/*
* Copyright (c) 2004 Andrey Panin <pazke@donpac.ru>
- * Copyright (c) 2006-2016 The Exim Maintainers
+ * Copyright (c) 2006-2017 The Exim Maintainers
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published
/* Size of the options list. An extern variable has to be used so that its
address can appear in the tables drtables.c. */
-int auth_dovecot_options_count =
- sizeof(auth_dovecot_options) / sizeof(optionlist);
+int auth_dovecot_options_count = nelem(auth_dovecot_options);
/* Default private options block for the authentication method. */
};
+
+
+#ifdef MACRO_PREDEF
+
+/* Dummy values */
+void auth_dovecot_init(auth_instance *ablock) {}
+int auth_dovecot_server(auth_instance *ablock, uschar *data) {return 0;}
+int auth_dovecot_client(auth_instance *ablock, void * sx,
+ int timeout, uschar *buffer, int buffsize) {return 0;}
+
+#else /*!MACRO_PREDEF*/
+
+
/* Static variables for reading from the socket */
static uschar sbuffer[256];
void auth_dovecot_init(auth_instance *ablock)
{
- auth_dovecot_options_block *ob =
- (auth_dovecot_options_block *)(ablock->options_block);
-
- if (ablock->public_name == NULL)
- ablock->public_name = ablock->name;
- if (ob->server_socket != NULL)
- ablock->server = TRUE;
- ablock->client = FALSE;
+auth_dovecot_options_block *ob =
+ (auth_dovecot_options_block *)(ablock->options_block);
+
+if (!ablock->public_name) ablock->public_name = ablock->name;
+if (ob->server_socket) ablock->server = TRUE;
+ablock->client = FALSE;
}
/*************************************************
static int
strcut(uschar *str, uschar **ptrs, int nptrs)
{
- uschar *last_sub_start = str;
- int n;
-
- for (n = 0; n < nptrs; n++)
- ptrs[n] = NULL;
- n = 1;
-
- while (*str) {
- if (*str == '\t') {
- if (n <= nptrs) {
- *ptrs++ = last_sub_start;
- last_sub_start = str + 1;
- *str = '\0';
- }
- n++;
- }
- str++;
- }
-
- /* It's acceptable for the string to end with a tab character. We see
- this in AUTH PLAIN without an initial response from the client, which
- causing us to send "334 " and get the data from the client. */
- if (n <= nptrs) {
- *ptrs = last_sub_start;
- } else {
- HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("dovecot: warning: too many results from tab-splitting; saw %d fields, room for %d\n", n, nptrs);
- n = nptrs;
- }
-
- return n <= nptrs ? n : nptrs;
+uschar *last_sub_start = str;
+int n;
+
+for (n = 0; n < nptrs; n++)
+ ptrs[n] = NULL;
+n = 1;
+
+while (*str)
+ if (*str++ == '\t')
+ if (n++ <= nptrs)
+ {
+ *ptrs++ = last_sub_start;
+ last_sub_start = str;
+ str[-1] = '\0';
+ }
+
+/* It's acceptable for the string to end with a tab character. We see
+this in AUTH PLAIN without an initial response from the client, which
+causing us to send "334 " and get the data from the client. */
+if (n <= nptrs)
+ *ptrs = last_sub_start;
+else
+ {
+ HDEBUG(D_auth)
+ debug_printf("dovecot: warning: too many results from tab-splitting;"
+ " saw %d fields, room for %d\n", n, nptrs);
+ n = nptrs;
+ }
+
+return n <= nptrs ? n : nptrs;
}
static void debug_strcut(uschar **ptrs, int nlen, int alen) ARG_UNUSED;
static void
debug_strcut(uschar **ptrs, int nlen, int alen)
{
- int i;
- debug_printf("%d read but unreturned bytes; strcut() gave %d results: ",
- socket_buffer_left, nlen);
- for (i = 0; i < nlen; i++) {
- debug_printf(" {%s}", ptrs[i]);
- }
- if (nlen < alen)
- debug_printf(" last is %s\n", ptrs[i] ? ptrs[i] : US"<null>");
- else
- debug_printf(" (max for capacity)\n");
+int i;
+debug_printf("%d read but unreturned bytes; strcut() gave %d results: ",
+ socket_buffer_left, nlen);
+for (i = 0; i < nlen; i++)
+ debug_printf(" {%s}", ptrs[i]);
+if (nlen < alen)
+ debug_printf(" last is %s\n", ptrs[i] ? ptrs[i] : US"<null>");
+else
+ debug_printf(" (max for capacity)\n");
}
#define CHECK_COMMAND(str, arg_min, arg_max) do { \
{
if (socket_buffer_left == 0)
{
- socket_buffer_left = read(fd, sbuffer, sizeof(sbuffer));
- if (socket_buffer_left == 0) { if (count == 0) return NULL; else break; }
+ if ((socket_buffer_left = read(fd, sbuffer, sizeof(sbuffer))) <= 0)
+ if (count == 0) return NULL; else break;
p = 0;
}
socket_buffer_left = 0; /* Global, used to read more than a line but return by line */
while (cont)
{
- if (dc_gets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), fd) == NULL)
+ if (!dc_gets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), fd))
OUT("authentication socket read error or premature eof");
p = buffer + Ustrlen(buffer) - 1;
if (*p != '\n')
*p = '\0';
HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("received: %s\n", buffer);
- nargs = strcut(buffer, args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]));
+ nargs = strcut(buffer, args, nelem(args));
- /* HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_strcut(args, nargs, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0])); */
+ /* HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_strcut(args, nargs, nelem(args)); */
/* Code below rewritten by Kirill Miazine (km@krot.org). Only check commands that
Exim will need. Original code also failed if Dovecot server sent unknown
/* Added by PH: extra fields when TLS is in use or if the TCP/IP
connection is local. */
-if (tls_in.cipher != NULL)
+if (tls_in.cipher)
auth_extra_data = string_sprintf("secured\t%s%s",
- tls_in.certificate_verified? "valid-client-cert" : "",
- tls_in.certificate_verified? "\t" : "");
+ tls_in.certificate_verified ? "valid-client-cert" : "",
+ tls_in.certificate_verified ? "\t" : "");
-else if ( interface_address != NULL
+else if ( interface_address
&& Ustrcmp(sender_host_address, interface_address) == 0)
auth_extra_data = US"secured\t";
"AUTH\t%d\t%s\trip=%s\tlip=%s\tresp=%s\r\n",
VERSION_MAJOR, VERSION_MINOR, getpid(), cuid,
ablock->public_name, sender_host_address, interface_address,
- data ? (char *) data : "");
+ data ? CS data : "");
Subsequently, the command was modified to add "secured" and "valid-client-
cert" when relevant.
{
uschar *temp;
uschar *auth_id_pre = NULL;
- int i;
- if (dc_gets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), fd) == NULL)
+ if (!dc_gets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), fd))
{
auth_defer_msg = US"authentication socket read error or premature eof";
goto out;
buffer[Ustrlen(buffer) - 1] = 0;
HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("received: %s\n", buffer);
- nargs = strcut(buffer, args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]));
+ nargs = strcut(buffer, args, nelem(args));
if (Uatoi(args[1]) != crequid)
OUT("authentication socket connection id mismatch");
case 'F':
CHECK_COMMAND("FAIL", 1, -1);
- for (i=2; (i<nargs) && (auth_id_pre == NULL); i++)
- {
- if ( Ustrncmp(args[i], US"user=", 5) == 0 )
+ for (int i = 2; i < nargs && !auth_id_pre; i++)
+ if (Ustrncmp(args[i], US"user=", 5) == 0)
{
- auth_id_pre = args[i]+5;
+ auth_id_pre = args[i] + 5;
expand_nstring[1] = auth_vars[0] = string_copy(auth_id_pre); /* PH */
expand_nlength[1] = Ustrlen(auth_id_pre);
expand_nmax = 1;
}
- }
-
ret = FAIL;
goto out;
/* Search for the "user=$USER" string in the args array
and return the proper value. */
- for (i=2; (i<nargs) && (auth_id_pre == NULL); i++)
- {
- if ( Ustrncmp(args[i], US"user=", 5) == 0 )
+ for (int i = 2; i < nargs && !auth_id_pre; i++)
+ if (Ustrncmp(args[i], US"user=", 5) == 0)
{
- auth_id_pre = args[i]+5;
+ auth_id_pre = args[i] + 5;
expand_nstring[1] = auth_vars[0] = string_copy(auth_id_pre); /* PH */
expand_nlength[1] = Ustrlen(auth_id_pre);
expand_nmax = 1;
}
- }
- if (auth_id_pre == NULL)
+ if (!auth_id_pre)
OUT("authentication socket protocol error, username missing");
ret = OK;
/* Expand server_condition as an authorization check */
return ret == OK ? auth_check_serv_cond(ablock) : ret;
}
+
+
+#endif /*!MACRO_PREDEF*/