From: Jeremy Harris Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 21:27:42 +0000 (+0100) Subject: Coding style closer to project norms X-Git-Tag: exim-4_85_RC1~67^2~36 X-Git-Url: https://vcs.fsf.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=880a1e7750a0d8935d48788e35ff03e47f7f6ada;p=exim.git Coding style closer to project norms --- diff --git a/src/src/dane-openssl.c b/src/src/dane-openssl.c index 790b4f079..781557075 100644 --- a/src/src/dane-openssl.c +++ b/src/src/dane-openssl.c @@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ #include #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1000000fL -#error "OpenSSL 1.0.0 or higher required" -#else +# error "OpenSSL 1.0.0 or higher required" +#else /* remainder of file */ #include "danessl.h" @@ -46,8 +46,9 @@ #define DANE_R_SCTX_INIT 112 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR -#define DANE_F_PLACEHOLDER 0 /* FIRST! Value TBD */ -static ERR_STRING_DATA dane_str_functs[] = { +# define DANE_F_PLACEHOLDER 0 /* FIRST! Value TBD */ +static ERR_STRING_DATA dane_str_functs[] = +{ {DANE_F_PLACEHOLDER, "DANE library"}, /* FIRST!!! */ {DANE_F_ADD_SKID, "add_skid"}, {DANE_F_CHECK_END_ENTITY, "check_end_entity"}, @@ -64,7 +65,8 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA dane_str_functs[] = { {DANE_F_WRAP_CERT, "wrap_cert"}, {0, NULL} }; -static ERR_STRING_DATA dane_str_reasons[] = { +static ERR_STRING_DATA dane_str_reasons[] = +{ {DANE_R_BAD_CERT, "Bad TLSA record certificate"}, {DANE_R_BAD_CERT_PKEY, "Bad TLSA record certificate public key"}, {DANE_R_BAD_DATA_LENGTH, "Bad TLSA record digest length"}, @@ -80,7 +82,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA dane_str_reasons[] = { {DANE_R_NOSIGN_KEY, "Certificate usage 2 requires EC support"}, {0, NULL} }; -#endif +#endif /*OPENSSL_NO_ERR*/ #define DANEerr(f, r) ERR_PUT_error(err_lib_dane, (f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__) @@ -96,1211 +98,1307 @@ static int wrap_to_root = 1; static void (*cert_free)(void *) = (void (*)(void *)) X509_free; static void (*pkey_free)(void *) = (void (*)(void *)) EVP_PKEY_free; -typedef struct dane_list { +typedef struct dane_list +{ struct dane_list *next; void *value; } *dane_list; #define LINSERT(h, e) do { (e)->next = (h); (h) = (e); } while (0) -typedef struct DANE_HOST_LIST { - struct DANE_HOST_LIST *next; +typedef struct dane_host_list +{ + struct dane_host_list *next; char *value; -} *DANE_HOST_LIST; +} *dane_host_list; -typedef struct dane_data { +typedef struct dane_data +{ size_t datalen; unsigned char data[0]; } *dane_data; -typedef struct DANE_DATA_LIST { - struct DANE_DATA_LIST *next; +typedef struct dane_data_list +{ + struct dane_data_list *next; dane_data value; -} *DANE_DATA_LIST; +} *dane_data_list; -typedef struct dane_mtype { +typedef struct dane_mtype +{ int mdlen; const EVP_MD *md; - DANE_DATA_LIST data; + dane_data_list data; } *dane_mtype; -typedef struct DANE_MTYPE_LIST { - struct DANE_MTYPE_LIST *next; +typedef struct dane_mtype_list +{ + struct dane_mtype_list *next; dane_mtype value; -} *DANE_MTYPE_LIST; +} *dane_mtype_list; -typedef struct dane_selector { +typedef struct dane_selector +{ uint8_t selector; - DANE_MTYPE_LIST mtype; + dane_mtype_list mtype; } *dane_selector; -typedef struct DANE_SELECTOR_LIST { - struct DANE_SELECTOR_LIST *next; +typedef struct dane_selector_list +{ + struct dane_selector_list *next; dane_selector value; -} *DANE_SELECTOR_LIST; +} *dane_selector_list; -typedef struct DANE_PKEY_LIST { - struct DANE_PKEY_LIST *next; +typedef struct dane_pkey_list +{ + struct dane_pkey_list *next; EVP_PKEY *value; -} *DANE_PKEY_LIST; +} *dane_pkey_list; -typedef struct DANE_CERT_LIST { - struct DANE_CERT_LIST *next; +typedef struct dane_cert_list +{ + struct dane_cert_list *next; X509 *value; -} *DANE_CERT_LIST; +} *dane_cert_list; -typedef struct SSL_DANE { +typedef struct ssl_dane +{ int (*verify)(X509_STORE_CTX *); STACK_OF(X509) *roots; STACK_OF(X509) *chain; const char *thost; /* TLSA base domain */ char *mhost; /* Matched, peer name */ - DANE_PKEY_LIST pkeys; - DANE_CERT_LIST certs; - DANE_HOST_LIST hosts; - DANE_SELECTOR_LIST selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_LAST + 1]; + dane_pkey_list pkeys; + dane_cert_list certs; + dane_host_list hosts; + dane_selector_list selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_LAST + 1]; int depth; int multi; /* Multi-label wildcards? */ int count; /* Number of TLSA records */ -} SSL_DANE; +} ssl_dane; #ifndef X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH -#define X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION +# define X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION #endif -static int match(DANE_SELECTOR_LIST slist, X509 *cert, int depth) +static int +match(dane_selector_list slist, X509 *cert, int depth) { - int matched; +int matched; - /* - * Note, set_trust_anchor() needs to know whether the match was for a - * pkey digest or a certificate digest. We return MATCHED_PKEY or - * MATCHED_CERT accordingly. - */ +/* + * Note, set_trust_anchor() needs to know whether the match was for a + * pkey digest or a certificate digest. We return MATCHED_PKEY or + * MATCHED_CERT accordingly. + */ #define MATCHED_CERT (SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_CERT + 1) #define MATCHED_PKEY (SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_SPKI + 1) +/* + * Loop over each selector, mtype, and associated data element looking + * for a match. + */ +for(matched = 0; !matched && slist; slist = slist->next) + { + dane_mtype_list m; + unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned char *buf; + unsigned char *buf2; + unsigned int len; + + /* + * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key. + */ + switch(slist->value->selector) + { + case SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_CERT: + len = i2d_X509(cert, NULL); + buf2 = buf = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(len); + if(buf) i2d_X509(cert, &buf2); + break; + case SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_SPKI: + len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), NULL); + buf2 = buf = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(len); + if(buf) i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf2); + break; + } + + if(!buf) + { + DANEerr(DANE_F_MATCH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + OPENSSL_assert(buf2 - buf == len); + + /* + * Loop over each mtype and data element + */ + for(m = slist->value->mtype; !matched && m; m = m->next) + { + dane_data_list d; + unsigned char *cmpbuf = buf; + unsigned int cmplen = len; + /* - * Loop over each selector, mtype, and associated data element looking - * for a match. + * If it is a digest, compute the corresponding digest of the + * DER data for comparison, otherwise, use the full object. */ - for (matched = 0; !matched && slist; slist = slist->next) { - DANE_MTYPE_LIST m; - unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - unsigned char *buf; - unsigned char *buf2; - unsigned int len; - - /* - * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key. - */ - switch (slist->value->selector) { - case SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_CERT: - len = i2d_X509(cert, NULL); - buf2 = buf = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(len); - if (buf) - i2d_X509(cert, &buf2); - break; - case SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_SPKI: - len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), NULL); - buf2 = buf = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(len); - if (buf) - i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf2); - break; - } - - if (buf == NULL) { - DANEerr(DANE_F_MATCH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - OPENSSL_assert(buf2 - buf == len); - - /* - * Loop over each mtype and data element - */ - for (m = slist->value->mtype; !matched && m; m = m->next) { - DANE_DATA_LIST d; - unsigned char *cmpbuf = buf; - unsigned int cmplen = len; - - /* - * If it is a digest, compute the corresponding digest of the - * DER data for comparison, otherwise, use the full object. - */ - if (m->value->md) { - cmpbuf = mdbuf; - if (!EVP_Digest(buf, len, cmpbuf, &cmplen, m->value->md, 0)) - matched = -1; - } - for (d = m->value->data; !matched && d; d = d->next) - if (cmplen == d->value->datalen && - memcmp(cmpbuf, d->value->data, cmplen) == 0) - matched = slist->value->selector + 1; - } - - OPENSSL_free(buf); + if(m->value->md) + { + cmpbuf = mdbuf; + if(!EVP_Digest(buf, len, cmpbuf, &cmplen, m->value->md, 0)) + matched = -1; + } + for(d = m->value->data; !matched && d; d = d->next) + if( cmplen == d->value->datalen + && memcmp(cmpbuf, d->value->data, cmplen) == 0) + matched = slist->value->selector + 1; } - return matched; -} + OPENSSL_free(buf); + } -static int push_ext(X509 *cert, X509_EXTENSION *ext) -{ - X509_EXTENSIONS *exts; - - if (ext) { - if ((exts = cert->cert_info->extensions) == 0) - exts = cert->cert_info->extensions = sk_X509_EXTENSION_new_null(); - if (exts && sk_X509_EXTENSION_push(exts, ext)) - return 1; - X509_EXTENSION_free(ext); - } - DANEerr(DANE_F_PUSH_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; +return matched; } -static int add_ext(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject, int ext_nid, char *ext_val) +static int +push_ext(X509 *cert, X509_EXTENSION *ext) { - X509V3_CTX v3ctx; +X509_EXTENSIONS *exts; - X509V3_set_ctx(&v3ctx, issuer, subject, 0, 0, 0); - return push_ext(subject, X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(0, &v3ctx, ext_nid, ext_val)); +if(ext) + { + if(!(exts = cert->cert_info->extensions)) + exts = cert->cert_info->extensions = sk_X509_EXTENSION_new_null(); + if (exts && sk_X509_EXTENSION_push(exts, ext)) + return 1; + X509_EXTENSION_free(ext); + } +DANEerr(DANE_F_PUSH_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); +return 0; } -static int set_serial(X509 *cert, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid, X509 *subject) +static int +add_ext(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject, int ext_nid, char *ext_val) { - int ret = 0; - BIGNUM *bn; - - if (akid && akid->serial) - return (X509_set_serialNumber(cert, akid->serial)); +X509V3_CTX v3ctx; - /* - * Add one to subject's serial to avoid collisions between TA serial and - * serial of signing root. - */ - if ((bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(X509_get_serialNumber(subject), 0)) != 0 - && BN_add_word(bn, 1) - && BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, X509_get_serialNumber(cert))) - ret = 1; - - if (bn) - BN_free(bn); - return ret; +X509V3_set_ctx(&v3ctx, issuer, subject, 0, 0, 0); +return push_ext(subject, X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(0, &v3ctx, ext_nid, ext_val)); } -static int add_akid(X509 *cert, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) +static int +set_serial(X509 *cert, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid, X509 *subject) { - int nid = NID_authority_key_identifier; - ASN1_STRING *id; - unsigned char c = 0; - int ret = 0; +int ret = 0; +BIGNUM *bn; + +if(akid && akid->serial) + return (X509_set_serialNumber(cert, akid->serial)); + +/* + * Add one to subject's serial to avoid collisions between TA serial and + * serial of signing root. + */ +if( (bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(X509_get_serialNumber(subject), 0)) != 0 + && BN_add_word(bn, 1) + && BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, X509_get_serialNumber(cert))) + ret = 1; + +if(bn) + BN_free(bn); +return ret; +} - /* - * 0 will never be our subject keyid from a SHA-1 hash, but it could be - * our subject keyid if forced from child's akid. If so, set our - * authority keyid to 1. This way we are never self-signed, and thus - * exempt from any potential (off by default for now in OpenSSL) - * self-signature checks! - */ - id = (ASN1_STRING *) ((akid && akid->keyid) ? akid->keyid : 0); - if (id && M_ASN1_STRING_length(id) == 1 && *M_ASN1_STRING_data(id) == c) - c = 1; - - if ((akid = AUTHORITY_KEYID_new()) != 0 - && (akid->keyid = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) != 0 - && M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(akid->keyid, (void *) &c, 1) - && X509_add1_ext_i2d(cert, nid, akid, 0, X509V3_ADD_APPEND)) - ret = 1; - if (akid) - AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(akid); - return ret; +static int +add_akid(X509 *cert, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) +{ +int nid = NID_authority_key_identifier; +ASN1_STRING *id; +unsigned char c = 0; +int ret = 0; + +/* + * 0 will never be our subject keyid from a SHA-1 hash, but it could be + * our subject keyid if forced from child's akid. If so, set our + * authority keyid to 1. This way we are never self-signed, and thus + * exempt from any potential (off by default for now in OpenSSL) + * self-signature checks! + */ +id = (ASN1_STRING *) ((akid && akid->keyid) ? akid->keyid : 0); +if(id && M_ASN1_STRING_length(id) == 1 && *M_ASN1_STRING_data(id) == c) + c = 1; + +if( (akid = AUTHORITY_KEYID_new()) != 0 + && (akid->keyid = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) != 0 + && M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(akid->keyid, (void *) &c, 1) + && X509_add1_ext_i2d(cert, nid, akid, 0, X509V3_ADD_APPEND)) + ret = 1; +if(akid) + AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(akid); +return ret; } -static int add_skid(X509 *cert, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) +static int +add_skid(X509 *cert, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) { - int nid = NID_subject_key_identifier; +int nid = NID_subject_key_identifier; - if (!akid || !akid->keyid) - return add_ext(0, cert, nid, "hash"); - return X509_add1_ext_i2d(cert, nid, akid->keyid, 0, X509V3_ADD_APPEND) > 0; +if(!akid || !akid->keyid) + return add_ext(0, cert, nid, "hash"); +return X509_add1_ext_i2d(cert, nid, akid->keyid, 0, X509V3_ADD_APPEND) > 0; } -static X509_NAME *akid_issuer_name(AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) +static X509_NAME * +akid_issuer_name(AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) { - if (akid && akid->issuer) { - int i; - GENERAL_NAMES *gens = akid->issuer; +if(akid && akid->issuer) + { + int i; + GENERAL_NAMES *gens = akid->issuer; - for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); ++i) { - GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); + for(i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); ++i) + { + GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); - if (gn->type == GEN_DIRNAME) - return (gn->d.dirn); - } + if(gn->type == GEN_DIRNAME) + return (gn->d.dirn); } - return 0; + } +return 0; } -static int set_issuer_name(X509 *cert, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) +static int +set_issuer_name(X509 *cert, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) { - X509_NAME *name = akid_issuer_name(akid); - - /* - * If subject's akid specifies an authority key identifer issuer name, we - * must use that. - */ - if (name) - return X509_set_issuer_name(cert, name); - return X509_set_issuer_name(cert, X509_get_subject_name(cert)); +X509_NAME *name = akid_issuer_name(akid); + +/* + * If subject's akid specifies an authority key identifer issuer name, we + * must use that. + */ +return X509_set_issuer_name(cert, + name ? name : X509_get_subject_name(cert)); } -static int grow_chain(SSL_DANE *dane, int trusted, X509 *cert) +static int +grow_chain(ssl_dane *dane, int trusted, X509 *cert) { - STACK_OF(X509) **xs = trusted ? &dane->roots : &dane->chain; - static ASN1_OBJECT *serverAuth = 0; +STACK_OF(X509) **xs = trusted ? &dane->roots : &dane->chain; +static ASN1_OBJECT *serverAuth = 0; #define UNTRUSTED 0 #define TRUSTED 1 - if (trusted && serverAuth == 0 && - (serverAuth = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_server_auth)) == 0) { - DANEerr(DANE_F_GROW_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - if (!*xs && (*xs = sk_X509_new_null()) == 0) { - DANEerr(DANE_F_GROW_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - - if (cert) { - if (trusted && !X509_add1_trust_object(cert, serverAuth)) - return 0; - CRYPTO_add(&cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - if (!sk_X509_push(*xs, cert)) { - X509_free(cert); - DANEerr(DANE_F_GROW_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } +if( trusted && !serverAuth + && !(serverAuth = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_server_auth))) + { + DANEerr(DANE_F_GROW_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } +if(!*xs && !(*xs = sk_X509_new_null())) + { + DANEerr(DANE_F_GROW_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + +if(cert) + { + if(trusted && !X509_add1_trust_object(cert, serverAuth)) + return 0; + CRYPTO_add(&cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); + if (!sk_X509_push(*xs, cert)) + { + X509_free(cert); + DANEerr(DANE_F_GROW_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; } - return 1; + } +return 1; } -static int wrap_issuer( - SSL_DANE *dane, - EVP_PKEY *key, - X509 *subject, - int depth, - int top -) +static int +wrap_issuer(ssl_dane *dane, EVP_PKEY *key, X509 *subject, int depth, int top) { - int ret = 1; - X509 *cert = 0; - AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid; - X509_NAME *name = X509_get_issuer_name(subject); - EVP_PKEY *newkey = key ? key : X509_get_pubkey(subject); +int ret = 1; +X509 *cert = 0; +AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid; +X509_NAME *name = X509_get_issuer_name(subject); +EVP_PKEY *newkey = key ? key : X509_get_pubkey(subject); #define WRAP_MID 0 /* Ensure intermediate. */ #define WRAP_TOP 1 /* Ensure self-signed. */ - if (name == 0 || newkey == 0 || (cert = X509_new()) == 0) - return 0; - - /* - * Record the depth of the trust-anchor certificate. - */ - if (dane->depth < 0) - dane->depth = depth + 1; - - /* - * XXX: Uncaught error condition: - * - * The return value is NULL both when the extension is missing, and when - * OpenSSL rans out of memory while parsing the extension. - */ - ERR_clear_error(); - akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(subject, NID_authority_key_identifier, 0, 0); - /* XXX: Should we peek at the error stack here??? */ - - /* - * If top is true generate a self-issued root CA, otherwise an - * intermediate CA and possibly its self-signed issuer. - * - * CA cert valid for +/- 30 days - */ - if (!X509_set_version(cert, 2) - || !set_serial(cert, akid, subject) - || !X509_set_subject_name(cert, name) - || !set_issuer_name(cert, akid) - || !X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notBefore(cert), -30 * 86400L) - || !X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notAfter(cert), 30 * 86400L) - || !X509_set_pubkey(cert, newkey) - || !add_ext(0, cert, NID_basic_constraints, "CA:TRUE") - || (!top && !add_akid(cert, akid)) - || !add_skid(cert, akid) - || (!top && wrap_to_root && - !wrap_issuer(dane, newkey, cert, depth, WRAP_TOP))) { - ret = 0; - } - if (akid) - AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(akid); - if (!key) - EVP_PKEY_free(newkey); - if (ret) { - if (!top && wrap_to_root) - ret = grow_chain(dane, UNTRUSTED, cert); - else - ret = grow_chain(dane, TRUSTED, cert); - } - if (cert) - X509_free(cert); - return ret; +if(!name || !newkey || !(cert = X509_new())) + return 0; + +/* + * Record the depth of the trust-anchor certificate. + */ +if(dane->depth < 0) + dane->depth = depth + 1; + +/* + * XXX: Uncaught error condition: + * + * The return value is NULL both when the extension is missing, and when + * OpenSSL rans out of memory while parsing the extension. + */ +ERR_clear_error(); +akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(subject, NID_authority_key_identifier, 0, 0); +/* XXX: Should we peek at the error stack here??? */ + +/* + * If top is true generate a self-issued root CA, otherwise an + * intermediate CA and possibly its self-signed issuer. + * + * CA cert valid for +/- 30 days + */ +if( !X509_set_version(cert, 2) + || !set_serial(cert, akid, subject) + || !X509_set_subject_name(cert, name) + || !set_issuer_name(cert, akid) + || !X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notBefore(cert), -30 * 86400L) + || !X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notAfter(cert), 30 * 86400L) + || !X509_set_pubkey(cert, newkey) + || !add_ext(0, cert, NID_basic_constraints, "CA:TRUE") + || (!top && !add_akid(cert, akid)) + || !add_skid(cert, akid) + || ( !top && wrap_to_root + && !wrap_issuer(dane, newkey, cert, depth, WRAP_TOP))) + ret = 0; + +if(akid) + AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(akid); +if(!key) + EVP_PKEY_free(newkey); +if(ret) + ret = grow_chain(dane, !top && wrap_to_root ? UNTRUSTED : TRUSTED, cert); +if(cert) + X509_free(cert); +return ret; } -static int wrap_cert(SSL_DANE *dane, X509 *tacert, int depth) +static int +wrap_cert(ssl_dane *dane, X509 *tacert, int depth) { - if (dane->depth < 0) - dane->depth = depth + 1; - - /* - * If the TA certificate is self-issued, or need not be, use it directly. - * Otherwise, synthesize requisuite ancestors. - */ - if (!wrap_to_root - || X509_check_issued(tacert, tacert) == X509_V_OK) - return grow_chain(dane, TRUSTED, tacert); - - if (wrap_issuer(dane, 0, tacert, depth, WRAP_MID)) - return grow_chain(dane, UNTRUSTED, tacert); - return 0; +if(dane->depth < 0) + dane->depth = depth + 1; + +/* + * If the TA certificate is self-issued, or need not be, use it directly. + * Otherwise, synthesize requisuite ancestors. + */ +if( !wrap_to_root + || X509_check_issued(tacert, tacert) == X509_V_OK) + return grow_chain(dane, TRUSTED, tacert); + +if(wrap_issuer(dane, 0, tacert, depth, WRAP_MID)) + return grow_chain(dane, UNTRUSTED, tacert); +return 0; } -static int ta_signed(SSL_DANE *dane, X509 *cert, int depth) +static int +ta_signed(ssl_dane *dane, X509 *cert, int depth) { - DANE_CERT_LIST x; - DANE_PKEY_LIST k; - EVP_PKEY *pk; - int done = 0; - - /* - * First check whether issued and signed by a TA cert, this is cheaper - * than the bare-public key checks below, since we can determine whether - * the candidate TA certificate issued the certificate to be checked - * first (name comparisons), before we bother with signature checks - * (public key operations). - */ - for (x = dane->certs; !done && x; x = x->next) { - if (X509_check_issued(x->value, cert) == X509_V_OK) { - if ((pk = X509_get_pubkey(x->value)) == 0) { - /* - * The cert originally contained a valid pkey, which does - * not just vanish, so this is most likely a memory error. - */ - done = -1; - break; - } - /* Check signature, since some other TA may work if not this. */ - if (X509_verify(cert, pk) > 0) - done = wrap_cert(dane, x->value, depth) ? 1 : -1; - EVP_PKEY_free(pk); - } +dane_cert_list x; +dane_pkey_list k; +EVP_PKEY *pk; +int done = 0; + +/* + * First check whether issued and signed by a TA cert, this is cheaper + * than the bare-public key checks below, since we can determine whether + * the candidate TA certificate issued the certificate to be checked + * first (name comparisons), before we bother with signature checks + * (public key operations). + */ +for (x = dane->certs; !done && x; x = x->next) + { + if(X509_check_issued(x->value, cert) == X509_V_OK) + { + if(!(pk = X509_get_pubkey(x->value))) + { + /* + * The cert originally contained a valid pkey, which does + * not just vanish, so this is most likely a memory error. + */ + done = -1; + break; + } + /* Check signature, since some other TA may work if not this. */ + if(X509_verify(cert, pk) > 0) + done = wrap_cert(dane, x->value, depth) ? 1 : -1; + EVP_PKEY_free(pk); } + } + +/* + * With bare TA public keys, we can't check whether the trust chain is + * issued by the key, but we can determine whether it is signed by the + * key, so we go with that. + * + * Ideally, the corresponding certificate was presented in the chain, and we + * matched it by its public key digest one level up. This code is here + * to handle adverse conditions imposed by sloppy administrators of + * receiving systems with poorly constructed chains. + * + * We'd like to optimize out keys that should not match when the cert's + * authority key id does not match the key id of this key computed via + * the RFC keyid algorithm (SHA-1 digest of public key bit-string sans + * ASN1 tag and length thus also excluding the unused bits field that is + * logically part of the length). However, some CAs have a non-standard + * authority keyid, so we lose. Too bad. + * + * This may push errors onto the stack when the certificate signature is + * not of the right type or length, throw these away, + */ +for(k = dane->pkeys; !done && k; k = k->next) + if(X509_verify(cert, k->value) > 0) + done = wrap_issuer(dane, k->value, cert, depth, WRAP_MID) ? 1 : -1; + else + ERR_clear_error(); - /* - * With bare TA public keys, we can't check whether the trust chain is - * issued by the key, but we can determine whether it is signed by the - * key, so we go with that. - * - * Ideally, the corresponding certificate was presented in the chain, and we - * matched it by its public key digest one level up. This code is here - * to handle adverse conditions imposed by sloppy administrators of - * receiving systems with poorly constructed chains. - * - * We'd like to optimize out keys that should not match when the cert's - * authority key id does not match the key id of this key computed via - * the RFC keyid algorithm (SHA-1 digest of public key bit-string sans - * ASN1 tag and length thus also excluding the unused bits field that is - * logically part of the length). However, some CAs have a non-standard - * authority keyid, so we lose. Too bad. - * - * This may push errors onto the stack when the certificate signature is - * not of the right type or length, throw these away, - */ - for (k = dane->pkeys; !done && k; k = k->next) - if (X509_verify(cert, k->value) > 0) - done = wrap_issuer(dane, k->value, cert, depth, WRAP_MID) ? 1 : -1; - else - ERR_clear_error(); - - return done; +return done; } -static int set_trust_anchor(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane, X509 *cert) +static int +set_trust_anchor(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, ssl_dane *dane, X509 *cert) { - int matched = 0; - int n; - int i; - int depth = 0; - EVP_PKEY *takey; - X509 *ca; - STACK_OF(X509) *in = ctx->untrusted; /* XXX: Accessor? */ - - if (!grow_chain(dane, UNTRUSTED, 0)) - return -1; - - /* - * Accept a degenerate case: depth 0 self-signed trust-anchor. - */ - if (X509_check_issued(cert, cert) == X509_V_OK) { - dane->depth = 0; - matched = match(dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA], cert, 0); - if (matched > 0 && !grow_chain(dane, TRUSTED, cert)) - matched = -1; - return matched; +int matched = 0; +int n; +int i; +int depth = 0; +EVP_PKEY *takey; +X509 *ca; +STACK_OF(X509) *in = ctx->untrusted; /* XXX: Accessor? */ + +if(!grow_chain(dane, UNTRUSTED, 0)) + return -1; + +/* + * Accept a degenerate case: depth 0 self-signed trust-anchor. + */ +if(X509_check_issued(cert, cert) == X509_V_OK) + { + dane->depth = 0; + matched = match(dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA], cert, 0); + if(matched > 0 && !grow_chain(dane, TRUSTED, cert)) + matched = -1; + return matched; + } + +/* Make a shallow copy of the input untrusted chain. */ +if(!(in = sk_X509_dup(in))) + { + DANEerr(DANE_F_SET_TRUST_ANCHOR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return -1; + } + +/* + * At each iteration we consume the issuer of the current cert. This + * reduces the length of the "in" chain by one. If no issuer is found, + * we are done. We also stop when a certificate matches a TA in the + * peer's TLSA RRset. + * + * Caller ensures that the initial certificate is not self-signed. + */ +for(n = sk_X509_num(in); n > 0; --n, ++depth) + { + for(i = 0; i < n; ++i) + if(X509_check_issued(sk_X509_value(in, i), cert) == X509_V_OK) + break; + + /* + * Final untrusted element with no issuer in the peer's chain, it may + * however be signed by a pkey or cert obtained via a TLSA RR. + */ + if(i == n) + break; + + /* Peer's chain contains an issuer ca. */ + ca = sk_X509_delete(in, i); + + /* If not a trust anchor, record untrusted ca and continue. */ + if((matched = match(dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA], ca, depth+1)) + == 0) + { + if(grow_chain(dane, UNTRUSTED, ca)) + { + if(!X509_check_issued(ca, ca) == X509_V_OK) + { + /* Restart with issuer as subject */ + cert = ca; + continue; + } + /* Final self-signed element, skip ta_signed() check. */ + cert = 0; + } + else + matched = -1; } - - /* Make a shallow copy of the input untrusted chain. */ - if ((in = sk_X509_dup(in)) == 0) { - DANEerr(DANE_F_SET_TRUST_ANCHOR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return -1; + else if(matched == MATCHED_CERT) + { + if(!wrap_cert(dane, ca, depth)) + matched = -1; } - - /* - * At each iteration we consume the issuer of the current cert. This - * reduces the length of the "in" chain by one. If no issuer is found, - * we are done. We also stop when a certificate matches a TA in the - * peer's TLSA RRset. - * - * Caller ensures that the initial certificate is not self-signed. - */ - for (n = sk_X509_num(in); n > 0; --n, ++depth) { - for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) - if (X509_check_issued(sk_X509_value(in, i), cert) == X509_V_OK) - break; - - /* - * Final untrusted element with no issuer in the peer's chain, it may - * however be signed by a pkey or cert obtained via a TLSA RR. - */ - if (i == n) - break; - - /* Peer's chain contains an issuer ca. */ - ca = sk_X509_delete(in, i); - - /* If not a trust anchor, record untrusted ca and continue. */ - if ((matched = match(dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA], ca, - depth + 1)) == 0) { - if (grow_chain(dane, UNTRUSTED, ca)) { - if (!X509_check_issued(ca, ca) == X509_V_OK) { - /* Restart with issuer as subject */ - cert = ca; - continue; - } - /* Final self-signed element, skip ta_signed() check. */ - cert = 0; - } else - matched = -1; - } else if (matched == MATCHED_CERT) { - if (!wrap_cert(dane, ca, depth)) - matched = -1; - } else if (matched == MATCHED_PKEY) { - if ((takey = X509_get_pubkey(ca)) == 0 || - !wrap_issuer(dane, takey, cert, depth, WRAP_MID)) { - if (takey) - EVP_PKEY_free(takey); - else - DANEerr(DANE_F_SET_TRUST_ANCHOR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - matched = -1; - } - } - break; + else if(matched == MATCHED_PKEY) + { + if( !(takey = X509_get_pubkey(ca)) + || !wrap_issuer(dane, takey, cert, depth, WRAP_MID)) + { + if(takey) + EVP_PKEY_free(takey); + else + DANEerr(DANE_F_SET_TRUST_ANCHOR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + matched = -1; + } } + break; + } - /* Shallow free the duplicated input untrusted chain. */ - sk_X509_free(in); +/* Shallow free the duplicated input untrusted chain. */ +sk_X509_free(in); - /* - * When the loop exits, if "cert" is set, it is not self-signed and has - * no issuer in the chain, we check for a possible signature via a DNS - * obtained TA cert or public key. - */ - if (matched == 0 && cert) - matched = ta_signed(dane, cert, depth); +/* + * When the loop exits, if "cert" is set, it is not self-signed and has + * no issuer in the chain, we check for a possible signature via a DNS + * obtained TA cert or public key. + */ +if(matched == 0 && cert) + matched = ta_signed(dane, cert, depth); - return matched; +return matched; } -static int check_end_entity(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane, X509 *cert) +static int +check_end_entity(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, ssl_dane *dane, X509 *cert) { - int matched; - - matched = match(dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_FIXED_LEAF], cert, 0); - if (matched > 0) { - if (ctx->chain == 0) { - if ((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) != 0 && - sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, cert)) { - CRYPTO_add(&cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - } else { - DANEerr(DANE_F_CHECK_END_ENTITY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return -1; - } - } - } - return matched; +int matched; + +matched = match(dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_FIXED_LEAF], cert, 0); +if(matched > 0) + if(!ctx->chain) + if( (ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) + && sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, cert)) + CRYPTO_add(&cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); + else + { + DANEerr(DANE_F_CHECK_END_ENTITY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return -1; + } +return matched; } -static int match_name(const char *certid, SSL_DANE *dane) +static int +match_name(const char *certid, ssl_dane *dane) { - int multi = dane->multi; - DANE_HOST_LIST hosts = dane->hosts; - - for (/* NOP */; hosts; hosts = hosts->next) { - int match_subdomain = 0; - const char *domain = hosts->value; - const char *parent; - int idlen; - int domlen; - - if (*domain == '.' && domain[1] != '\0') { - ++domain; - match_subdomain = 1; - } - - /* - * Sub-domain match: certid is any sub-domain of hostname. - */ - if (match_subdomain) { - if ((idlen = strlen(certid)) > (domlen = strlen(domain)) + 1 - && certid[idlen - domlen - 1] == '.' - && !strcasecmp(certid + (idlen - domlen), domain)) - return 1; - else - continue; - } - - /* - * Exact match and initial "*" match. The initial "*" in a certid - * matches one (if multi is false) or more hostname components under - * the condition that the certid contains multiple hostname components. - */ - if (!strcasecmp(certid, domain) - || (certid[0] == '*' && certid[1] == '.' && certid[2] != 0 - && (parent = strchr(domain, '.')) != 0 - && (idlen = strlen(certid + 1)) <= (domlen = strlen(parent)) - && strcasecmp(multi ? parent + domlen - idlen : parent, - certid + 1) == 0)) - return 1; +int multi = dane->multi; +dane_host_list hosts; + +for(hosts = dane->hosts; hosts; hosts = hosts->next) + { + int match_subdomain = 0; + const char *domain = hosts->value; + const char *parent; + int idlen; + int domlen; + + if(*domain == '.' && domain[1] != '\0') + { + ++domain; + match_subdomain = 1; } - return 0; + + /* + * Sub-domain match: certid is any sub-domain of hostname. + */ + if(match_subdomain) + if( (idlen = strlen(certid)) > (domlen = strlen(domain)) + 1 + && certid[idlen - domlen - 1] == '.' + && !strcasecmp(certid + (idlen - domlen), domain)) + return 1; + else + continue; + + /* + * Exact match and initial "*" match. The initial "*" in a certid + * matches one (if multi is false) or more hostname components under + * the condition that the certid contains multiple hostname components. + */ + if( !strcasecmp(certid, domain) + || ( certid[0] == '*' && certid[1] == '.' && certid[2] != 0 + && (parent = strchr(domain, '.')) != 0 + && (idlen = strlen(certid + 1)) <= (domlen = strlen(parent)) + && strcasecmp(multi ? parent + domlen - idlen : parent, certid+1) == 0)) + return 1; + } +return 0; } -static char *check_name(char *name, int len) +static char * +check_name(char *name, int len) { - register char *cp = name + len; - - while (len > 0 && *--cp == 0) - --len; /* Ignore trailing NULs */ - if (len <= 0) - return 0; - for (cp = name; *cp; cp++) { - register char c = *cp; - if (!((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || - (c >= '0' && c <= '9') || - (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || - (c == '.' || c == '-') || - (c == '*'))) - return 0; /* Only LDH, '.' and '*' */ - } - if (cp - name != len) /* Guard against internal NULs */ - return 0; - return name; +char *cp = name + len; + +while(len > 0 && !*--cp) + --len; /* Ignore trailing NULs */ +if(len <= 0) + return 0; +for(cp = name; *cp; cp++) + { + char c = *cp; + if (!((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || + (c >= '0' && c <= '9') || + (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || + (c == '.' || c == '-') || + (c == '*'))) + return 0; /* Only LDH, '.' and '*' */ + } +if(cp - name != len) /* Guard against internal NULs */ + return 0; +return name; } -static char *parse_dns_name(const GENERAL_NAME *gn) +static char * +parse_dns_name(const GENERAL_NAME *gn) { - if (gn->type != GEN_DNS) - return 0; - if (ASN1_STRING_type(gn->d.ia5) != V_ASN1_IA5STRING) - return 0; - return check_name((char *) ASN1_STRING_data(gn->d.ia5), - ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.ia5)); +if(gn->type != GEN_DNS) + return 0; +if(ASN1_STRING_type(gn->d.ia5) != V_ASN1_IA5STRING) + return 0; +return check_name((char *) ASN1_STRING_data(gn->d.ia5), + ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.ia5)); } -static char *parse_subject_name(X509 *cert) +static char * +parse_subject_name(X509 *cert) { - X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(cert); - X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry; - ASN1_STRING *entry_str; - unsigned char *namebuf; - int nid = NID_commonName; - int len; - int i; - - if (name == 0 || (i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, nid, -1)) < 0) - return 0; - if ((entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i)) == 0) - return 0; - if ((entry_str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry)) == 0) - return 0; - - if ((len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&namebuf, entry_str)) < 0) - return 0; - if (len <= 0 || check_name((char *) namebuf, len) == 0) { - OPENSSL_free(namebuf); - return 0; - } - return (char *) namebuf; +X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(cert); +X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry; +ASN1_STRING *entry_str; +unsigned char *namebuf; +int nid = NID_commonName; +int len; +int i; + +if(!name || (i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, nid, -1)) < 0) + return 0; +if(!(entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i))) + return 0; +if(!(entry_str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry))) + return 0; + +if((len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&namebuf, entry_str)) < 0) + return 0; +if(len <= 0 || check_name((char *) namebuf, len) == 0) + { + OPENSSL_free(namebuf); + return 0; + } +return (char *) namebuf; } -static int name_check(SSL_DANE *dane, X509 *cert) +static int +name_check(ssl_dane *dane, X509 *cert) { - int matched = 0; - int got_altname = 0; - GENERAL_NAMES *gens; - - gens = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, 0, 0); - if (gens) { - int n = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { - const GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); - const char *certid; - - if (gn->type != GEN_DNS) - continue; - got_altname = 1; - certid = parse_dns_name(gn); - if (certid && *certid) { - if ((matched = match_name(certid, dane)) == 0) - continue; - if ((dane->mhost = OPENSSL_strdup(certid)) == 0) - matched = -1; - break; - } - } - GENERAL_NAMES_free(gens); - } - - /* - * XXX: Should the subjectName be skipped when *any* altnames are present, - * or only when DNS altnames are present? - */ - if (got_altname == 0) { - char *certid = parse_subject_name(cert); - if (certid != 0 && *certid && (matched = match_name(certid, dane)) != 0) - dane->mhost = certid; /* Already a copy */ +int matched = 0; +BOOL got_altname = FALSE; +GENERAL_NAMES *gens; + +gens = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, 0, 0); +if(gens) + { + int n = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); + int i; + + for(i = 0; i < n; ++i) + { + const GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); + const char *certid; + + if(gn->type != GEN_DNS) + continue; + got_altname = TRUE; + certid = parse_dns_name(gn); + if(certid && *certid) + { + if((matched = match_name(certid, dane)) == 0) + continue; + if(!(dane->mhost = OPENSSL_strdup(certid))) + matched = -1; + break; + } } - return matched; + GENERAL_NAMES_free(gens); + } + +/* + * XXX: Should the subjectName be skipped when *any* altnames are present, + * or only when DNS altnames are present? + */ +if(got_altname) + { + char *certid = parse_subject_name(cert); + if(certid != 0 && *certid && (matched = match_name(certid, dane)) != 0) + dane->mhost = certid; /* Already a copy */ + } +return matched; } -static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) +static int +verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { - DANE_SELECTOR_LIST issuer_rrs; - DANE_SELECTOR_LIST leaf_rrs; - int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) = ctx->verify_cb; - int ssl_idx = SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(); - SSL *ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, ssl_idx); - SSL_DANE *dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx); - X509 *cert = ctx->cert; /* XXX: accessor? */ - int matched = 0; - int chain_length = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); - - issuer_rrs = dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_LIMIT_ISSUER]; - leaf_rrs = dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_LIMIT_LEAF]; - ctx->verify = dane->verify; - - if ((matched = name_check(dane, cert)) < 0) { - X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM); - return 0; +dane_selector_list issuer_rrs; +dane_selector_list leaf_rrs; +int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) = ctx->verify_cb; +int ssl_idx = SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(); +SSL *ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, ssl_idx); +ssl_dane *dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx); +X509 *cert = ctx->cert; /* XXX: accessor? */ +int matched = 0; +int chain_length = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); + +issuer_rrs = dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_LIMIT_ISSUER]; +leaf_rrs = dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_LIMIT_LEAF]; +ctx->verify = dane->verify; + +if((matched = name_check(dane, cert)) < 0) + { + X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM); + return 0; + } + +if(!matched) + { + ctx->error_depth = 0; + ctx->current_cert = cert; + X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH); + if(!cb(0, ctx)) + return 0; + } +matched = 0; + +/* + * Satisfy at least one usage 0 or 1 constraint, unless we've already + * matched a usage 2 trust anchor. + * + * XXX: internal_verify() doesn't callback with top certs that are not + * self-issued. This should be fixed in a future OpenSSL. + */ +if(dane->roots && sk_X509_num(dane->roots)) + { +#ifndef NO_CALLBACK_WORKAROUND + X509 *top = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, dane->depth); + + if(X509_check_issued(top, top) != X509_V_OK) + { + ctx->error_depth = dane->depth; + ctx->current_cert = top; + if(!cb(1, ctx)) + return 0; + } +#endif + /* Pop synthetic trust-anchor ancestors off the chain! */ + while (--chain_length > dane->depth) + X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain)); + } +else if(issuer_rrs || leaf_rrs) + { + int n = chain_length; + + /* + * Check for an EE match, then a CA match at depths > 0, and + * finally, if the EE cert is self-issued, for a depth 0 CA match. + */ + if(leaf_rrs) + matched = match(leaf_rrs, cert, 0); + while(!matched && issuer_rrs && --n >= 0) + { + X509 *xn = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); + + if(n > 0 || X509_check_issued(xn, xn) == X509_V_OK) + matched = match(issuer_rrs, xn, n); } - if (!matched) { - ctx->error_depth = 0; - ctx->current_cert = cert; - X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH); - if (!cb(0, ctx)) - return 0; + if(matched < 0) + { + X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM); + return 0; } - matched = 0; - /* - * Satisfy at least one usage 0 or 1 constraint, unless we've already - * matched a usage 2 trust anchor. - * - * XXX: internal_verify() doesn't callback with top certs that are not - * self-issued. This should be fixed in a future OpenSSL. - */ - if (dane->roots && sk_X509_num(dane->roots)) { -#ifndef NO_CALLBACK_WORKAROUND - X509 *top = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, dane->depth); - - if (X509_check_issued(top, top) != X509_V_OK) { - ctx->error_depth = dane->depth; - ctx->current_cert = top; - if (!cb(1, ctx)) - return 0; - } -#endif - /* Pop synthetic trust-anchor ancestors off the chain! */ - while (--chain_length > dane->depth) - X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain)); - } else if (issuer_rrs || leaf_rrs) { - int n = chain_length; - - /* - * Check for an EE match, then a CA match at depths > 0, and - * finally, if the EE cert is self-issued, for a depth 0 CA match. - */ - if (leaf_rrs) - matched = match(leaf_rrs, cert, 0); - while (!matched && issuer_rrs && --n >= 0) { - X509 *xn = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); - - if (n > 0 || X509_check_issued(xn, xn) == X509_V_OK) - matched = match(issuer_rrs, xn, n); - } - - if (matched < 0) { - X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM); - return 0; - } - - if (!matched) { - ctx->current_cert = cert; - ctx->error_depth = 0; - X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED); - if (!cb(0, ctx)) - return 0; - } + if(!matched) + { + ctx->current_cert = cert; + ctx->error_depth = 0; + X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED); + if(!cb(0, ctx)) + return 0; } + } - return ctx->verify(ctx); +return ctx->verify(ctx); } -static int verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *unused_ctx) +static int +verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *unused_ctx) { - static int ssl_idx = -1; - SSL *ssl; - SSL_DANE *dane; - int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) = ctx->verify_cb; - int matched; - X509 *cert = ctx->cert; /* XXX: accessor? */ - - if (ssl_idx < 0) - ssl_idx = SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(); - if (dane_idx < 0) { - DANEerr(DANE_F_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return -1; +static int ssl_idx = -1; +SSL *ssl; +ssl_dane *dane; +int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) = ctx->verify_cb; +int matched; +X509 *cert = ctx->cert; /* XXX: accessor? */ + +if(ssl_idx < 0) + ssl_idx = SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(); +if(dane_idx < 0) + { + DANEerr(DANE_F_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return -1; + } + +ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, ssl_idx); +if(!(dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx)) || !cert) + return X509_verify_cert(ctx); + +if(dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_FIXED_LEAF]) + { + if((matched = check_end_entity(ctx, dane, cert)) > 0) + { + ctx->error_depth = 0; + ctx->current_cert = cert; + return cb(1, ctx); } - - ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, ssl_idx); - if ((dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx)) == 0 || cert == 0) - return X509_verify_cert(ctx); - - if (dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_FIXED_LEAF]) { - if ((matched = check_end_entity(ctx, dane, cert)) > 0) { - ctx->error_depth = 0; - ctx->current_cert = cert; - return cb(1, ctx); - } - if (matched < 0) { - X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM); - return -1; - } + if(matched < 0) + { + X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM); + return -1; } + } - if (dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA]) { - if ((matched = set_trust_anchor(ctx, dane, cert)) < 0) { - X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM); - return -1; - } - if (matched) { - /* - * Check that setting the untrusted chain updates the expected - * structure member at the expected offset. - */ - X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(ctx, dane->roots); - X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(ctx, dane->chain); - OPENSSL_assert(ctx->untrusted == dane->chain); - } +if(dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA]) + { + if((matched = set_trust_anchor(ctx, dane, cert)) < 0) + { + X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM); + return -1; } - + if(matched) + { /* - * Name checks and usage 0/1 constraint enforcement are delayed until - * X509_verify_cert() builds the full chain and calls our verify_chain() - * wrapper. + * Check that setting the untrusted chain updates the expected + * structure member at the expected offset. */ - dane->verify = ctx->verify; - ctx->verify = verify_chain; + X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(ctx, dane->roots); + X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(ctx, dane->chain); + OPENSSL_assert(ctx->untrusted == dane->chain); + } + } - return X509_verify_cert(ctx); +/* + * Name checks and usage 0/1 constraint enforcement are delayed until + * X509_verify_cert() builds the full chain and calls our verify_chain() + * wrapper. + */ +dane->verify = ctx->verify; +ctx->verify = verify_chain; + +return X509_verify_cert(ctx); } -static dane_list list_alloc(size_t vsize) +static dane_list +list_alloc(size_t vsize) { - void *value = (void *) OPENSSL_malloc(vsize); - dane_list l; - - if (value == 0) { - DANEerr(DANE_F_LIST_ALLOC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - if ((l = (dane_list) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*l))) == 0) { - OPENSSL_free(value); - DANEerr(DANE_F_LIST_ALLOC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - l->next = 0; - l->value = value; - return l; +void *value = (void *) OPENSSL_malloc(vsize); +dane_list l; + +if(!value) + { + DANEerr(DANE_F_LIST_ALLOC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } +if(!(l = (dane_list) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*l)))) + { + OPENSSL_free(value); + DANEerr(DANE_F_LIST_ALLOC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } +l->next = 0; +l->value = value; +return l; } -static void list_free(void *list, void (*f)(void *)) +static void +list_free(void *list, void (*f)(void *)) { - dane_list head = (dane_list) list; - dane_list next; - - for (/* NOP */; head; head = next) { - next = head->next; - if (f && head->value) - f(head->value); - OPENSSL_free(head); - } +dane_list head; +dane_list next; + +for(head = (dane_list) list; head; head = next) + { + next = head->next; + if (f && head->value) + f(head->value); + OPENSSL_free(head); + } } -static void dane_mtype_free(void *p) +static void +dane_mtype_free(void *p) { - list_free(((dane_mtype) p)->data, OPENSSL_freeFunc); - OPENSSL_free(p); +list_free(((dane_mtype) p)->data, OPENSSL_freeFunc); +OPENSSL_free(p); } -static void dane_selector_free(void *p) +static void +dane_selector_free(void *p) { - list_free(((dane_selector) p)->mtype, dane_mtype_free); - OPENSSL_free(p); +list_free(((dane_selector) p)->mtype, dane_mtype_free); +OPENSSL_free(p); } -void DANESSL_cleanup(SSL *ssl) +void +DANESSL_cleanup(SSL *ssl) { - SSL_DANE *dane; - int u; - - if (dane_idx < 0 || (dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx)) == 0) - return; - (void) SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx, 0); - - if (dane->hosts) - list_free(dane->hosts, OPENSSL_freeFunc); - if (dane->mhost) - OPENSSL_free(dane->mhost); - for (u = 0; u <= SSL_DANE_USAGE_LAST; ++u) - if (dane->selectors[u]) - list_free(dane->selectors[u], dane_selector_free); - if (dane->pkeys) - list_free(dane->pkeys, pkey_free); - if (dane->certs) - list_free(dane->certs, cert_free); - if (dane->roots) - sk_X509_pop_free(dane->roots, X509_free); - if (dane->chain) - sk_X509_pop_free(dane->chain, X509_free); - OPENSSL_free(dane); +ssl_dane *dane; +int u; + +if(dane_idx < 0 || !(dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx))) + return; +(void) SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx, 0); + +if(dane->hosts) + list_free(dane->hosts, OPENSSL_freeFunc); +if(dane->mhost) + OPENSSL_free(dane->mhost); +for(u = 0; u <= SSL_DANE_USAGE_LAST; ++u) + if(dane->selectors[u]) + list_free(dane->selectors[u], dane_selector_free); +if(dane->pkeys) + list_free(dane->pkeys, pkey_free); +if(dane->certs) + list_free(dane->certs, cert_free); +if(dane->roots) + sk_X509_pop_free(dane->roots, X509_free); +if(dane->chain) + sk_X509_pop_free(dane->chain, X509_free); +OPENSSL_free(dane); } -static DANE_HOST_LIST host_list_init(const char **src) +static dane_host_list +host_list_init(const char **src) { - DANE_HOST_LIST head = 0; - - while (*src) { - DANE_HOST_LIST elem = (DANE_HOST_LIST) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*elem)); - if (elem == 0) { - list_free(head, OPENSSL_freeFunc); - return 0; - } - elem->value = OPENSSL_strdup(*src++); - LINSERT(head, elem); +dane_host_list head = NULL; + +while(*src) + { + dane_host_list elem = (dane_host_list) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*elem)); + if(!elem) + { + list_free(head, OPENSSL_freeFunc); + return 0; } - return head; + elem->value = OPENSSL_strdup(*src++); + LINSERT(head, elem); + } +return head; } -int DANESSL_add_tlsa( - SSL *ssl, - uint8_t usage, - uint8_t selector, - const char *mdname, - unsigned const char *data, - size_t dlen -) +int +DANESSL_add_tlsa(SSL *ssl, uint8_t usage, uint8_t selector, const char *mdname, + unsigned const char *data, size_t dlen) { - SSL_DANE *dane; - DANE_SELECTOR_LIST s = 0; - DANE_MTYPE_LIST m = 0; - DANE_DATA_LIST d = 0; - DANE_CERT_LIST xlist = 0; - DANE_PKEY_LIST klist = 0; - const EVP_MD *md = 0; - - if (dane_idx < 0 || (dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx)) == 0) { - DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_DANE_INIT); - return -1; - } - - if (usage > SSL_DANE_USAGE_LAST) { - DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_USAGE); - return 0; - } - if (selector > SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_LAST) { - DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_SELECTOR); - return 0; - } - if (mdname && (md = EVP_get_digestbyname(mdname)) == 0) { - DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_DIGEST); - return 0; - } - if (!data) { - DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_NULL_DATA); - return 0; - } - if (mdname && dlen != EVP_MD_size(md)) { - DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_DATA_LENGTH); - return 0; - } - - if (mdname == 0) { - X509 *x = 0; - EVP_PKEY *k = 0; - const unsigned char *p = data; +ssl_dane *dane; +dane_selector_list s = 0; +dane_mtype_list m = 0; +dane_data_list d = 0; +dane_cert_list xlist = 0; +dane_pkey_list klist = 0; +const EVP_MD *md = 0; + +if(dane_idx < 0 || !(dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx))) + { + DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_DANE_INIT); + return -1; + } + +if(usage > SSL_DANE_USAGE_LAST) + { + DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_USAGE); + return 0; + } +if(selector > SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_LAST) + { + DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_SELECTOR); + return 0; + } +if(mdname && !(md = EVP_get_digestbyname(mdname))) + { + DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_DIGEST); + return 0; + } +if(!data) + { + DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_NULL_DATA); + return 0; + } +if(mdname && dlen != EVP_MD_size(md)) + { + DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_DATA_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + +if(!mdname) + { + X509 *x = 0; + EVP_PKEY *k = 0; + const unsigned char *p = data; #define xklistinit(lvar, ltype, var, freeFunc) do { \ - (lvar) = (ltype) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*(lvar))); \ - if ((lvar) == 0) { \ - DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); \ - freeFunc((var)); \ - return 0; \ - } \ - (lvar)->next = 0; \ - lvar->value = var; \ - } while (0) + (lvar) = (ltype) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*(lvar))); \ + if (!(lvar)) { \ + DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); \ + freeFunc((var)); \ + return 0; \ + } \ + (lvar)->next = 0; \ + lvar->value = var; \ + } while (0) #define xkfreeret(ret) do { \ - if (xlist) list_free(xlist, cert_free); \ - if (klist) list_free(klist, pkey_free); \ - return (ret); \ - } while (0) - - switch (selector) { - case SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_CERT: - if (!d2i_X509(&x, &p, dlen) || dlen != p - data) { - if (x) - X509_free(x); - DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_CERT); - return 0; - } - k = X509_get_pubkey(x); - EVP_PKEY_free(k); - if (k == 0) { - X509_free(x); - DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_CERT_PKEY); - return 0; - } - if (usage == SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA) - xklistinit(xlist, DANE_CERT_LIST, x, X509_free); - break; - - case SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_SPKI: - if (!d2i_PUBKEY(&k, &p, dlen) || dlen != p - data) { - if (k) - EVP_PKEY_free(k); - DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_PKEY); - return 0; - } - if (usage == SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA) - xklistinit(klist, DANE_PKEY_LIST, k, EVP_PKEY_free); - break; - } + if (xlist) list_free(xlist, cert_free); \ + if (klist) list_free(klist, pkey_free); \ + return (ret); \ + } while (0) + + switch(selector) + { + case SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_CERT: + if(!d2i_X509(&x, &p, dlen) || dlen != p - data) + { + if (x) + X509_free(x); + DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_CERT); + return 0; + } + k = X509_get_pubkey(x); + EVP_PKEY_free(k); + if(!k) + { + X509_free(x); + DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_CERT_PKEY); + return 0; + } + if(usage == SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA) + xklistinit(xlist, dane_cert_list, x, X509_free); + break; + + case SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_SPKI: + if(!d2i_PUBKEY(&k, &p, dlen) || dlen != p - data) + { + if(k) + EVP_PKEY_free(k); + DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_PKEY); + return 0; + } + if(usage == SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA) + xklistinit(klist, dane_pkey_list, k, EVP_PKEY_free); + break; } - - /* Find insertion point and don't add duplicate elements. */ - for (s = dane->selectors[usage]; s; s = s->next) - if (s->value->selector == selector) - for (m = s->value->mtype; m; m = m->next) - if (m->value->md == md) - for (d = m->value->data; d; d = d->next) - if (d->value->datalen == dlen && - memcmp(d->value->data, data, dlen) == 0) - xkfreeret(1); - - if ((d = (DANE_DATA_LIST) list_alloc(sizeof(*d->value) + dlen)) == 0) - xkfreeret(0); - d->value->datalen = dlen; - memcpy(d->value->data, data, dlen); - if (!m) { - if ((m = (DANE_MTYPE_LIST) list_alloc(sizeof(*m->value))) == 0) { - list_free(d, OPENSSL_freeFunc); - xkfreeret(0); - } - m->value->data = 0; - if ((m->value->md = md) != 0) - m->value->mdlen = dlen; - if (!s) { - if ((s = (DANE_SELECTOR_LIST) list_alloc(sizeof(*s->value))) == 0) { - list_free(m, dane_mtype_free); - xkfreeret(0); - } - s->value->mtype = 0; - s->value->selector = selector; - LINSERT(dane->selectors[usage], s); - } - LINSERT(s->value->mtype, m); + } + +/* Find insertion point and don't add duplicate elements. */ +for(s = dane->selectors[usage]; s; s = s->next) + if(s->value->selector == selector) + for(m = s->value->mtype; m; m = m->next) + if(m->value->md == md) + for(d = m->value->data; d; d = d->next) + if( d->value->datalen == dlen + && memcmp(d->value->data, data, dlen) == 0) + xkfreeret(1); + +if(!(d = (dane_data_list) list_alloc(sizeof(*d->value) + dlen))) + xkfreeret(0); +d->value->datalen = dlen; +memcpy(d->value->data, data, dlen); +if(!m) + { + if(!(m = (dane_mtype_list) list_alloc(sizeof(*m->value)))) + { + list_free(d, OPENSSL_freeFunc); + xkfreeret(0); } - LINSERT(m->value->data, d); - - if (xlist) - LINSERT(dane->certs, xlist); - else if (klist) - LINSERT(dane->pkeys, klist); - ++dane->count; - return 1; + m->value->data = 0; + if((m->value->md = md) != 0) + m->value->mdlen = dlen; + if(!s) + { + if(!(s = (dane_selector_list) list_alloc(sizeof(*s->value)))) + { + list_free(m, dane_mtype_free); + xkfreeret(0); + } + s->value->mtype = 0; + s->value->selector = selector; + LINSERT(dane->selectors[usage], s); + } + LINSERT(s->value->mtype, m); + } +LINSERT(m->value->data, d); + +if(xlist) + LINSERT(dane->certs, xlist); +else if(klist) + LINSERT(dane->pkeys, klist); +++dane->count; +return 1; } -int DANESSL_init(SSL *ssl, const char *sni_domain, const char **hostnames) +int +DANESSL_init(SSL *ssl, const char *sni_domain, const char **hostnames) { - SSL_DANE *dane; - int i; +ssl_dane *dane; +int i; #ifdef OPENSSL_INTERNAL - SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl); +SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl); - if (sctx->app_verify_callback != verify_cert) { - DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, DANE_R_SCTX_INIT); - return -1; - } +if(sctx->app_verify_callback != verify_cert) + { + DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, DANE_R_SCTX_INIT); + return -1; + } #else - if (dane_idx < 0) { - DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, DANE_R_LIBRARY_INIT); - return -1; - } +if(dane_idx < 0) + { + DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, DANE_R_LIBRARY_INIT); + return -1; + } #endif - if (sni_domain && !SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(ssl, sni_domain)) - return 0; - - if ((dane = (SSL_DANE *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_DANE))) == 0) { - DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - if (!SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx, dane)) { - DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - OPENSSL_free(dane); - return 0; - } - - dane->pkeys = 0; - dane->certs = 0; - dane->chain = 0; - dane->roots = 0; - dane->depth = -1; - dane->mhost = 0; /* Future SSL control interface */ - dane->multi = 0; /* Future SSL control interface */ - dane->count = 0; - - for (i = 0; i <= SSL_DANE_USAGE_LAST; ++i) - dane->selectors[i] = 0; - - if (hostnames && (dane->hosts = host_list_init(hostnames)) == 0) { - DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - DANESSL_cleanup(ssl); - return 0; - } +if(sni_domain && !SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(ssl, sni_domain)) + return 0; - return 1; +if(!(dane = (ssl_dane *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(ssl_dane)))) + { + DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } +if(!SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx, dane)) + { + DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + OPENSSL_free(dane); + return 0; + } + +dane->pkeys = 0; +dane->certs = 0; +dane->chain = 0; +dane->roots = 0; +dane->depth = -1; +dane->mhost = 0; /* Future SSL control interface */ +dane->multi = 0; /* Future SSL control interface */ +dane->count = 0; + +for(i = 0; i <= SSL_DANE_USAGE_LAST; ++i) + dane->selectors[i] = 0; + +if(hostnames && !(dane->hosts = host_list_init(hostnames))) + { + DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + DANESSL_cleanup(ssl); + return 0; + } + +return 1; } -int DANESSL_CTX_init(SSL_CTX *ctx) +int +DANESSL_CTX_init(SSL_CTX *ctx) { - if (dane_idx >= 0) { - SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(ctx, verify_cert, 0); - return 1; - } - DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_CTX_DANE_INIT, DANE_R_LIBRARY_INIT); - return -1; +if(dane_idx >= 0) + { + SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(ctx, verify_cert, 0); + return 1; + } +DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_CTX_DANE_INIT, DANE_R_LIBRARY_INIT); +return -1; } -static int init_once( - volatile int *value, - int (*init)(void), - void (*postinit)(void) -) +static int +init_once(volatile int *value, int (*init)(void), void (*postinit)(void)) { - int wlock = 0; - - CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - if (*value < 0) { - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - wlock = 1; - if (*value < 0) { - *value = init(); - if (postinit) - postinit(); - } +int wlock = 0; + +CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); +if(*value < 0) + { + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + wlock = 1; + if(*value < 0) + { + *value = init(); + if(postinit) + postinit(); } - if (wlock) - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - else - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); - return *value; + } +if (wlock) + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); +else + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); +return *value; } -static void dane_init(void) +static void +dane_init(void) { - /* - * Store library id in zeroth function slot, used to locate the library - * name. This must be done before we load the error strings. - */ +/* + * Store library id in zeroth function slot, used to locate the library + * name. This must be done before we load the error strings. + */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR - dane_str_functs[0].error |= ERR_PACK(err_lib_dane, 0, 0); - ERR_load_strings(err_lib_dane, dane_str_functs); - ERR_load_strings(err_lib_dane, dane_str_reasons); +dane_str_functs[0].error |= ERR_PACK(err_lib_dane, 0, 0); +ERR_load_strings(err_lib_dane, dane_str_functs); +ERR_load_strings(err_lib_dane, dane_str_reasons); #endif - /* - * Register SHA-2 digests, if implemented and not already registered. - */ +/* + * Register SHA-2 digests, if implemented and not already registered. + */ #if defined(LN_sha256) && defined(NID_sha256) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256) - if (!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha224)) - EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha224()); - if (!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha256)) - EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256()); +if(!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha224)) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha224()); +if(!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha256)) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256()); #endif #if defined(LN_sha512) && defined(NID_sha512) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA512) - if (!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha384)) - EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha384()); - if (!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha512)) - EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha512()); +if(!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha384)) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha384()); +if(!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha512)) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha512()); #endif - /* - * Register an SSL index for the connection-specific SSL_DANE structure. - * Using a separate index makes it possible to add DANE support to - * existing OpenSSL releases that don't have a suitable pointer in the - * SSL structure. - */ - dane_idx = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, 0, 0, 0, 0); +/* + * Register an SSL index for the connection-specific ssl_dane structure. + * Using a separate index makes it possible to add DANE support to + * existing OpenSSL releases that don't have a suitable pointer in the + * SSL structure. + */ +dane_idx = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, 0, 0, 0, 0); } -int DANESSL_library_init(void) +int +DANESSL_library_init(void) { - if (err_lib_dane < 0) - init_once(&err_lib_dane, ERR_get_next_error_library, dane_init); +if(err_lib_dane < 0) + init_once(&err_lib_dane, ERR_get_next_error_library, dane_init); #if defined(LN_sha256) - /* No DANE without SHA256 support */ - if (dane_idx >= 0 && EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha256) != 0) - return 1; +/* No DANE without SHA256 support */ +if(dane_idx >= 0 && EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha256) != 0) + return 1; #endif - DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_LIBRARY_INIT, DANE_R_DANE_SUPPORT); - return 0; + +DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_LIBRARY_INIT, DANE_R_DANE_SUPPORT); +return 0; } #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */ +/* vi: aw ai sw=2 +*/