Document problems with SHA-1 in certs with DANE-TA

Very few domains are using SHA-1 in EE certs issued from a CA used in
DANE-TA anchoring, but some are.  Meanwhile apparently GnuTLS now
defaults to disabling SHA-1 in chains.  Which is eminently reasonable.

I do not believe that Exim should re-enable use of SHA-1 here.  Let it
die.  Document with warnings that folks using a private CA for certs to
be publicly trusted via DANE-TA should follow decent operational
issuance practices.

Also update my Channel Binding docs for GSASL to warn that Channel
Binding is Broken™.

diff --git a/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt b/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt
index 9cddddde5e4f42974f4ef2ea8296f054286a2e8f..35fb43a6e4a1e09c4d92d449c51d1fb69e5fd160 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt
+++ b/doc/doc-docbook/spec.xfpt
@@ -10425,7 +10425,7 @@ abbreviation &%h%& can be used when &%hash%& is used as an operator.
 .cindex "expansion" "hex to base64"
 .cindex "&%hex2b64%& expansion item"
 This operator converts a hex string into one that is base64 encoded. This can
-be useful for processing the output of the MD5 and SHA-1 hashing functions.
+be useful for processing the output of the various hashing functions.
 
 
 
@@ -26830,15 +26830,17 @@ without code changes in Exim.
 
 
 .option server_channelbinding gsasl boolean false
+Do not set this true without consulting a cryptographic engineer.
+
 Some authentication mechanisms are able to use external context at both ends
 of the session to bind the authentication to that context, and fail the
 authentication process if that context differs.  Specifically, some TLS
 ciphersuites can provide identifying information about the cryptographic
 context.
 
-This means that certificate identity and verification becomes a non-issue,
-as a man-in-the-middle attack will cause the correct client and server to
-see different identifiers and authentication will fail.
+This should have meant that certificate identity and verification becomes a
+non-issue, as a man-in-the-middle attack will cause the correct client and
+server to see different identifiers and authentication will fail.
 
 This is currently only supported when using the GnuTLS library.  This is
 only usable by mechanisms which support "channel binding"; at time of
@@ -26846,7 +26848,11 @@ writing, that's the SCRAM family.
 
 This defaults off to ensure smooth upgrade across Exim releases, in case
 this option causes some clients to start failing.  Some future release
-of Exim may switch the default to be true.
+of Exim might have switched the default to be true.
+
+However, Channel Binding in TLS has proven to be broken in current versions.
+Do not plan to rely upon this feature for security, ever, without consulting
+with a subject matter expert (a cryptographic engineer).
 
 
 .option server_hostname gsasl string&!! "see below"
@@ -28173,6 +28179,27 @@ all of which point to a single TLSA record.
 Another approach which should be seriously considered is to use DANE with a certificate
 from a public CA, because of another technology, "MTA-STS", described below.
 
+.new
+When you use DANE-TA to publish trust anchor information, you ask entities
+outside your administrative control to trust the Certificate Authority for
+connections to you.
+If using a private CA then you should expect others to still apply the
+technical criteria they'd use for a public CA to your certificates.
+In particular, you should probably try to follow current best practices for CA
+operation around hash algorithms and key sizes.
+Do not expect other organizations to lower their security expectations just
+because a particular profile might be reasonable for your own internal use.
+
+When this text was last updated, this in practice means to avoid use of SHA-1
+and MD5; if using RSA to use key sizes of at least 2048 bits (and no larger
+than 4096, for interoperability); to use keyUsage fields correctly; to use
+random serial numbers.
+The list of requirements is subject to change as best practices evolve.
+If you're not already using a private CA, or it doesn't meet these
+requirements, then we encourage you to avoid all these issues and use a public
+CA such as &url(https://letsencrypt.org/,Let's Encrypt) instead.
+.wen
+
 The TLSA record should have a Selector field of SPKI(1) and a Matching Type field of SHA2-512(2).
 
 At the time of writing, &url(https://www.huque.com/bin/gen_tlsa)
@@ -28189,6 +28216,16 @@ are workable for 4th-field hashes.
 
 For use with the DANE-TA model, server certificates must have a correct name (SubjectName or SubjectAltName).
 
+.new
+The Certificate issued by the CA published in the DANE-TA model should be
+issued using a strong hash algorithm.
+Exim, and importantlyimportantly  various other MTAs sending to you, will not
+re-enable hash algorithms which have been disabled by default in TLS
+libraries.
+This means no MD5 and no SHA-1.  SHA2-256 is the minimum for reliable
+interoperability (and probably the maximum too, in 2018).
+.wen
+
 The use of OCSP-stapling should be considered, allowing for fast revocation of certificates (which would otherwise
 be limited by the DNS TTL on the TLSA records).  However, this is likely to only be usable with DANE-TA.  NOTE: the
 default of requesting OCSP for all hosts is modified iff DANE is in use, to:

diff --git a/doc/doc-txt/GnuTLS-FAQ.txt b/doc/doc-txt/GnuTLS-FAQ.txt
index 897087582a8793b1696eb74034334e16d448fa94..ab4e5aaa6a88e549304923d5d75c2a271feef939 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/doc-txt/GnuTLS-FAQ.txt
+++ b/doc/doc-txt/GnuTLS-FAQ.txt
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Using Exim 4.80+ with GnuTLS
 (3) I'm seeing:
     "(gnutls_handshake): A TLS packet with unexpected length was received"
     Why?
-(4) What's the deal with MD5?
+(4) What's the deal with MD5?  (And SHA-1?)
 (5) What happened to gnutls_require_kx / gnutls_require_mac /
     gnutls_require_protocols?
 (6) What's the deal with tls_dh_max_bits?  What's DH?
@@ -89,8 +89,8 @@ option fixes the problem, this was the cause.  See Q6.
 
 
 
-(4): What's the deal with MD5?
-------------------------------
+(4): What's the deal with MD5?  (And SHA-1?)
+--------------------------------------------
 
 MD5 is a hash algorithm.  Hash algorithms are used to reduce a lot of data
 down to a fairly short value, which is supposed to be extremely hard to
@@ -119,6 +119,10 @@ the ongoing costs of proving a trust relationship, such as providing
 revocation protocols.  This is just another of those ongoing costs you have
 already paid for.
 
+The same has happened to SHA-1: there are real-world collision attacks against
+SHA-1, so SHA-1 is mostly defunct in certificates.  GnuTLS no longer supports
+its use in TLS certificates.
+
 
 
 (5): ... gnutls_require_kx / gnutls_require_mac / gnutls_require_protocols?