ee16bdc9eadc05f297c8f5ccf4a91256b4ab4250
[exim.git] / src / src / tls-openssl.c
1 /*************************************************
2 * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
3 *************************************************/
4
5 /* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2014 */
6 /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */
7
8 /* Portions Copyright (c) The OpenSSL Project 1999 */
9
10 /* This module provides the TLS (aka SSL) support for Exim using the OpenSSL
11 library. It is #included into the tls.c file when that library is used. The
12 code herein is based on a patch that was originally contributed by Steve
13 Haslam. It was adapted from stunnel, a GPL program by Michal Trojnara.
14
15 No cryptographic code is included in Exim. All this module does is to call
16 functions from the OpenSSL library. */
17
18
19 /* Heading stuff */
20
21 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
22 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
23 #include <openssl/err.h>
24 #include <openssl/rand.h>
25 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
26 # include <openssl/ocsp.h>
27 #endif
28 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
29 # include <danessl.h>
30 #endif
31
32
33 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
34 # define EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS (300L)
35 # define EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE (-1L)
36 #endif
37
38 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090806fL && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
39 # define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
40 #endif
41 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010100000L
42 # define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CHECKHOST
43 #endif
44 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010000000L \
45 && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER & 0x0000ff000L) >= 0x000002000L
46 # define EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CHECKHOST
47 #endif
48
49 #if !defined(EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT) && !defined(DISABLE_OCSP)
50 # warning "OpenSSL library version too old; define DISABLE_OCSP in Makefile"
51 # define DISABLE_OCSP
52 #endif
53
54 /* Structure for collecting random data for seeding. */
55
56 typedef struct randstuff {
57 struct timeval tv;
58 pid_t p;
59 } randstuff;
60
61 /* Local static variables */
62
63 static BOOL client_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
64 static BOOL server_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
65 static const uschar *sid_ctx = US"exim";
66
67 /* We have three different contexts to care about.
68
69 Simple case: client, `client_ctx`
70 As a client, we can be doing a callout or cut-through delivery while receiving
71 a message. So we have a client context, which should have options initialised
72 from the SMTP Transport.
73
74 Server:
75 There are two cases: with and without ServerNameIndication from the client.
76 Given TLS SNI, we can be using different keys, certs and various other
77 configuration settings, because they're re-expanded with $tls_sni set. This
78 allows vhosting with TLS. This SNI is sent in the handshake.
79 A client might not send SNI, so we need a fallback, and an initial setup too.
80 So as a server, we start out using `server_ctx`.
81 If SNI is sent by the client, then we as server, mid-negotiation, try to clone
82 `server_sni` from `server_ctx` and then initialise settings by re-expanding
83 configuration.
84 */
85
86 static SSL_CTX *client_ctx = NULL;
87 static SSL_CTX *server_ctx = NULL;
88 static SSL *client_ssl = NULL;
89 static SSL *server_ssl = NULL;
90
91 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
92 static SSL_CTX *server_sni = NULL;
93 #endif
94
95 static char ssl_errstring[256];
96
97 static int ssl_session_timeout = 200;
98 static BOOL client_verify_optional = FALSE;
99 static BOOL server_verify_optional = FALSE;
100
101 static BOOL reexpand_tls_files_for_sni = FALSE;
102
103
104 typedef struct tls_ext_ctx_cb {
105 uschar *certificate;
106 uschar *privatekey;
107 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
108 BOOL is_server;
109 union {
110 struct {
111 uschar *file;
112 uschar *file_expanded;
113 OCSP_RESPONSE *response;
114 } server;
115 struct {
116 X509_STORE *verify_store; /* non-null if status requested */
117 BOOL verify_required;
118 } client;
119 } u_ocsp;
120 #endif
121 uschar *dhparam;
122 /* these are cached from first expand */
123 uschar *server_cipher_list;
124 /* only passed down to tls_error: */
125 host_item *host;
126 const uschar * verify_cert_hostnames;
127 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
128 uschar * event_action;
129 #endif
130 } tls_ext_ctx_cb;
131
132 /* should figure out a cleanup of API to handle state preserved per
133 implementation, for various reasons, which can be void * in the APIs.
134 For now, we hack around it. */
135 tls_ext_ctx_cb *client_static_cbinfo = NULL;
136 tls_ext_ctx_cb *server_static_cbinfo = NULL;
137
138 static int
139 setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host, BOOL optional,
140 int (*cert_vfy_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) );
141
142 /* Callbacks */
143 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
144 static int tls_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad ARG_UNUSED, void *arg);
145 #endif
146 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
147 static int tls_server_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg);
148 #endif
149
150
151 /*************************************************
152 * Handle TLS error *
153 *************************************************/
154
155 /* Called from lots of places when errors occur before actually starting to do
156 the TLS handshake, that is, while the session is still in clear. Always returns
157 DEFER for a server and FAIL for a client so that most calls can use "return
158 tls_error(...)" to do this processing and then give an appropriate return. A
159 single function is used for both server and client, because it is called from
160 some shared functions.
161
162 Argument:
163 prefix text to include in the logged error
164 host NULL if setting up a server;
165 the connected host if setting up a client
166 msg error message or NULL if we should ask OpenSSL
167
168 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
169 */
170
171 static int
172 tls_error(uschar * prefix, const host_item * host, uschar * msg)
173 {
174 if (!msg)
175 {
176 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
177 msg = (uschar *)ssl_errstring;
178 }
179
180 if (host)
181 {
182 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "H=%s [%s] TLS error on connection (%s): %s",
183 host->name, host->address, prefix, msg);
184 return FAIL;
185 }
186 else
187 {
188 uschar *conn_info = smtp_get_connection_info();
189 if (Ustrncmp(conn_info, US"SMTP ", 5) == 0)
190 conn_info += 5;
191 /* I'd like to get separated H= here, but too hard for now */
192 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error on %s (%s): %s",
193 conn_info, prefix, msg);
194 return DEFER;
195 }
196 }
197
198
199
200 /*************************************************
201 * Callback to generate RSA key *
202 *************************************************/
203
204 /*
205 Arguments:
206 s SSL connection
207 export not used
208 keylength keylength
209
210 Returns: pointer to generated key
211 */
212
213 static RSA *
214 rsa_callback(SSL *s, int export, int keylength)
215 {
216 RSA *rsa_key;
217 export = export; /* Shut picky compilers up */
218 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Generating %d bit RSA key...\n", keylength);
219 rsa_key = RSA_generate_key(keylength, RSA_F4, NULL, NULL);
220 if (rsa_key == NULL)
221 {
222 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
223 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "TLS error (RSA_generate_key): %s",
224 ssl_errstring);
225 return NULL;
226 }
227 return rsa_key;
228 }
229
230
231
232 /* Extreme debug
233 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
234 void
235 x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(X509_STORE * store)
236 {
237 STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) * roots= store->objs;
238 int i;
239 static uschar name[256];
240
241 for(i= 0; i<sk_X509_OBJECT_num(roots); i++)
242 {
243 X509_OBJECT * tmp_obj= sk_X509_OBJECT_value(roots, i);
244 if(tmp_obj->type == X509_LU_X509)
245 {
246 X509 * current_cert= tmp_obj->data.x509;
247 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(current_cert), CS name, sizeof(name));
248 txt[sizeof(name)-1] = '\0';
249 debug_printf(" %s\n", name);
250 }
251 }
252 }
253 #endif
254 */
255
256
257 /*************************************************
258 * Callback for verification *
259 *************************************************/
260
261 /* The SSL library does certificate verification if set up to do so. This
262 callback has the current yes/no state is in "state". If verification succeeded,
263 we set up the tls_peerdn string. If verification failed, what happens depends
264 on whether the client is required to present a verifiable certificate or not.
265
266 If verification is optional, we change the state to yes, but still log the
267 verification error. For some reason (it really would help to have proper
268 documentation of OpenSSL), this callback function then gets called again, this
269 time with state = 1. In fact, that's useful, because we can set up the peerdn
270 value, but we must take care not to set the private verified flag on the second
271 time through.
272
273 Note: this function is not called if the client fails to present a certificate
274 when asked. We get here only if a certificate has been received. Handling of
275 optional verification for this case is done when requesting SSL to verify, by
276 setting SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT in the non-optional case.
277
278 May be called multiple times for different issues with a certificate, even
279 for a given "depth" in the certificate chain.
280
281 Arguments:
282 state current yes/no state as 1/0
283 x509ctx certificate information.
284 client TRUE for client startup, FALSE for server startup
285
286 Returns: 1 if verified, 0 if not
287 */
288
289 static int
290 verify_callback(int state, X509_STORE_CTX *x509ctx,
291 tls_support *tlsp, BOOL *calledp, BOOL *optionalp)
292 {
293 X509 * cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(x509ctx);
294 int depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx);
295 static uschar txt[256];
296 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
297 uschar * ev;
298 uschar * yield;
299 #endif
300
301 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS txt, sizeof(txt));
302 txt[sizeof(txt)-1] = '\0';
303
304 if (state == 0)
305 {
306 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] SSL verify error: depth=%d error=%s cert=%s",
307 tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address,
308 depth,
309 X509_verify_cert_error_string(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(x509ctx)),
310 txt);
311 *calledp = TRUE;
312 if (!*optionalp)
313 {
314 tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert);
315 return 0; /* reject */
316 }
317 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify failure overridden (host in "
318 "tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
319 }
320
321 else if (depth != 0)
322 {
323 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify ok: depth=%d SN=%s\n", depth, txt);
324 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
325 if (tlsp == &tls_out && client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store)
326 { /* client, wanting stapling */
327 /* Add the server cert's signing chain as the one
328 for the verification of the OCSP stapled information. */
329
330 if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store,
331 cert))
332 ERR_clear_error();
333 }
334 #endif
335 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
336 ev = tlsp == &tls_out ? client_static_cbinfo->event_action : event_action;
337 if (ev)
338 {
339 tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert);
340 if ((yield = event_raise(ev, US"tls:cert", string_sprintf("%d", depth))))
341 {
342 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] SSL verify denied by event-action: "
343 "depth=%d cert=%s: %s",
344 tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address,
345 depth, txt, yield);
346 *calledp = TRUE;
347 if (!*optionalp)
348 return 0; /* reject */
349 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Event-action verify failure overridden "
350 "(host in tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
351 }
352 X509_free(tlsp->peercert);
353 tlsp->peercert = NULL;
354 }
355 #endif
356 }
357 else
358 {
359 const uschar * verify_cert_hostnames;
360
361 tlsp->peerdn = txt;
362 tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert);
363
364 if ( tlsp == &tls_out
365 && ((verify_cert_hostnames = client_static_cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames)))
366 /* client, wanting hostname check */
367
368 # if EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_CHECKHOST
369 # ifndef X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS
370 # define X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS 0
371 # endif
372 # ifndef X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS
373 # define X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS 0
374 # endif
375 {
376 int sep = 0;
377 const uschar * list = verify_cert_hostnames;
378 uschar * name;
379 int rc;
380 while ((name = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, NULL, 0)))
381 if ((rc = X509_check_host(cert, name, 0,
382 X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS
383 | X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS)))
384 {
385 if (rc < 0)
386 {
387 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] SSL verify error: internal error",
388 tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address);
389 name = NULL;
390 }
391 break;
392 }
393 if (!name)
394 {
395 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
396 "[%s] SSL verify error: certificate name mismatch: \"%s\"",
397 tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address,
398 txt);
399 *calledp = TRUE;
400 if (!*optionalp)
401 return 0; /* reject */
402 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify failure overridden (host in "
403 "tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
404 }
405 }
406 # else
407 if (!tls_is_name_for_cert(verify_cert_hostnames, cert))
408 {
409 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
410 "[%s] SSL verify error: certificate name mismatch: \"%s\"",
411 tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address,
412 txt);
413 *calledp = TRUE;
414 if (!*optionalp)
415 return 0; /* reject */
416 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL verify failure overridden (host in "
417 "tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
418 }
419 # endif
420
421 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
422 ev = tlsp == &tls_out ? client_static_cbinfo->event_action : event_action;
423 if (ev)
424 if ((yield = event_raise(ev, US"tls:cert", US"0")))
425 {
426 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "[%s] SSL verify denied by event-action: "
427 "depth=0 cert=%s: %s",
428 tlsp == &tls_out ? deliver_host_address : sender_host_address,
429 txt, yield);
430 *calledp = TRUE;
431 if (!*optionalp)
432 return 0; /* reject */
433 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Event-action verify failure overridden "
434 "(host in tls_try_verify_hosts)\n");
435 }
436 #endif
437
438 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL%s verify ok: depth=0 SN=%s\n",
439 *calledp ? "" : " authenticated", txt);
440 if (!*calledp) tlsp->certificate_verified = TRUE;
441 *calledp = TRUE;
442 }
443
444 return 1; /* accept, at least for this level */
445 }
446
447 static int
448 verify_callback_client(int state, X509_STORE_CTX *x509ctx)
449 {
450 return verify_callback(state, x509ctx, &tls_out, &client_verify_callback_called, &client_verify_optional);
451 }
452
453 static int
454 verify_callback_server(int state, X509_STORE_CTX *x509ctx)
455 {
456 return verify_callback(state, x509ctx, &tls_in, &server_verify_callback_called, &server_verify_optional);
457 }
458
459
460 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
461
462 /* This gets called *by* the dane library verify callback, which interposes
463 itself.
464 */
465 static int
466 verify_callback_client_dane(int state, X509_STORE_CTX * x509ctx)
467 {
468 X509 * cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(x509ctx);
469 static uschar txt[256];
470 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
471 int depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509ctx);
472 uschar * yield;
473 #endif
474
475 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), CS txt, sizeof(txt));
476 txt[sizeof(txt)-1] = '\0';
477
478 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("verify_callback_client_dane: %s\n", txt);
479 tls_out.peerdn = txt;
480 tls_out.peercert = X509_dup(cert);
481
482 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
483 if (client_static_cbinfo->event_action)
484 {
485 if ((yield = event_raise(client_static_cbinfo->event_action,
486 US"tls:cert", string_sprintf("%d", depth))))
487 {
488 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DANE verify denied by event-action: "
489 "depth=%d cert=%s: %s", depth, txt, yield);
490 tls_out.certificate_verified = FALSE;
491 return 0; /* reject */
492 }
493 if (depth != 0)
494 {
495 X509_free(tls_out.peercert);
496 tls_out.peercert = NULL;
497 }
498 }
499 #endif
500
501 if (state == 1)
502 tls_out.dane_verified =
503 tls_out.certificate_verified = TRUE;
504 return 1;
505 }
506
507 #endif /*EXPERIMENTAL_DANE*/
508
509
510 /*************************************************
511 * Information callback *
512 *************************************************/
513
514 /* The SSL library functions call this from time to time to indicate what they
515 are doing. We copy the string to the debugging output when TLS debugging has
516 been requested.
517
518 Arguments:
519 s the SSL connection
520 where
521 ret
522
523 Returns: nothing
524 */
525
526 static void
527 info_callback(SSL *s, int where, int ret)
528 {
529 where = where;
530 ret = ret;
531 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL info: %s\n", SSL_state_string_long(s));
532 }
533
534
535
536 /*************************************************
537 * Initialize for DH *
538 *************************************************/
539
540 /* If dhparam is set, expand it, and load up the parameters for DH encryption.
541
542 Arguments:
543 dhparam DH parameter file or fixed parameter identity string
544 host connected host, if client; NULL if server
545
546 Returns: TRUE if OK (nothing to set up, or setup worked)
547 */
548
549 static BOOL
550 init_dh(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *dhparam, const host_item *host)
551 {
552 BIO *bio;
553 DH *dh;
554 uschar *dhexpanded;
555 const char *pem;
556
557 if (!expand_check(dhparam, US"tls_dhparam", &dhexpanded))
558 return FALSE;
559
560 if (!dhexpanded || !*dhexpanded)
561 bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(CS std_dh_prime_default(), -1);
562 else if (dhexpanded[0] == '/')
563 {
564 if (!(bio = BIO_new_file(CS dhexpanded, "r")))
565 {
566 tls_error(string_sprintf("could not read dhparams file %s", dhexpanded),
567 host, US strerror(errno));
568 return FALSE;
569 }
570 }
571 else
572 {
573 if (Ustrcmp(dhexpanded, "none") == 0)
574 {
575 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Requested no DH parameters.\n");
576 return TRUE;
577 }
578
579 if (!(pem = std_dh_prime_named(dhexpanded)))
580 {
581 tls_error(string_sprintf("Unknown standard DH prime \"%s\"", dhexpanded),
582 host, US strerror(errno));
583 return FALSE;
584 }
585 bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(CS pem, -1);
586 }
587
588 if (!(dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL)))
589 {
590 BIO_free(bio);
591 tls_error(string_sprintf("Could not read tls_dhparams \"%s\"", dhexpanded),
592 host, NULL);
593 return FALSE;
594 }
595
596 /* Even if it is larger, we silently return success rather than cause things
597 * to fail out, so that a too-large DH will not knock out all TLS; it's a
598 * debatable choice. */
599 if ((8*DH_size(dh)) > tls_dh_max_bits)
600 {
601 DEBUG(D_tls)
602 debug_printf("dhparams file %d bits, is > tls_dh_max_bits limit of %d",
603 8*DH_size(dh), tls_dh_max_bits);
604 }
605 else
606 {
607 SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(sctx, dh);
608 DEBUG(D_tls)
609 debug_printf("Diffie-Hellman initialized from %s with %d-bit prime\n",
610 dhexpanded ? dhexpanded : US"default", 8*DH_size(dh));
611 }
612
613 DH_free(dh);
614 BIO_free(bio);
615
616 return TRUE;
617 }
618
619
620
621
622 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
623 /*************************************************
624 * Load OCSP information into state *
625 *************************************************/
626
627 /* Called to load the server OCSP response from the given file into memory, once
628 caller has determined this is needed. Checks validity. Debugs a message
629 if invalid.
630
631 ASSUMES: single response, for single cert.
632
633 Arguments:
634 sctx the SSL_CTX* to update
635 cbinfo various parts of session state
636 expanded the filename putatively holding an OCSP response
637
638 */
639
640 static void
641 ocsp_load_response(SSL_CTX *sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo, const uschar *expanded)
642 {
643 BIO *bio;
644 OCSP_RESPONSE *resp;
645 OCSP_BASICRESP *basic_response;
646 OCSP_SINGLERESP *single_response;
647 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
648 X509_STORE *store;
649 unsigned long verify_flags;
650 int status, reason, i;
651
652 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded = string_copy(expanded);
653 if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response)
654 {
655 OCSP_RESPONSE_free(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response);
656 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = NULL;
657 }
658
659 bio = BIO_new_file(CS cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded, "rb");
660 if (!bio)
661 {
662 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Failed to open OCSP response file \"%s\"\n",
663 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded);
664 return;
665 }
666
667 resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(bio, NULL);
668 BIO_free(bio);
669 if (!resp)
670 {
671 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Error reading OCSP response.\n");
672 return;
673 }
674
675 status = OCSP_response_status(resp);
676 if (status != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL)
677 {
678 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response not valid: %s (%d)\n",
679 OCSP_response_status_str(status), status);
680 goto bad;
681 }
682
683 basic_response = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp);
684 if (!basic_response)
685 {
686 DEBUG(D_tls)
687 debug_printf("OCSP response parse error: unable to extract basic response.\n");
688 goto bad;
689 }
690
691 store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(sctx);
692 verify_flags = OCSP_NOVERIFY; /* check sigs, but not purpose */
693
694 /* May need to expose ability to adjust those flags?
695 OCSP_NOSIGS OCSP_NOVERIFY OCSP_NOCHAIN OCSP_NOCHECKS OCSP_NOEXPLICIT
696 OCSP_TRUSTOTHER OCSP_NOINTERN */
697
698 i = OCSP_basic_verify(basic_response, NULL, store, verify_flags);
699 if (i <= 0)
700 {
701 DEBUG(D_tls) {
702 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
703 debug_printf("OCSP response verify failure: %s\n", US ssl_errstring);
704 }
705 goto bad;
706 }
707
708 /* Here's the simplifying assumption: there's only one response, for the
709 one certificate we use, and nothing for anything else in a chain. If this
710 proves false, we need to extract a cert id from our issued cert
711 (tls_certificate) and use that for OCSP_resp_find_status() (which finds the
712 right cert in the stack and then calls OCSP_single_get0_status()).
713
714 I'm hoping to avoid reworking a bunch more of how we handle state here. */
715 single_response = OCSP_resp_get0(basic_response, 0);
716 if (!single_response)
717 {
718 DEBUG(D_tls)
719 debug_printf("Unable to get first response from OCSP basic response.\n");
720 goto bad;
721 }
722
723 status = OCSP_single_get0_status(single_response, &reason, &rev, &thisupd, &nextupd);
724 if (status != V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD)
725 {
726 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response bad cert status: %s (%d) %s (%d)\n",
727 OCSP_cert_status_str(status), status,
728 OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason), reason);
729 goto bad;
730 }
731
732 if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE))
733 {
734 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP status invalid times.\n");
735 goto bad;
736 }
737
738 supply_response:
739 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = resp;
740 return;
741
742 bad:
743 if (running_in_test_harness)
744 {
745 extern char ** environ;
746 uschar ** p;
747 for (p = USS environ; *p != NULL; p++)
748 if (Ustrncmp(*p, "EXIM_TESTHARNESS_DISABLE_OCSPVALIDITYCHECK", 42) == 0)
749 {
750 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Supplying known bad OCSP response\n");
751 goto supply_response;
752 }
753 }
754 return;
755 }
756 #endif /*!DISABLE_OCSP*/
757
758
759
760
761 /*************************************************
762 * Expand key and cert file specs *
763 *************************************************/
764
765 /* Called once during tls_init and possibly again during TLS setup, for a
766 new context, if Server Name Indication was used and tls_sni was seen in
767 the certificate string.
768
769 Arguments:
770 sctx the SSL_CTX* to update
771 cbinfo various parts of session state
772
773 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
774 */
775
776 static int
777 tls_expand_session_files(SSL_CTX *sctx, tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo)
778 {
779 uschar *expanded;
780
781 if (cbinfo->certificate == NULL)
782 return OK;
783
784 if (Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_sni") ||
785 Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_in_sni") ||
786 Ustrstr(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_out_sni")
787 )
788 reexpand_tls_files_for_sni = TRUE;
789
790 if (!expand_check(cbinfo->certificate, US"tls_certificate", &expanded))
791 return DEFER;
792
793 if (expanded != NULL)
794 {
795 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_certificate file %s\n", expanded);
796 if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(sctx, CS expanded))
797 return tls_error(string_sprintf(
798 "SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file file=%s", expanded),
799 cbinfo->host, NULL);
800 }
801
802 if (cbinfo->privatekey != NULL &&
803 !expand_check(cbinfo->privatekey, US"tls_privatekey", &expanded))
804 return DEFER;
805
806 /* If expansion was forced to fail, key_expanded will be NULL. If the result
807 of the expansion is an empty string, ignore it also, and assume the private
808 key is in the same file as the certificate. */
809
810 if (expanded != NULL && *expanded != 0)
811 {
812 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_privatekey file %s\n", expanded);
813 if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(sctx, CS expanded, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM))
814 return tls_error(string_sprintf(
815 "SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file file=%s", expanded), cbinfo->host, NULL);
816 }
817
818 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
819 if (cbinfo->is_server && cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file != NULL)
820 {
821 if (!expand_check(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file, US"tls_ocsp_file", &expanded))
822 return DEFER;
823
824 if (expanded != NULL && *expanded != 0)
825 {
826 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_ocsp_file %s\n", expanded);
827 if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded &&
828 (Ustrcmp(expanded, cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded) == 0))
829 {
830 DEBUG(D_tls)
831 debug_printf("tls_ocsp_file value unchanged, using existing values.\n");
832 } else {
833 ocsp_load_response(sctx, cbinfo, expanded);
834 }
835 }
836 }
837 #endif
838
839 return OK;
840 }
841
842
843
844
845 /*************************************************
846 * Callback to handle SNI *
847 *************************************************/
848
849 /* Called when acting as server during the TLS session setup if a Server Name
850 Indication extension was sent by the client.
851
852 API documentation is OpenSSL s_server.c implementation.
853
854 Arguments:
855 s SSL* of the current session
856 ad unknown (part of OpenSSL API) (unused)
857 arg Callback of "our" registered data
858
859 Returns: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_{OK,ALERT_WARNING,ALERT_FATAL,NOACK}
860 */
861
862 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
863 static int
864 tls_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad ARG_UNUSED, void *arg)
865 {
866 const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
867 tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo = (tls_ext_ctx_cb *) arg;
868 int rc;
869 int old_pool = store_pool;
870
871 if (!servername)
872 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
873
874 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS SNI \"%s\"%s\n", servername,
875 reexpand_tls_files_for_sni ? "" : " (unused for certificate selection)");
876
877 /* Make the extension value available for expansion */
878 store_pool = POOL_PERM;
879 tls_in.sni = string_copy(US servername);
880 store_pool = old_pool;
881
882 if (!reexpand_tls_files_for_sni)
883 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
884
885 /* Can't find an SSL_CTX_clone() or equivalent, so we do it manually;
886 not confident that memcpy wouldn't break some internal reference counting.
887 Especially since there's a references struct member, which would be off. */
888
889 if (!(server_sni = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method())))
890 {
891 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
892 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_CTX_new() failed: %s\n", ssl_errstring);
893 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
894 }
895
896 /* Not sure how many of these are actually needed, since SSL object
897 already exists. Might even need this selfsame callback, for reneg? */
898
899 SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(server_ctx));
900 SSL_CTX_set_mode(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_mode(server_ctx));
901 SSL_CTX_set_options(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_options(server_ctx));
902 SSL_CTX_set_timeout(server_sni, SSL_CTX_get_timeout(server_ctx));
903 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_sni, tls_servername_cb);
904 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_sni, cbinfo);
905 if (cbinfo->server_cipher_list)
906 SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(server_sni, CS cbinfo->server_cipher_list);
907 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
908 if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file)
909 {
910 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(server_sni, tls_server_stapling_cb);
911 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(server_sni, cbinfo);
912 }
913 #endif
914
915 rc = setup_certs(server_sni, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, FALSE, verify_callback_server);
916 if (rc != OK) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
917
918 /* do this after setup_certs, because this can require the certs for verifying
919 OCSP information. */
920 rc = tls_expand_session_files(server_sni, cbinfo);
921 if (rc != OK) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
922
923 if (!init_dh(server_sni, cbinfo->dhparam, NULL))
924 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
925
926 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Switching SSL context.\n");
927 SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, server_sni);
928
929 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
930 }
931 #endif /* EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT */
932
933
934
935
936 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
937
938 /*************************************************
939 * Callback to handle OCSP Stapling *
940 *************************************************/
941
942 /* Called when acting as server during the TLS session setup if the client
943 requests OCSP information with a Certificate Status Request.
944
945 Documentation via openssl s_server.c and the Apache patch from the OpenSSL
946 project.
947
948 */
949
950 static int
951 tls_server_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
952 {
953 const tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo = (tls_ext_ctx_cb *) arg;
954 uschar *response_der;
955 int response_der_len;
956
957 DEBUG(D_tls)
958 debug_printf("Received TLS status request (OCSP stapling); %s response.",
959 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response ? "have" : "lack");
960
961 tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
962 if (!cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response)
963 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
964
965 response_der = NULL;
966 response_der_len = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response,
967 &response_der);
968 if (response_der_len <= 0)
969 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
970
971 SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(server_ssl, response_der, response_der_len);
972 tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
973 return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
974 }
975
976
977 static void
978 time_print(BIO * bp, const char * str, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME * time)
979 {
980 BIO_printf(bp, "\t%s: ", str);
981 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bp, time);
982 BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
983 }
984
985 static int
986 tls_client_stapling_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
987 {
988 tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo = arg;
989 const unsigned char * p;
990 int len;
991 OCSP_RESPONSE * rsp;
992 OCSP_BASICRESP * bs;
993 int i;
994
995 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS status response (OCSP stapling):");
996 len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &p);
997 if(!p)
998 {
999 /* Expect this when we requested ocsp but got none */
1000 if ( cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required
1001 && log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
1002 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS status callback, null content");
1003 else
1004 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" null\n");
1005 return cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
1006 }
1007
1008 if(!(rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len)))
1009 {
1010 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
1011 if (log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
1012 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS cert status response, parse error");
1013 else
1014 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" parse error\n");
1015 return 0;
1016 }
1017
1018 if(!(bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp)))
1019 {
1020 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
1021 if (log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
1022 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS cert status response, error parsing response");
1023 else
1024 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf(" error parsing response\n");
1025 OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
1026 return 0;
1027 }
1028
1029 /* We'd check the nonce here if we'd put one in the request. */
1030 /* However that would defeat cacheability on the server so we don't. */
1031
1032 /* This section of code reworked from OpenSSL apps source;
1033 The OpenSSL Project retains copyright:
1034 Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
1035 */
1036 {
1037 BIO * bp = NULL;
1038 int status, reason;
1039 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
1040
1041 DEBUG(D_tls) bp = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
1042
1043 /*OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, rsp, 0); extreme debug: stapling content */
1044
1045 /* Use the chain that verified the server cert to verify the stapled info */
1046 /* DEBUG(D_tls) x509_store_dump_cert_s_names(cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store); */
1047
1048 if ((i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, NULL,
1049 cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store, 0)) <= 0)
1050 {
1051 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
1052 if (log_extra_selector & LX_tls_cipher)
1053 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Received TLS cert status response, itself unverifiable");
1054 BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response verify failure\n");
1055 ERR_print_errors(bp);
1056 i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
1057 goto out;
1058 }
1059
1060 BIO_printf(bp, "OCSP response well-formed and signed OK\n");
1061
1062 {
1063 STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) * sresp = bs->tbsResponseData->responses;
1064 OCSP_SINGLERESP * single;
1065
1066 if (sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp) != 1)
1067 {
1068 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
1069 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "OCSP stapling "
1070 "with multiple responses not handled");
1071 i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
1072 goto out;
1073 }
1074 single = OCSP_resp_get0(bs, 0);
1075 status = OCSP_single_get0_status(single, &reason, &rev,
1076 &thisupd, &nextupd);
1077 }
1078
1079 DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "This OCSP Update", thisupd);
1080 DEBUG(D_tls) if(nextupd) time_print(bp, "Next OCSP Update", nextupd);
1081 if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd,
1082 EXIM_OCSP_SKEW_SECONDS, EXIM_OCSP_MAX_AGE))
1083 {
1084 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
1085 DEBUG(D_tls) ERR_print_errors(bp);
1086 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server OSCP dates invalid");
1087 i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
1088 }
1089 else
1090 {
1091 DEBUG(D_tls) BIO_printf(bp, "Certificate status: %s\n",
1092 OCSP_cert_status_str(status));
1093 switch(status)
1094 {
1095 case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD:
1096 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_VFIED;
1097 i = 1;
1098 break;
1099 case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED:
1100 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
1101 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "Server certificate revoked%s%s",
1102 reason != -1 ? "; reason: " : "",
1103 reason != -1 ? OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason) : "");
1104 DEBUG(D_tls) time_print(bp, "Revocation Time", rev);
1105 i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
1106 break;
1107 default:
1108 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_FAILED;
1109 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
1110 "Server certificate status unknown, in OCSP stapling");
1111 i = cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required ? 0 : 1;
1112 break;
1113 }
1114 }
1115 out:
1116 BIO_free(bp);
1117 }
1118
1119 OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
1120 return i;
1121 }
1122 #endif /*!DISABLE_OCSP*/
1123
1124
1125 /*************************************************
1126 * Initialize for TLS *
1127 *************************************************/
1128
1129 /* Called from both server and client code, to do preliminary initialization
1130 of the library. We allocate and return a context structure.
1131
1132 Arguments:
1133 ctxp returned SSL context
1134 host connected host, if client; NULL if server
1135 dhparam DH parameter file
1136 certificate certificate file
1137 privatekey private key
1138 ocsp_file file of stapling info (server); flag for require ocsp (client)
1139 addr address if client; NULL if server (for some randomness)
1140 cbp place to put allocated callback context
1141
1142 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
1143 */
1144
1145 static int
1146 tls_init(SSL_CTX **ctxp, host_item *host, uschar *dhparam, uschar *certificate,
1147 uschar *privatekey,
1148 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1149 uschar *ocsp_file,
1150 #endif
1151 address_item *addr, tls_ext_ctx_cb ** cbp)
1152 {
1153 long init_options;
1154 int rc;
1155 BOOL okay;
1156 tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo;
1157
1158 cbinfo = store_malloc(sizeof(tls_ext_ctx_cb));
1159 cbinfo->certificate = certificate;
1160 cbinfo->privatekey = privatekey;
1161 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1162 if ((cbinfo->is_server = host==NULL))
1163 {
1164 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file = ocsp_file;
1165 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file_expanded = NULL;
1166 cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.response = NULL;
1167 }
1168 else
1169 cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store = NULL;
1170 #endif
1171 cbinfo->dhparam = dhparam;
1172 cbinfo->server_cipher_list = NULL;
1173 cbinfo->host = host;
1174 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
1175 cbinfo->event_action = NULL;
1176 #endif
1177
1178 SSL_load_error_strings(); /* basic set up */
1179 OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
1180
1181 #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256)
1182 /* SHA256 is becoming ever more popular. This makes sure it gets added to the
1183 list of available digests. */
1184 EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
1185 #endif
1186
1187 /* Create a context.
1188 The OpenSSL docs in 1.0.1b have not been updated to clarify TLS variant
1189 negotiation in the different methods; as far as I can tell, the only
1190 *_{server,client}_method which allows negotiation is SSLv23, which exists even
1191 when OpenSSL is built without SSLv2 support.
1192 By disabling with openssl_options, we can let admins re-enable with the
1193 existing knob. */
1194
1195 *ctxp = SSL_CTX_new((host == NULL)?
1196 SSLv23_server_method() : SSLv23_client_method());
1197
1198 if (*ctxp == NULL) return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_new", host, NULL);
1199
1200 /* It turns out that we need to seed the random number generator this early in
1201 order to get the full complement of ciphers to work. It took me roughly a day
1202 of work to discover this by experiment.
1203
1204 On systems that have /dev/urandom, SSL may automatically seed itself from
1205 there. Otherwise, we have to make something up as best we can. Double check
1206 afterwards. */
1207
1208 if (!RAND_status())
1209 {
1210 randstuff r;
1211 gettimeofday(&r.tv, NULL);
1212 r.p = getpid();
1213
1214 RAND_seed((uschar *)(&r), sizeof(r));
1215 RAND_seed((uschar *)big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
1216 if (addr != NULL) RAND_seed((uschar *)addr, sizeof(addr));
1217
1218 if (!RAND_status())
1219 return tls_error(US"RAND_status", host,
1220 US"unable to seed random number generator");
1221 }
1222
1223 /* Set up the information callback, which outputs if debugging is at a suitable
1224 level. */
1225
1226 SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(*ctxp, (void (*)())info_callback);
1227
1228 /* Automatically re-try reads/writes after renegotiation. */
1229 (void) SSL_CTX_set_mode(*ctxp, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
1230
1231 /* Apply administrator-supplied work-arounds.
1232 Historically we applied just one requested option,
1233 SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS, but when bug 994 requested a second, we
1234 moved to an administrator-controlled list of options to specify and
1235 grandfathered in the first one as the default value for "openssl_options".
1236
1237 No OpenSSL version number checks: the options we accept depend upon the
1238 availability of the option value macros from OpenSSL. */
1239
1240 okay = tls_openssl_options_parse(openssl_options, &init_options);
1241 if (!okay)
1242 return tls_error(US"openssl_options parsing failed", host, NULL);
1243
1244 if (init_options)
1245 {
1246 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("setting SSL CTX options: %#lx\n", init_options);
1247 if (!(SSL_CTX_set_options(*ctxp, init_options)))
1248 return tls_error(string_sprintf(
1249 "SSL_CTX_set_option(%#lx)", init_options), host, NULL);
1250 }
1251 else
1252 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("no SSL CTX options to set\n");
1253
1254 /* Initialize with DH parameters if supplied */
1255
1256 if (!init_dh(*ctxp, dhparam, host)) return DEFER;
1257
1258 /* Set up certificate and key (and perhaps OCSP info) */
1259
1260 rc = tls_expand_session_files(*ctxp, cbinfo);
1261 if (rc != OK) return rc;
1262
1263 /* If we need to handle SNI, do so */
1264 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
1265 if (host == NULL) /* server */
1266 {
1267 # ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1268 /* We check u_ocsp.server.file, not server.response, because we care about if
1269 the option exists, not what the current expansion might be, as SNI might
1270 change the certificate and OCSP file in use between now and the time the
1271 callback is invoked. */
1272 if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file)
1273 {
1274 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(server_ctx, tls_server_stapling_cb);
1275 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(server_ctx, cbinfo);
1276 }
1277 # endif
1278 /* We always do this, so that $tls_sni is available even if not used in
1279 tls_certificate */
1280 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(*ctxp, tls_servername_cb);
1281 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(*ctxp, cbinfo);
1282 }
1283 # ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1284 else /* client */
1285 if(ocsp_file) /* wanting stapling */
1286 {
1287 if (!(cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_store = X509_STORE_new()))
1288 {
1289 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("failed to create store for stapling verify\n");
1290 return FAIL;
1291 }
1292 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(*ctxp, tls_client_stapling_cb);
1293 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(*ctxp, cbinfo);
1294 }
1295 # endif
1296 #endif
1297
1298 cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames = NULL;
1299
1300 /* Set up the RSA callback */
1301
1302 SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(*ctxp, rsa_callback);
1303
1304 /* Finally, set the timeout, and we are done */
1305
1306 SSL_CTX_set_timeout(*ctxp, ssl_session_timeout);
1307 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Initialized TLS\n");
1308
1309 *cbp = cbinfo;
1310
1311 return OK;
1312 }
1313
1314
1315
1316
1317 /*************************************************
1318 * Get name of cipher in use *
1319 *************************************************/
1320
1321 /*
1322 Argument: pointer to an SSL structure for the connection
1323 buffer to use for answer
1324 size of buffer
1325 pointer to number of bits for cipher
1326 Returns: nothing
1327 */
1328
1329 static void
1330 construct_cipher_name(SSL *ssl, uschar *cipherbuf, int bsize, int *bits)
1331 {
1332 /* With OpenSSL 1.0.0a, this needs to be const but the documentation doesn't
1333 yet reflect that. It should be a safe change anyway, even 0.9.8 versions have
1334 the accessor functions use const in the prototype. */
1335 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1336 const uschar *ver;
1337
1338 ver = (const uschar *)SSL_get_version(ssl);
1339
1340 c = (const SSL_CIPHER *) SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
1341 SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(c, bits);
1342
1343 string_format(cipherbuf, bsize, "%s:%s:%u", ver,
1344 SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c), *bits);
1345
1346 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Cipher: %s\n", cipherbuf);
1347 }
1348
1349
1350
1351
1352
1353 /*************************************************
1354 * Set up for verifying certificates *
1355 *************************************************/
1356
1357 /* Called by both client and server startup
1358
1359 Arguments:
1360 sctx SSL_CTX* to initialise
1361 certs certs file or NULL
1362 crl CRL file or NULL
1363 host NULL in a server; the remote host in a client
1364 optional TRUE if called from a server for a host in tls_try_verify_hosts;
1365 otherwise passed as FALSE
1366 cert_vfy_cb Callback function for certificate verification
1367
1368 Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL
1369 */
1370
1371 static int
1372 setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host, BOOL optional,
1373 int (*cert_vfy_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) )
1374 {
1375 uschar *expcerts, *expcrl;
1376
1377 if (!expand_check(certs, US"tls_verify_certificates", &expcerts))
1378 return DEFER;
1379
1380 if (expcerts != NULL && *expcerts != '\0')
1381 {
1382 if (Ustrcmp(expcerts, "system") == 0)
1383 {
1384 /* Tell the library to use its compiled-in location for the system default
1385 CA bundle, only */
1386
1387 if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(sctx))
1388 return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths", host, NULL);
1389 }
1390 else
1391 {
1392 struct stat statbuf;
1393
1394 /* Tell the library to use its compiled-in location for the system default
1395 CA bundle. Those given by the exim config are additional to these */
1396
1397 if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(sctx))
1398 return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths", host, NULL);
1399
1400 if (Ustat(expcerts, &statbuf) < 0)
1401 {
1402 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
1403 "failed to stat %s for certificates", expcerts);
1404 return DEFER;
1405 }
1406 else
1407 {
1408 uschar *file, *dir;
1409 if ((statbuf.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
1410 { file = NULL; dir = expcerts; }
1411 else
1412 { file = expcerts; dir = NULL; }
1413
1414 /* If a certificate file is empty, the next function fails with an
1415 unhelpful error message. If we skip it, we get the correct behaviour (no
1416 certificates are recognized, but the error message is still misleading (it
1417 says no certificate was supplied.) But this is better. */
1418
1419 if ((file == NULL || statbuf.st_size > 0) &&
1420 !SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(sctx, CS file, CS dir))
1421 return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations", host, NULL);
1422
1423 /* Load the list of CAs for which we will accept certs, for sending
1424 to the client. This is only for the one-file tls_verify_certificates
1425 variant.
1426 If a list isn't loaded into the server, but
1427 some verify locations are set, the server end appears to make
1428 a wildcard reqest for client certs.
1429 Meanwhile, the client library as deafult behaviour *ignores* the list
1430 we send over the wire - see man SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb.
1431 Because of this, and that the dir variant is likely only used for
1432 the public-CA bundle (not for a private CA), not worth fixing.
1433 */
1434 if (file != NULL)
1435 {
1436 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * names = SSL_load_client_CA_file(CS file);
1437 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Added %d certificate authorities.\n",
1438 sk_X509_NAME_num(names));
1439 SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(sctx, names);
1440 }
1441 }
1442 }
1443
1444 /* Handle a certificate revocation list. */
1445
1446 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L
1447
1448 /* This bit of code is now the version supplied by Lars Mainka. (I have
1449 * merely reformatted it into the Exim code style.)
1450
1451 * "From here I changed the code to add support for multiple crl's
1452 * in pem format in one file or to support hashed directory entries in
1453 * pem format instead of a file. This method now uses the library function
1454 * X509_STORE_load_locations to add the CRL location to the SSL context.
1455 * OpenSSL will then handle the verify against CA certs and CRLs by
1456 * itself in the verify callback." */
1457
1458 if (!expand_check(crl, US"tls_crl", &expcrl)) return DEFER;
1459 if (expcrl != NULL && *expcrl != 0)
1460 {
1461 struct stat statbufcrl;
1462 if (Ustat(expcrl, &statbufcrl) < 0)
1463 {
1464 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC,
1465 "failed to stat %s for certificates revocation lists", expcrl);
1466 return DEFER;
1467 }
1468 else
1469 {
1470 /* is it a file or directory? */
1471 uschar *file, *dir;
1472 X509_STORE *cvstore = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(sctx);
1473 if ((statbufcrl.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
1474 {
1475 file = NULL;
1476 dir = expcrl;
1477 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL CRL value is a directory %s\n", dir);
1478 }
1479 else
1480 {
1481 file = expcrl;
1482 dir = NULL;
1483 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL CRL value is a file %s\n", file);
1484 }
1485 if (X509_STORE_load_locations(cvstore, CS file, CS dir) == 0)
1486 return tls_error(US"X509_STORE_load_locations", host, NULL);
1487
1488 /* setting the flags to check against the complete crl chain */
1489
1490 X509_STORE_set_flags(cvstore,
1491 X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
1492 }
1493 }
1494
1495 #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */
1496
1497 /* If verification is optional, don't fail if no certificate */
1498
1499 SSL_CTX_set_verify(sctx,
1500 SSL_VERIFY_PEER | (optional? 0 : SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT),
1501 cert_vfy_cb);
1502 }
1503
1504 return OK;
1505 }
1506
1507
1508
1509 /*************************************************
1510 * Start a TLS session in a server *
1511 *************************************************/
1512
1513 /* This is called when Exim is running as a server, after having received
1514 the STARTTLS command. It must respond to that command, and then negotiate
1515 a TLS session.
1516
1517 Arguments:
1518 require_ciphers allowed ciphers
1519
1520 Returns: OK on success
1521 DEFER for errors before the start of the negotiation
1522 FAIL for errors during the negotation; the server can't
1523 continue running.
1524 */
1525
1526 int
1527 tls_server_start(const uschar *require_ciphers)
1528 {
1529 int rc;
1530 uschar *expciphers;
1531 tls_ext_ctx_cb *cbinfo;
1532 static uschar cipherbuf[256];
1533
1534 /* Check for previous activation */
1535
1536 if (tls_in.active >= 0)
1537 {
1538 tls_error(US"STARTTLS received after TLS started", NULL, US"");
1539 smtp_printf("554 Already in TLS\r\n");
1540 return FAIL;
1541 }
1542
1543 /* Initialize the SSL library. If it fails, it will already have logged
1544 the error. */
1545
1546 rc = tls_init(&server_ctx, NULL, tls_dhparam, tls_certificate, tls_privatekey,
1547 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1548 tls_ocsp_file,
1549 #endif
1550 NULL, &server_static_cbinfo);
1551 if (rc != OK) return rc;
1552 cbinfo = server_static_cbinfo;
1553
1554 if (!expand_check(require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers))
1555 return FAIL;
1556
1557 /* In OpenSSL, cipher components are separated by hyphens. In GnuTLS, they
1558 were historically separated by underscores. So that I can use either form in my
1559 tests, and also for general convenience, we turn underscores into hyphens here.
1560 */
1561
1562 if (expciphers != NULL)
1563 {
1564 uschar *s = expciphers;
1565 while (*s != 0) { if (*s == '_') *s = '-'; s++; }
1566 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("required ciphers: %s\n", expciphers);
1567 if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(server_ctx, CS expciphers))
1568 return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list", NULL, NULL);
1569 cbinfo->server_cipher_list = expciphers;
1570 }
1571
1572 /* If this is a host for which certificate verification is mandatory or
1573 optional, set up appropriately. */
1574
1575 tls_in.certificate_verified = FALSE;
1576 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1577 tls_in.dane_verified = FALSE;
1578 #endif
1579 server_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
1580
1581 if (verify_check_host(&tls_verify_hosts) == OK)
1582 {
1583 rc = setup_certs(server_ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL,
1584 FALSE, verify_callback_server);
1585 if (rc != OK) return rc;
1586 server_verify_optional = FALSE;
1587 }
1588 else if (verify_check_host(&tls_try_verify_hosts) == OK)
1589 {
1590 rc = setup_certs(server_ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL,
1591 TRUE, verify_callback_server);
1592 if (rc != OK) return rc;
1593 server_verify_optional = TRUE;
1594 }
1595
1596 /* Prepare for new connection */
1597
1598 if ((server_ssl = SSL_new(server_ctx)) == NULL) return tls_error(US"SSL_new", NULL, NULL);
1599
1600 /* Warning: we used to SSL_clear(ssl) here, it was removed.
1601 *
1602 * With the SSL_clear(), we get strange interoperability bugs with
1603 * OpenSSL 1.0.1b and TLS1.1/1.2. It looks as though this may be a bug in
1604 * OpenSSL itself, as a clear should not lead to inability to follow protocols.
1605 *
1606 * The SSL_clear() call is to let an existing SSL* be reused, typically after
1607 * session shutdown. In this case, we have a brand new object and there's no
1608 * obvious reason to immediately clear it. I'm guessing that this was
1609 * originally added because of incomplete initialisation which the clear fixed,
1610 * in some historic release.
1611 */
1612
1613 /* Set context and tell client to go ahead, except in the case of TLS startup
1614 on connection, where outputting anything now upsets the clients and tends to
1615 make them disconnect. We need to have an explicit fflush() here, to force out
1616 the response. Other smtp_printf() calls do not need it, because in non-TLS
1617 mode, the fflush() happens when smtp_getc() is called. */
1618
1619 SSL_set_session_id_context(server_ssl, sid_ctx, Ustrlen(sid_ctx));
1620 if (!tls_in.on_connect)
1621 {
1622 smtp_printf("220 TLS go ahead\r\n");
1623 fflush(smtp_out);
1624 }
1625
1626 /* Now negotiate the TLS session. We put our own timer on it, since it seems
1627 that the OpenSSL library doesn't. */
1628
1629 SSL_set_wfd(server_ssl, fileno(smtp_out));
1630 SSL_set_rfd(server_ssl, fileno(smtp_in));
1631 SSL_set_accept_state(server_ssl);
1632
1633 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_accept\n");
1634
1635 sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
1636 if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout);
1637 rc = SSL_accept(server_ssl);
1638 alarm(0);
1639
1640 if (rc <= 0)
1641 {
1642 tls_error(US"SSL_accept", NULL, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL);
1643 if (ERR_get_error() == 0)
1644 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN,
1645 "TLS client disconnected cleanly (rejected our certificate?)");
1646 return FAIL;
1647 }
1648
1649 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_accept was successful\n");
1650
1651 /* TLS has been set up. Adjust the input functions to read via TLS,
1652 and initialize things. */
1653
1654 construct_cipher_name(server_ssl, cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf), &tls_in.bits);
1655 tls_in.cipher = cipherbuf;
1656
1657 DEBUG(D_tls)
1658 {
1659 uschar buf[2048];
1660 if (SSL_get_shared_ciphers(server_ssl, CS buf, sizeof(buf)) != NULL)
1661 debug_printf("Shared ciphers: %s\n", buf);
1662 }
1663
1664 /* Record the certificate we presented */
1665 {
1666 X509 * crt = SSL_get_certificate(server_ssl);
1667 tls_in.ourcert = crt ? X509_dup(crt) : NULL;
1668 }
1669
1670 /* Only used by the server-side tls (tls_in), including tls_getc.
1671 Client-side (tls_out) reads (seem to?) go via
1672 smtp_read_response()/ip_recv().
1673 Hence no need to duplicate for _in and _out.
1674 */
1675 ssl_xfer_buffer = store_malloc(ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
1676 ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm = ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm = 0;
1677 ssl_xfer_eof = ssl_xfer_error = 0;
1678
1679 receive_getc = tls_getc;
1680 receive_ungetc = tls_ungetc;
1681 receive_feof = tls_feof;
1682 receive_ferror = tls_ferror;
1683 receive_smtp_buffered = tls_smtp_buffered;
1684
1685 tls_in.active = fileno(smtp_out);
1686 return OK;
1687 }
1688
1689
1690
1691
1692 static int
1693 tls_client_basic_ctx_init(SSL_CTX * ctx,
1694 host_item * host, smtp_transport_options_block * ob, tls_ext_ctx_cb * cbinfo
1695 )
1696 {
1697 int rc;
1698 /* stick to the old behaviour for compatibility if tls_verify_certificates is
1699 set but both tls_verify_hosts and tls_try_verify_hosts is not set. Check only
1700 the specified host patterns if one of them is defined */
1701
1702 if ( ( !ob->tls_verify_hosts
1703 && (!ob->tls_try_verify_hosts || !*ob->tls_try_verify_hosts)
1704 )
1705 || (verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_verify_hosts, host) == OK)
1706 )
1707 client_verify_optional = FALSE;
1708 else if (verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_try_verify_hosts, host) == OK)
1709 client_verify_optional = TRUE;
1710 else
1711 return OK;
1712
1713 if ((rc = setup_certs(ctx, ob->tls_verify_certificates,
1714 ob->tls_crl, host, client_verify_optional, verify_callback_client)) != OK)
1715 return rc;
1716
1717 if (verify_check_given_host(&ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames, host) == OK)
1718 {
1719 cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames = host->name;
1720 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Cert hostname to check: \"%s\"\n",
1721 cbinfo->verify_cert_hostnames);
1722 }
1723 return OK;
1724 }
1725
1726
1727 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1728 static int
1729 dane_tlsa_load(SSL * ssl, host_item * host, dns_answer * dnsa)
1730 {
1731 dns_record * rr;
1732 dns_scan dnss;
1733 const char * hostnames[2] = { CS host->name, NULL };
1734 int found = 0;
1735
1736 if (DANESSL_init(ssl, NULL, hostnames) != 1)
1737 return tls_error(US"hostnames load", host, NULL);
1738
1739 for (rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS);
1740 rr;
1741 rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT)
1742 ) if (rr->type == T_TLSA)
1743 {
1744 uschar * p = rr->data;
1745 uint8_t usage, selector, mtype;
1746 const char * mdname;
1747
1748 usage = *p++;
1749
1750 /* Only DANE-TA(2) and DANE-EE(3) are supported */
1751 if (usage != 2 && usage != 3) continue;
1752
1753 selector = *p++;
1754 mtype = *p++;
1755
1756 switch (mtype)
1757 {
1758 default: continue; /* Only match-types 0, 1, 2 are supported */
1759 case 0: mdname = NULL; break;
1760 case 1: mdname = "sha256"; break;
1761 case 2: mdname = "sha512"; break;
1762 }
1763
1764 found++;
1765 switch (DANESSL_add_tlsa(ssl, usage, selector, mdname, p, rr->size - 3))
1766 {
1767 default:
1768 case 0: /* action not taken */
1769 return tls_error(US"tlsa load", host, NULL);
1770 case 1: break;
1771 }
1772
1773 tls_out.tlsa_usage |= 1<<usage;
1774 }
1775
1776 if (found)
1777 return OK;
1778
1779 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "DANE error: No usable TLSA records");
1780 return DEFER;
1781 }
1782 #endif /*EXPERIMENTAL_DANE*/
1783
1784
1785
1786 /*************************************************
1787 * Start a TLS session in a client *
1788 *************************************************/
1789
1790 /* Called from the smtp transport after STARTTLS has been accepted.
1791
1792 Argument:
1793 fd the fd of the connection
1794 host connected host (for messages)
1795 addr the first address
1796 tb transport (always smtp)
1797 tlsa_dnsa tlsa lookup, if DANE, else null
1798
1799 Returns: OK on success
1800 FAIL otherwise - note that tls_error() will not give DEFER
1801 because this is not a server
1802 */
1803
1804 int
1805 tls_client_start(int fd, host_item *host, address_item *addr,
1806 transport_instance *tb
1807 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1808 , dns_answer * tlsa_dnsa
1809 #endif
1810 )
1811 {
1812 smtp_transport_options_block * ob =
1813 (smtp_transport_options_block *)tb->options_block;
1814 static uschar txt[256];
1815 uschar * expciphers;
1816 X509 * server_cert;
1817 int rc;
1818 static uschar cipherbuf[256];
1819
1820 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1821 BOOL request_ocsp = FALSE;
1822 BOOL require_ocsp = FALSE;
1823 #endif
1824
1825 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1826 tls_out.tlsa_usage = 0;
1827 #endif
1828
1829 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1830 {
1831 # ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1832 if ( tlsa_dnsa
1833 && ob->hosts_request_ocsp[0] == '*'
1834 && ob->hosts_request_ocsp[1] == '\0'
1835 )
1836 {
1837 /* Unchanged from default. Use a safer one under DANE */
1838 request_ocsp = TRUE;
1839 ob->hosts_request_ocsp = US"${if or { {= {0}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} "
1840 " {= {4}{$tls_out_tlsa_usage}} } "
1841 " {*}{}}";
1842 }
1843 # endif
1844
1845 if ((require_ocsp =
1846 verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_require_ocsp, host) == OK))
1847 request_ocsp = TRUE;
1848 else
1849 # ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1850 if (!request_ocsp)
1851 # endif
1852 request_ocsp =
1853 verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_request_ocsp, host) == OK;
1854 }
1855 #endif
1856
1857 rc = tls_init(&client_ctx, host, NULL,
1858 ob->tls_certificate, ob->tls_privatekey,
1859 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1860 (void *)(long)request_ocsp,
1861 #endif
1862 addr, &client_static_cbinfo);
1863 if (rc != OK) return rc;
1864
1865 tls_out.certificate_verified = FALSE;
1866 client_verify_callback_called = FALSE;
1867
1868 if (!expand_check(ob->tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers",
1869 &expciphers))
1870 return FAIL;
1871
1872 /* In OpenSSL, cipher components are separated by hyphens. In GnuTLS, they
1873 are separated by underscores. So that I can use either form in my tests, and
1874 also for general convenience, we turn underscores into hyphens here. */
1875
1876 if (expciphers != NULL)
1877 {
1878 uschar *s = expciphers;
1879 while (*s != 0) { if (*s == '_') *s = '-'; s++; }
1880 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("required ciphers: %s\n", expciphers);
1881 if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(client_ctx, CS expciphers))
1882 return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list", host, NULL);
1883 }
1884
1885 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1886 if (tlsa_dnsa)
1887 {
1888 SSL_CTX_set_verify(client_ctx,
1889 SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT,
1890 verify_callback_client_dane);
1891
1892 if (!DANESSL_library_init())
1893 return tls_error(US"library init", host, NULL);
1894 if (DANESSL_CTX_init(client_ctx) <= 0)
1895 return tls_error(US"context init", host, NULL);
1896 }
1897 else
1898
1899 #endif
1900
1901 if ((rc = tls_client_basic_ctx_init(client_ctx, host, ob, client_static_cbinfo))
1902 != OK)
1903 return rc;
1904
1905 if ((client_ssl = SSL_new(client_ctx)) == NULL)
1906 return tls_error(US"SSL_new", host, NULL);
1907 SSL_set_session_id_context(client_ssl, sid_ctx, Ustrlen(sid_ctx));
1908 SSL_set_fd(client_ssl, fd);
1909 SSL_set_connect_state(client_ssl);
1910
1911 if (ob->tls_sni)
1912 {
1913 if (!expand_check(ob->tls_sni, US"tls_sni", &tls_out.sni))
1914 return FAIL;
1915 if (tls_out.sni == NULL)
1916 {
1917 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS SNI forced to fail, not sending\n");
1918 }
1919 else if (!Ustrlen(tls_out.sni))
1920 tls_out.sni = NULL;
1921 else
1922 {
1923 #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT
1924 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting TLS SNI \"%s\"\n", tls_out.sni);
1925 SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(client_ssl, tls_out.sni);
1926 #else
1927 DEBUG(D_tls)
1928 debug_printf("OpenSSL at build-time lacked SNI support, ignoring \"%s\"\n",
1929 tls_out.sni);
1930 #endif
1931 }
1932 }
1933
1934 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1935 if (tlsa_dnsa)
1936 if ((rc = dane_tlsa_load(client_ssl, host, tlsa_dnsa)) != OK)
1937 return rc;
1938 #endif
1939
1940 #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP
1941 /* Request certificate status at connection-time. If the server
1942 does OCSP stapling we will get the callback (set in tls_init()) */
1943 # ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1944 if (request_ocsp)
1945 {
1946 const uschar * s;
1947 if ( ((s = ob->hosts_require_ocsp) && Ustrstr(s, US"tls_out_tlsa_usage"))
1948 || ((s = ob->hosts_request_ocsp) && Ustrstr(s, US"tls_out_tlsa_usage"))
1949 )
1950 { /* Re-eval now $tls_out_tlsa_usage is populated. If
1951 this means we avoid the OCSP request, we wasted the setup
1952 cost in tls_init(). */
1953 require_ocsp = verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_require_ocsp, host) == OK;
1954 request_ocsp = require_ocsp
1955 || verify_check_given_host(&ob->hosts_request_ocsp, host) == OK;
1956 }
1957 }
1958 # endif
1959
1960 if (request_ocsp)
1961 {
1962 SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(client_ssl, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
1963 client_static_cbinfo->u_ocsp.client.verify_required = require_ocsp;
1964 tls_out.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP;
1965 }
1966 #endif
1967
1968 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT
1969 client_static_cbinfo->event_action = tb->event_action;
1970 #endif
1971
1972 /* There doesn't seem to be a built-in timeout on connection. */
1973
1974 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_connect\n");
1975 sigalrm_seen = FALSE;
1976 alarm(ob->command_timeout);
1977 rc = SSL_connect(client_ssl);
1978 alarm(0);
1979
1980 #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_DANE
1981 if (tlsa_dnsa)
1982 DANESSL_cleanup(client_ssl);
1983 #endif
1984
1985 if (rc <= 0)
1986 return tls_error(US"SSL_connect", host, sigalrm_seen ? US"timed out" : NULL);
1987
1988 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_connect succeeded\n");
1989
1990 /* Beware anonymous ciphers which lead to server_cert being NULL */
1991 /*XXX server_cert is never freed... use X509_free() */
1992 server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate (client_ssl);
1993 if (server_cert)
1994 {
1995 tls_out.peerdn = US X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(server_cert),
1996 CS txt, sizeof(txt));
1997 txt[sizeof(txt)-1] = '\0';
1998 tls_out.peerdn = txt; /*XXX a static buffer... */
1999 }
2000 else
2001 tls_out.peerdn = NULL;
2002
2003 construct_cipher_name(client_ssl, cipherbuf, sizeof(cipherbuf), &tls_out.bits);
2004 tls_out.cipher = cipherbuf;
2005
2006 /* Record the certificate we presented */
2007 {
2008 X509 * crt = SSL_get_certificate(client_ssl);
2009 tls_out.ourcert = crt ? X509_dup(crt) : NULL;
2010 }
2011
2012 tls_out.active = fd;
2013 return OK;
2014 }
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020 /*************************************************
2021 * TLS version of getc *
2022 *************************************************/
2023
2024 /* This gets the next byte from the TLS input buffer. If the buffer is empty,
2025 it refills the buffer via the SSL reading function.
2026
2027 Arguments: none
2028 Returns: the next character or EOF
2029
2030 Only used by the server-side TLS.
2031 */
2032
2033 int
2034 tls_getc(void)
2035 {
2036 if (ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm >= ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm)
2037 {
2038 int error;
2039 int inbytes;
2040
2041 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_read(%p, %p, %u)\n", server_ssl,
2042 ssl_xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
2043
2044 if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) alarm(smtp_receive_timeout);
2045 inbytes = SSL_read(server_ssl, CS ssl_xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size);
2046 error = SSL_get_error(server_ssl, inbytes);
2047 alarm(0);
2048
2049 /* SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN appears to mean that the SSL session has been
2050 closed down, not that the socket itself has been closed down. Revert to
2051 non-SSL handling. */
2052
2053 if (error == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN)
2054 {
2055 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN\n");
2056
2057 receive_getc = smtp_getc;
2058 receive_ungetc = smtp_ungetc;
2059 receive_feof = smtp_feof;
2060 receive_ferror = smtp_ferror;
2061 receive_smtp_buffered = smtp_buffered;
2062
2063 SSL_free(server_ssl);
2064 server_ssl = NULL;
2065 tls_in.active = -1;
2066 tls_in.bits = 0;
2067 tls_in.cipher = NULL;
2068 tls_in.peerdn = NULL;
2069 tls_in.sni = NULL;
2070
2071 return smtp_getc();
2072 }
2073
2074 /* Handle genuine errors */
2075
2076 else if (error == SSL_ERROR_SSL)
2077 {
2078 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
2079 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error (SSL_read): %s", ssl_errstring);
2080 ssl_xfer_error = 1;
2081 return EOF;
2082 }
2083
2084 else if (error != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
2085 {
2086 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL error %d\n", error);
2087 ssl_xfer_error = 1;
2088 return EOF;
2089 }
2090
2091 #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM
2092 dkim_exim_verify_feed(ssl_xfer_buffer, inbytes);
2093 #endif
2094 ssl_xfer_buffer_hwm = inbytes;
2095 ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm = 0;
2096 }
2097
2098 /* Something in the buffer; return next uschar */
2099
2100 return ssl_xfer_buffer[ssl_xfer_buffer_lwm++];
2101 }
2102
2103
2104
2105 /*************************************************
2106 * Read bytes from TLS channel *
2107 *************************************************/
2108
2109 /*
2110 Arguments:
2111 buff buffer of data
2112 len size of buffer
2113
2114 Returns: the number of bytes read
2115 -1 after a failed read
2116
2117 Only used by the client-side TLS.
2118 */
2119
2120 int
2121 tls_read(BOOL is_server, uschar *buff, size_t len)
2122 {
2123 SSL *ssl = is_server ? server_ssl : client_ssl;
2124 int inbytes;
2125 int error;
2126
2127 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling SSL_read(%p, %p, %u)\n", ssl,
2128 buff, (unsigned int)len);
2129
2130 inbytes = SSL_read(ssl, CS buff, len);
2131 error = SSL_get_error(ssl, inbytes);
2132
2133 if (error == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN)
2134 {
2135 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN\n");
2136 return -1;
2137 }
2138 else if (error != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
2139 {
2140 return -1;
2141 }
2142
2143 return inbytes;
2144 }
2145
2146
2147
2148
2149
2150 /*************************************************
2151 * Write bytes down TLS channel *
2152 *************************************************/
2153
2154 /*
2155 Arguments:
2156 is_server channel specifier
2157 buff buffer of data
2158 len number of bytes
2159
2160 Returns: the number of bytes after a successful write,
2161 -1 after a failed write
2162
2163 Used by both server-side and client-side TLS.
2164 */
2165
2166 int
2167 tls_write(BOOL is_server, const uschar *buff, size_t len)
2168 {
2169 int outbytes;
2170 int error;
2171 int left = len;
2172 SSL *ssl = is_server ? server_ssl : client_ssl;
2173
2174 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_do_write(%p, %d)\n", buff, left);
2175 while (left > 0)
2176 {
2177 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("SSL_write(SSL, %p, %d)\n", buff, left);
2178 outbytes = SSL_write(ssl, CS buff, left);
2179 error = SSL_get_error(ssl, outbytes);
2180 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("outbytes=%d error=%d\n", outbytes, error);
2181 switch (error)
2182 {
2183 case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
2184 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
2185 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error (SSL_write): %s", ssl_errstring);
2186 return -1;
2187
2188 case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
2189 left -= outbytes;
2190 buff += outbytes;
2191 break;
2192
2193 case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
2194 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL channel closed on write");
2195 return -1;
2196
2197 case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
2198 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL_write: (from %s) syscall: %s",
2199 sender_fullhost ? sender_fullhost : US"<unknown>",
2200 strerror(errno));
2201
2202 default:
2203 log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL_write error %d", error);
2204 return -1;
2205 }
2206 }
2207 return len;
2208 }
2209
2210
2211
2212 /*************************************************
2213 * Close down a TLS session *
2214 *************************************************/
2215
2216 /* This is also called from within a delivery subprocess forked from the
2217 daemon, to shut down the TLS library, without actually doing a shutdown (which
2218 would tamper with the SSL session in the parent process).
2219
2220 Arguments: TRUE if SSL_shutdown is to be called
2221 Returns: nothing
2222
2223 Used by both server-side and client-side TLS.
2224 */
2225
2226 void
2227 tls_close(BOOL is_server, BOOL shutdown)
2228 {
2229 SSL **sslp = is_server ? &server_ssl : &client_ssl;
2230 int *fdp = is_server ? &tls_in.active : &tls_out.active;
2231
2232 if (*fdp < 0) return; /* TLS was not active */
2233
2234 if (shutdown)
2235 {
2236 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_close(): shutting down SSL\n");
2237 SSL_shutdown(*sslp);
2238 }
2239
2240 SSL_free(*sslp);
2241 *sslp = NULL;
2242
2243 *fdp = -1;
2244 }
2245
2246
2247
2248
2249 /*************************************************
2250 * Let tls_require_ciphers be checked at startup *
2251 *************************************************/
2252
2253 /* The tls_require_ciphers option, if set, must be something which the
2254 library can parse.
2255
2256 Returns: NULL on success, or error message
2257 */
2258
2259 uschar *
2260 tls_validate_require_cipher(void)
2261 {
2262 SSL_CTX *ctx;
2263 uschar *s, *expciphers, *err;
2264
2265 /* this duplicates from tls_init(), we need a better "init just global
2266 state, for no specific purpose" singleton function of our own */
2267
2268 SSL_load_error_strings();
2269 OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
2270 #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256)
2271 /* SHA256 is becoming ever more popular. This makes sure it gets added to the
2272 list of available digests. */
2273 EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
2274 #endif
2275
2276 if (!(tls_require_ciphers && *tls_require_ciphers))
2277 return NULL;
2278
2279 if (!expand_check(tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers))
2280 return US"failed to expand tls_require_ciphers";
2281
2282 if (!(expciphers && *expciphers))
2283 return NULL;
2284
2285 /* normalisation ripped from above */
2286 s = expciphers;
2287 while (*s != 0) { if (*s == '_') *s = '-'; s++; }
2288
2289 err = NULL;
2290
2291 ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method());
2292 if (!ctx)
2293 {
2294 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
2295 return string_sprintf("SSL_CTX_new() failed: %s", ssl_errstring);
2296 }
2297
2298 DEBUG(D_tls)
2299 debug_printf("tls_require_ciphers expands to \"%s\"\n", expciphers);
2300
2301 if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, CS expciphers))
2302 {
2303 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
2304 err = string_sprintf("SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(%s) failed", expciphers);
2305 }
2306
2307 SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
2308
2309 return err;
2310 }
2311
2312
2313
2314
2315 /*************************************************
2316 * Report the library versions. *
2317 *************************************************/
2318
2319 /* There have historically been some issues with binary compatibility in
2320 OpenSSL libraries; if Exim (like many other applications) is built against
2321 one version of OpenSSL but the run-time linker picks up another version,
2322 it can result in serious failures, including crashing with a SIGSEGV. So
2323 report the version found by the compiler and the run-time version.
2324
2325 Note: some OS vendors backport security fixes without changing the version
2326 number/string, and the version date remains unchanged. The _build_ date
2327 will change, so we can more usefully assist with version diagnosis by also
2328 reporting the build date.
2329
2330 Arguments: a FILE* to print the results to
2331 Returns: nothing
2332 */
2333
2334 void
2335 tls_version_report(FILE *f)
2336 {
2337 fprintf(f, "Library version: OpenSSL: Compile: %s\n"
2338 " Runtime: %s\n"
2339 " : %s\n",
2340 OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT,
2341 SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION),
2342 SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_BUILT_ON));
2343 /* third line is 38 characters for the %s and the line is 73 chars long;
2344 the OpenSSL output includes a "built on: " prefix already. */
2345 }
2346
2347
2348
2349
2350 /*************************************************
2351 * Random number generation *
2352 *************************************************/
2353
2354 /* Pseudo-random number generation. The result is not expected to be
2355 cryptographically strong but not so weak that someone will shoot themselves
2356 in the foot using it as a nonce in input in some email header scheme or
2357 whatever weirdness they'll twist this into. The result should handle fork()
2358 and avoid repeating sequences. OpenSSL handles that for us.
2359
2360 Arguments:
2361 max range maximum
2362 Returns a random number in range [0, max-1]
2363 */
2364
2365 int
2366 vaguely_random_number(int max)
2367 {
2368 unsigned int r;
2369 int i, needed_len;
2370 static pid_t pidlast = 0;
2371 pid_t pidnow;
2372 uschar *p;
2373 uschar smallbuf[sizeof(r)];
2374
2375 if (max <= 1)
2376 return 0;
2377
2378 pidnow = getpid();
2379 if (pidnow != pidlast)
2380 {
2381 /* Although OpenSSL documents that "OpenSSL makes sure that the PRNG state
2382 is unique for each thread", this doesn't apparently apply across processes,
2383 so our own warning from vaguely_random_number_fallback() applies here too.
2384 Fix per PostgreSQL. */
2385 if (pidlast != 0)
2386 RAND_cleanup();
2387 pidlast = pidnow;
2388 }
2389
2390 /* OpenSSL auto-seeds from /dev/random, etc, but this a double-check. */
2391 if (!RAND_status())
2392 {
2393 randstuff r;
2394 gettimeofday(&r.tv, NULL);
2395 r.p = getpid();
2396
2397 RAND_seed((uschar *)(&r), sizeof(r));
2398 }
2399 /* We're after pseudo-random, not random; if we still don't have enough data
2400 in the internal PRNG then our options are limited. We could sleep and hope
2401 for entropy to come along (prayer technique) but if the system is so depleted
2402 in the first place then something is likely to just keep taking it. Instead,
2403 we'll just take whatever little bit of pseudo-random we can still manage to
2404 get. */
2405
2406 needed_len = sizeof(r);
2407 /* Don't take 8 times more entropy than needed if int is 8 octets and we were
2408 asked for a number less than 10. */
2409 for (r = max, i = 0; r; ++i)
2410 r >>= 1;
2411 i = (i + 7) / 8;
2412 if (i < needed_len)
2413 needed_len = i;
2414
2415 /* We do not care if crypto-strong */
2416 i = RAND_pseudo_bytes(smallbuf, needed_len);
2417 if (i < 0)
2418 {
2419 DEBUG(D_all)
2420 debug_printf("OpenSSL RAND_pseudo_bytes() not supported by RAND method, using fallback.\n");
2421 return vaguely_random_number_fallback(max);
2422 }
2423
2424 r = 0;
2425 for (p = smallbuf; needed_len; --needed_len, ++p)
2426 {
2427 r *= 256;
2428 r += *p;
2429 }
2430
2431 /* We don't particularly care about weighted results; if someone wants
2432 smooth distribution and cares enough then they should submit a patch then. */
2433 return r % max;
2434 }
2435
2436
2437
2438
2439 /*************************************************
2440 * OpenSSL option parse *
2441 *************************************************/
2442
2443 /* Parse one option for tls_openssl_options_parse below
2444
2445 Arguments:
2446 name one option name
2447 value place to store a value for it
2448 Returns success or failure in parsing
2449 */
2450
2451 struct exim_openssl_option {
2452 uschar *name;
2453 long value;
2454 };
2455 /* We could use a macro to expand, but we need the ifdef and not all the
2456 options document which version they were introduced in. Policylet: include
2457 all options unless explicitly for DTLS, let the administrator choose which
2458 to apply.
2459
2460 This list is current as of:
2461 ==> 1.0.1b <==
2462 Plus SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG from 2013-June patch/discussion on openssl-dev
2463 */
2464 static struct exim_openssl_option exim_openssl_options[] = {
2465 /* KEEP SORTED ALPHABETICALLY! */
2466 #ifdef SSL_OP_ALL
2467 { US"all", SSL_OP_ALL },
2468 #endif
2469 #ifdef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
2470 { US"allow_unsafe_legacy_renegotiation", SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION },
2471 #endif
2472 #ifdef SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
2473 { US"cipher_server_preference", SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE },
2474 #endif
2475 #ifdef SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
2476 { US"dont_insert_empty_fragments", SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS },
2477 #endif
2478 #ifdef SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
2479 { US"ephemeral_rsa", SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA },
2480 #endif
2481 #ifdef SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT
2482 { US"legacy_server_connect", SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT },
2483 #endif
2484 #ifdef SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
2485 { US"microsoft_big_sslv3_buffer", SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER },
2486 #endif
2487 #ifdef SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG
2488 { US"microsoft_sess_id_bug", SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG },
2489 #endif
2490 #ifdef SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
2491 { US"msie_sslv2_rsa_padding", SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING },
2492 #endif
2493 #ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG
2494 { US"netscape_challenge_bug", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG },
2495 #endif
2496 #ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
2497 { US"netscape_reuse_cipher_change_bug", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG },
2498 #endif
2499 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
2500 { US"no_compression", SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION },
2501 #endif
2502 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2503 { US"no_session_resumption_on_renegotiation", SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION },
2504 #endif
2505 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
2506 { US"no_sslv2", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 },
2507 #endif
2508 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
2509 { US"no_sslv3", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 },
2510 #endif
2511 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
2512 { US"no_ticket", SSL_OP_NO_TICKET },
2513 #endif
2514 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
2515 { US"no_tlsv1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 },
2516 #endif
2517 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
2518 #if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 == 0x00000400L
2519 /* Error in chosen value in 1.0.1a; see first item in CHANGES for 1.0.1b */
2520 #warning OpenSSL 1.0.1a uses a bad value for SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, ignoring
2521 #else
2522 { US"no_tlsv1_1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 },
2523 #endif
2524 #endif
2525 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
2526 { US"no_tlsv1_2", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 },
2527 #endif
2528 #ifdef SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
2529 { US"safari_ecdhe_ecdsa_bug", SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG },
2530 #endif
2531 #ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
2532 { US"single_dh_use", SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE },
2533 #endif
2534 #ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
2535 { US"single_ecdh_use", SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE },
2536 #endif
2537 #ifdef SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
2538 { US"ssleay_080_client_dh_bug", SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG },
2539 #endif
2540 #ifdef SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
2541 { US"sslref2_reuse_cert_type_bug", SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG },
2542 #endif
2543 #ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
2544 { US"tls_block_padding_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG },
2545 #endif
2546 #ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
2547 { US"tls_d5_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG },
2548 #endif
2549 #ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
2550 { US"tls_rollback_bug", SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG },
2551 #endif
2552 };
2553 static int exim_openssl_options_size =
2554 sizeof(exim_openssl_options)/sizeof(struct exim_openssl_option);
2555
2556
2557 static BOOL
2558 tls_openssl_one_option_parse(uschar *name, long *value)
2559 {
2560 int first = 0;
2561 int last = exim_openssl_options_size;
2562 while (last > first)
2563 {
2564 int middle = (first + last)/2;
2565 int c = Ustrcmp(name, exim_openssl_options[middle].name);
2566 if (c == 0)
2567 {
2568 *value = exim_openssl_options[middle].value;
2569 return TRUE;
2570 }
2571 else if (c > 0)
2572 first = middle + 1;
2573 else
2574 last = middle;
2575 }
2576 return FALSE;
2577 }
2578
2579
2580
2581
2582 /*************************************************
2583 * OpenSSL option parsing logic *
2584 *************************************************/
2585
2586 /* OpenSSL has a number of compatibility options which an administrator might
2587 reasonably wish to set. Interpret a list similarly to decode_bits(), so that
2588 we look like log_selector.
2589
2590 Arguments:
2591 option_spec the administrator-supplied string of options
2592 results ptr to long storage for the options bitmap
2593 Returns success or failure
2594 */
2595
2596 BOOL
2597 tls_openssl_options_parse(uschar *option_spec, long *results)
2598 {
2599 long result, item;
2600 uschar *s, *end;
2601 uschar keep_c;
2602 BOOL adding, item_parsed;
2603
2604 result = 0L;
2605 /* Prior to 4.80 we or'd in SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS; removed
2606 * from default because it increases BEAST susceptibility. */
2607 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
2608 result |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
2609 #endif
2610
2611 if (option_spec == NULL)
2612 {
2613 *results = result;
2614 return TRUE;
2615 }
2616
2617 for (s=option_spec; *s != '\0'; /**/)
2618 {
2619 while (isspace(*s)) ++s;
2620 if (*s == '\0')
2621 break;
2622 if (*s != '+' && *s != '-')
2623 {
2624 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("malformed openssl option setting: "
2625 "+ or - expected but found \"%s\"\n", s);
2626 return FALSE;
2627 }
2628 adding = *s++ == '+';
2629 for (end = s; (*end != '\0') && !isspace(*end); ++end) /**/ ;
2630 keep_c = *end;
2631 *end = '\0';
2632 item_parsed = tls_openssl_one_option_parse(s, &item);
2633 if (!item_parsed)
2634 {
2635 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("openssl option setting unrecognised: \"%s\"\n", s);
2636 return FALSE;
2637 }
2638 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("openssl option, %s from %lx: %lx (%s)\n",
2639 adding ? "adding" : "removing", result, item, s);
2640 if (adding)
2641 result |= item;
2642 else
2643 result &= ~item;
2644 *end = keep_c;
2645 s = end;
2646 }
2647
2648 *results = result;
2649 return TRUE;
2650 }
2651
2652 /* vi: aw ai sw=2
2653 */
2654 /* End of tls-openssl.c */