X-Git-Url: https://vcs.fsf.org/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=doc%2Fdoc-txt%2Fexperimental-spec.txt;h=3dbf13f9da71910a2d9a847480cba19049b958d3;hb=7019e10b7ab291e67b3499623547ea755098f972;hp=b98ac7929918fb36aa7b1791e43f27ef2f90a058;hpb=a7538db17824b7fd70c12ef7561a67b85d6f247e;p=exim.git diff --git a/doc/doc-txt/experimental-spec.txt b/doc/doc-txt/experimental-spec.txt index b98ac7929..3dbf13f9d 100644 --- a/doc/doc-txt/experimental-spec.txt +++ b/doc/doc-txt/experimental-spec.txt @@ -623,10 +623,10 @@ exim will send these forensic emails. It's also advised that you configure a dmarc_forensic_sender because the default sender address construction might be inadequate. - control = dmarc_forensic_enable + control = dmarc_enable_forensic (AGAIN: You can choose not to send these forensic reports by simply -not putting the dmarc_forensic_enable control line at any point in +not putting the dmarc_enable_forensic control line at any point in your exim config. If you don't tell it to send them, it will not send them.) @@ -755,42 +755,50 @@ b. Configure, somewhere before the DATA ACL, the control option to deny dmarc_status = reject !authenticated = * - message = Message from $domain_used_domain failed sender's DMARC policy, REJECT + message = Message from $dmarc_used_domain failed sender's DMARC policy, REJECT -Transport post-delivery actions +Event Actions -------------------------------------------------------------- -An arbitrary per-transport string can be expanded on successful delivery, -and (for SMTP transports) a second string on deferrals caused by a host error. +(Renamed from TPDA, Transport post-delivery actions) + +An arbitrary per-transport string can be expanded upon various transport events. +Additionally a main-section configuration option can be expanded on some +per-message events. This feature may be used, for example, to write exim internal log information (not available otherwise) into a database. In order to use the feature, you must compile with -EXPERIMENTAL_TPDA=yes +EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT=yes in your Local/Makefile -and define the tpda_event_action option in the transport, to -be expanded when the event fires. +and define one or both of +- the event_action option in the transport +- the event_action main option +to be expanded when the event fires. -A new variable, $tpda_event, is set to the event type when the +A new variable, $event_name, is set to the event type when the expansion is done. The current list of events is: - msg:delivery - msg:host:defer - tcp:connect - tcp:close - tls:cert - smtp:connect - -The expansion is called for all event types, and should use the $tpda_event + msg:complete after main per message + msg:delivery after transport per recipient + msg:host:defer after transport per attempt + msg:fail:delivery after main per recipient + msg:fail:internal after main per recipient + tcp:connect before transport per connection + tcp:close after transport per connection + tls:cert before both per certificate in verification chain + smtp:connect after transport per connection + +The expansion is called for all event types, and should use the $event_name value to decide when to act. The variable data is a colon-separated list, describing an event tree. -There is an auxilary variable, $tpda_data, for which the +There is an auxilary variable, $event_data, for which the content is event_dependent: msg:delivery smtp confirmation mssage @@ -798,9 +806,9 @@ content is event_dependent: tls:cert verification chain depth smtp:connect smtp banner -The msg:host:defer event populates one extra variable, $tpda_defer_errno. +The msg:host:defer event populates one extra variable, $event_defer_errno. -The following variables are likely to be useful for most event types: +The following variables are likely to be useful depending on the event type: router_name, transport_name local_part, domain @@ -808,11 +816,12 @@ The following variables are likely to be useful for most event types: tls_out_peercert lookup_dnssec_authenticated, tls_out_dane sending_ip_address, sending_port + message_exim_id, verify_mode An example might look like: -tpda_event_action = ${if = {msg:delivery}{$tpda_event} \ +event_action = ${if eq {msg:delivery}{$event_name} \ {${lookup pgsql {SELECT * FROM record_Delivery( \ '${quote_pgsql:$sender_address_domain}',\ '${quote_pgsql:${lc:$sender_address_local_part}}', \ @@ -823,27 +832,30 @@ tpda_event_action = ${if = {msg:delivery}{$tpda_event} \ '${quote_pgsql:$message_exim_id}')}} \ } {}} -The string is expanded after the delivery completes and any -side-effects will happen. The result is then discarded. +The string is expanded when each of the supported events occur +and any side-effects of the expansion will happen. Note that for complex operations an ACL expansion can be used. -During the expansion the tpda_event variable will contain the -string-list "msg:delivery". - -The expansion of the tpda_event_action option should normally +The expansion of the event_action option should normally return an empty string. Should it return anything else the following will be forced: msg:delivery (ignored) msg:host:defer (ignored) + msg:fail:delivery (ignored) tcp:connect do not connect tcp:close (ignored) tls:cert refuse verification smtp:connect close connection +No other use is made of the result string. +Known issues: +- the tls:cert event is only called for the cert chain elements + received over the wire, with GnuTLS. OpenSSL gives the entire + chain including thse loaded locally. Redis Lookup @@ -1072,82 +1084,221 @@ QUIT 221 mail.example.net closing connection -DSN Support --------------------------------------------------------------- - -DSN Support tries to add RFC 3461 support to Exim. It adds support for -*) the additional parameters for MAIL FROM and RCPT TO -*) RFC complient MIME DSN messages for all of - success, failure and delay notifications -*) dsn_advertise_hosts main option to select which hosts are able - to use the extension -*) dsn_lasthop router switch to end DSN processing - -In case of failure reports this means that the last three parts, the message body -intro, size info and final text, of the defined template are ignored since there is no -logical place to put them in the MIME message. - -All the other changes are made without changing any defaults - -Building exim: --------------- - -Define -EXPERIMENTAL_DSN=YES -in your Local/Makefile. - -Configuration: --------------- -All DSNs are sent in MIME format if you built exim with EXPERIMENTAL_DSN=YES -No option needed to activate it, and no way to turn it off. - -Failure and delay DSNs are triggered as usual except a sender used NOTIFY=... -to prevent them. - -Support for Success DSNs is added and activated by NOTIFY=SUCCESS by clients. - -Add -dsn_advertise_hosts = * -or a more restrictive host_list to announce DSN in EHLO answers - -Those hosts can then use NOTIFY,ENVID,RET,ORCPT options. -If a message is relayed to a DSN aware host without changing the envelope -recipient the options are passed along and no success DSN is generated. -A redirect router will always trigger a success DSN if requested and the DSN -options are not passed any further. - -A success DSN always contains the recipient address as submitted by the -client as required by RFC. Rewritten addresses are never exposed. - -If you used DSN patch up to 1.3 before remove all "dsn_process" switches from -your routers since you don't need them anymore. There is no way to "gag" -success DSNs anymore. Announcing DSN means answering as requested. - -You can prevent Exim from passing DSN options along to other DSN aware hosts by defining -dsn_lasthop -in a router. Exim will then send the success DSN himself if requested as if -the next hop does not support DSN. -Adding it to a redirect router makes no difference. - -Certificate name checking --------------------------------------------------------------- -The X509 certificates used for TLS are supposed be verified -that they are owned by the expected host. The coding of TLS -support to date has not made these checks. +SOCKS +------------------------------------------------------------ +Support for proxying outbound SMTP via a Socks 5 proxy +(RFC 1928) is included if Exim is compiled with +EXPERIMENTAL_SOCKS defined. + +If an smtp transport has a nonempty socks_proxy option +defined, this is active. The option is expanded and +should be a list (colon-separated by default) of +proxy specifiers. Each proxy specifier is a list +(space-separated by default) where the initial element +is an IP address and any subsequent elements are options. + +Options are a string =. +These options are currently defined: +- "auth", with possible values "none" and "name". + Using "name" selects username/password authentication + per RFC 1929. Default is "none". +- "name" sets the authentication username. Default is empty. +- "pass" sets the authentication password. Default is empty. +- "port" sets the tcp port number for the proxy. Default is 1080. +- "tmo" sets a connection timeout in seconds for this proxy. Default is 5. + +Proxies from the list are tried in order until +one responds. The timeout for the overall connection +applies to the set of proxied attempts. + +If events are used, the remote IP/port during a +tcp:connect event will be that of the proxy. + + + + +DANE +------------------------------------------------------------ +DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities, as applied +to SMTP over TLS, provides assurance to a client that +it is actually talking to the server it wants to rather +than some attacker operating a Man In The Middle (MITM) +operation. The latter can terminate the TLS connection +you make, and make another one to the server (so both +you and the server still think you have an encrypted +connection) and, if one of the "well known" set of +Certificate Authorities has been suborned - something +which *has* been seen already (2014), a verifiable +certificate (if you're using normal root CAs, eg. the +Mozilla set, as your trust anchors). + +What DANE does is replace the CAs with the DNS as the +trust anchor. The assurance is limited to a) the possibility +that the DNS has been suborned, b) mistakes made by the +admins of the target server. The attack surface presented +by (a) is thought to be smaller than that of the set +of root CAs. + +It also allows the server to declare (implicitly) that +connections to it should use TLS. An MITM could simply +fail to pass on a server's STARTTLS. + +DANE scales better than having to maintain (and +side-channel communicate) copies of server certificates +for every possible target server. It also scales +(slightly) better than having to maintain on an SMTP +client a copy of the standard CAs bundle. It also +means not having to pay a CA for certificates. + +DANE requires a server operator to do three things: +1) run DNSSEC. This provides assurance to clients +that DNS lookups they do for the server have not +been tampered with. The domain MX record applying +to this server, its A record, its TLSA record and +any associated CNAME records must all be covered by +DNSSEC. +2) add TLSA DNS records. These say what the server +certificate for a TLS connection should be. +3) offer a server certificate, or certificate chain, +in TLS connections which is traceable to the one +defined by (one of?) the TSLA records + +There are no changes to Exim specific to server-side +operation of DANE. + +The TLSA record for the server may have "certificate +usage" of DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3). The latter specifies +the End Entity directly, i.e. the certificate involved +is that of the server (and should be the sole one transmitted +during the TLS handshake); this is appropriate for a +single system, using a self-signed certificate. + DANE-TA usage is effectively declaring a specific CA +to be used; this might be a private CA or a public, +well-known one. A private CA at simplest is just +a self-signed certificate which is used to sign +cerver certificates, but running one securely does +require careful arrangement. If a private CA is used +then either all clients must be primed with it, or +(probably simpler) the server TLS handshake must transmit +the entire certificate chain from CA to server-certificate. +If a public CA is used then all clients must be primed with it +(losing one advantage of DANE) - but the attack surface is +reduced from all public CAs to that single CA. +DANE-TA is commonly used for several services and/or +servers, each having a TLSA query-domain CNAME record, +all of which point to a single TLSA record. + +The TLSA record should have a Selector field of SPKI(1) +and a Matching Type field of SHA2-512(2). + +At the time of writing, https://www.huque.com/bin/gen_tlsa +is useful for quickly generating TLSA records; and commands like + + openssl x509 -in -pubkey -noout /dev/null \ + | openssl sha512 \ + | awk '{print $2}' + +are workable for 4th-field hashes. + +For use with the DANE-TA model, server certificates +must have a correct name (SubjectName or SubjectAltName). + +The use of OCSP-stapling should be considered, allowing +for fast revocation of certificates (which would otherwise +be limited by the DNS TTL on the TLSA records). However, +this is likely to only be usable with DANE-TA. NOTE: the +default of requesting OCSP for all hosts is modified iff +DANE is in use, to: + + hosts_request_ocsp = ${if or { {= {0}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} \ + {= {4}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} } \ + {*}{}} + +The (new) variable $tls_out_tlsa_usage is a bitfield with +numbered bits set for TLSA record usage codes. +The zero above means DANE was not in use, +the four means that only DANE-TA usage TLSA records were +found. If the definition of hosts_request_ocsp includes the +string "tls_out_tlsa_usage", they are re-expanded in time to +control the OCSP request. + +This modification of hosts_request_ocsp is only done if +it has the default value of "*". Admins who change it, and +those who use hosts_require_ocsp, should consider the interaction +with DANE in their OCSP settings. + + +For client-side DANE there are two new smtp transport options, +hosts_try_dane and hosts_require_dane. They do the obvious thing. +[ should they be domain-based rather than host-based? ] + +DANE will only be usable if the target host has DNSSEC-secured +MX, A and TLSA records. + +A TLSA lookup will be done if either of the above options match +and the host-lookup succeded using dnssec. +If a TLSA lookup is done and succeeds, a DANE-verified TLS connection +will be required for the host. + +(TODO: specify when fallback happens vs. when the host is not used) + +If DANE is requested and useable (see above) the following transport +options are ignored: + hosts_require_tls + tls_verify_hosts + tls_try_verify_hosts + tls_verify_certificates + tls_crl + tls_verify_cert_hostnames + +If DANE is not usable, whether requested or not, and CA-anchored +verification evaluation is wanted, the above variables should be set +appropriately. + +Currently dnssec_request_domains must be active (need to think about that) +and dnssec_require_domains is ignored. + +If verification was successful using DANE then the "CV" item +in the delivery log line will show as "CV=dane". + +There is a new variable $tls_out_dane which will have "yes" if +verification succeeded using DANE and "no" otherwise (only useful +in combination with EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT), and a new variable +$tls_out_tlsa_usage (detailed above). + + + +SMTPUTF8 +------------------------------------------------------------ +Internationalised mail name handling. +RFCs 6530, 6533, 5890 + +Compile with EXPERIMENTAL_INTERNATIONAL and libidn. + +Main config option smtputf8_advertise_hosts, default '*', +a host list. If this matches the sending host and +accept_8bitmime is true (the default) then the ESMTP option +SMTPUTF8 will be advertised. + +If the sender specifies the SMTPUTF8 option on a MAIL command +international handling for the message is enabled and +the expansion variable $message_smtputf8 will have value TRUE. -If built with EXPERIMENTAL_CERTNAMES defined, code is -included to do so, and a new smtp transport option -"tls_verify_cert_hostname" supported which takes a list of -names for which the checks must be made. The host must -also be in "tls_verify_hosts". +The option allow_utf8_domains is set to true for this +message. All DNS lookups are converted to a-label form +whatever the setting of allow_utf8_domains. -Both Subject and Subject-Alternate-Name certificate fields -are supported, as are wildcard certificates (limited to -a single wildcard being the initial component of a 3-or-more -component FQDN). +Log lines and Received-by: header lines will aquire a "utf8" +prefix on the protocol element, eg. utf8esmtp. +Expansion operators: + ${utf8_domain_to_alabel:str} + ${utf8_domain_from_alabel:str} + ${utf8_localpart_to_alabel:str} + ${utf8_localpart_from_alabel:str} --------------------------------------------------------------