Fix DSN Final-Recipient: field

[exim.git] / src / src / tls-openssl.c

diff --git a/src/src/tls-openssl.c b/src/src/tls-openssl.c
index ee52b7caafeaf0c381bb0a4077335841b1b84bfc..ea30ff7cad2ce8ac6e701a902b4194a470db9f67 100644 (file)
--- a/src/src/tls-openssl.c
+++ b/src/src/tls-openssl.c
@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ static SSL_CTX *server_sni = NULL;
 
 static char ssl_errstring[256];
 
-static int  ssl_session_timeout = 3600;
+static int  ssl_session_timeout = 7200;                /* Two hours */
 static BOOL client_verify_optional = FALSE;
 static BOOL server_verify_optional = FALSE;
 
@@ -586,6 +586,7 @@ if (!X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS dn, sizeof(dn)))
   }
 dn[sizeof(dn)-1] = '\0';
 
+tlsp->verify_override = FALSE;
 if (preverify_ok == 0)
   {
   uschar * extra = verify_mode ? string_sprintf(" (during %c-verify for [%s])",
@@ -943,6 +944,12 @@ else
   EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, key->aes_cipher, NULL, key->aes_key, iv);
 
   DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("ticket usable, STEK expire %ld\n", key->expire - now);
+
+  /* The ticket lifetime and renewal are the same as the STEK lifetime and
+  renewal, which is overenthusiastic.  A factor of, say, 3x longer STEK would
+  be better.  To do that we'd have to encode ticket lifetime in the name as
+  we don't yet see the restored session.  Could check posthandshake for TLS1.3
+  and trigger a new ticket then, but cannot do that for TLS1.2 */
   return key->renew < now ? 2 : 1;
   }
 }
@@ -1708,17 +1715,17 @@ if(!p)
   return cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
  }
 
-if(!(rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len)))
- {
-  tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
+if (!(rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len)))
+  {
+  tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;  /*XXX should use tlsp-> to permit concurrent outbound */
   if (LOGGING(tls_cipher))
     log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS cert status response, parse error");
   else
     DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" parse error\n");
   return 0;
- }
+  }
 
-if(!(bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp)))
+if (!(bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp)))
   {
   tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
   if (LOGGING(tls_cipher))
@@ -2168,7 +2175,8 @@ if (tlsp->peercert)
     when it actually failed but we're in try-verify mode, due to us wanting the
     knowlege that it failed so needing to have the callback and forcing a
     permissive return.  If we don't force it, the TLS startup is failed.
-    Hence the verify_override bodge - though still a problem for resumption. */
+    The extra bit of information is set in verify_override in the cb, stashed
+    for resumption next to the TLS session, and used here. */
 
     if (!tlsp->verify_override)
       tlsp->certificate_verified = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK;
@@ -2731,6 +2739,14 @@ if (tlsp->host_resumable)
          debug_printf("decoding session: %s\n", ssl_errstring);
          }
        }
+#ifdef EXIM_HAVE_SESSION_TICKET
+      else if ( SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(ss) + dt->time_stamp
+              < time(NULL))
+       {
+       DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("session expired\n");
+       dbfn_delete(dbm_file, key);
+       }
+#endif
       else if (!SSL_set_session(ssl, ss))
        {
        DEBUG(D_tls)
@@ -2744,6 +2760,8 @@ if (tlsp->host_resumable)
        {
        DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("good session\n");
        tlsp->resumption |= RESUME_CLIENT_SUGGESTED;
+       tlsp->verify_override = dt->verify_override;
+       tlsp->ocsp = dt->ocsp;
        }
       }
     else
@@ -2779,7 +2797,9 @@ if (SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(ss))         /* 1.1.1 */
   DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("session is resumable\n");
   tlsp->resumption |= RESUME_SERVER_TICKET;    /* server gave us a ticket */
 
-  len = i2d_SSL_SESSION(ss, &s);       /* s gets bumped to end */
+  dt->verify_override = tlsp->verify_override;
+  dt->ocsp = tlsp->ocsp;
+  (void) i2d_SSL_SESSION(ss, &s);              /* s gets bumped to end */
 
   if ((dbm_file = dbfn_open(US"tls", O_RDWR, &dbblock, FALSE, FALSE)))
     {
@@ -3008,12 +3028,6 @@ if (!(exim_client_ctx->ssl = SSL_new(exim_client_ctx->ctx)))
   }
 SSL_set_session_id_context(exim_client_ctx->ssl, sid_ctx, Ustrlen(sid_ctx));
 
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_TLS_RESUME
-if (!tls_client_ssl_resume_prehandshake(exim_client_ctx->ssl, tlsp, host,
-      errstr))
-  return FALSE;
-#endif
-
 SSL_set_fd(exim_client_ctx->ssl, cctx->sock);
 SSL_set_connect_state(exim_client_ctx->ssl);
 
@@ -3073,6 +3087,12 @@ if (request_ocsp)
   }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_TLS_RESUME
+if (!tls_client_ssl_resume_prehandshake(exim_client_ctx->ssl, tlsp, host,
+      errstr))
+  return FALSE;
+#endif
+
 #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
 client_static_cbinfo->event_action = tb ? tb->event_action : NULL;
 #endif
@@ -3375,14 +3395,14 @@ a store reset there, so use POOL_PERM. */
 
 if ((more || corked))
   {
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_PIPE_CONNECT
+#ifdef SUPPORT_PIPE_CONNECT
   int save_pool = store_pool;
   store_pool = POOL_PERM;
 #endif
 
   corked = string_catn(corked, buff, len);
 
-#ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_PIPE_CONNECT
+#ifdef SUPPORT_PIPE_CONNECT
   store_pool = save_pool;
 #endif