
d7978c0f 1047for (header_line * h = acl_added_headers; h; h = h->next)
362145b5 1048 {
bce15b62
JH
1049 int i = h->slen;
1050 if (h->text[i-1] == '\n') i--;
1051 g = string_append_listele_n(g, '\n', h->text, i);
362145b5 1052 }
362145b5 1053
bce15b62 1054return g ? g->s : NULL;
362145b5
JH
1055}
1056
1057
1058/*************************************************
e7568d51
TL
1059* Set up removed header line(s) *
1060*************************************************/
1061
1062/* This function is called by the remove_header modifier. The argument is
1063treated as a sequence of header names which are added to a colon separated
1064list, provided there isn't an identical one already there.
1065
1066Argument: string of header names
1067Returns: nothing
1068*/
1069
1070static void
55414b25 1071setup_remove_header(const uschar *hnames)
e7568d51 1072{
48334568 1073if (*hnames)
55414b25
JH
1074 acl_removed_headers = acl_removed_headers
1075 ? string_sprintf("%s : %s", acl_removed_headers, hnames)
1076 : string_copy(hnames);
e7568d51
TL
1077}
1078
1079
71fafd95
PH
1080
1081/*************************************************
059ec3d9
PH
1082* Handle warnings *
1083*************************************************/
1084
1085/* This function is called when a WARN verb's conditions are true. It adds to
1086the message's headers, and/or writes information to the log. In each case, this
1087only happens once (per message for headers, per connection for log).
1088
71fafd95
PH
1089** NOTE: The header adding action using the "message" setting is historic, and
1090its use is now deprecated. The new add_header modifier should be used instead.
1091
059ec3d9
PH
1092Arguments:
1093 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
1094 user_message message for adding to headers
1095 log_message message for logging, if different
1096
1097Returns: nothing
1098*/
1099
1100static void
1101acl_warn(int where, uschar *user_message, uschar *log_message)
1102{
059ec3d9
PH
1103if (log_message != NULL && log_message != user_message)
1104 {
1105 uschar *text;
1106 string_item *logged;
1107
1108 text = string_sprintf("%s Warning: %s", host_and_ident(TRUE),
1109 string_printing(log_message));
1110
1111 /* If a sender verification has failed, and the log message is "sender verify
1112 failed", add the failure message. */
1113
1114 if (sender_verified_failed != NULL &&
1115 sender_verified_failed->message != NULL &&
1116 strcmpic(log_message, US"sender verify failed") == 0)
1117 text = string_sprintf("%s: %s", text, sender_verified_failed->message);
1118
9c7a242c
PH
1119 /* Search previously logged warnings. They are kept in malloc
1120 store so they can be freed at the start of a new message. */
059ec3d9 1121
d7978c0f 1122 for (logged = acl_warn_logged; logged; logged = logged->next)
059ec3d9
PH
1123 if (Ustrcmp(logged->text, text) == 0) break;
1124
d7978c0f 1125 if (!logged)
059ec3d9
PH
1126 {
1127 int length = Ustrlen(text) + 1;
1128 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "%s", text);
1129 logged = store_malloc(sizeof(string_item) + length);
5903c6ff 1130 logged->text = US logged + sizeof(string_item);
059ec3d9
PH
1131 memcpy(logged->text, text, length);
1132 logged->next = acl_warn_logged;
1133 acl_warn_logged = logged;
1134 }
1135 }
1136
1137/* If there's no user message, we are done. */
1138
d7978c0f 1139if (!user_message) return;
059ec3d9
PH
1140
1141/* If this isn't a message ACL, we can't do anything with a user message.
1142Log an error. */
1143
1144if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
1145 {
1146 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "ACL \"warn\" with \"message\" setting "
1147 "found in a non-message (%s) ACL: cannot specify header lines here: "
1148 "message ignored", acl_wherenames[where]);
1149 return;
1150 }
1151
71fafd95
PH
1152/* The code for setting up header lines is now abstracted into a separate
1153function so that it can be used for the add_header modifier as well. */
059ec3d9 1154
71fafd95 1155setup_header(user_message);
059ec3d9
PH
1156}
1157
1158
1159
1160/*************************************************
1161* Verify and check reverse DNS *
1162*************************************************/
1163
1164/* Called from acl_verify() below. We look up the host name(s) of the client IP
1165address if this has not yet been done. The host_name_lookup() function checks
1166that one of these names resolves to an address list that contains the client IP
1167address, so we don't actually have to do the check here.
1168
1169Arguments:
1170 user_msgptr pointer for user message
1171 log_msgptr pointer for log message
1172
1173Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
1174 FAIL verification failed
1175 DEFER there was a problem verifying
1176*/
1177
1178static int
1179acl_verify_reverse(uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr)
1180{
1181int rc;
1182
1183user_msgptr = user_msgptr; /* stop compiler warning */
1184
1185/* Previous success */
1186
1187if (sender_host_name != NULL) return OK;
1188
1189/* Previous failure */
1190
1191if (host_lookup_failed)
1192 {
1193 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("host lookup failed%s", host_lookup_msg);
1194 return FAIL;
1195 }
1196
1197/* Need to do a lookup */
1198
1199HDEBUG(D_acl)
e1d04f48 1200 debug_printf_indent("looking up host name to force name/address consistency check\n");
059ec3d9
PH
1201
1202if ((rc = host_name_lookup()) != OK)
1203 {
d7978c0f
JH
1204 *log_msgptr = rc == DEFER
1205 ? US"host lookup deferred for reverse lookup check"
1206 : string_sprintf("host lookup failed for reverse lookup check%s",
1207 host_lookup_msg);
059ec3d9
PH
1208 return rc; /* DEFER or FAIL */
1209 }
1210
1211host_build_sender_fullhost();
1212return OK;
1213}
1214
1215
1216
1217/*************************************************
e5a9dba6
PH
1218* Check client IP address matches CSA target *
1219*************************************************/
1220
1221/* Called from acl_verify_csa() below. This routine scans a section of a DNS
1222response for address records belonging to the CSA target hostname. The section
1223is specified by the reset argument, either RESET_ADDITIONAL or RESET_ANSWERS.
1224If one of the addresses matches the client's IP address, then the client is
1225authorized by CSA. If there are target IP addresses but none of them match
1226then the client is using an unauthorized IP address. If there are no target IP
1227addresses then the client cannot be using an authorized IP address. (This is
1228an odd configuration - why didn't the SRV record have a weight of 1 instead?)
1229
1230Arguments:
1231 dnsa the DNS answer block
1232 dnss a DNS scan block for us to use
4c04137d 1233 reset option specifying what portion to scan, as described above
e5a9dba6
PH
1234 target the target hostname to use for matching RR names
1235
1236Returns: CSA_OK successfully authorized
1237 CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH addresses found but none matched
1238 CSA_FAIL_NOADDR no target addresses found
1239*/
1240
1241static int
1242acl_verify_csa_address(dns_answer *dnsa, dns_scan *dnss, int reset,
1243 uschar *target)
1244{
d7978c0f 1245int rc = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
e5a9dba6 1246
d7978c0f
JH
1247for (dns_record * rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, reset);
1248 rr;
e5a9dba6
PH
1249 rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, dnss, RESET_NEXT))
1250 {
1251 /* Check this is an address RR for the target hostname. */
1252
1253 if (rr->type != T_A
1254 #if HAVE_IPV6
1255 && rr->type != T_AAAA
e5a9dba6
PH
1256 #endif
1257 ) continue;
1258
1259 if (strcmpic(target, rr->name) != 0) continue;
1260
d7978c0f 1261 rc = CSA_FAIL_MISMATCH;
e5a9dba6
PH
1262
1263 /* Turn the target address RR into a list of textual IP addresses and scan
1264 the list. There may be more than one if it is an A6 RR. */
1265
d7978c0f 1266 for (dns_address * da = dns_address_from_rr(dnsa, rr); da; da = da->next)
e5a9dba6
PH
1267 {
1268 /* If the client IP address matches the target IP address, it's good! */
1269
e1d04f48 1270 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("CSA target address is %s\n", da->address);
e5a9dba6
PH
1271
1272 if (strcmpic(sender_host_address, da->address) == 0) return CSA_OK;
1273 }
1274 }
1275
1276/* If we found some target addresses but none of them matched, the client is
1277using an unauthorized IP address, otherwise the target has no authorized IP
1278addresses. */
1279
d7978c0f 1280return rc;
e5a9dba6
PH
1281}
1282
1283
1284
1285/*************************************************
1286* Verify Client SMTP Authorization *
1287*************************************************/
1288
1289/* Called from acl_verify() below. This routine calls dns_lookup_special()
1290to find the CSA SRV record corresponding to the domain argument, or
1291$sender_helo_name if no argument is provided. It then checks that the
1292client is authorized, and that its IP address corresponds to the SRV
1293target's address by calling acl_verify_csa_address() above. The address
1294should have been returned in the DNS response's ADDITIONAL section, but if
1295not we perform another DNS lookup to get it.
1296
1297Arguments:
1298 domain pointer to optional parameter following verify = csa
1299
1300Returns: CSA_UNKNOWN no valid CSA record found
1301 CSA_OK successfully authorized
1302 CSA_FAIL_* client is definitely not authorized
1303 CSA_DEFER_* there was a DNS problem
1304*/
1305
1306static int
55414b25 1307acl_verify_csa(const uschar *domain)
e5a9dba6
PH
1308{
1309tree_node *t;
55414b25 1310const uschar *found;
e5a9dba6 1311int priority, weight, port;
8743d3ac 1312dns_answer * dnsa = store_get_dns_answer();
e5a9dba6
PH
1313dns_scan dnss;
1314dns_record *rr;
1315int rc, type;
1316uschar target[256];
1317
1318/* Work out the domain we are using for the CSA lookup. The default is the
1319client's HELO domain. If the client has not said HELO, use its IP address
1320instead. If it's a local client (exim -bs), CSA isn't applicable. */
1321
1322while (isspace(*domain) && *domain != '\0') ++domain;
1323if (*domain == '\0') domain = sender_helo_name;
1324if (domain == NULL) domain = sender_host_address;
1325if (sender_host_address == NULL) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
1326
1327/* If we have an address literal, strip off the framing ready for turning it
1328into a domain. The framing consists of matched square brackets possibly
1329containing a keyword and a colon before the actual IP address. */
1330
1331if (domain[0] == '[')
1332 {
55414b25 1333 const uschar *start = Ustrchr(domain, ':');
e5a9dba6
PH
1334 if (start == NULL) start = domain;
1335 domain = string_copyn(start + 1, Ustrlen(start) - 2);
1336 }
1337
1338/* Turn domains that look like bare IP addresses into domains in the reverse
1339DNS. This code also deals with address literals and $sender_host_address. It's
1340not quite kosher to treat bare domains such as EHLO 192.0.2.57 the same as
1341address literals, but it's probably the most friendly thing to do. This is an
1342extension to CSA, so we allow it to be turned off for proper conformance. */
1343
7e66e54d 1344if (string_is_ip_address(domain, NULL) != 0)
e5a9dba6
PH
1345 {
1346 if (!dns_csa_use_reverse) return CSA_UNKNOWN;
152481a0 1347 domain = dns_build_reverse(domain);
e5a9dba6
PH
1348 }
1349
1350/* Find out if we've already done the CSA check for this domain. If we have,
1351return the same result again. Otherwise build a new cached result structure
1352for this domain. The name is filled in now, and the value is filled in when
1353we return from this function. */
1354
1355t = tree_search(csa_cache, domain);
1356if (t != NULL) return t->data.val;
1357
f3ebb786 1358t = store_get_perm(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(domain), is_tainted(domain));
e5a9dba6
PH
1359Ustrcpy(t->name, domain);
1360(void)tree_insertnode(&csa_cache, t);
1361
1362/* Now we are ready to do the actual DNS lookup(s). */
1363
28e6ef29 1364found = domain;
8743d3ac 1365switch (dns_special_lookup(dnsa, domain, T_CSA, &found))
e5a9dba6
PH
1366 {
1367 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1368
1369 default:
1370 return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_SRV;
1371
1372 /* If we found nothing, the client's authorization is unknown. */
1373
1374 case DNS_NOMATCH:
1375 case DNS_NODATA:
1376 return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
1377
1378 /* We got something! Go on to look at the reply in more detail. */
1379
1380 case DNS_SUCCEED:
1381 break;
1382 }
1383
1384/* Scan the reply for well-formed CSA SRV records. */
1385
8743d3ac 1386for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
dd708fd7 1387 rr;
8743d3ac 1388 rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT)) if (rr->type == T_SRV)
e5a9dba6 1389 {
dd708fd7 1390 const uschar * p = rr->data;
e5a9dba6
PH
1391
1392 /* Extract the numerical SRV fields (p is incremented) */
1393
e5a9dba6
PH
1394 GETSHORT(priority, p);
1395 GETSHORT(weight, p);
1396 GETSHORT(port, p);
1397
1398 DEBUG(D_acl)
e1d04f48 1399 debug_printf_indent("CSA priority=%d weight=%d port=%d\n", priority, weight, port);
e5a9dba6
PH
1400
1401 /* Check the CSA version number */
1402
1403 if (priority != 1) continue;
1404
1405 /* If the domain does not have a CSA SRV record of its own (i.e. the domain
1406 found by dns_special_lookup() is a parent of the one we asked for), we check
1407 the subdomain assertions in the port field. At the moment there's only one
1408 assertion: legitimate SMTP clients are all explicitly authorized with CSA
1409 SRV records of their own. */
1410
1dc92d5a 1411 if (Ustrcmp(found, domain) != 0)
dd708fd7 1412 return t->data.val = port & 1 ? CSA_FAIL_EXPLICIT : CSA_UNKNOWN;
e5a9dba6
PH
1413
1414 /* This CSA SRV record refers directly to our domain, so we check the value
1415 in the weight field to work out the domain's authorization. 0 and 1 are
1416 unauthorized; 3 means the client is authorized but we can't check the IP
1417 address in order to authenticate it, so we treat it as unknown; values
1418 greater than 3 are undefined. */
1419
1420 if (weight < 2) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_DOMAIN;
1421
1422 if (weight > 2) continue;
1423
1424 /* Weight == 2, which means the domain is authorized. We must check that the
1425 client's IP address is listed as one of the SRV target addresses. Save the
1426 target hostname then break to scan the additional data for its addresses. */
1427
8743d3ac 1428 (void)dn_expand(dnsa->answer, dnsa->answer + dnsa->answerlen, p,
e5a9dba6
PH
1429 (DN_EXPAND_ARG4_TYPE)target, sizeof(target));
1430
e1d04f48 1431 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("CSA target is %s\n", target);
e5a9dba6
PH
1432
1433 break;
1434 }
1435
1436/* If we didn't break the loop then no appropriate records were found. */
1437
d7978c0f 1438if (!rr) return t->data.val = CSA_UNKNOWN;
e5a9dba6
PH
1439
1440/* Do not check addresses if the target is ".", in accordance with RFC 2782.
1441A target of "." indicates there are no valid addresses, so the client cannot
1442be authorized. (This is an odd configuration because weight=2 target=. is
1443equivalent to weight=1, but we check for it in order to keep load off the
1444root name servers.) Note that dn_expand() turns "." into "". */
1445
1446if (Ustrcmp(target, "") == 0) return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
1447
1448/* Scan the additional section of the CSA SRV reply for addresses belonging
1449to the target. If the name server didn't return any additional data (e.g.
1450because it does not fully support SRV records), we need to do another lookup
1451to obtain the target addresses; otherwise we have a definitive result. */
1452
8743d3ac 1453rc = acl_verify_csa_address(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ADDITIONAL, target);
e5a9dba6
PH
1454if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
1455
1456/* The DNS lookup type corresponds to the IP version used by the client. */
1457
1458#if HAVE_IPV6
1459if (Ustrchr(sender_host_address, ':') != NULL)
1460 type = T_AAAA;
1461else
1462#endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */
1463 type = T_A;
1464
1465
4e0983dc 1466lookup_dnssec_authenticated = NULL;
8743d3ac 1467switch (dns_lookup(dnsa, target, type, NULL))
e5a9dba6
PH
1468 {
1469 /* If something bad happened (most commonly DNS_AGAIN), defer. */
1470
1471 default:
cc00f4af 1472 return t->data.val = CSA_DEFER_ADDR;
e5a9dba6
PH
1473
1474 /* If the query succeeded, scan the addresses and return the result. */
1475
1476 case DNS_SUCCEED:
8743d3ac 1477 rc = acl_verify_csa_address(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS, target);
cc00f4af
JH
1478 if (rc != CSA_FAIL_NOADDR) return t->data.val = rc;
1479 /* else fall through */
e5a9dba6
PH
1480
1481 /* If the target has no IP addresses, the client cannot have an authorized
1482 IP address. However, if the target site uses A6 records (not AAAA records)
1483 we have to do yet another lookup in order to check them. */
1484
1485 case DNS_NOMATCH:
1486 case DNS_NODATA:
cc00f4af 1487 return t->data.val = CSA_FAIL_NOADDR;
e5a9dba6
PH
1488 }
1489}
1490
1491
1492
1493/*************************************************
059ec3d9
PH
1494* Handle verification (address & other) *
1495*************************************************/
1496
89583014 1497enum { VERIFY_REV_HOST_LKUP, VERIFY_CERT, VERIFY_HELO, VERIFY_CSA, VERIFY_HDR_SYNTAX,
770747fd 1498 VERIFY_NOT_BLIND, VERIFY_HDR_SNDR, VERIFY_SNDR, VERIFY_RCPT,
e3a69b62 1499 VERIFY_HDR_NAMES_ASCII, VERIFY_ARC
89583014
JH
1500 };
1501typedef struct {
1502 uschar * name;
1503 int value;
1504 unsigned where_allowed; /* bitmap */
1505 BOOL no_options; /* Never has /option(s) following */
1506 unsigned alt_opt_sep; /* >0 Non-/ option separator (custom parser) */
1507 } verify_type_t;
1508static verify_type_t verify_type_list[] = {
6d95688d
JH
1509 /* name value where no-opt opt-sep */
1510 { US"reverse_host_lookup", VERIFY_REV_HOST_LKUP, (unsigned)~0, FALSE, 0 },
1511 { US"certificate", VERIFY_CERT, (unsigned)~0, TRUE, 0 },
1512 { US"helo", VERIFY_HELO, (unsigned)~0, TRUE, 0 },
1513 { US"csa", VERIFY_CSA, (unsigned)~0, FALSE, 0 },
e3a69b62 1514 { US"header_syntax", VERIFY_HDR_SYNTAX, ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP, TRUE, 0 },
7c498df1 1515 { US"not_blind", VERIFY_NOT_BLIND, ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP, FALSE, 0 },
e3a69b62
JH
1516 { US"header_sender", VERIFY_HDR_SNDR, ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP, FALSE, 0 },
1517 { US"sender", VERIFY_SNDR, ACL_BIT_MAIL | ACL_BIT_RCPT
1518 |ACL_BIT_PREDATA | ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP,
89583014 1519 FALSE, 6 },
e3a69b62
JH
1520 { US"recipient", VERIFY_RCPT, ACL_BIT_RCPT, FALSE, 0 },
1521 { US"header_names_ascii", VERIFY_HDR_NAMES_ASCII, ACL_BIT_DATA | ACL_BIT_NOTSMTP, TRUE, 0 },
1522#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_ARC
f48946eb 1523 { US"arc", VERIFY_ARC, ACL_BIT_DATA, FALSE , 0 },
e3a69b62 1524#endif
89583014
JH
1525 };
1526
1527
1528enum { CALLOUT_DEFER_OK, CALLOUT_NOCACHE, CALLOUT_RANDOM, CALLOUT_USE_SENDER,
1529 CALLOUT_USE_POSTMASTER, CALLOUT_POSTMASTER, CALLOUT_FULLPOSTMASTER,
1530 CALLOUT_MAILFROM, CALLOUT_POSTMASTER_MAILFROM, CALLOUT_MAXWAIT, CALLOUT_CONNECT,
57cc2785 1531 CALLOUT_HOLD, CALLOUT_TIME /* TIME must be last */
89583014
JH
1532 };
1533typedef struct {
1534 uschar * name;
1535 int value;
1536 int flag;
1537 BOOL has_option; /* Has =option(s) following */
1538 BOOL timeval; /* Has a time value */
1539 } callout_opt_t;
1540static callout_opt_t callout_opt_list[] = {
f2ed27cf 1541 /* name value flag has-opt has-time */
89583014
JH
1542 { US"defer_ok", CALLOUT_DEFER_OK, 0, FALSE, FALSE },
1543 { US"no_cache", CALLOUT_NOCACHE, vopt_callout_no_cache, FALSE, FALSE },
1544 { US"random", CALLOUT_RANDOM, vopt_callout_random, FALSE, FALSE },
1545 { US"use_sender", CALLOUT_USE_SENDER, vopt_callout_recipsender, FALSE, FALSE },
1546 { US"use_postmaster", CALLOUT_USE_POSTMASTER,vopt_callout_recippmaster, FALSE, FALSE },
1547 { US"postmaster_mailfrom",CALLOUT_POSTMASTER_MAILFROM,0, TRUE, FALSE },
1548 { US"postmaster", CALLOUT_POSTMASTER, 0, FALSE, FALSE },
1549 { US"fullpostmaster", CALLOUT_FULLPOSTMASTER,vopt_callout_fullpm, FALSE, FALSE },
1550 { US"mailfrom", CALLOUT_MAILFROM, 0, TRUE, FALSE },
1551 { US"maxwait", CALLOUT_MAXWAIT, 0, TRUE, TRUE },
1552 { US"connect", CALLOUT_CONNECT, 0, TRUE, TRUE },
57cc2785 1553 { US"hold", CALLOUT_HOLD, vopt_callout_hold, FALSE, FALSE },
89583014
JH
1554 { NULL, CALLOUT_TIME, 0, FALSE, TRUE }
1555 };
1556
1557
1558
059ec3d9
PH
1559/* This function implements the "verify" condition. It is called when
1560encountered in any ACL, because some tests are almost always permitted. Some
1561just don't make sense, and always fail (for example, an attempt to test a host
1562lookup for a non-TCP/IP message). Others are restricted to certain ACLs.
1563
1564Arguments:
1565 where where called from
1566 addr the recipient address that the ACL is handling, or NULL
1567 arg the argument of "verify"
1568 user_msgptr pointer for user message
1569 log_msgptr pointer for log message
1570 basic_errno where to put verify errno
1571
1572Returns: OK verification condition succeeded
1573 FAIL verification failed
1574 DEFER there was a problem verifying
1575 ERROR syntax error
1576*/
1577
1578static int
55414b25 1579acl_verify(int where, address_item *addr, const uschar *arg,
059ec3d9
PH
1580 uschar **user_msgptr, uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
1581{
1582int sep = '/';
1583int callout = -1;
1584int callout_overall = -1;
4deaf07d 1585int callout_connect = -1;
059ec3d9
PH
1586int verify_options = 0;
1587int rc;
1588BOOL verify_header_sender = FALSE;
1589BOOL defer_ok = FALSE;
1590BOOL callout_defer_ok = FALSE;
1591BOOL no_details = FALSE;
eafd343b 1592BOOL success_on_redirect = FALSE;
059ec3d9
PH
1593address_item *sender_vaddr = NULL;
1594uschar *verify_sender_address = NULL;
1595uschar *pm_mailfrom = NULL;
1596uschar *se_mailfrom = NULL;
596875b3
PH
1597
1598/* Some of the verify items have slash-separated options; some do not. Diagnose
89583014 1599an error if options are given for items that don't expect them.
596875b3
PH
1600*/
1601
1602uschar *slash = Ustrchr(arg, '/');
55414b25 1603const uschar *list = arg;
ba74fb8d 1604uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0);
89583014 1605verify_type_t * vp;
059ec3d9 1606
e3a69b62 1607if (!ss) goto BAD_VERIFY;
059ec3d9
PH
1608
1609/* Handle name/address consistency verification in a separate function. */
1610
d7978c0f 1611for (vp = verify_type_list;
5903c6ff 1612 CS vp < CS verify_type_list + sizeof(verify_type_list);
89583014
JH
1613 vp++
1614 )
1615 if (vp->alt_opt_sep ? strncmpic(ss, vp->name, vp->alt_opt_sep) == 0
1616 : strcmpic (ss, vp->name) == 0)
1617 break;
5903c6ff 1618if (CS vp >= CS verify_type_list + sizeof(verify_type_list))
89583014
JH
1619 goto BAD_VERIFY;
1620
e3a69b62 1621if (vp->no_options && slash)
059ec3d9 1622 {
89583014
JH
1623 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unexpected '/' found in \"%s\" "
1624 "(this verify item has no options)", arg);
1625 return ERROR;
059ec3d9 1626 }
e3a69b62 1627if (!(vp->where_allowed & BIT(where)))
059ec3d9 1628 {
e3a69b62
JH
1629 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot verify %s in ACL for %s",
1630 vp->name, acl_wherenames[where]);
89583014 1631 return ERROR;
059ec3d9 1632 }
89583014 1633switch(vp->value)
596875b3 1634 {
89583014 1635 case VERIFY_REV_HOST_LKUP:
617d3932 1636 if (!sender_host_address) return OK;
7e8360e6 1637 if ((rc = acl_verify_reverse(user_msgptr, log_msgptr)) == DEFER)
617d3932 1638 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
7e8360e6
JH
1639 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0)
1640 return OK;
1641 return rc;
059ec3d9 1642
89583014
JH
1643 case VERIFY_CERT:
1644 /* TLS certificate verification is done at STARTTLS time; here we just
1645 test whether it was successful or not. (This is for optional verification; for
1646 mandatory verification, the connection doesn't last this long.) */
e5a9dba6 1647
3703d818
JH
1648 if (tls_in.certificate_verified) return OK;
1649 *user_msgptr = US"no verified certificate";
1650 return FAIL;
e5a9dba6 1651
89583014
JH
1652 case VERIFY_HELO:
1653 /* We can test the result of optional HELO verification that might have
1654 occurred earlier. If not, we can attempt the verification now. */
059ec3d9 1655
8768d548
JH
1656 if (!f.helo_verified && !f.helo_verify_failed) smtp_verify_helo();
1657 return f.helo_verified ? OK : FAIL;
059ec3d9 1658
89583014
JH
1659 case VERIFY_CSA:
1660 /* Do Client SMTP Authorization checks in a separate function, and turn the
1661 result code into user-friendly strings. */
1c41c9cc 1662
3703d818
JH
1663 rc = acl_verify_csa(list);
1664 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("client SMTP authorization %s",
89583014 1665 csa_reason_string[rc]);
3703d818 1666 csa_status = csa_status_string[rc];
e1d04f48 1667 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("CSA result %s\n", csa_status);
3703d818 1668 return csa_return_code[rc];
89583014 1669
617d3932
JH
1670#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_ARC
1671 case VERIFY_ARC:
1672 { /* Do Authenticated Received Chain checks in a separate function. */
1673 const uschar * condlist = CUS string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0);
1674 int csep = 0;
1675 uschar * cond;
1676
1677 if (!(arc_state = acl_verify_arc())) return DEFER;
93c931f8
JH
1678 DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ARC verify result %s %s%s%s\n", arc_state,
1679 arc_state_reason ? "(":"", arc_state_reason, arc_state_reason ? ")":"");
617d3932
JH
1680
1681 if (!condlist) condlist = US"none:pass";
1682 while ((cond = string_nextinlist(&condlist, &csep, NULL, 0)))
1683 if (Ustrcmp(arc_state, cond) == 0) return OK;
1684 return FAIL;
1685 }
1686#endif
1687
89583014 1688 case VERIFY_HDR_SYNTAX:
db57e575 1689 /* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct 5322-syntax. If there is
89583014
JH
1690 a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to
1691 send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as
1692 always). */
1693
1694 rc = verify_check_headers(log_msgptr);
3703d818
JH
1695 if (rc != OK && *log_msgptr)
1696 if (smtp_return_error_details)
1697 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1698 else
1699 acl_verify_message = *log_msgptr;
89583014 1700 return rc;
059ec3d9 1701
770747fd
MFM
1702 case VERIFY_HDR_NAMES_ASCII:
1703 /* Check that all header names are true 7 bit strings
1704 See RFC 5322, 2.2. and RFC 6532, 3. */
1705
1706 rc = verify_check_header_names_ascii(log_msgptr);
617d3932 1707 if (rc != OK && smtp_return_error_details && *log_msgptr)
770747fd
MFM
1708 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1709 return rc;
1710
89583014
JH
1711 case VERIFY_NOT_BLIND:
1712 /* Check that no recipient of this message is "blind", that is, every envelope
1713 recipient must be mentioned in either To: or Cc:. */
7c498df1
SA
1714 {
1715 BOOL case_sensitive = TRUE;
1716
1717 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
1718 if (strcmpic(ss, US"case_insensitive") == 0)
1719 case_sensitive = FALSE;
1720 else
1721 {
1722 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unknown option \"%s\" in ACL "
1723 "condition \"verify %s\"", ss, arg);
1724 return ERROR;
1725 }
059ec3d9 1726
7c498df1 1727 if ((rc = verify_check_notblind(case_sensitive)) != OK)
89583014 1728 {
f3ebb786 1729 *log_msgptr = US"bcc recipient detected";
89583014
JH
1730 if (smtp_return_error_details)
1731 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
1732 }
1733 return rc;
7c498df1 1734 }
059ec3d9 1735
89583014
JH
1736 /* The remaining verification tests check recipient and sender addresses,
1737 either from the envelope or from the header. There are a number of
1738 slash-separated options that are common to all of them. */
059ec3d9 1739
89583014
JH
1740 case VERIFY_HDR_SNDR:
1741 verify_header_sender = TRUE;
1742 break;
059ec3d9 1743
89583014
JH
1744 case VERIFY_SNDR:
1745 /* In the case of a sender, this can optionally be followed by an address to use
1746 in place of the actual sender (rare special-case requirement). */
059ec3d9 1747 {
89583014
JH
1748 uschar *s = ss + 6;
1749 if (*s == 0)
1750 verify_sender_address = sender_address;
1751 else
1752 {
1753 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1754 if (*s++ != '=') goto BAD_VERIFY;
1755 while (isspace(*s)) s++;
1756 verify_sender_address = string_copy(s);
1757 }
059ec3d9 1758 }
89583014
JH
1759 break;
1760
1761 case VERIFY_RCPT:
1762 break;
059ec3d9
PH
1763 }
1764
89583014
JH
1765
1766
596875b3
PH
1767/* Remaining items are optional; they apply to sender and recipient
1768verification, including "header sender" verification. */
059ec3d9 1769
d7978c0f 1770while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)))
059ec3d9
PH
1771 {
1772 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0) defer_ok = TRUE;
1773 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"no_details") == 0) no_details = TRUE;
eafd343b 1774 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"success_on_redirect") == 0) success_on_redirect = TRUE;
059ec3d9
PH
1775
1776 /* These two old options are left for backwards compatibility */
1777
1778 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"callout_defer_ok") == 0)
1779 {
1780 callout_defer_ok = TRUE;
1781 if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1782 }
1783
1784 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"check_postmaster") == 0)
1785 {
1786 pm_mailfrom = US"";
1787 if (callout == -1) callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1788 }
1789
1790 /* The callout option has a number of sub-options, comma separated */
1791
1792 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"callout", 7) == 0)
1793 {
1794 callout = CALLOUT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT;
1795 ss += 7;
1796 if (*ss != 0)
1797 {
1798 while (isspace(*ss)) ss++;
1799 if (*ss++ == '=')
1800 {
55414b25 1801 const uschar * sublist = ss;
059ec3d9 1802 int optsep = ',';
059ec3d9 1803 uschar buffer[256];
d7978c0f 1804 uschar * opt;
8e669ac1 1805
d7978c0f 1806 while (isspace(*sublist)) sublist++;
57cc2785 1807 while ((opt = string_nextinlist(&sublist, &optsep, buffer, sizeof(buffer))))
059ec3d9 1808 {
89583014 1809 callout_opt_t * op;
438257ba 1810 double period = 1.0F;
059ec3d9 1811
89583014 1812 for (op= callout_opt_list; op->name; op++)
438257ba 1813 if (strncmpic(opt, op->name, Ustrlen(op->name)) == 0)
89583014 1814 break;
059ec3d9 1815
89583014
JH
1816 verify_options |= op->flag;
1817 if (op->has_option)
1818 {
438257ba 1819 opt += Ustrlen(op->name);
4deaf07d
PH
1820 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
1821 if (*opt++ != '=')
1822 {
1823 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after "
89583014 1824 "\"%s\" in ACL verify condition \"%s\"", op->name, arg);
4deaf07d
PH
1825 return ERROR;
1826 }
1827 while (isspace(*opt)) opt++;
89583014 1828 }
57cc2785 1829 if (op->timeval && (period = readconf_readtime(opt, 0, FALSE)) < 0)
89583014 1830 {
57cc2785
JH
1831 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("bad time value in ACL condition "
1832 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
1833 return ERROR;
89583014
JH
1834 }
1835
1836 switch(op->value)
1837 {
1838 case CALLOUT_DEFER_OK: callout_defer_ok = TRUE; break;
1839 case CALLOUT_POSTMASTER: pm_mailfrom = US""; break;
1840 case CALLOUT_FULLPOSTMASTER: pm_mailfrom = US""; break;
1841 case CALLOUT_MAILFROM:
1842 if (!verify_header_sender)
1843 {
1844 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"mailfrom\" is allowed as a "
1845 "callout option only for verify=header_sender (detected in ACL "
1846 "condition \"%s\")", arg);
1847 return ERROR;
1848 }
1849 se_mailfrom = string_copy(opt);
1850 break;
1851 case CALLOUT_POSTMASTER_MAILFROM: pm_mailfrom = string_copy(opt); break;
1852 case CALLOUT_MAXWAIT: callout_overall = period; break;
1853 case CALLOUT_CONNECT: callout_connect = period; break;
1854 case CALLOUT_TIME: callout = period; break;
1855 }
059ec3d9
PH
1856 }
1857 }
1858 else
1859 {
1860 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("'=' expected after \"callout\" in "
1861 "ACL condition \"%s\"", arg);
1862 return ERROR;
1863 }
1864 }
1865 }
1866
1867 /* Option not recognized */
1868
1869 else
1870 {
1871 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unknown option \"%s\" in ACL "
1872 "condition \"verify %s\"", ss, arg);
1873 return ERROR;
1874 }
1875 }
1876
1877if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster)) ==
1878 (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster))
1879 {
1880 *log_msgptr = US"only one of use_sender and use_postmaster can be set "
1881 "for a recipient callout";
1882 return ERROR;
1883 }
1884
1885/* Handle sender-in-header verification. Default the user message to the log
1886message if giving out verification details. */
1887
1888if (verify_header_sender)
1889 {
8e669ac1 1890 int verrno;
2f682e45
JH
1891
1892 if ((rc = verify_check_header_address(user_msgptr, log_msgptr, callout,
fe5b5d0b 1893 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, verify_options,
2f682e45 1894 &verrno)) != OK)
8e669ac1 1895 {
fe5b5d0b
PH
1896 *basic_errno = verrno;
1897 if (smtp_return_error_details)
1898 {
2f682e45 1899 if (!*user_msgptr && *log_msgptr)
fe5b5d0b 1900 *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
8768d548 1901 if (rc == DEFER) f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
fe5b5d0b 1902 }
8e669ac1 1903 }
059ec3d9
PH
1904 }
1905
1906/* Handle a sender address. The default is to verify *the* sender address, but
1907optionally a different address can be given, for special requirements. If the
1908address is empty, we are dealing with a bounce message that has no sender, so
1909we cannot do any checking. If the real sender address gets rewritten during
1910verification (e.g. DNS widening), set the flag to stop it being rewritten again
1911during message reception.
1912
1913A list of verified "sender" addresses is kept to try to avoid doing to much
1914work repetitively when there are multiple recipients in a message and they all
1915require sender verification. However, when callouts are involved, it gets too
1916complicated because different recipients may require different callout options.
1917Therefore, we always do a full sender verify when any kind of callout is
1918specified. Caching elsewhere, for instance in the DNS resolver and in the
1919callout handling, should ensure that this is not terribly inefficient. */
1920
2f682e45 1921else if (verify_sender_address)
059ec3d9 1922 {
2f682e45 1923 if ((verify_options & (vopt_callout_recipsender|vopt_callout_recippmaster)))
059ec3d9
PH
1924 {
1925 *log_msgptr = US"use_sender or use_postmaster cannot be used for a "
1926 "sender verify callout";
1927 return ERROR;
1928 }
1929
1930 sender_vaddr = verify_checked_sender(verify_sender_address);
1931 if (sender_vaddr != NULL && /* Previously checked */
1932 callout <= 0) /* No callout needed this time */
1933 {
1934 /* If the "routed" flag is set, it means that routing worked before, so
1935 this check can give OK (the saved return code value, if set, belongs to a
1936 callout that was done previously). If the "routed" flag is not set, routing
1937 must have failed, so we use the saved return code. */
1938
2f682e45
JH
1939 if (testflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed))
1940 rc = OK;
1941 else
059ec3d9
PH
1942 {
1943 rc = sender_vaddr->special_action;
1944 *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
1945 }
e1d04f48 1946 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("using cached sender verify result\n");
059ec3d9
PH
1947 }
1948
1949 /* Do a new verification, and cache the result. The cache is used to avoid
1950 verifying the sender multiple times for multiple RCPTs when callouts are not
1951 specified (see comments above).
1952
1953 The cache is also used on failure to give details in response to the first
1954 RCPT that gets bounced for this reason. However, this can be suppressed by
1955 the no_details option, which sets the flag that says "this detail has already
1956 been sent". The cache normally contains just one address, but there may be
1957 more in esoteric circumstances. */
1958
1959 else
1960 {
1961 BOOL routed = TRUE;
2a3eea10 1962 uschar *save_address_data = deliver_address_data;
8e669ac1 1963
059ec3d9 1964 sender_vaddr = deliver_make_addr(verify_sender_address, TRUE);
8c5d388a 1965#ifdef SUPPORT_I18N
3c8b3577
JH
1966 if ((sender_vaddr->prop.utf8_msg = message_smtputf8))
1967 {
1968 sender_vaddr->prop.utf8_downcvt = message_utf8_downconvert == 1;
1969 sender_vaddr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = message_utf8_downconvert == -1;
1970 }
f358d5e0 1971#endif
059ec3d9
PH
1972 if (no_details) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_sverify_told);
1973 if (verify_sender_address[0] != 0)
1974 {
1975 /* If this is the real sender address, save the unrewritten version
1976 for use later in receive. Otherwise, set a flag so that rewriting the
1977 sender in verify_address() does not update sender_address. */
1978
1979 if (verify_sender_address == sender_address)
1980 sender_address_unrewritten = sender_address;
1981 else
1982 verify_options |= vopt_fake_sender;
1983
eafd343b
TK
1984 if (success_on_redirect)
1985 verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect;
1986
059ec3d9
PH
1987 /* The recipient, qualify, and expn options are never set in
1988 verify_options. */
1989
1990 rc = verify_address(sender_vaddr, NULL, verify_options, callout,
4deaf07d 1991 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, &routed);
059ec3d9 1992
e1d04f48 1993 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("----------- end verify ------------\n");
059ec3d9 1994
2f682e45
JH
1995 if (rc != OK)
1996 *basic_errno = sender_vaddr->basic_errno;
1997 else
1998 DEBUG(D_acl)
1999 {
2000 if (Ustrcmp(sender_vaddr->address, verify_sender_address) != 0)
e1d04f48 2001 debug_printf_indent("sender %s verified ok as %s\n",
2f682e45
JH
2002 verify_sender_address, sender_vaddr->address);
2003 else
e1d04f48 2004 debug_printf_indent("sender %s verified ok\n",
2f682e45
JH
2005 verify_sender_address);
2006 }
059ec3d9 2007 }
2f682e45
JH
2008 else
2009 rc = OK; /* Null sender */
059ec3d9
PH
2010
2011 /* Cache the result code */
2012
2013 if (routed) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_routed);
2014 if (callout > 0) setflag(sender_vaddr, af_verify_callout);
2015 sender_vaddr->special_action = rc;
2016 sender_vaddr->next = sender_verified_list;
2017 sender_verified_list = sender_vaddr;
8e669ac1
PH
2018
2019 /* Restore the recipient address data, which might have been clobbered by
2a3eea10 2020 the sender verification. */
8e669ac1 2021
2a3eea10 2022 deliver_address_data = save_address_data;
059ec3d9 2023 }
8e669ac1 2024
2a3eea10
PH
2025 /* Put the sender address_data value into $sender_address_data */
2026
d43cbe25 2027 sender_address_data = sender_vaddr->prop.address_data;
059ec3d9
PH
2028 }
2029
2030/* A recipient address just gets a straightforward verify; again we must handle
2031the DEFER overrides. */
2032
2033else
2034 {
2035 address_item addr2;
2036
eafd343b
TK
2037 if (success_on_redirect)
2038 verify_options |= vopt_success_on_redirect;
2039
059ec3d9
PH
2040 /* We must use a copy of the address for verification, because it might
2041 get rewritten. */
2042
2043 addr2 = *addr;
2044 rc = verify_address(&addr2, NULL, verify_options|vopt_is_recipient, callout,
4deaf07d 2045 callout_overall, callout_connect, se_mailfrom, pm_mailfrom, NULL);
e1d04f48 2046 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("----------- end verify ------------\n");
8e669ac1 2047
42855d71 2048 *basic_errno = addr2.basic_errno;
059ec3d9 2049 *log_msgptr = addr2.message;
8e669ac1 2050 *user_msgptr = (addr2.user_message != NULL)?
6729cf78 2051 addr2.user_message : addr2.message;
42855d71
PH
2052
2053 /* Allow details for temporary error if the address is so flagged. */
8768d548 2054 if (testflag((&addr2), af_pass_message)) f.acl_temp_details = TRUE;
059ec3d9
PH
2055
2056 /* Make $address_data visible */
d43cbe25 2057 deliver_address_data = addr2.prop.address_data;
059ec3d9
PH
2058 }
2059
2060/* We have a result from the relevant test. Handle defer overrides first. */
2061
2062if (rc == DEFER && (defer_ok ||
2063 (callout_defer_ok && *basic_errno == ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)))
2064 {
e1d04f48 2065 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("verify defer overridden by %s\n",
059ec3d9
PH
2066 defer_ok? "defer_ok" : "callout_defer_ok");
2067 rc = OK;
2068 }
2069
2070/* If we've failed a sender, set up a recipient message, and point
2071sender_verified_failed to the address item that actually failed. */
2072
2073if (rc != OK && verify_sender_address != NULL)
2074 {
2075 if (rc != DEFER)
059ec3d9 2076 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Sender verify failed";
059ec3d9 2077 else if (*basic_errno != ERRNO_CALLOUTDEFER)
059ec3d9 2078 *log_msgptr = *user_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify";
059ec3d9
PH
2079 else
2080 {
2081 *log_msgptr = US"Could not complete sender verify callout";
2082 *user_msgptr = smtp_return_error_details? sender_vaddr->user_message :
2083 *log_msgptr;
2084 }
2085
2086 sender_verified_failed = sender_vaddr;
2087 }
2088
2089/* Verifying an address messes up the values of $domain and $local_part,
2090so reset them before returning if this is a RCPT ACL. */
2091
2092if (addr != NULL)
2093 {
2094 deliver_domain = addr->domain;
2095 deliver_localpart = addr->local_part;
2096 }
2097return rc;
2098
2099/* Syntax errors in the verify argument come here. */
2100
2101BAD_VERIFY:
2102*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("expected \"sender[=address]\", \"recipient\", "
770747fd
MFM
2103 "\"helo\", \"header_syntax\", \"header_sender\", \"header_names_ascii\" "
2104 "or \"reverse_host_lookup\" at start of ACL condition "
059ec3d9
PH
2105 "\"verify %s\"", arg);
2106return ERROR;
2107}
2108
2109
2110
2111
2112/*************************************************
2113* Check argument for control= modifier *
2114*************************************************/
2115
cfe6f17c
JH
2116/* Called from acl_check_condition() below.
2117To handle the case "queue_only" we accept an _ in the
2118initial / option-switch position.
059ec3d9
PH
2119
2120Arguments:
2121 arg the argument string for control=
2122 pptr set to point to the terminating character
2123 where which ACL we are in
2124 log_msgptr for error messages
2125
2126Returns: CONTROL_xxx value
2127*/
2128
2129static int
55414b25 2130decode_control(const uschar *arg, const uschar **pptr, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
059ec3d9 2131{
d7bed771
JH
2132int idx, len;
2133control_def * d;
cfe6f17c 2134uschar c;
059ec3d9 2135
d7bed771 2136if ( (idx = find_control(arg, controls_list, nelem(controls_list))) < 0
cfe6f17c
JH
2137 || ( (c = arg[len = Ustrlen((d = controls_list+idx)->name)]) != 0
2138 && (!d->has_option || c != '/' && c != '_')
d7bed771 2139 ) )
059ec3d9
PH
2140 {
2141 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
2142 return CONTROL_ERROR;
2143 }
2144
059ec3d9 2145*pptr = arg + len;
d7bed771 2146return idx;
059ec3d9
PH
2147}
2148
2149
2150
c99ce5c9
TF
2151
2152/*************************************************
2153* Return a ratelimit error *
2154*************************************************/
2155
2156/* Called from acl_ratelimit() below
2157
2158Arguments:
2159 log_msgptr for error messages
2160 format format string
2161 ... supplementary arguments
c99ce5c9
TF
2162
2163Returns: ERROR
2164*/
2165
2166static int
2167ratelimit_error(uschar **log_msgptr, const char *format, ...)
2168{
2169va_list ap;
d12746bc
JH
2170gstring * g =
2171 string_cat(NULL, US"error in arguments to \"ratelimit\" condition: ");
2172
c99ce5c9 2173va_start(ap, format);
f3ebb786 2174g = string_vformat(g, SVFMT_EXTEND|SVFMT_REBUFFER, format, ap);
c99ce5c9 2175va_end(ap);
d12746bc 2176
e59797e3 2177gstring_release_unused(g);
d12746bc 2178*log_msgptr = string_from_gstring(g);
c99ce5c9
TF
2179return ERROR;
2180}
2181
2182
2183
2184
059ec3d9 2185/*************************************************
870f6ba8
TF
2186* Handle rate limiting *
2187*************************************************/
2188
2189/* Called by acl_check_condition() below to calculate the result
2190of the ACL ratelimit condition.
2191
2192Note that the return value might be slightly unexpected: if the
2193sender's rate is above the limit then the result is OK. This is
2194similar to the dnslists condition, and is so that you can write
2195ACL clauses like: defer ratelimit = 15 / 1h
2196
2197Arguments:
2198 arg the option string for ratelimit=
90fc3069 2199 where ACL_WHERE_xxxx indicating which ACL this is
870f6ba8
TF
2200 log_msgptr for error messages
2201
2202Returns: OK - Sender's rate is above limit
2203 FAIL - Sender's rate is below limit
2204 DEFER - Problem opening ratelimit database
2205 ERROR - Syntax error in options.
2206*/
2207
2208static int
55414b25 2209acl_ratelimit(const uschar *arg, int where, uschar **log_msgptr)
870f6ba8 2210{
c99ce5c9 2211double limit, period, count;
8f240103
PH
2212uschar *ss;
2213uschar *key = NULL;
c99ce5c9 2214uschar *unique = NULL;
870f6ba8 2215int sep = '/';
c99ce5c9
TF
2216BOOL leaky = FALSE, strict = FALSE, readonly = FALSE;
2217BOOL noupdate = FALSE, badacl = FALSE;
2218int mode = RATE_PER_WHAT;
870f6ba8
TF
2219int old_pool, rc;
2220tree_node **anchor, *t;
2221open_db dbblock, *dbm;
c99ce5c9 2222int dbdb_size;
870f6ba8 2223dbdata_ratelimit *dbd;
c99ce5c9 2224dbdata_ratelimit_unique *dbdb;
870f6ba8
TF
2225struct timeval tv;
2226
2227/* Parse the first two options and record their values in expansion
2228variables. These variables allow the configuration to have informative
2229error messages based on rate limits obtained from a table lookup. */
2230
c99ce5c9 2231/* First is the maximum number of messages per period / maximum burst
870f6ba8
TF
2232size, which must be greater than or equal to zero. Zero is useful for
2233rate measurement as opposed to rate limiting. */
2234
65a32f85 2235if (!(sender_rate_limit = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0)))
96f5fe4c
JH
2236 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "sender rate limit not set");
2237
2238limit = Ustrtod(sender_rate_limit, &ss);
2239if (tolower(*ss) == 'k') { limit *= 1024.0; ss++; }
2240else if (tolower(*ss) == 'm') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
2241else if (tolower(*ss) == 'g') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
2242
c99ce5c9
TF
2243if (limit < 0.0 || *ss != '\0')
2244 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
2245 "\"%s\" is not a positive number", sender_rate_limit);
870f6ba8 2246
c99ce5c9 2247/* Second is the rate measurement period / exponential smoothing time
870f6ba8
TF
2248constant. This must be strictly greater than zero, because zero leads to
2249run-time division errors. */
2250
65a32f85
JH
2251period = !(sender_rate_period = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0))
2252 ? -1.0 : readconf_readtime(sender_rate_period, 0, FALSE);
870f6ba8 2253if (period <= 0.0)
c99ce5c9
TF
2254 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
2255 "\"%s\" is not a time value", sender_rate_period);
2256
2257/* By default we are counting one of something, but the per_rcpt,
2258per_byte, and count options can change this. */
2259
2260count = 1.0;
870f6ba8 2261
c99ce5c9 2262/* Parse the other options. */
870f6ba8 2263
0d7a24c6 2264while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0)))
870f6ba8
TF
2265 {
2266 if (strcmpic(ss, US"leaky") == 0) leaky = TRUE;
2267 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"strict") == 0) strict = TRUE;
8f240103 2268 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"noupdate") == 0) noupdate = TRUE;
c99ce5c9
TF
2269 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"readonly") == 0) readonly = TRUE;
2270 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_cmd") == 0) RATE_SET(mode, PER_CMD);
2271 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_conn") == 0)
2272 {
2273 RATE_SET(mode, PER_CONN);
2274 if (where == ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP || where == ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP_START)
2275 badacl = TRUE;
2276 }
2277 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_mail") == 0)
2278 {
2279 RATE_SET(mode, PER_MAIL);
2280 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) badacl = TRUE;
2281 }
2282 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_rcpt") == 0)
2283 {
2284 /* If we are running in the RCPT ACL, then we'll count the recipients
2285 one by one, but if we are running when we have accumulated the whole
2286 list then we'll add them all in one batch. */
2287 if (where == ACL_WHERE_RCPT)
2288 RATE_SET(mode, PER_RCPT);
2289 else if (where >= ACL_WHERE_PREDATA && where <= ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
2290 RATE_SET(mode, PER_ALLRCPTS), count = (double)recipients_count;
2291 else if (where == ACL_WHERE_MAIL || where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
2292 RATE_SET(mode, PER_RCPT), badacl = TRUE;
2293 }
2294 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_byte") == 0)
2295 {
2296 /* If we have not yet received the message data and there was no SIZE
4c04137d 2297 declaration on the MAIL command, then it's safe to just use a value of
c99ce5c9
TF
2298 zero and let the recorded rate decay as if nothing happened. */
2299 RATE_SET(mode, PER_MAIL);
2300 if (where > ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP) badacl = TRUE;
65a32f85 2301 else count = message_size < 0 ? 0.0 : (double)message_size;
c99ce5c9
TF
2302 }
2303 else if (strcmpic(ss, US"per_addr") == 0)
2304 {
2305 RATE_SET(mode, PER_RCPT);
438257ba 2306 if (where != ACL_WHERE_RCPT) badacl = TRUE, unique = US"*";
65a32f85 2307 else unique = string_sprintf("%s@%s", deliver_localpart, deliver_domain);
c99ce5c9
TF
2308 }
2309 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"count=", 6) == 0)
2310 {
2311 uschar *e;
2312 count = Ustrtod(ss+6, &e);
2313 if (count < 0.0 || *e != '\0')
65a32f85 2314 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "\"%s\" is not a positive number", ss);
c99ce5c9
TF
2315 }
2316 else if (strncmpic(ss, US"unique=", 7) == 0)
2317 unique = string_copy(ss + 7);
65a32f85 2318 else if (!key)
c99ce5c9
TF
2319 key = string_copy(ss);
2320 else
2321 key = string_sprintf("%s/%s", key, ss);
870f6ba8
TF
2322 }
2323
c99ce5c9
TF
2324/* Sanity check. When the badacl flag is set the update mode must either
2325be readonly (which is the default if it is omitted) or, for backwards
2326compatibility, a combination of noupdate and strict or leaky. */
2327
2328if (mode == RATE_PER_CLASH)
2329 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "conflicting per_* options");
2330if (leaky + strict + readonly > 1)
2331 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "conflicting update modes");
2332if (badacl && (leaky || strict) && !noupdate)
2333 return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
bfe6da19 2334 "\"%s\" must not have /leaky or /strict option, or cannot be used in %s ACL",
c99ce5c9
TF
2335 ratelimit_option_string[mode], acl_wherenames[where]);
2336
2337/* Set the default values of any unset options. In readonly mode we
2338perform the rate computation without any increment so that its value
2339decays to eventually allow over-limit senders through. */
2340
2341if (noupdate) readonly = TRUE, leaky = strict = FALSE;
2342if (badacl) readonly = TRUE;
2343if (readonly) count = 0.0;
2344if (!strict && !readonly) leaky = TRUE;
2345if (mode == RATE_PER_WHAT) mode = RATE_PER_MAIL;
870f6ba8 2346
8f240103
PH
2347/* Create the lookup key. If there is no explicit key, use sender_host_address.
2348If there is no sender_host_address (e.g. -bs or acl_not_smtp) then we simply
2349omit it. The smoothing constant (sender_rate_period) and the per_xxx options
2350are added to the key because they alter the meaning of the stored data. */
2351
65a32f85
JH
2352if (!key)
2353 key = !sender_host_address ? US"" : sender_host_address;
870f6ba8 2354
c99ce5c9 2355key = string_sprintf("%s/%s/%s%s",
8f240103 2356 sender_rate_period,
c99ce5c9
TF
2357 ratelimit_option_string[mode],
2358 unique == NULL ? "" : "unique/",
8f240103 2359 key);
870f6ba8 2360
c99ce5c9 2361HDEBUG(D_acl)
e1d04f48 2362 debug_printf_indent("ratelimit condition count=%.0f %.1f/%s\n", count, limit, key);
870f6ba8 2363
8f240103
PH
2364/* See if we have already computed the rate by looking in the relevant tree.
2365For per-connection rate limiting, store tree nodes and dbdata in the permanent
c99ce5c9
TF
2366pool so that they survive across resets. In readonly mode we only remember the
2367result for the rest of this command in case a later command changes it. After
2368this bit of logic the code is independent of the per_* mode. */
870f6ba8 2369
870f6ba8
TF
2370old_pool = store_pool;
2371
c99ce5c9
TF
2372if (readonly)
2373 anchor = &ratelimiters_cmd;
65a32f85
JH
2374else switch(mode)
2375 {
2376 case RATE_PER_CONN:
2377 anchor = &ratelimiters_conn;
2378 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2379 break;
2380 case RATE_PER_BYTE:
2381 case RATE_PER_MAIL:
2382 case RATE_PER_ALLRCPTS:
2383 anchor = &ratelimiters_mail;
2384 break;
2385 case RATE_PER_ADDR:
2386 case RATE_PER_CMD:
2387 case RATE_PER_RCPT:
2388 anchor = &ratelimiters_cmd;
2389 break;
2390 default:
2391 anchor = NULL; /* silence an "unused" complaint */
2392 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE,
2393 "internal ACL error: unknown ratelimit mode %d", mode);
2394 break;
2395 }
870f6ba8 2396
65a32f85 2397if ((t = tree_search(*anchor, key)))
870f6ba8
TF
2398 {
2399 dbd = t->data.ptr;
2400 /* The following few lines duplicate some of the code below. */
8f240103 2401 rc = (dbd->rate < limit)? FAIL : OK;
870f6ba8
TF
2402 store_pool = old_pool;
2403 sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
2404 HDEBUG(D_acl)
e1d04f48 2405 debug_printf_indent("ratelimit found pre-computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
870f6ba8
TF
2406 return rc;
2407 }
2408
c99ce5c9
TF
2409/* We aren't using a pre-computed rate, so get a previously recorded rate
2410from the database, which will be updated and written back if required. */
870f6ba8 2411
b10c87b3 2412if (!(dbm = dbfn_open(US"ratelimit", O_RDWR, &dbblock, TRUE, TRUE)))
870f6ba8
TF
2413 {
2414 store_pool = old_pool;
2415 sender_rate = NULL;
e1d04f48 2416 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit database not available\n");
870f6ba8
TF
2417 *log_msgptr = US"ratelimit database not available";
2418 return DEFER;
2419 }
c99ce5c9
TF
2420dbdb = dbfn_read_with_length(dbm, key, &dbdb_size);
2421dbd = NULL;
870f6ba8
TF
2422
2423gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
2424
65a32f85 2425if (dbdb)
c99ce5c9
TF
2426 {
2427 /* Locate the basic ratelimit block inside the DB data. */
e1d04f48 2428 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit found key in database\n");
c99ce5c9
TF
2429 dbd = &dbdb->dbd;
2430
2431 /* Forget the old Bloom filter if it is too old, so that we count each
2432 repeating event once per period. We don't simply clear and re-use the old
2433 filter because we want its size to change if the limit changes. Note that
2434 we keep the dbd pointer for copying the rate into the new data block. */
2435
65a32f85 2436 if(unique && tv.tv_sec > dbdb->bloom_epoch + period)
c99ce5c9 2437 {
e1d04f48 2438 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit discarding old Bloom filter\n");
c99ce5c9
TF
2439 dbdb = NULL;
2440 }
2441
2442 /* Sanity check. */
2443
65a32f85 2444 if(unique && dbdb_size < sizeof(*dbdb))
c99ce5c9 2445 {
e1d04f48 2446 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit discarding undersize Bloom filter\n");
c99ce5c9
TF
2447 dbdb = NULL;
2448 }
2449 }
2450
2451/* Allocate a new data block if the database lookup failed
2452or the Bloom filter passed its age limit. */
2453
65a32f85 2454if (!dbdb)
c99ce5c9 2455 {
65a32f85 2456 if (!unique)
c99ce5c9
TF
2457 {
2458 /* No Bloom filter. This basic ratelimit block is initialized below. */
e1d04f48 2459 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit creating new rate data block\n");
c99ce5c9 2460 dbdb_size = sizeof(*dbd);
f3ebb786 2461 dbdb = store_get(dbdb_size, FALSE); /* not tainted */
c99ce5c9
TF
2462 }
2463 else
2464 {
2465 int extra;
e1d04f48 2466 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit creating new Bloom filter\n");
c99ce5c9
TF
2467
2468 /* See the long comment below for an explanation of the magic number 2.
2469 The filter has a minimum size in case the rate limit is very small;
2470 this is determined by the definition of dbdata_ratelimit_unique. */
2471
2472 extra = (int)limit * 2 - sizeof(dbdb->bloom);
2473 if (extra < 0) extra = 0;
2474 dbdb_size = sizeof(*dbdb) + extra;
f3ebb786 2475 dbdb = store_get(dbdb_size, FALSE); /* not tainted */
c99ce5c9
TF
2476 dbdb->bloom_epoch = tv.tv_sec;
2477 dbdb->bloom_size = sizeof(dbdb->bloom) + extra;
2478 memset(dbdb->bloom, 0, dbdb->bloom_size);
2479
2480 /* Preserve any basic ratelimit data (which is our longer-term memory)
2481 by copying it from the discarded block. */
2482
65a32f85 2483 if (dbd)
c99ce5c9
TF
2484 {
2485 dbdb->dbd = *dbd;
2486 dbd = &dbdb->dbd;
2487 }
2488 }
2489 }
2490
2491/* If we are counting unique events, find out if this event is new or not.
2492If the client repeats the event during the current period then it should be
2493counted. We skip this code in readonly mode for efficiency, because any
2494changes to the filter will be discarded and because count is already set to
2495zero. */
2496
65a32f85 2497if (unique && !readonly)
c99ce5c9
TF
2498 {
2499 /* We identify unique events using a Bloom filter. (You can find my
2500 notes on Bloom filters at http://fanf.livejournal.com/81696.html)
2501 With the per_addr option, an "event" is a recipient address, though the
2502 user can use the unique option to define their own events. We only count
2503 an event if we have not seen it before.
2504
2505 We size the filter according to the rate limit, which (in leaky mode)
2506 is the limit on the population of the filter. We allow 16 bits of space
2507 per entry (see the construction code above) and we set (up to) 8 of them
2508 when inserting an element (see the loop below). The probability of a false
2509 positive (an event we have not seen before but which we fail to count) is
2510
2511 size = limit * 16
2512 numhash = 8
2513 allzero = exp(-numhash * pop / size)
2514 = exp(-0.5 * pop / limit)
2515 fpr = pow(1 - allzero, numhash)
2516
2517 For senders at the limit the fpr is 0.06% or 1 in 1700
2518 and for senders at half the limit it is 0.0006% or 1 in 170000
2519
2520 In strict mode the Bloom filter can fill up beyond the normal limit, in
2521 which case the false positive rate will rise. This means that the
2522 measured rate for very fast senders can bogusly drop off after a while.
2523
2524 At twice the limit, the fpr is 2.5% or 1 in 40
2525 At four times the limit, it is 31% or 1 in 3.2
2526
2527 It takes ln(pop/limit) periods for an over-limit burst of pop events to
2528 decay below the limit, and if this is more than one then the Bloom filter
2529 will be discarded before the decay gets that far. The false positive rate
2530 at this threshold is 9.3% or 1 in 10.7. */
2531
2532 BOOL seen;
2533 unsigned n, hash, hinc;
2534 uschar md5sum[16];
2535 md5 md5info;
2536
2537 /* Instead of using eight independent hash values, we combine two values
2538 using the formula h1 + n * h2. This does not harm the Bloom filter's
2539 performance, and means the amount of hash we need is independent of the
2540 number of bits we set in the filter. */
2541
2542 md5_start(&md5info);
2543 md5_end(&md5info, unique, Ustrlen(unique), md5sum);
2544 hash = md5sum[0] | md5sum[1] << 8 | md5sum[2] << 16 | md5sum[3] << 24;
2545 hinc = md5sum[4] | md5sum[5] << 8 | md5sum[6] << 16 | md5sum[7] << 24;
2546
2547 /* Scan the bits corresponding to this event. A zero bit means we have
2548 not seen it before. Ensure all bits are set to record this event. */
2549
e1d04f48 2550 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit checking uniqueness of %s\n", unique);
c99ce5c9
TF
2551
2552 seen = TRUE;
2553 for (n = 0; n < 8; n++, hash += hinc)
2554 {
2555 int bit = 1 << (hash % 8);
2556 int byte = (hash / 8) % dbdb->bloom_size;
2557 if ((dbdb->bloom[byte] & bit) == 0)
2558 {
2559 dbdb->bloom[byte] |= bit;
2560 seen = FALSE;
2561 }
2562 }
2563
2564 /* If this event has occurred before, do not count it. */
2565
2566 if (seen)
2567 {
e1d04f48 2568 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit event found in Bloom filter\n");
c99ce5c9
TF
2569 count = 0.0;
2570 }
2571 else
e1d04f48 2572 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit event added to Bloom filter\n");
c99ce5c9
TF
2573 }
2574
2575/* If there was no previous ratelimit data block for this key, initialize
2576the new one, otherwise update the block from the database. The initial rate
2577is what would be computed by the code below for an infinite interval. */
2578
65a32f85 2579if (!dbd)
870f6ba8 2580 {
e1d04f48 2581 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit initializing new key's rate data\n");
c99ce5c9 2582 dbd = &dbdb->dbd;
870f6ba8
TF
2583 dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
2584 dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
c99ce5c9 2585 dbd->rate = count;
870f6ba8
TF
2586 }
2587else
2588 {
2589 /* The smoothed rate is computed using an exponentially weighted moving
2590 average adjusted for variable sampling intervals. The standard EWMA for
2591 a fixed sampling interval is: f'(t) = (1 - a) * f(t) + a * f'(t - 1)
2592 where f() is the measured value and f'() is the smoothed value.
2593
2594 Old data decays out of the smoothed value exponentially, such that data n
2595 samples old is multiplied by a^n. The exponential decay time constant p
2596 is defined such that data p samples old is multiplied by 1/e, which means
2597 that a = exp(-1/p). We can maintain the same time constant for a variable
2598 sampling interval i by using a = exp(-i/p).
2599
2600 The rate we are measuring is messages per period, suitable for directly
2601 comparing with the limit. The average rate between now and the previous
2602 message is period / interval, which we feed into the EWMA as the sample.
2603
2604 It turns out that the number of messages required for the smoothed rate
2605 to reach the limit when they are sent in a burst is equal to the limit.
2606 This can be seen by analysing the value of the smoothed rate after N
2607 messages sent at even intervals. Let k = (1 - a) * p/i
2608
2609 rate_1 = (1 - a) * p/i + a * rate_0
2610 = k + a * rate_0
2611 rate_2 = k + a * rate_1
2612 = k + a * k + a^2 * rate_0
2613 rate_3 = k + a * k + a^2 * k + a^3 * rate_0
2614 rate_N = rate_0 * a^N + k * SUM(x=0..N-1)(a^x)
2615 = rate_0 * a^N + k * (1 - a^N) / (1 - a)
2616 = rate_0 * a^N + p/i * (1 - a^N)
2617
2618 When N is large, a^N -> 0 so rate_N -> p/i as desired.
2619
2620 rate_N = p/i + (rate_0 - p/i) * a^N
2621 a^N = (rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i)
2622 N * -i/p = log((rate_N - p/i) / (rate_0 - p/i))
2623 N = p/i * log((rate_0 - p/i) / (rate_N - p/i))
2624
2625 Numerical analysis of the above equation, setting the computed rate to
2626 increase from rate_0 = 0 to rate_N = limit, shows that for large sending
2627 rates, p/i, the number of messages N = limit. So limit serves as both the
2628 maximum rate measured in messages per period, and the maximum number of
2629 messages that can be sent in a fast burst. */
2630
2631 double this_time = (double)tv.tv_sec
2632 + (double)tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0;
2633 double prev_time = (double)dbd->time_stamp
2634 + (double)dbd->time_usec / 1000000.0;
870f6ba8
TF
2635
2636 /* We must avoid division by zero, and deal gracefully with the clock going
2637 backwards. If we blunder ahead when time is in reverse then the computed
e5d5a95f 2638 rate will be bogus. To be safe we clamp interval to a very small number. */
870f6ba8 2639
e5d5a95f
TF
2640 double interval = this_time - prev_time <= 0.0 ? 1e-9
2641 : this_time - prev_time;
2642
2643 double i_over_p = interval / period;
2644 double a = exp(-i_over_p);
870f6ba8 2645
c99ce5c9
TF
2646 /* Combine the instantaneous rate (period / interval) with the previous rate
2647 using the smoothing factor a. In order to measure sized events, multiply the
2648 instantaneous rate by the count of bytes or recipients etc. */
2649
870f6ba8
TF
2650 dbd->time_stamp = tv.tv_sec;
2651 dbd->time_usec = tv.tv_usec;
c99ce5c9
TF
2652 dbd->rate = (1 - a) * count / i_over_p + a * dbd->rate;
2653
2654 /* When events are very widely spaced the computed rate tends towards zero.
2655 Although this is accurate it turns out not to be useful for our purposes,
2656 especially when the first event after a long silence is the start of a spam
2657 run. A more useful model is that the rate for an isolated event should be the
2658 size of the event per the period size, ignoring the lack of events outside
2659 the current period and regardless of where the event falls in the period. So,
2660 if the interval was so long that the calculated rate is unhelpfully small, we
4c04137d 2661 re-initialize the rate. In the absence of higher-rate bursts, the condition
c99ce5c9
TF
2662 below is true if the interval is greater than the period. */
2663
2664 if (dbd->rate < count) dbd->rate = count;
870f6ba8
TF
2665 }
2666
c99ce5c9
TF
2667/* Clients sending at the limit are considered to be over the limit.
2668This matters for edge cases such as a limit of zero, when the client
2669should be completely blocked. */
3348576f 2670
65a32f85 2671rc = dbd->rate < limit ? FAIL : OK;
870f6ba8
TF
2672
2673/* Update the state if the rate is low or if we are being strict. If we
2674are in leaky mode and the sender's rate is too high, we do not update
2675the recorded rate in order to avoid an over-aggressive sender's retry
c99ce5c9
TF
2676rate preventing them from getting any email through. If readonly is set,
2677neither leaky nor strict are set, so we do not do any updates. */
870f6ba8 2678
c99ce5c9 2679if ((rc == FAIL && leaky) || strict)
8f240103 2680 {
c99ce5c9 2681 dbfn_write(dbm, key, dbdb, dbdb_size);
e1d04f48 2682 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit db updated\n");
8f240103
PH
2683 }
2684else
2685 {
e1d04f48 2686 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("ratelimit db not updated: %s\n",
c99ce5c9 2687 readonly? "readonly mode" : "over the limit, but leaky");
8f240103
PH
2688 }
2689
870f6ba8
TF
2690dbfn_close(dbm);
2691
f3ebb786
JH
2692/* Store the result in the tree for future reference. Take the taint status
2693from the key for consistency even though it's unlikely we'll ever expand this. */
870f6ba8 2694
f3ebb786 2695t = store_get(sizeof(tree_node) + Ustrlen(key), is_tainted(key));
c99ce5c9
TF
2696t->data.ptr = dbd;
2697Ustrcpy(t->name, key);
2698(void)tree_insertnode(anchor, t);
870f6ba8
TF
2699
2700/* We create the formatted version of the sender's rate very late in
2701order to ensure that it is done using the correct storage pool. */
2702
2703store_pool = old_pool;
2704sender_rate = string_sprintf("%.1f", dbd->rate);
2705
2706HDEBUG(D_acl)
e1d04f48 2707 debug_printf_indent("ratelimit computed rate %s\n", sender_rate);
870f6ba8
TF
2708
2709return rc;
2710}
2711
2712
2713
2714/*************************************************
b0019c78
TF
2715* The udpsend ACL modifier *
2716*************************************************/
2717
2718/* Called by acl_check_condition() below.
2719
2720Arguments:
2721 arg the option string for udpsend=
2722 log_msgptr for error messages
2723
2724Returns: OK - Completed.
2725 DEFER - Problem with DNS lookup.
2726 ERROR - Syntax error in options.
2727*/
2728
2729static int
55414b25 2730acl_udpsend(const uschar *arg, uschar **log_msgptr)
b0019c78
TF
2731{
2732int sep = 0;
2733uschar *hostname;
2734uschar *portstr;
2735uschar *portend;
2736host_item *h;
2737int portnum;
b0019c78
TF
2738int len;
2739int r, s;
b1f8e4f8 2740uschar * errstr;
b0019c78
TF
2741
2742hostname = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
2743portstr = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
2744
f5d25c2b 2745if (!hostname)
b0019c78 2746 {
217b0e56 2747 *log_msgptr = US"missing destination host in \"udpsend\" modifier";
b0019c78
TF
2748 return ERROR;
2749 }
f5d25c2b 2750if (!portstr)
b0019c78 2751 {
217b0e56 2752 *log_msgptr = US"missing destination port in \"udpsend\" modifier";
b0019c78
TF
2753 return ERROR;
2754 }
f5d25c2b 2755if (!arg)
b0019c78 2756 {
217b0e56 2757 *log_msgptr = US"missing datagram payload in \"udpsend\" modifier";
b0019c78
TF
2758 return ERROR;
2759 }
2760portnum = Ustrtol(portstr, &portend, 10);
2761if (*portend != '\0')
2762 {
217b0e56 2763 *log_msgptr = US"bad destination port in \"udpsend\" modifier";
b0019c78
TF
2764 return ERROR;
2765 }
2766
2767/* Make a single-item host list. */
f3ebb786 2768h = store_get(sizeof(host_item), FALSE);
b0019c78
TF
2769memset(h, 0, sizeof(host_item));
2770h->name = hostname;
2771h->port = portnum;
2772h->mx = MX_NONE;
2773
2774if (string_is_ip_address(hostname, NULL))
2775 h->address = hostname, r = HOST_FOUND;
2776else
2777 r = host_find_byname(h, NULL, 0, NULL, FALSE);
2778if (r == HOST_FIND_FAILED || r == HOST_FIND_AGAIN)
2779 {
217b0e56 2780 *log_msgptr = US"DNS lookup failed in \"udpsend\" modifier";
b0019c78
TF
2781 return DEFER;
2782 }
2783
2784HDEBUG(D_acl)
e1d04f48 2785 debug_printf_indent("udpsend [%s]:%d %s\n", h->address, portnum, arg);
b0019c78 2786
4a5cbaff 2787/*XXX this could better use sendto */
b1f8e4f8 2788r = s = ip_connectedsocket(SOCK_DGRAM, h->address, portnum, portnum,
4a5cbaff 2789 1, NULL, &errstr, NULL);
b0019c78 2790if (r < 0) goto defer;
27f9999e 2791len = Ustrlen(arg);
9cb1785a 2792r = send(s, arg, len, 0);
b1f8e4f8
JH
2793if (r < 0)
2794 {
2795 errstr = US strerror(errno);
2796 close(s);
2797 goto defer;
2798 }
2799close(s);
b0019c78
TF
2800if (r < len)
2801 {
2802 *log_msgptr =
2803 string_sprintf("\"udpsend\" truncated from %d to %d octets", len, r);
2804 return DEFER;
2805 }
2806
2807HDEBUG(D_acl)
e1d04f48 2808 debug_printf_indent("udpsend %d bytes\n", r);
b0019c78
TF
2809
2810return OK;
2811
2812defer:
b1f8e4f8 2813*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("\"udpsend\" failed: %s", errstr);
b0019c78
TF
2814return DEFER;
2815}
2816
2817
2818
2819/*************************************************
059ec3d9
PH
2820* Handle conditions/modifiers on an ACL item *
2821*************************************************/
2822
2823/* Called from acl_check() below.
2824
2825Arguments:
2826 verb ACL verb
2827 cb ACL condition block - if NULL, result is OK
2828 where where called from
2829 addr the address being checked for RCPT, or NULL
2830 level the nesting level
2831 epp pointer to pass back TRUE if "endpass" encountered
2832 (applies only to "accept" and "discard")
2833 user_msgptr user message pointer
2834 log_msgptr log message pointer
2835 basic_errno pointer to where to put verify error
2836
2837Returns: OK - all conditions are met
2838 DISCARD - an "acl" condition returned DISCARD - only allowed
2839 for "accept" or "discard" verbs
2840 FAIL - at least one condition fails
2841 FAIL_DROP - an "acl" condition returned FAIL_DROP
2842 DEFER - can't tell at the moment (typically, lookup defer,
2843 but can be temporary callout problem)
2844 ERROR - ERROR from nested ACL or expansion failure or other
2845 error
2846*/
2847
2848static int
2849acl_check_condition(int verb, acl_condition_block *cb, int where,
2850 address_item *addr, int level, BOOL *epp, uschar **user_msgptr,
2851 uschar **log_msgptr, int *basic_errno)
2852{
2853uschar *user_message = NULL;
2854uschar *log_message = NULL;
059ec3d9 2855int rc = OK;
8523533c 2856#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
0f0c8159 2857int sep = -'/';
8523533c 2858#endif
059ec3d9 2859
bce15b62 2860for (; cb; cb = cb->next)
059ec3d9 2861 {
55414b25 2862 const uschar *arg;
8e669ac1 2863 int control_type;
059ec3d9
PH
2864
2865 /* The message and log_message items set up messages to be used in
2866 case of rejection. They are expanded later. */
2867
2868 if (cb->type == ACLC_MESSAGE)
2869 {
e1d04f48 2870 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent(" message: %s\n", cb->arg);
059ec3d9
PH
2871 user_message = cb->arg;
2872 continue;
2873 }
2874
2875 if (cb->type == ACLC_LOG_MESSAGE)
2876 {
e1d04f48 2877 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("l_message: %s\n", cb->arg);
059ec3d9
PH
2878 log_message = cb->arg;
2879 continue;
2880 }
2881
2882 /* The endpass "condition" just sets a flag to show it occurred. This is
2883 checked at compile time to be on an "accept" or "discard" item. */
2884
2885 if (cb->type == ACLC_ENDPASS)
2886 {
2887 *epp = TRUE;
2888 continue;
2889 }
2890
2891 /* For other conditions and modifiers, the argument is expanded now for some
2892 of them, but not for all, because expansion happens down in some lower level
2893 checking functions in some cases. */
2894
560e71cc
JH
2895 if (!conditions[cb->type].expand_at_top)
2896 arg = cb->arg;
2897 else if (!(arg = expand_string(cb->arg)))
059ec3d9 2898 {
8768d548 2899 if (f.expand_string_forcedfail) continue;
560e71cc
JH
2900 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("failed to expand ACL string \"%s\": %s",
2901 cb->arg, expand_string_message);
8768d548 2902 return f.search_find_defer ? DEFER : ERROR;
059ec3d9 2903 }
059ec3d9
PH
2904
2905 /* Show condition, and expanded condition if it's different */
2906
2907 HDEBUG(D_acl)
2908 {
2909 int lhswidth = 0;
e1d04f48 2910 debug_printf_indent("check %s%s %n",
2d009132
JH
2911 (!conditions[cb->type].is_modifier && cb->u.negated)? "!":"",
2912 conditions[cb->type].name, &lhswidth);
059ec3d9
PH
2913
2914 if (cb->type == ACLC_SET)
2915 {
a79d8834
JH
2916#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
2917 if ( Ustrcmp(cb->u.varname, "dkim_verify_status") == 0
2918 || Ustrcmp(cb->u.varname, "dkim_verify_reason") == 0)
2919 {
2920 debug_printf("%s ", cb->u.varname);
2921 lhswidth += 19;
2922 }
2923 else
2924#endif
2925 {
2926 debug_printf("acl_%s ", cb->u.varname);
2927 lhswidth += 5 + Ustrlen(cb->u.varname);
2928 }
059ec3d9
PH
2929 }
2930
2931 debug_printf("= %s\n", cb->arg);
2932
2933 if (arg != cb->arg)
2934 debug_printf("%.*s= %s\n", lhswidth,
2935 US" ", CS arg);
2936 }
2937
2938 /* Check that this condition makes sense at this time */
2939
2d009132 2940 if ((conditions[cb->type].forbids & (1 << where)) != 0)
059ec3d9
PH
2941 {
2942 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot %s %s condition in %s ACL",
2d009132
JH
2943 conditions[cb->type].is_modifier ? "use" : "test",
2944 conditions[cb->type].name, acl_wherenames[where]);
059ec3d9
PH
2945 return ERROR;
2946 }
2947
2948 /* Run the appropriate test for each condition, or take the appropriate
2949 action for the remaining modifiers. */
2950
2951 switch(cb->type)
2952 {
71fafd95
PH
2953 case ACLC_ADD_HEADER:
2954 setup_header(arg);
2955 break;
2956
059ec3d9
PH
2957 /* A nested ACL that returns "discard" makes sense only for an "accept" or
2958 "discard" verb. */
71fafd95 2959
059ec3d9 2960 case ACLC_ACL:
e1d04f48 2961 rc = acl_check_wargs(where, addr, arg, user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
7421ecab
JH
2962 if (rc == DISCARD && verb != ACL_ACCEPT && verb != ACL_DISCARD)
2963 {
2964 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("nested ACL returned \"discard\" for "
2965 "\"%s\" command (only allowed with \"accept\" or \"discard\")",
2966 verbs[verb]);
2967 return ERROR;
2968 }
059ec3d9
PH
2969 break;
2970
2971 case ACLC_AUTHENTICATED:
c44ff8be
JH
2972 rc = sender_host_authenticated ? match_isinlist(sender_host_authenticated,
2973 &arg, 0, NULL, NULL, MCL_STRING, TRUE, NULL) : FAIL;
059ec3d9
PH
2974 break;
2975
71fafd95 2976 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
8523533c
TK
2977 case ACLC_BMI_OPTIN:
2978 {
2979 int old_pool = store_pool;
2980 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
2981 bmi_current_optin = string_copy(arg);
2982 store_pool = old_pool;
2983 }
2984 break;
71fafd95 2985 #endif
8523533c 2986
059ec3d9 2987 case ACLC_CONDITION:
f3766eb5
NM
2988 /* The true/false parsing here should be kept in sync with that used in
2989 expand.c when dealing with ECOND_BOOL so that we don't have too many
2990 different definitions of what can be a boolean. */
51c7471d
JH
2991 if (*arg == '-'
2992 ? Ustrspn(arg+1, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg+1) /* Negative number */
2993 : Ustrspn(arg, "0123456789") == Ustrlen(arg)) /* Digits, or empty */
059ec3d9
PH
2994 rc = (Uatoi(arg) == 0)? FAIL : OK;
2995 else
2996 rc = (strcmpic(arg, US"no") == 0 ||
2997 strcmpic(arg, US"false") == 0)? FAIL :
2998 (strcmpic(arg, US"yes") == 0 ||
2999 strcmpic(arg, US"true") == 0)? OK : DEFER;
3000 if (rc == DEFER)
3001 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("invalid \"condition\" value \"%s\"", arg);
3002 break;
3003
c3611384
PH
3004 case ACLC_CONTINUE: /* Always succeeds */
3005 break;
3006
059ec3d9 3007 case ACLC_CONTROL:
c5fcb476 3008 {
55414b25
JH
3009 const uschar *p = NULL;
3010 control_type = decode_control(arg, &p, where, log_msgptr);
4840604e 3011
55414b25 3012 /* Check if this control makes sense at this time */
f7572e5a 3013
d7bed771 3014 if (controls_list[control_type].forbids & (1 << where))
55414b25
JH
3015 {
3016 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot use \"control=%s\" in %s ACL",
d7bed771 3017 controls_list[control_type].name, acl_wherenames[where]);
55414b25
JH
3018 return ERROR;
3019 }
8800895a 3020
55414b25
JH
3021 switch(control_type)
3022 {
3023 case CONTROL_AUTH_UNADVERTISED:
e851856f
JH
3024 f.allow_auth_unadvertised = TRUE;
3025 break;
55414b25 3026
e851856f 3027#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_BRIGHTMAIL
55414b25 3028 case CONTROL_BMI_RUN:
e851856f
JH
3029 bmi_run = 1;
3030 break;
3031#endif
55414b25 3032
1a2e76e1 3033#ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
55414b25 3034 case CONTROL_DKIM_VERIFY:
e851856f 3035 f.dkim_disable_verify = TRUE;
1a2e76e1 3036# ifdef SUPPORT_DMARC
e851856f
JH
3037 /* Since DKIM was blocked, skip DMARC too */
3038 f.dmarc_disable_verify = TRUE;
3039 f.dmarc_enable_forensic = FALSE;
1a2e76e1 3040# endif
55414b25 3041 break;
1a2e76e1 3042#endif
55414b25 3043
1a2e76e1 3044#ifdef SUPPORT_DMARC
55414b25 3045 case CONTROL_DMARC_VERIFY:
e851856f
JH
3046 f.dmarc_disable_verify = TRUE;
3047 break;
55414b25
JH
3048
3049 case CONTROL_DMARC_FORENSIC:
e851856f
JH
3050 f.dmarc_enable_forensic = TRUE;
3051 break;
1a2e76e1 3052#endif
55414b25
JH
3053
3054 case CONTROL_DSCP:
e851856f 3055 if (*p == '/')
55414b25 3056 {
e851856f
JH
3057 int fd, af, level, optname, value;
3058 /* If we are acting on stdin, the setsockopt may fail if stdin is not
3059 a socket; we can accept that, we'll just debug-log failures anyway. */
3060 fd = fileno(smtp_in);
3061 if ((af = ip_get_address_family(fd)) < 0)
55414b25 3062 {
e851856f
JH
3063 HDEBUG(D_acl)
3064 debug_printf_indent("smtp input is probably not a socket [%s], not setting DSCP\n",
3065 strerror(errno));
3066 break;
55414b25 3067 }
e851856f
JH
3068 if (dscp_lookup(p+1, af, &level, &optname, &value))
3069 if (setsockopt(fd, level, optname, &value, sizeof(value)) < 0)
3070 {
3071 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("failed to set input DSCP[%s]: %s\n",
3072 p+1, strerror(errno));
3073 }
3074 else
3075 {
3076 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("set input DSCP to \"%s\"\n", p+1);
3077 }
55414b25
JH
3078 else
3079 {
e851856f
JH
3080 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unrecognised DSCP value in \"control=%s\"", arg);
3081 return ERROR;
55414b25
JH
3082 }
3083 }
3084 else
3085 {
e851856f 3086 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
55414b25
JH
3087 return ERROR;
3088 }
e851856f 3089 break;
55414b25
JH
3090
3091 case CONTROL_ERROR:
e851856f 3092 return ERROR;
55414b25
JH
3093
3094 case CONTROL_CASEFUL_LOCAL_PART:
e851856f
JH
3095 deliver_localpart = addr->cc_local_part;
3096 break;
55414b25
JH
3097
3098 case CONTROL_CASELOWER_LOCAL_PART:
e851856f
JH
3099 deliver_localpart = addr->lc_local_part;
3100 break;
55414b25
JH
3101
3102 case CONTROL_ENFORCE_SYNC:
e851856f
JH
3103 smtp_enforce_sync = TRUE;
3104 break;
55414b25
JH
3105
3106 case CONTROL_NO_ENFORCE_SYNC:
e851856f
JH
3107 smtp_enforce_sync = FALSE;
3108 break;
55414b25 3109
e851856f 3110#ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
55414b25 3111 case CONTROL_NO_MBOX_UNSPOOL:
e851856f
JH
3112 f.no_mbox_unspool = TRUE;
3113 break;
3114#endif
55414b25
JH
3115
3116 case CONTROL_NO_MULTILINE:
e851856f
JH
3117 f.no_multiline_responses = TRUE;
3118 break;
55414b25
JH
3119
3120 case CONTROL_NO_PIPELINING:
e851856f
JH
3121 f.pipelining_enable = FALSE;
3122 break;
55414b25
JH
3123
3124 case CONTROL_NO_DELAY_FLUSH:
e851856f
JH
3125 f.disable_delay_flush = TRUE;
3126 break;
55414b25
JH
3127
3128 case CONTROL_NO_CALLOUT_FLUSH:
e851856f
JH
3129 f.disable_callout_flush = TRUE;
3130 break;
55414b25
JH
3131
3132 case CONTROL_FAKEREJECT:
e851856f
JH
3133 cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"fakereject");
3134 case CONTROL_FAKEDEFER:
3135 fake_response = (control_type == CONTROL_FAKEDEFER) ? DEFER : FAIL;
3136 if (*p == '/')
3137 {
3138 const uschar *pp = p + 1;
3139 while (*pp) pp++;
3140 fake_response_text = expand_string(string_copyn(p+1, pp-p-1));
3141 p = pp;
3142 }
3143 else /* Explicitly reset to default string */
3144 fake_response_text = US"Your message has been rejected but is being kept for evaluation.\nIf it was a legitimate message, it may still be delivered to the target recipient(s).";
3145 break;
ed7f7860 3146
55414b25 3147 case CONTROL_FREEZE:
e851856f
JH
3148 f.deliver_freeze = TRUE;
3149 deliver_frozen_at = time(NULL);
3150 freeze_tell = freeze_tell_config; /* Reset to configured value */
3151 if (Ustrncmp(p, "/no_tell", 8) == 0)
3152 {
3153 p += 8;
3154 freeze_tell = NULL;
3155 }
3156 if (*p)
3157 {
3158 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
3159 return ERROR;
3160 }
3161 cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"item frozen");
3162 break;
55414b25 3163
9438970c 3164 case CONTROL_QUEUE:
e851856f 3165 f.queue_only_policy = TRUE;
cfe6f17c
JH
3166 if (Ustrcmp(p, "_only") == 0)
3167 p += 5;
3168 else while (*p == '/')
3169 if (Ustrncmp(p, "/only", 5) == 0)
3170 { p += 5; f.queue_smtp = FALSE; }
3171 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/first_pass_route", 17) == 0)
3172 { p += 17; f.queue_smtp = TRUE; }
3173 else
3174 break;
e851856f
JH
3175 cancel_cutthrough_connection(TRUE, US"queueing forced");
3176 break;
55414b25
JH
3177
3178 case CONTROL_SUBMISSION:
e851856f
JH
3179 originator_name = US"";
3180 f.submission_mode = TRUE;
3181 while (*p == '/')
55414b25 3182 {
e851856f
JH
3183 if (Ustrncmp(p, "/sender_retain", 14) == 0)
3184 {
3185 p += 14;
3186 f.active_local_sender_retain = TRUE;
3187 f.active_local_from_check = FALSE;
3188 }
3189 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/domain=", 8) == 0)
3190 {
3191 const uschar *pp = p + 8;
3192 while (*pp && *pp != '/') pp++;
3193 submission_domain = string_copyn(p+8, pp-p-8);
3194 p = pp;
3195 }
3196 /* The name= option must be last, because it swallows the rest of
3197 the string. */
3198 else if (Ustrncmp(p, "/name=", 6) == 0)
3199 {
3200 const uschar *pp = p + 6;
3201 while (*pp) pp++;
3202 submission_name = string_copy(parse_fix_phrase(p+6, pp-p-6,
3203 big_buffer, big_buffer_size));
3204 p = pp;
3205 }
3206 else break;
55414b25 3207 }
e851856f 3208 if (*p)
55414b25 3209 {
e851856f
JH
3210 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in \"control=%s\"", arg);
3211 return ERROR;
55414b25 3212 }
e851856f 3213 break;
e4bdf652 3214
55414b25 3215 case CONTROL_DEBUG:
55414b25 3216 {
b0d68adc
JH
3217 uschar * debug_tag = NULL;
3218 uschar * debug_opts = NULL;
3219 BOOL kill = FALSE;
3220
3221 while (*p == '/')
55414b25 3222 {
b0d68adc
JH
3223 const uschar * pp = p+1;
3224 if (Ustrncmp(pp, "tag=", 4) == 0)
3225 {
3226 for (pp += 4; *pp && *pp != '/';) pp++;
3227 debug_tag = string_copyn(p+5, pp-p-5);
3228 }
3229 else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "opts=", 5) == 0)
3230 {
3231 for (pp += 5; *pp && *pp != '/';) pp++;
3232 debug_opts = string_copyn(p+6, pp-p-6);
3233 }
3234 else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "kill", 4) == 0)
3235 {
3236 for (pp += 4; *pp && *pp != '/';) pp++;
3237 kill = TRUE;
3238 }
3239 else
3240 while (*pp && *pp != '/') pp++;
55414b25
JH
3241 p = pp;
3242 }
b0d68adc
JH
3243
3244 if (kill)
3245 debug_logging_stop();
3246 else
3247 debug_logging_activate(debug_tag, debug_opts);
e851856f 3248 break;
55414b25 3249 }
55414b25
JH
3250
3251 case CONTROL_SUPPRESS_LOCAL_FIXUPS:
e851856f
JH
3252 f.suppress_local_fixups = TRUE;
3253 break;
55414b25
JH
3254
3255 case CONTROL_CUTTHROUGH_DELIVERY:
e851856f
JH
3256 {
3257 uschar * ignored = NULL;
a2b89db1 3258#ifndef DISABLE_PRDR
e851856f 3259 if (prdr_requested)
a2b89db1 3260#else
e851856f 3261 if (0)
a2b89db1 3262#endif
e851856f
JH
3263 /* Too hard to think about for now. We might in future cutthrough
3264 the case where both sides handle prdr and this-node prdr acl
3265 is "accept" */
3266 ignored = US"PRDR active";
55414b25
JH
3267 else
3268 {
e851856f
JH
3269 if (f.deliver_freeze)
3270 ignored = US"frozen";
3271 else if (f.queue_only_policy)
3272 ignored = US"queue-only";
3273 else if (fake_response == FAIL)
3274 ignored = US"fakereject";
3275 else
ff5929e3 3276 {
e851856f 3277 if (rcpt_count == 1)
ff5929e3 3278 {
e851856f
JH
3279 cutthrough.delivery = TRUE; /* control accepted */
3280 while (*p == '/')
ff5929e3 3281 {
e851856f
JH
3282 const uschar * pp = p+1;
3283 if (Ustrncmp(pp, "defer=", 6) == 0)
3284 {
3285 pp += 6;
3286 if (Ustrncmp(pp, "pass", 4) == 0) cutthrough.defer_pass = TRUE;
3287 /* else if (Ustrncmp(pp, "spool") == 0) ; default */
3288 }
3289 else
3290 while (*pp && *pp != '/') pp++;
3291 p = pp;
ff5929e3 3292 }
ff5929e3 3293 }
e851856f
JH
3294 else
3295 ignored = US"nonfirst rcpt";
ff5929e3 3296 }
55414b25 3297 }
e851856f
JH
3298 DEBUG(D_acl) if (ignored)
3299 debug_printf(" cutthrough request ignored on %s item\n", ignored);
5032d1cf 3300 }
051d5efa 3301 break;
3c8b3577 3302
8c5d388a 3303#ifdef SUPPORT_I18N
3c8b3577 3304 case CONTROL_UTF8_DOWNCONVERT:
e851856f 3305 if (*p == '/')
921dfc11 3306 {
e851856f
JH
3307 if (p[1] == '1')
3308 {
3309 message_utf8_downconvert = 1;
3310 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = TRUE;
3311 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = FALSE;
3312 p += 2;
3313 break;
3314 }
3315 if (p[1] == '0')
3316 {
3317 message_utf8_downconvert = 0;
3318 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = FALSE;
3319 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = FALSE;
3320 p += 2;
3321 break;
3322 }
3323 if (p[1] == '-' && p[2] == '1')
3324 {
3325 message_utf8_downconvert = -1;
3326 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = FALSE;
3327 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = TRUE;
3328 p += 3;
3329 break;
3330 }
3331 *log_msgptr = US"bad option value for control=utf8_downconvert";
921dfc11 3332 }
e851856f 3333 else
921dfc11 3334 {
e851856f
JH
3335 message_utf8_downconvert = 1;
3336 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt = TRUE;
921dfc11 3337 addr->prop.utf8_downcvt_maybe = FALSE;
921dfc11
JH
3338 break;
3339 }
e851856f 3340 return ERROR;
8c5d388a 3341#endif
3c8b3577 3342
9171d434 3343 }
55414b25 3344 break;
059ec3d9 3345 }
059ec3d9 3346
6a8f9482
TK
3347 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DCC
3348 case ACLC_DCC:
3349 {
4c04137d 3350 /* Separate the regular expression and any optional parameters. */
55414b25
JH
3351 const uschar * list = arg;
3352 uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
6a8f9482
TK
3353 /* Run the dcc backend. */
3354 rc = dcc_process(&ss);
4c04137d 3355 /* Modify return code based upon the existence of options. */
3c8b3577 3356 while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size)))
6a8f9482 3357 if (strcmpic(ss, US"defer_ok") == 0 && rc == DEFER)
3c8b3577 3358 rc = FAIL; /* FAIL so that the message is passed to the next ACL */
6a8f9482
TK
3359 }
3360 break;
3361 #endif
3362
71fafd95 3363 #ifdef WITH_CONTENT_SCAN
8523533c
TK
3364 case ACLC_DECODE:
3365 rc = mime_decode(&arg);
3366 break;
71fafd95 3367 #endif
8523533c 3368
059ec3d9
PH
3369 case ACLC_DELAY:
3370 {
3371 int delay = readconf_readtime(arg, 0, FALSE);
3372 if (delay < 0)
3373 {
3374 *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("syntax error in argument for \"delay\" "
3375 "modifier: \"%s\" is not a time value", arg);
3376 return ERROR;
3377 }
3378 else
3379 {
e1d04f48 3380 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("delay modifier requests %d-second delay\n",
059ec3d9
PH
3381 delay);
3382 if (host_checking)
3383 {
3384 HDEBUG(D_acl)
e1d04f48 3385 debug_printf_indent("delay skipped in -bh checking mode\n");
059ec3d9 3386 }
010c2d14 3387
ae9d18bc
JH
3388 /* NOTE 1: Remember that we may be
3389 dealing with stdin/stdout here, in addition to TCP/IP connections.
3390 Also, delays may be specified for non-SMTP input, where smtp_out and
3391 smtp_in will be NULL. Whatever is done must work in all cases.
3392
3393 NOTE 2: The added feature of flushing the output before a delay must
3394 apply only to SMTP input. Hence the test for smtp_out being non-NULL.
3395 */
3396
3397 else
3398 {
02c30a32 3399 if (smtp_out && !f.disable_delay_flush)
ae9d18bc
JH
3400 mac_smtp_fflush();
3401
861a7c51 3402#if !defined(NO_POLL_H) && defined (POLLRDHUP)
ae9d18bc
JH
3403 {
3404 struct pollfd p;
3405 nfds_t n = 0;
3406 if (smtp_out)
3407 {
3408 p.fd = fileno(smtp_out);
3409 p.events = POLLRDHUP;
3410 n = 1;
3411 }
3412 if (poll(&p, n, delay*1000) > 0)
e1d04f48 3413 HDEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf_indent("delay cancelled by peer close\n");
ae9d18bc
JH
3414 }
3415#else
02c30a32
JH
3416 /* Lacking POLLRDHUP it appears to be impossible to detect that a
3417 TCP/IP connection has gone away without reading from it. This means
3418 that we cannot shorten the delay below if the client goes away,
3419 because we cannot discover that the client has closed its end of the
3420 connection. (The connection is actually in a half-closed state,
3421 waiting for the server to close its end.) It would be nice to be able
3422 to detect this state, so that the Exim process is not held up
3423 unnecessarily. However, it seems that we can't. The poll() function
3424 does not do the right thing, and in any case it is not always
3425 available. */
010c2d14 3426
86b8287f 3427 while (delay > 0) delay = sleep(delay);
ae9d18bc 3428#endif
8e669ac1 3429 }
059ec3d9
PH
3430 }
3431 }
3432 break;
3433
80a47a2c
TK
3434 #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
3435 case ACLC_DKIM_SIGNER:
a79d8834 3436 if (dkim_cur_signer)
9e5d6b55 3437 rc = match_isinlist(dkim_cur_signer,
80a47a2c 3438 &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL);
80a47a2c 3439 else
b0b9dbb1 3440 rc = FAIL;
71fafd95
PH
3441 break;
3442
80a47a2c 3443 case ACLC_DKIM_STATUS:
a79d8834 3444 rc = match_isinlist(dkim_verify_status,
80a47a2c 3445 &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL);
71fafd95
PH
3446 break;
3447 #endif
fb2274d4 3448
1a2e76e1 3449#ifdef SUPPORT_DMARC
4840604e 3450 case ACLC_DMARC_STATUS:
8768d548 3451 if (!f.dmarc_has_been_checked)
4840604e 3452 dmarc_process();
8768d548 3453 f.dmarc_has_been_checked = TRUE;
4840604e
TL
3454 /* used long way of dmarc_exim_expand_query() in case we need more
3455 * view into the process in the future. */
3456 rc = match_isinlist(dmarc_exim_expand_query(DMARC_VERIFY_STATUS),
3457 &arg,0,NULL,NULL,MCL_STRING,TRUE,NULL);
3458 break;
1a2e76e1 3459#endif
4840604e 3460
059ec3d9 3461 case ACLC_DNSLISTS:
379ba7d0 3462 rc = verify_check_dnsbl(where, &arg, log_msgptr);
059ec3d9
PH
3463 break;
3464
3465 case ACLC_DOMAINS:
3466 rc = match_isinlist(addr->domain, &arg, 0, &domainlist_anchor,
55414b25 3467 addr->domain_cache, MCL_DOMAIN, TRUE, CUSS &deliver_domain_data);
059ec3d9
PH
3468 break;
3469
3470 /* The value in tls_cipher is the full cipher name, for example,
3471 TLSv1:DES-CBC3-SHA:168, whereas the values to test for are just the
3472 cipher names such as DES-CBC3-SHA. But program defensively. We don't know
3473 what may in practice come out of the SSL library - which at the time of
3474 writing is poorly documented. */
3475
3476 case ACLC_ENCRYPTED:
817d9f57 3477 if (tls_in.cipher == NULL) rc = FAIL; else
059ec3d9
PH
3478</