OpenSSSL: support write-with-more-intent in client

(cherry picked from commit f6a1bb920eebdba0d4a6c295c4d054307b49b2b1)

diff --git a/src/src/tls-openssl.c b/src/src/tls-openssl.c
index 5cb1ac1e82b61dd58c04d64f7e3814cfe5bfbaec..f04cbf813957a704597d9925d21d49f5872f5a0b 100644 (file)
--- a/src/src/tls-openssl.c
+++ b/src/src/tls-openssl.c
@@ -2900,6 +2900,7 @@ Used by both server-side and client-side TLS.
 int
 tls_write(void * ct_ctx, const uschar *buff, size_t len, BOOL more)
 {
+size_t olen = len;
 int outbytes, error;
 SSL * ssl = ct_ctx ? ((exim_openssl_client_tls_ctx *)ct_ctx)->ssl : server_ssl;
 static gstring * corked = NULL;
@@ -2911,10 +2912,11 @@ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("%s(%p, %lu%s)\n", __FUNCTION__,
 "more" is notified.  This hack is only ok if small amounts are involved AND only
 one stream does it, in one context (i.e. no store reset).  Currently it is used
 for the responses to the received SMTP MAIL , RCPT, DATA sequence, only. */
-/*XXX + if PIPE_COMMAND, banner & ehlo-resp for smmtp-on-connect. Suspect there's
-a store reset there. */
+/* + if PIPE_COMMAND, banner & ehlo-resp for smmtp-on-connect. Suspect there's
+a store reset there, so use POOL_PERM. */
+/* + if CHUNKING, cmds EHLO,MAIL,RCPT(s),BDAT */
 
-if (!ct_ctx && (more || corked))
+if ((more || corked))
   {
 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_PIPE_CONNECT
   int save_pool = store_pool;
@@ -2967,7 +2969,7 @@ for (int left = len; left > 0;)
       return -1;
     }
   }
-return len;
+return olen;
 }
 
 

diff --git a/test/confs/4060 b/test/confs/4060
index dcc0ec2e726f44ebab8d157d2c452017f8459656..30d65a146fa358d2a76dff11430271f350c92717 100644 (file)
--- a/test/confs/4060
+++ b/test/confs/4060
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ tls_certificate = ${if eq {SERVER}{server}{DIR/aux-fixed/cert1}fail}
 # Avoid ECDHE key-exchange so that we can wireshark-decode (not TLS1.3)
 .ifdef _HAVE_GNUTLS
 tls_require_ciphers = NORMAL:-KX-ALL:+RSA
+.else
+tls_require_ciphers = DEFAULT:!kECDHE
 .endif
 
 pipelining_connect_advertise_hosts = *