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0cd68797 | 1 | $Cambridge: exim/doc/doc-txt/NewStuff,v 1.50 2005/06/16 20:03:43 tom Exp $ |
495ae4b0 PH |
2 | |
3 | New Features in Exim | |
4 | -------------------- | |
5 | ||
6 | This file contains descriptions of new features that have been added to Exim, | |
7 | but have not yet made it into the main manual (which is most conveniently | |
8 | updated when there is a relatively large batch of changes). The doc/ChangeLog | |
9 | file contains a listing of all changes, including bug fixes. | |
10 | ||
11 | ||
e5a9dba6 PH |
12 | Exim version 4.52 |
13 | ----------------- | |
14 | ||
15 | TF/01 Support for checking Client SMTP Authorization has been added. CSA is a | |
16 | system which allows a site to advertise which machines are and are not | |
17 | permitted to send email. This is done by placing special SRV records in | |
18 | the DNS, which are looked up using the client's HELO domain. At this | |
19 | time CSA is still an Internet-Draft. | |
20 | ||
21 | Client SMTP Authorization checks are performed by the ACL condition | |
22 | verify=csa. This will fail if the client is not authorized. If there is | |
23 | a DNS problem, or if no valid CSA SRV record is found, or if the client | |
24 | is authorized, the condition succeeds. These three cases can be | |
25 | distinguished using the expansion variable $csa_status, which can take | |
26 | one of the values "fail", "defer", "unknown", or "ok". The condition | |
27 | does not itself defer because that would be likely to cause problems | |
28 | for legitimate email. | |
29 | ||
30 | The error messages produced by the CSA code include slightly more | |
31 | detail. If $csa_status is "defer" this may be because of problems | |
32 | looking up the CSA SRV record, or problems looking up the CSA target | |
33 | address record. There are four reasons for $csa_status being "fail": | |
34 | the client's host name is explicitly not authorized; the client's IP | |
35 | address does not match any of the CSA target IP addresses; the client's | |
36 | host name is authorized but it has no valid target IP addresses (e.g. | |
37 | the target's addresses are IPv6 and the client is using IPv4); or the | |
38 | client's host name has no CSA SRV record but a parent domain has | |
39 | asserted that all subdomains must be explicitly authorized. | |
40 | ||
41 | The verify=csa condition can take an argument which is the domain to | |
42 | use for the DNS query. The default is verify=csa/$sender_helo_name. | |
43 | ||
44 | This implementation includes an extension to CSA. If the query domain | |
45 | is an address literal such as [192.0.2.95], or if it is a bare IP | |
46 | address, Exim will search for CSA SRV records in the reverse DNS as if | |
47 | the HELO domain was e.g. 95.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. Therefore it is | |
48 | meaningful to say, for example, verify=csa/$sender_host_address - in | |
49 | fact, this is the check that Exim performs if the client does not say | |
50 | HELO. This extension can be turned off by setting the main | |
51 | configuration option dns_csa_use_reverse = false. | |
52 | ||
53 | If a CSA SRV record is not found for the domain itself, then a search | |
54 | is performed through its parent domains for a record which might be | |
55 | making assertions about subdomains. The maximum depth of this search is | |
56 | limited using the main configuration option dns_csa_search_limit, which | |
57 | takes the value 5 by default. Exim does not look for CSA SRV records in | |
58 | a top level domain, so the default settings handle HELO domains as long | |
59 | as seven (hostname.five.four.three.two.one.com) which encompasses the | |
60 | vast majority of legitimate HELO domains. | |
61 | ||
62 | The dnsdb lookup also has support for CSA. Although dnsdb already | |
63 | supports SRV lookups, this is not sufficient because of the extra | |
64 | parent domain search behaviour of CSA, and (as with PTR lookups) | |
65 | dnsdb also turns IP addresses into lookups in the reverse DNS space. | |
66 | The result of ${lookup dnsdb {csa=$sender_helo_name} } has two | |
67 | space-separated fields: an authorization code and a target host name. | |
68 | The authorization code can be "Y" for yes, "N" for no, "X" for explicit | |
69 | authorization required but absent, or "?" for unknown. | |
70 | ||
c1ac6996 PH |
71 | PH/01 The amount of output produced by the "make" process has been reduced, |
72 | because the compile lines are often rather long, making it all pretty | |
73 | unreadable. The new style is along the lines of the 2.6 Linux kernel: | |
74 | just a short line for each module that is being compiled or linked. | |
75 | However, it is still possible to get the full output, by calling "make" | |
76 | like this: | |
77 | ||
78 | FULLECHO='' make -e | |
79 | ||
80 | The value of FULLECHO defaults to "@", the flag character that suppresses | |
81 | command reflection in "make". When you ask for the full output, it is | |
82 | given in addition to the the short output. | |
83 | ||
4df1e33e | 84 | TF/02 There have been two changes concerned with submission mode: |
87ba3f5f | 85 | |
4df1e33e TF |
86 | Until now submission mode always left the return path alone, whereas |
87 | locally-submitted messages from untrusted users have the return path | |
88 | fixed to the user's email address. Submission mode now fixes the return | |
89 | path to the same address as is used to create the Sender: header. If | |
90 | /sender_retain is specified then both the Sender: header and the return | |
91 | path are left alone. | |
87ba3f5f | 92 | |
4df1e33e TF |
93 | Note that the changes caused by submission mode take effect after the |
94 | predata ACL. This means that any sender checks performed before the | |
95 | fix-ups will use the untrusted sender address specified by the user, not | |
96 | the trusted sender address specified by submission mode. Although this | |
97 | might be slightly unexpected, it does mean that you can configure ACL | |
98 | checks to spot that a user is trying to spoof another's address, for | |
99 | example. | |
87ba3f5f | 100 | |
4df1e33e TF |
101 | There is also a new /name= option for submission mode which allows you |
102 | to specify the user's full name to be included in the Sender: header. | |
103 | For example: | |
104 | ||
105 | accept authenticated = * | |
106 | control = submission/name=${lookup {$authenticated_id} \ | |
107 | lsearch {/etc/exim/namelist} } | |
108 | ||
109 | The namelist file contains entries like | |
110 | ||
111 | fanf: Tony Finch | |
112 | ||
113 | And the resulting Sender: header looks like | |
114 | ||
115 | Sender: Tony Finch <fanf@exim.org> | |
116 | ||
117 | TF/03 The control = fakereject ACL modifier now has a fakedefer counterpart, | |
29aba418 TF |
118 | which works in exactly the same way except it causes a fake SMTP 450 |
119 | response after the message data instead of a fake SMTP 550 response. | |
120 | You must take care when using fakedefer because it will cause messages | |
121 | to be duplicated when the sender retries. Therefore you should not use | |
122 | fakedefer if the message will be delivered normally. | |
123 | ||
870f6ba8 TF |
124 | TF/04 There is a new ratelimit ACL condition which can be used to measure |
125 | and control the rate at which clients can send email. This is more | |
126 | powerful than the existing smtp_ratelimit_* options, because those | |
127 | options only control the rate of commands in a single SMTP session, | |
128 | whereas the new ratelimit condition works across all connections | |
129 | (concurrent and sequential) to the same host. | |
130 | ||
131 | The syntax of the ratelimit condition is: | |
132 | ||
133 | ratelimit = <m> / <p> / <options> / <key> | |
134 | ||
3348576f TF |
135 | If the average client sending rate is less than m messages per time |
136 | period p then the condition is false, otherwise it is true. | |
870f6ba8 TF |
137 | |
138 | The parameter p is the smoothing time constant, in the form of an Exim | |
139 | time interval e.g. 8h for eight hours. A larger time constant means it | |
140 | takes Exim longer to forget a client's past behaviour. The parameter m is | |
141 | the maximum number of messages that a client can send in a fast burst. By | |
142 | increasing both m and p but keeping m/p constant, you can allow a client | |
143 | to send more messages in a burst without changing its overall sending | |
144 | rate limit. Conversely, if m and p are both small then messages must be | |
145 | sent at an even rate. | |
146 | ||
147 | The key is used to look up the data used to calcluate the client's | |
148 | average sending rate. This data is stored in a database maintained by | |
149 | Exim in its spool directory alongside the retry database etc. For | |
150 | example, you can limit the sending rate of each authenticated user, | |
151 | independent of the computer they are sending from, by setting the key | |
152 | to $authenticated_id. The default key is $sender_host_address. | |
153 | ||
154 | Each ratelimit condition can have up to two options. The first option | |
155 | specifies what Exim measures the rate of, and the second specifies how | |
156 | Exim handles excessively fast clients. | |
157 | ||
158 | The per_mail option means that it measures the client's rate of sending | |
159 | messages. This is the default if none of the per_* options is specified. | |
160 | ||
161 | The per_conn option means that it measures the client's connection rate. | |
162 | ||
163 | The per_byte option limits the sender's email bandwidth. Note that it | |
164 | is best to use this option in the DATA ACL; if it is used in an earlier | |
165 | ACL it relies on the SIZE parameter on the MAIL command, which may be | |
166 | inaccurate or completely missing. You can follow the limit m in the | |
167 | configuration with K, M, or G to specify limits in kilobytes, | |
168 | megabytes, or gigabytes respectively. | |
169 | ||
170 | The per_cmd option means that Exim recomputes the rate every time the | |
171 | condition is processed, which can be used to limit the SMTP command rate. | |
172 | The alias per_rcpt is provided for use in the RCPT ACL instead of per_cmd | |
173 | to make it clear that the effect is to limit the rate at which recipients | |
174 | are accepted. Note that in this case the rate limiting engine will see a | |
175 | message with many recipients as a large high-speed burst. | |
176 | ||
177 | If a client's average rate is greater than the maximum, the rate | |
178 | limiting engine can react in two possible ways, depending on the | |
179 | presence of the strict or leaky options. This is independent of the | |
180 | other counter-measures (e.g. rejecting the message) that may be | |
181 | specified by the rest of the ACL. The default mode is leaky, which | |
182 | avoids a sender's over-aggressive retry rate preventing it from getting | |
183 | any email through. | |
184 | ||
185 | The strict option means that the client's recorded rate is always | |
186 | updated. The effect of this is that Exim measures the client's average | |
187 | rate of attempts to send email, which can be much higher than the | |
188 | maximum. If the client is over the limit it will be subjected to | |
189 | counter-measures until it slows down below the maximum rate. | |
190 | ||
191 | The leaky option means that the client's recorded rate is not updated | |
192 | if it is above the limit. The effect of this is that Exim measures the | |
193 | client's average rate of successfully sent email, which cannot be | |
194 | greater than the maximum. If the client is over the limit it will | |
195 | suffer some counter-measures, but it will still be able to send email | |
196 | at the configured maximum rate, whatever the rate of its attempts. | |
197 | ||
198 | As a side-effect, the ratelimit condition will set the expansion | |
199 | variables $sender_rate containing the client's computed rate, | |
200 | $sender_rate_limit containing the configured value of m, and | |
201 | $sender_rate_period containing the configured value of p. | |
202 | ||
203 | Exim's other ACL facilities are used to define what counter-measures | |
204 | are taken when the rate limit is exceeded. This might be anything from | |
205 | logging a warning (e.g. while measuring existing sending rates in order | |
206 | to define our policy), through time delays to slow down fast senders, | |
207 | up to rejecting the message. For example, | |
208 | ||
209 | # Log all senders' rates | |
210 | warn | |
211 | ratelimit = 0 / 1h / strict | |
212 | log_message = \ | |
213 | Sender rate $sender_rate > $sender_rate_limit / $sender_rate_period | |
214 | ||
215 | # Slow down fast senders | |
216 | warn | |
217 | ratelimit = 100 / 1h / per_rcpt / strict | |
218 | delay = ${eval: 10 * ($sender_rate - $sender_rate_limit) } | |
219 | ||
220 | # Keep authenticated users under control | |
221 | deny | |
222 | ratelimit = 100 / 1d / strict / $authenticated_id | |
223 | ||
224 | # System-wide rate limit | |
225 | defer | |
226 | message = Sorry, too busy. Try again later. | |
227 | ratelimit = 10 / 1s / $primary_hostname | |
228 | ||
229 | # Restrict incoming rate from each host, with a default rate limit | |
230 | # set using a macro and special cases looked up in a table. | |
231 | defer | |
232 | message = Sender rate $sender_rate exceeds \ | |
233 | $sender_rate_limit messages per $sender_rate_period | |
234 | ratelimit = ${lookup {$sender_host_address} \ | |
235 | cdb {DB/ratelimits.cdb} \ | |
236 | {$value} {RATELIMIT} } | |
237 | ||
7d50add3 TK |
238 | TK/01 Added an 'spf' lookup type that will return an SPF result for a given |
239 | email address (the key) and an IP address (the database): | |
240 | ||
241 | ${lookup {tom@duncanthrax.net} spf{217.115.139.137}} | |
242 | ||
243 | The lookup will return the same result strings as they can appear in | |
244 | $spf_result (pass,fail,softfail,neutral,none,err_perm,err_temp). The | |
245 | lookup is armored in EXPERIMENTAL_SPF. Currently, only IPv4 addresses | |
246 | are supported. | |
247 | ||
248 | Patch submitted by Chris Webb <chris@arachsys.com>. | |
249 | ||
2a4be8f9 PH |
250 | PH/02 There's a new verify callout option, "fullpostmaster", which first acts |
251 | as "postmaster" and checks the recipient <postmaster@domain>. If that | |
252 | fails, it tries just <postmaster>, without a domain, in accordance with | |
253 | the specification in RFC 2821. | |
254 | ||
ef213c3b PH |
255 | PH/03 The action of the auto_thaw option has been changed. It no longer applies |
256 | to frozen bounce messages. | |
257 | ||
0cd68797 TK |
258 | TK/02 There are two new expansion items to help with the implementation of |
259 | the BATV "prvs" scheme in an Exim configuration: | |
260 | ||
261 | ||
262 | ${prvs {<ADDRESS>}{<KEY>}{[KEYNUM]}} | |
263 | ||
264 | The "prvs" expansion item takes three arguments: A qualified RFC2821 | |
265 | email address, a key and an (optional) key number. All arguments are | |
266 | expanded before being used, so it is easily possible to lookup a key | |
267 | and key number using the address as the lookup key. The key number is | |
268 | optional and defaults to "0". The item will expand to a "prvs"-signed | |
269 | email address, to be typically used with the "return_path" option on | |
270 | a smtp transport. The decision if BATV should be used with a given | |
271 | sender/recipient pair should be done on router level, to avoid having | |
272 | to set "max_rcpt = 1" on the transport. | |
273 | ||
274 | ||
275 | ${prvscheck {<ADDRESS>}{<SECRET>}{<RETURN_STRING>}} | |
276 | ||
277 | The "prvscheck" expansion item takes three arguments. Argument 1 is | |
278 | expanded first. When the expansion does not yield a SYNTACTICALLY | |
279 | valid "prvs"-scheme address, the whole "prvscheck" item expands to | |
280 | the empty string. If <ADDRESS> is a "prvs"-encoded address after | |
281 | expansion, two expansion variables are set up: | |
282 | ||
283 | $prvscheck_address Contains the "prvs"-decoded version of | |
284 | the address from argument 1. | |
285 | ||
286 | $prvscheck_keynum Contains the key number extracted from | |
287 | the "prvs"-address in argument 1. | |
288 | ||
289 | These two variables can be used in the expansion code of argument 2 | |
290 | to retrieve the <SECRET>. The VALIDITY of the "prvs"-signed address | |
291 | is then checked. The result is stored in yet another expansion | |
292 | variable: | |
293 | ||
294 | $prvscheck_result Contains the result of a "prvscheck" | |
295 | expansion: Unset (the empty string) for | |
296 | failure, "1" for success. | |
297 | ||
298 | The "prvscheck" expansion expands to the empty string if <ADDRESS> | |
299 | is not a SYNTACTICALLY valid "prvs"-scheme address. Otherwise, | |
300 | argument 3 defines what "prvscheck" expands to: If argument 3 | |
301 | is the empty string, "prvscheck" expands to the decoded version | |
302 | of the address (no matter if it is CRYPTOGRAPHICALLY valid or not). | |
303 | If argument 3 expands to a non-empty string, "prvscheck" expands | |
304 | to that string. | |
305 | ||
306 | ||
307 | Usage example | |
308 | ------------- | |
309 | ||
310 | Macro: | |
311 | ||
312 | PRVSCHECK_SQL = ${lookup mysql{SELECT secret FROM batv_prvs WHERE \ | |
313 | sender='${quote_mysql:$prvscheck_address}'}{$value}} | |
314 | ||
315 | RCPT ACL: | |
316 | ||
317 | # Bounces: drop unsigned addresses for BATV senders | |
318 | deny message = This address does not send an unsigned reverse path. | |
319 | senders = : | |
320 | recipients = +batv_recipients | |
321 | ||
322 | # Bounces: In case of prvs-signed address, check signature. | |
323 | deny message = Invalid reverse path signature. | |
324 | senders = : | |
325 | condition = ${prvscheck {$local_part@$domain}{PRVSCHECK_SQL}{1}} | |
326 | !condition = $prvscheck_result | |
327 | ||
328 | Top-Level Router: | |
329 | ||
330 | batv_redirect: | |
331 | driver = redirect | |
332 | data = ${prvscheck {$local_part@$domain}{PRVSCHECK_SQL}{}} | |
333 | ||
334 | Transport (referenced by router that makes decision if | |
335 | BATV is applicable): | |
336 | ||
337 | external_smtp_batv: | |
338 | driver = smtp | |
339 | return_path = ${prvs {$return_path} \ | |
340 | {${lookup mysql{SELECT \ | |
341 | secret FROM batv_prvs WHERE \ | |
342 | sender='${quote_mysql:$sender_address}'} \ | |
343 | {$value}fail}}} | |
344 | ||
345 | ||
e5a9dba6 | 346 | |
b5aea5e1 PH |
347 | Version 4.51 |
348 | ------------ | |
349 | ||
1a46a8c5 PH |
350 | PH/01 The format in which GnuTLS parameters are written to the gnutls-param |
351 | file in the spool directory has been changed. This change has been made | |
352 | to alleviate problems that some people had with the generation of the | |
353 | parameters by Exim when /dev/random was exhausted. In this situation, | |
354 | Exim would hang until /dev/random acquired some more entropy. | |
355 | ||
356 | The new code exports and imports the DH and RSA parameters in PEM | |
357 | format. This means that the parameters can be generated externally using | |
358 | the certtool command that is part of GnuTLS. | |
359 | ||
360 | To replace the parameters with new ones, instead of deleting the file | |
361 | and letting Exim re-create it, you can generate new parameters using | |
362 | certtool and, when this has been done, replace Exim's cache file by | |
363 | renaming. The relevant commands are something like this: | |
364 | ||
365 | # rm -f new.params | |
366 | # touch new.params | |
367 | # chown exim:exim new.params | |
368 | # chmod 0400 new.params | |
369 | # certtool --generate-privkey --bits 512 >new.params | |
370 | # echo "" >>new.params | |
371 | # certtool --generate-dh-params --bits 1024 >> new.params | |
372 | # mv new.params params | |
373 | ||
374 | If Exim never has to generate the parameters itself, the possibility of | |
375 | stalling is removed. | |
376 | ||
377 | PH/02 A new expansion item for dynamically loading and calling a locally- | |
378 | written C function is now provided, if Exim is compiled with | |
379 | ||
380 | EXPAND_DLFUNC=yes | |
381 | ||
382 | set in Local/Makefile. The facility is not included by default (a | |
383 | suitable error is given if you try to use it when it is not there.) | |
4754440d PH |
384 | |
385 | If you enable EXPAND_DLFUNC, you should also be aware of the new redirect | |
386 | router option forbid_filter_dlfunc. If you have unprivileged users on | |
387 | your system who are permitted to create filter files, you might want to | |
388 | set forbid_filter_dlfunc=true in the appropriate router, to stop them | |
389 | using ${dlfunc to run code within Exim. | |
390 | ||
391 | You load and call an external function like this: | |
1a46a8c5 PH |
392 | |
393 | ${dlfunc{/some/file}{function}{arg1}{arg2}...} | |
394 | ||
4754440d PH |
395 | Once loaded, Exim remembers the dynamically loaded object so that it |
396 | doesn't reload the same object file in the same Exim process (but of | |
397 | course Exim does start new processes frequently). | |
1a46a8c5 PH |
398 | |
399 | There may be from zero to eight arguments to the function. When compiling | |
400 | a local function that is to be called in this way, local_scan.h should be | |
401 | included. The Exim variables and functions that are defined by that API | |
402 | are also available for dynamically loaded functions. The function itself | |
403 | must have the following type: | |
404 | ||
405 | int dlfunction(uschar **yield, int argc, uschar *argv[]) | |
406 | ||
407 | Where "uschar" is a typedef for "unsigned char" in local_scan.h. The | |
408 | function should return one of the following values: | |
409 | ||
410 | OK Success. The string that is placed in "yield" is put into | |
411 | the expanded string that is being built. | |
412 | ||
413 | FAIL A non-forced expansion failure occurs, with the error | |
414 | message taken from "yield", if it is set. | |
415 | ||
416 | FAIL_FORCED A forced expansion failure occurs, with the error message | |
417 | taken from "yield" if it is set. | |
418 | ||
419 | ERROR Same as FAIL, except that a panic log entry is written. | |
420 | ||
421 | When compiling a function that is to be used in this way with gcc, | |
422 | you need to add -shared to the gcc command. Also, in the Exim build-time | |
423 | configuration, you must add -export-dynamic to EXTRALIBS. | |
b5aea5e1 | 424 | |
7dbf77c9 PH |
425 | TF/01 $received_time is a new expansion variable containing the time and date |
426 | as a number of seconds since the start of the Unix epoch when the | |
427 | current message was received. | |
b5aea5e1 | 428 | |
7766a4f0 PH |
429 | PH/03 There is a new value for RADIUS_LIB_TYPE that can be set in |
430 | Local/Makefile. It is RADIUSCLIENTNEW, and it requests that the new API, | |
431 | in use from radiusclient 0.4.0 onwards, be used. It does not appear to be | |
432 | possible to detect the different versions automatically. | |
433 | ||
54cdb463 PH |
434 | PH/04 There is a new option called acl_not_smtp_mime that allows you to scan |
435 | MIME parts in non-SMTP messages. It operates in exactly the same way as | |
436 | acl_smtp_mime | |
437 | ||
cf00dad6 PH |
438 | PH/05 It is now possible to redefine a macro within the configuration file. |
439 | The macro must have been previously defined within the configuration (or | |
440 | an included file). A definition on the command line using the -D option | |
441 | causes all definitions and redefinitions within the file to be ignored. | |
442 | In other words, -D overrides any values that are set in the file. | |
443 | Redefinition is specified by using '==' instead of '='. For example: | |
444 | ||
445 | MAC1 = initial value | |
446 | ... | |
447 | MAC1 == updated value | |
448 | ||
449 | Redefinition does not alter the order in which the macros are applied to | |
450 | the subsequent lines of the configuration file. It is still the same | |
451 | order in which the macros were originally defined. All that changes is | |
452 | the macro's value. Redefinition makes it possible to accumulate values. | |
453 | For example: | |
454 | ||
455 | MAC1 = initial value | |
456 | ... | |
457 | MAC1 == MAC1 and something added | |
458 | ||
459 | This can be helpful in situations where the configuration file is built | |
460 | from a number of other files. | |
461 | ||
462 | PH/06 Macros may now be defined or redefined between router, transport, | |
463 | authenticator, or ACL definitions, as well as in the main part of the | |
464 | configuration. They may not, however, be changed within an individual | |
465 | driver or ACL, or in the local_scan, retry, or rewrite sections of the | |
466 | configuration. | |
467 | ||
475fe28a PH |
468 | PH/07 $acl_verify_message is now set immediately after the failure of a |
469 | verification in an ACL, and so is available in subsequent modifiers. In | |
470 | particular, the message can be preserved by coding like this: | |
471 | ||
472 | warn !verify = sender | |
473 | set acl_m0 = $acl_verify_message | |
474 | ||
475 | Previously, $acl_verify_message was set only while expanding "message" | |
476 | and "log_message" when a very denied access. | |
477 | ||
e4a89c47 PH |
478 | PH/08 The redirect router has two new options, sieve_useraddress and |
479 | sieve_subaddress. These are passed to a Sieve filter to specify the :user | |
480 | and :subaddress parts of an address. Both options are unset by default. | |
481 | However, when a Sieve filter is run, if sieve_useraddress is unset, the | |
482 | entire original local part (including any prefix or suffix) is used for | |
483 | :user. An unset subaddress is treated as an empty subaddress. | |
475fe28a | 484 | |
be22d70e PH |
485 | PH/09 Quota values can be followed by G as well as K and M. |
486 | ||
2e0c1448 PH |
487 | PH/10 $message_linecount is a new variable that contains the total number of |
488 | lines in the header and body of the message. Compare $body_linecount, | |
489 | which is the count for the body only. During the DATA and | |
490 | content-scanning ACLs, $message_linecount contains the number of lines | |
491 | received. Before delivery happens (that is, before filters, routers, and | |
492 | transports run) the count is increased to include the Received: header | |
493 | line that Exim standardly adds, and also any other header lines that are | |
494 | added by ACLs. The blank line that separates the message header from the | |
495 | body is not counted. Here is an example of the use of this variable in a | |
496 | DATA ACL: | |
497 | ||
498 | deny message = Too many lines in message header | |
499 | condition = \ | |
500 | ${if <{250}{${eval: $message_linecount - $body_linecount}}} | |
501 | ||
502 | In the MAIL and RCPT ACLs, the value is zero because at that stage the | |
503 | message has not yet been received. | |
504 | ||
d20976dc PH |
505 | PH/11 In a ${run expansion, the variable $value (which contains the standard |
506 | output) is now also usable in the "else" string. | |
507 | ||
2e2a30b4 PH |
508 | PH/12 In a pipe transport, although a timeout while waiting for the pipe |
509 | process to complete was treated as a delivery failure, a timeout while | |
510 | writing the message to the pipe was logged, but erroneously treated as a | |
511 | successful delivery. Such timeouts include transport filter timeouts. For | |
512 | consistency with the overall process timeout, these timeouts are now | |
513 | treated as errors, giving rise to delivery failures by default. However, | |
514 | there is now a new Boolean option for the pipe transport called | |
515 | timeout_defer, which, if set TRUE, converts the failures into defers for | |
516 | both kinds of timeout. A transport filter timeout is now identified in | |
517 | the log output. | |
518 | ||
7766a4f0 | 519 | |
f7b63901 | 520 | Version 4.50 |
35edf2ff PH |
521 | ------------ |
522 | ||
b9e40c51 | 523 | The documentation is up-to-date for the 4.50 release. |
495ae4b0 PH |
524 | |
525 | **** |