X-Git-Url: https://vcs.fsf.org/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fsrc%2Ftls-openssl.c;h=7e6524dbd97e295dc69dd1cb08375be45aa65684;hb=7a8b95190c22a8176c583985a41beb3e9ae831cd;hp=4dfeac06d35f12586174fe042ca2af6d5a641f0d;hpb=cfa8f329e9fddbb6db594761364854e780359ace;p=exim.git

diff --git a/src/src/tls-openssl.c b/src/src/tls-openssl.c
index 4dfeac06d..7e6524dbd 100644
--- a/src/src/tls-openssl.c
+++ b/src/src/tls-openssl.c
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ functions from the OpenSSL library. */
 # if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010100000L
 #  define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CHECKHOST
 #  define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_DH_BITS
+#  define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLS_METHOD
 # endif
 # if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010000000L \
     && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER & 0x0000ff000L) >= 0x000002000L
@@ -152,7 +153,6 @@ typedef struct tls_ext_ctx_cb {
   uschar *certificate;
   uschar *privatekey;
   BOOL is_server;
-  STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * acceptable_certnames;
 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
   STACK_OF(X509) *verify_stack;		/* chain for verifying the proof */
   union {
@@ -905,7 +905,7 @@ We do not free the stack since it could be needed a second time for
 SNI handling.
 
 Separately we might try to replace using OCSP_basic_verify() - which seems to not
-be a public interface into the OpenSSL library (there's no manual entry) - 
+be a public interface into the OpenSSL library (there's no manual entry) -
 But what with?  We also use OCSP_basic_verify in the client stapling callback.
 And there we NEED it; we must verify that status... unless the
 library does it for us anyway?  */
@@ -1001,7 +1001,7 @@ if (!EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa))
   goto err;
 
 X509_set_version(x509, 2);				/* N+1 - version 3 */
-ASN1_INTEGER_set(X509_get_serialNumber(x509), 0);
+ASN1_INTEGER_set(X509_get_serialNumber(x509), 1);
 X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x509), 0);
 X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notAfter(x509), (long)60 * 60);	/* 1 hour */
 X509_set_pubkey(x509, pkey);
@@ -1217,7 +1217,11 @@ if (!reexpand_tls_files_for_sni)
 not confident that memcpy wouldn't break some internal reference counting.
 Especially since there's a references struct member, which would be off. */
 
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLS_METHOD
+if (!(server_sni = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method())))
+#else
 if (!(server_sni = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method())))
+#endif
   {
   ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
   DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_CTX_new() failed: %s\n", ssl_errstring);
@@ -1511,7 +1515,6 @@ cbinfo = store_malloc(sizeof(tls_ext_ctx_cb));
 cbinfo->certificate = certificate;
 cbinfo->privatekey = privatekey;
 cbinfo->is_server = host==NULL;
-cbinfo->acceptable_certnames = NULL;
 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
 cbinfo->verify_stack = NULL;
 if (!host)
@@ -1547,7 +1550,11 @@ when OpenSSL is built without SSLv2 support.
 By disabling with openssl_options, we can let admins re-enable with the
 existing knob. */
 
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLS_METHOD
+if (!(ctx = SSL_CTX_new(host ? TLS_client_method() : TLS_server_method())))
+#else
 if (!(ctx = SSL_CTX_new(host ? SSLv23_client_method() : SSLv23_server_method())))
+#endif
   return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_new", host, NULL, errstr);
 
 /* It turns out that we need to seed the random number generator this early in
@@ -1603,9 +1610,15 @@ if (init_options)
 else
   DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("no SSL CTX options to set\n");
 
-/* Disable session cache unconditionally */
-
+/* We'd like to disable session cache unconditionally, but foolish Outlook
+Express clients then give up the first TLS connection and make a second one
+(which works).  Only when there is an IMAP service on the same machine.
+Presumably OE is trying to use the cache for A on B.  Leave it enabled for
+now, until we work out a decent way of presenting control to the config.  It
+will never be used because we use a new context every time. */
+#ifdef notdef
 (void) SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
+#endif
 
 /* Initialize with DH parameters if supplied */
 /* Initialize ECDH temp key parameter selection */
@@ -1631,7 +1644,7 @@ if ((rc = tls_expand_session_files(ctx, cbinfo, errstr)) != OK)
     }
 # endif
 
-if (host == NULL)		/* server */
+if (!host)		/* server */
   {
 # ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
   /* We check u_ocsp.server.file, not server.response, because we care about if
@@ -1700,15 +1713,13 @@ Returns:    nothing
 static void
 construct_cipher_name(SSL *ssl, uschar *cipherbuf, int bsize, int *bits)
 {
-/* With OpenSSL 1.0.0a, this needs to be const but the documentation doesn't
+/* With OpenSSL 1.0.0a, 'c' needs to be const but the documentation doesn't
 yet reflect that.  It should be a safe change anyway, even 0.9.8 versions have
 the accessor functions use const in the prototype. */
-const SSL_CIPHER *c;
-const uschar *ver;
 
-ver = (const uschar *)SSL_get_version(ssl);
+const uschar * ver = CUS SSL_get_version(ssl);
+const SSL_CIPHER * c = (const SSL_CIPHER *) SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
 
-c = (const SSL_CIPHER *) SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
 SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(c, bits);
 
 string_format(cipherbuf, bsize, "%s:%s:%u", ver,
@@ -1748,6 +1759,7 @@ else
 *        Set up for verifying certificates       *
 *************************************************/
 
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
 /* Load certs from file, return TRUE on success */
 
 static BOOL
@@ -1765,6 +1777,7 @@ while ((x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bp, NULL, 0, NULL)))
 BIO_free(bp);
 return TRUE;
 }
+#endif
 
 
 
@@ -1859,21 +1872,11 @@ if (expcerts && *expcerts)
       */
       if (file)
 	{
-	tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo = host
-	  ? client_static_cbinfo : server_static_cbinfo;
-	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * names;
-
-	if ((names = cbinfo->acceptable_certnames))
-	  {
-	  sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(names, X509_NAME_free);
-	  cbinfo->acceptable_certnames = NULL;
-	  }
-	names = SSL_load_client_CA_file(CS file);
+	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * names = SSL_load_client_CA_file(CS file);
 
 	SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(sctx, names);
 	DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Added %d certificate authorities.\n",
 				    sk_X509_NAME_num(names));
-	cbinfo->acceptable_certnames = names;
 	}
       }
     }
@@ -2113,7 +2116,7 @@ DEBUG(D_tls)
  */
 if (!ssl_xfer_buffer) ssl_xfer_buffer = store_malloc(ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
 ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm = ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm = 0;
-ssl_xfer_eof = ssl_xfer_error = 0;
+ssl_xfer_eof = ssl_xfer_error = FALSE;
 
 receive_getc = tls_getc;
 receive_getbuf = tls_getbuf;
@@ -2312,8 +2315,23 @@ if (rc != OK) return rc;
 tls_out.certificate_verified = FALSE;
 client_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
 
-if (!expand_check(ob->tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers",
-    &expciphers, errstr))
+expciphers = NULL;
+#ifdef SUPPORT_DANE
+if (tlsa_dnsa)
+  {
+  /* We fall back to tls_require_ciphers if unset, empty or forced failure, but
+  other failures should be treated as problems. */
+  if (ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers &&
+      !expand_check(ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers, US"dane_require_tls_ciphers",
+        &expciphers, errstr))
+    return FAIL;
+  if (expciphers && *expciphers == '\0')
+    expciphers = NULL;
+  }
+#endif
+if (!expciphers &&
+    !expand_check(ob->tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers",
+      &expciphers, errstr))
   return FAIL;
 
 /* In OpenSSL, cipher components are separated by hyphens. In GnuTLS, they
@@ -2349,7 +2367,7 @@ else
       client_static_cbinfo, errstr)) != OK)
     return rc;
 
-if ((client_ssl = SSL_new(client_ctx)) == NULL)
+if (!(client_ssl = SSL_new(client_ctx)))
   return tls_error(US"SSL_new", host, NULL, errstr);
 SSL_set_session_id_context(client_ssl, sid_ctx, Ustrlen(sid_ctx));
 SSL_set_fd(client_ssl, fd);
@@ -2466,7 +2484,16 @@ if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout);
 inbytes = SSL_read(server_ssl, CS ssl_xfer_buffer,
 		  MIN(ssl_xfer_buffer_size, lim));
 error = SSL_get_error(server_ssl, inbytes);
-alarm(0);
+if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(0);
+
+if (had_command_timeout)		/* set by signal handler */
+  smtp_command_timeout_exit();		/* does not return */
+if (had_command_sigterm)
+  smtp_command_sigterm_exit();
+if (had_data_timeout)
+  smtp_data_timeout_exit();
+if (had_data_sigint)
+  smtp_data_sigint_exit();
 
 /* SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN appears to mean that the SSL session has been
 closed down, not that the socket itself has been closed down. Revert to
@@ -2487,12 +2514,12 @@ if (error == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN)
   if (SSL_get_shutdown(server_ssl) == SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
  	SSL_shutdown(server_ssl);
 
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
   sk_X509_pop_free(server_static_cbinfo->verify_stack, X509_free);
-  sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(server_static_cbinfo->acceptable_certnames, X509_NAME_free);
+  server_static_cbinfo->verify_stack = NULL;
+#endif
   SSL_free(server_ssl);
   SSL_CTX_free(server_ctx);
-  server_static_cbinfo->verify_stack = NULL;
-  server_static_cbinfo->acceptable_certnames = NULL;
   server_ctx = NULL;
   server_ssl = NULL;
   tls_in.active = -1;
@@ -2510,14 +2537,14 @@ else if (error == SSL_ERROR_SSL)
   {
   ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
   log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error (SSL_read): %s", ssl_errstring);
-  ssl_xfer_error = 1;
+  ssl_xfer_error = TRUE;
   return FALSE;
   }
 
 else if (error != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
   {
   DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL error %d\n", error);
-  ssl_xfer_error = 1;
+  ssl_xfer_error = TRUE;
   return FALSE;
   }
 
@@ -2766,14 +2793,13 @@ if (shutdown)
     }
   }
 
+#ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
 if (is_server)
   {
   sk_X509_pop_free(server_static_cbinfo->verify_stack, X509_free);
-  sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(server_static_cbinfo->acceptable_certnames,
-    X509_NAME_free);
   server_static_cbinfo->verify_stack = NULL;
-  server_static_cbinfo->acceptable_certnames = NULL;
   }
+#endif
 
 SSL_CTX_free(*ctxp);
 SSL_free(*sslp);
@@ -2828,8 +2854,11 @@ while (*s != 0) { if (*s == '_') *s = '-'; s++; }
 
 err = NULL;
 
-ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method());
-if (!ctx)
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLS_METHOD
+if (!(ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method())))
+#else
+if (!(ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method())))
+#endif
   {
   ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
   return string_sprintf("SSL_CTX_new() failed: %s", ssl_errstring);