| 1 | /************************************************* |
| 2 | * Exim - an Internet mail transport agent * |
| 3 | *************************************************/ |
| 4 | |
| 5 | /* Copyright (c) University of Cambridge 1995 - 2018 */ |
| 6 | /* See the file NOTICE for conditions of use and distribution. */ |
| 7 | |
| 8 | /* Copyright (c) Phil Pennock 2012 */ |
| 9 | |
| 10 | /* This file provides TLS/SSL support for Exim using the GnuTLS library, |
| 11 | one of the available supported implementations. This file is #included into |
| 12 | tls.c when USE_GNUTLS has been set. |
| 13 | |
| 14 | The code herein is a revamp of GnuTLS integration using the current APIs; the |
| 15 | original tls-gnu.c was based on a patch which was contributed by Nikos |
| 16 | Mavrogiannopoulos. The revamp is partially a rewrite, partially cut&paste as |
| 17 | appropriate. |
| 18 | |
| 19 | APIs current as of GnuTLS 2.12.18; note that the GnuTLS manual is for GnuTLS 3, |
| 20 | which is not widely deployed by OS vendors. Will note issues below, which may |
| 21 | assist in updating the code in the future. Another sources of hints is |
| 22 | mod_gnutls for Apache (SNI callback registration and handling). |
| 23 | |
| 24 | Keeping client and server variables more split than before and is currently |
| 25 | the norm, in anticipation of TLS in ACL callouts. |
| 26 | |
| 27 | I wanted to switch to gnutls_certificate_set_verify_function() so that |
| 28 | certificate rejection could happen during handshake where it belongs, rather |
| 29 | than being dropped afterwards, but that was introduced in 2.10.0 and Debian |
| 30 | (6.0.5) is still on 2.8.6. So for now we have to stick with sub-par behaviour. |
| 31 | |
| 32 | (I wasn't looking for libraries quite that old, when updating to get rid of |
| 33 | compiler warnings of deprecated APIs. If it turns out that a lot of the rest |
| 34 | require current GnuTLS, then we'll drop support for the ancient libraries). |
| 35 | */ |
| 36 | |
| 37 | #include <gnutls/gnutls.h> |
| 38 | /* needed for cert checks in verification and DN extraction: */ |
| 39 | #include <gnutls/x509.h> |
| 40 | /* man-page is incorrect, gnutls_rnd() is not in gnutls.h: */ |
| 41 | #include <gnutls/crypto.h> |
| 42 | |
| 43 | /* needed to disable PKCS11 autoload unless requested */ |
| 44 | #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x020c00 |
| 45 | # include <gnutls/pkcs11.h> |
| 46 | # define SUPPORT_PARAM_TO_PK_BITS |
| 47 | #endif |
| 48 | #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x030103 && !defined(DISABLE_OCSP) |
| 49 | # warning "GnuTLS library version too old; define DISABLE_OCSP in Makefile" |
| 50 | # define DISABLE_OCSP |
| 51 | #endif |
| 52 | #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x020a00 && !defined(DISABLE_EVENT) |
| 53 | # warning "GnuTLS library version too old; tls:cert event unsupported" |
| 54 | # define DISABLE_EVENT |
| 55 | #endif |
| 56 | #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030306 |
| 57 | # define SUPPORT_CA_DIR |
| 58 | #else |
| 59 | # undef SUPPORT_CA_DIR |
| 60 | #endif |
| 61 | #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030014 |
| 62 | # define SUPPORT_SYSDEFAULT_CABUNDLE |
| 63 | #endif |
| 64 | #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030104 |
| 65 | # define GNUTLS_CERT_VFY_STATUS_PRINT |
| 66 | #endif |
| 67 | #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030109 |
| 68 | # define SUPPORT_CORK |
| 69 | #endif |
| 70 | #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x03010a |
| 71 | # define SUPPORT_GNUTLS_SESS_DESC |
| 72 | #endif |
| 73 | #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030500 |
| 74 | # define SUPPORT_GNUTLS_KEYLOG |
| 75 | #endif |
| 76 | #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030506 && !defined(DISABLE_OCSP) |
| 77 | # define SUPPORT_SRV_OCSP_STACK |
| 78 | #endif |
| 79 | |
| 80 | #ifdef SUPPORT_DANE |
| 81 | # if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030000 |
| 82 | # define DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA 2 |
| 83 | # define DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE 3 |
| 84 | # else |
| 85 | # error GnuTLS version too early for DANE |
| 86 | # endif |
| 87 | # if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x999999 |
| 88 | # define GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION |
| 89 | # endif |
| 90 | #endif |
| 91 | |
| 92 | #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP |
| 93 | # include <gnutls/ocsp.h> |
| 94 | #endif |
| 95 | #ifdef SUPPORT_DANE |
| 96 | # include <gnutls/dane.h> |
| 97 | #endif |
| 98 | |
| 99 | #include "tls-cipher-stdname.c" |
| 100 | |
| 101 | |
| 102 | /* GnuTLS 2 vs 3 |
| 103 | |
| 104 | GnuTLS 3 only: |
| 105 | gnutls_global_set_audit_log_function() |
| 106 | |
| 107 | Changes: |
| 108 | gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(): is new, drop the 2 for old version |
| 109 | */ |
| 110 | |
| 111 | /* Local static variables for GnuTLS */ |
| 112 | |
| 113 | /* Values for verify_requirement */ |
| 114 | |
| 115 | enum peer_verify_requirement |
| 116 | { VERIFY_NONE, VERIFY_OPTIONAL, VERIFY_REQUIRED, VERIFY_DANE }; |
| 117 | |
| 118 | /* This holds most state for server or client; with this, we can set up an |
| 119 | outbound TLS-enabled connection in an ACL callout, while not stomping all |
| 120 | over the TLS variables available for expansion. |
| 121 | |
| 122 | Some of these correspond to variables in globals.c; those variables will |
| 123 | be set to point to content in one of these instances, as appropriate for |
| 124 | the stage of the process lifetime. |
| 125 | |
| 126 | Not handled here: global tls_channelbinding_b64. |
| 127 | */ |
| 128 | |
| 129 | typedef struct exim_gnutls_state { |
| 130 | gnutls_session_t session; |
| 131 | gnutls_certificate_credentials_t x509_cred; |
| 132 | gnutls_priority_t priority_cache; |
| 133 | enum peer_verify_requirement verify_requirement; |
| 134 | int fd_in; |
| 135 | int fd_out; |
| 136 | BOOL peer_cert_verified; |
| 137 | BOOL peer_dane_verified; |
| 138 | BOOL trigger_sni_changes; |
| 139 | BOOL have_set_peerdn; |
| 140 | const struct host_item *host; /* NULL if server */ |
| 141 | gnutls_x509_crt_t peercert; |
| 142 | uschar *peerdn; |
| 143 | uschar *ciphersuite; |
| 144 | uschar *received_sni; |
| 145 | |
| 146 | const uschar *tls_certificate; |
| 147 | const uschar *tls_privatekey; |
| 148 | const uschar *tls_sni; /* client send only, not received */ |
| 149 | const uschar *tls_verify_certificates; |
| 150 | const uschar *tls_crl; |
| 151 | const uschar *tls_require_ciphers; |
| 152 | |
| 153 | uschar *exp_tls_certificate; |
| 154 | uschar *exp_tls_privatekey; |
| 155 | uschar *exp_tls_verify_certificates; |
| 156 | uschar *exp_tls_crl; |
| 157 | uschar *exp_tls_require_ciphers; |
| 158 | const uschar *exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames; |
| 159 | #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT |
| 160 | uschar *event_action; |
| 161 | #endif |
| 162 | #ifdef SUPPORT_DANE |
| 163 | char * const * dane_data; |
| 164 | const int * dane_data_len; |
| 165 | #endif |
| 166 | |
| 167 | tls_support *tlsp; /* set in tls_init() */ |
| 168 | |
| 169 | uschar *xfer_buffer; |
| 170 | int xfer_buffer_lwm; |
| 171 | int xfer_buffer_hwm; |
| 172 | BOOL xfer_eof; /*XXX never gets set! */ |
| 173 | BOOL xfer_error; |
| 174 | } exim_gnutls_state_st; |
| 175 | |
| 176 | static const exim_gnutls_state_st exim_gnutls_state_init = { |
| 177 | .session = NULL, |
| 178 | .x509_cred = NULL, |
| 179 | .priority_cache = NULL, |
| 180 | .verify_requirement = VERIFY_NONE, |
| 181 | .fd_in = -1, |
| 182 | .fd_out = -1, |
| 183 | .peer_cert_verified = FALSE, |
| 184 | .peer_dane_verified = FALSE, |
| 185 | .trigger_sni_changes =FALSE, |
| 186 | .have_set_peerdn = FALSE, |
| 187 | .host = NULL, |
| 188 | .peercert = NULL, |
| 189 | .peerdn = NULL, |
| 190 | .ciphersuite = NULL, |
| 191 | .received_sni = NULL, |
| 192 | |
| 193 | .tls_certificate = NULL, |
| 194 | .tls_privatekey = NULL, |
| 195 | .tls_sni = NULL, |
| 196 | .tls_verify_certificates = NULL, |
| 197 | .tls_crl = NULL, |
| 198 | .tls_require_ciphers =NULL, |
| 199 | |
| 200 | .exp_tls_certificate = NULL, |
| 201 | .exp_tls_privatekey = NULL, |
| 202 | .exp_tls_verify_certificates = NULL, |
| 203 | .exp_tls_crl = NULL, |
| 204 | .exp_tls_require_ciphers = NULL, |
| 205 | .exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames = NULL, |
| 206 | #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT |
| 207 | .event_action = NULL, |
| 208 | #endif |
| 209 | .tlsp = NULL, |
| 210 | |
| 211 | .xfer_buffer = NULL, |
| 212 | .xfer_buffer_lwm = 0, |
| 213 | .xfer_buffer_hwm = 0, |
| 214 | .xfer_eof = FALSE, |
| 215 | .xfer_error = FALSE, |
| 216 | }; |
| 217 | |
| 218 | /* Not only do we have our own APIs which don't pass around state, assuming |
| 219 | it's held in globals, GnuTLS doesn't appear to let us register callback data |
| 220 | for callbacks, or as part of the session, so we have to keep a "this is the |
| 221 | context we're currently dealing with" pointer and rely upon being |
| 222 | single-threaded to keep from processing data on an inbound TLS connection while |
| 223 | talking to another TLS connection for an outbound check. This does mean that |
| 224 | there's no way for heart-beats to be responded to, for the duration of the |
| 225 | second connection. |
| 226 | XXX But see gnutls_session_get_ptr() |
| 227 | */ |
| 228 | |
| 229 | static exim_gnutls_state_st state_server; |
| 230 | |
| 231 | /* dh_params are initialised once within the lifetime of a process using TLS; |
| 232 | if we used TLS in a long-lived daemon, we'd have to reconsider this. But we |
| 233 | don't want to repeat this. */ |
| 234 | |
| 235 | static gnutls_dh_params_t dh_server_params = NULL; |
| 236 | |
| 237 | /* No idea how this value was chosen; preserving it. Default is 3600. */ |
| 238 | |
| 239 | static const int ssl_session_timeout = 200; |
| 240 | |
| 241 | static const uschar * const exim_default_gnutls_priority = US"NORMAL"; |
| 242 | |
| 243 | /* Guard library core initialisation */ |
| 244 | |
| 245 | static BOOL exim_gnutls_base_init_done = FALSE; |
| 246 | |
| 247 | #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP |
| 248 | static BOOL gnutls_buggy_ocsp = FALSE; |
| 249 | #endif |
| 250 | |
| 251 | |
| 252 | /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */ |
| 253 | /* macros */ |
| 254 | |
| 255 | #define MAX_HOST_LEN 255 |
| 256 | |
| 257 | /* Set this to control gnutls_global_set_log_level(); values 0 to 9 will setup |
| 258 | the library logging; a value less than 0 disables the calls to set up logging |
| 259 | callbacks. GNuTLS also looks for an environment variable - except not for |
| 260 | setuid binaries, making it useless - "GNUTLS_DEBUG_LEVEL". |
| 261 | Allegedly the testscript line "GNUTLS_DEBUG_LEVEL=9 sudo exim ..." would work, |
| 262 | but the env var must be added to /etc/sudoers too. */ |
| 263 | #ifndef EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL |
| 264 | # define EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL -1 |
| 265 | #endif |
| 266 | |
| 267 | #ifndef EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_BITS |
| 268 | # define EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_BITS 1024 |
| 269 | #endif |
| 270 | |
| 271 | /* With GnuTLS 2.12.x+ we have gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits() with which we |
| 272 | can ask for a bit-strength. Without that, we stick to the constant we had |
| 273 | before, for now. */ |
| 274 | #ifndef EXIM_SERVER_DH_BITS_PRE2_12 |
| 275 | # define EXIM_SERVER_DH_BITS_PRE2_12 1024 |
| 276 | #endif |
| 277 | |
| 278 | #define expand_check_tlsvar(Varname, errstr) \ |
| 279 | expand_check(state->Varname, US #Varname, &state->exp_##Varname, errstr) |
| 280 | |
| 281 | #if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x020c00 |
| 282 | # define HAVE_GNUTLS_SESSION_CHANNEL_BINDING |
| 283 | # define HAVE_GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_CONSTANTS |
| 284 | # define HAVE_GNUTLS_RND |
| 285 | /* The security fix we provide with the gnutls_allow_auto_pkcs11 option |
| 286 | * (4.82 PP/09) introduces a compatibility regression. The symbol simply |
| 287 | * isn't available sometimes, so this needs to become a conditional |
| 288 | * compilation; the sanest way to deal with this being a problem on |
| 289 | * older OSes is to block it in the Local/Makefile with this compiler |
| 290 | * definition */ |
| 291 | # ifndef AVOID_GNUTLS_PKCS11 |
| 292 | # define HAVE_GNUTLS_PKCS11 |
| 293 | # endif /* AVOID_GNUTLS_PKCS11 */ |
| 294 | #endif |
| 295 | |
| 296 | |
| 297 | |
| 298 | |
| 299 | /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */ |
| 300 | /* Callback declarations */ |
| 301 | |
| 302 | #if EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL >= 0 |
| 303 | static void exim_gnutls_logger_cb(int level, const char *message); |
| 304 | #endif |
| 305 | |
| 306 | static int exim_sni_handling_cb(gnutls_session_t session); |
| 307 | |
| 308 | #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP |
| 309 | static int server_ocsp_stapling_cb(gnutls_session_t session, void * ptr, |
| 310 | gnutls_datum_t * ocsp_response); |
| 311 | #endif |
| 312 | |
| 313 | |
| 314 | |
| 315 | /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */ |
| 316 | /* Static functions */ |
| 317 | |
| 318 | /************************************************* |
| 319 | * Handle TLS error * |
| 320 | *************************************************/ |
| 321 | |
| 322 | /* Called from lots of places when errors occur before actually starting to do |
| 323 | the TLS handshake, that is, while the session is still in clear. Always returns |
| 324 | DEFER for a server and FAIL for a client so that most calls can use "return |
| 325 | tls_error(...)" to do this processing and then give an appropriate return. A |
| 326 | single function is used for both server and client, because it is called from |
| 327 | some shared functions. |
| 328 | |
| 329 | Argument: |
| 330 | prefix text to include in the logged error |
| 331 | msg additional error string (may be NULL) |
| 332 | usually obtained from gnutls_strerror() |
| 333 | host NULL if setting up a server; |
| 334 | the connected host if setting up a client |
| 335 | errstr pointer to returned error string |
| 336 | |
| 337 | Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL |
| 338 | */ |
| 339 | |
| 340 | static int |
| 341 | tls_error(const uschar *prefix, const uschar *msg, const host_item *host, |
| 342 | uschar ** errstr) |
| 343 | { |
| 344 | if (errstr) |
| 345 | *errstr = string_sprintf("(%s)%s%s", prefix, msg ? ": " : "", msg ? msg : US""); |
| 346 | return host ? FAIL : DEFER; |
| 347 | } |
| 348 | |
| 349 | |
| 350 | static int |
| 351 | tls_error_gnu(const uschar *prefix, int err, const host_item *host, |
| 352 | uschar ** errstr) |
| 353 | { |
| 354 | return tls_error(prefix, US gnutls_strerror(err), host, errstr); |
| 355 | } |
| 356 | |
| 357 | static int |
| 358 | tls_error_sys(const uschar *prefix, int err, const host_item *host, |
| 359 | uschar ** errstr) |
| 360 | { |
| 361 | return tls_error(prefix, US strerror(err), host, errstr); |
| 362 | } |
| 363 | |
| 364 | |
| 365 | /************************************************* |
| 366 | * Deal with logging errors during I/O * |
| 367 | *************************************************/ |
| 368 | |
| 369 | /* We have to get the identity of the peer from saved data. |
| 370 | |
| 371 | Argument: |
| 372 | state the current GnuTLS exim state container |
| 373 | rc the GnuTLS error code, or 0 if it's a local error |
| 374 | when text identifying read or write |
| 375 | text local error text when rc is 0 |
| 376 | |
| 377 | Returns: nothing |
| 378 | */ |
| 379 | |
| 380 | static void |
| 381 | record_io_error(exim_gnutls_state_st *state, int rc, uschar *when, uschar *text) |
| 382 | { |
| 383 | const uschar * msg; |
| 384 | uschar * errstr; |
| 385 | |
| 386 | if (rc == GNUTLS_E_FATAL_ALERT_RECEIVED) |
| 387 | msg = string_sprintf("A TLS fatal alert has been received: %s", |
| 388 | US gnutls_alert_get_name(gnutls_alert_get(state->session))); |
| 389 | else |
| 390 | msg = US gnutls_strerror(rc); |
| 391 | |
| 392 | (void) tls_error(when, msg, state->host, &errstr); |
| 393 | |
| 394 | if (state->host) |
| 395 | log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "H=%s [%s] TLS error on connection %s", |
| 396 | state->host->name, state->host->address, errstr); |
| 397 | else |
| 398 | { |
| 399 | uschar * conn_info = smtp_get_connection_info(); |
| 400 | if (Ustrncmp(conn_info, US"SMTP ", 5) == 0) conn_info += 5; |
| 401 | /* I'd like to get separated H= here, but too hard for now */ |
| 402 | log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error on %s %s", conn_info, errstr); |
| 403 | } |
| 404 | } |
| 405 | |
| 406 | |
| 407 | |
| 408 | |
| 409 | /************************************************* |
| 410 | * Set various Exim expansion vars * |
| 411 | *************************************************/ |
| 412 | |
| 413 | #define exim_gnutls_cert_err(Label) \ |
| 414 | do \ |
| 415 | { \ |
| 416 | if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) \ |
| 417 | { \ |
| 418 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: cert problem: %s: %s\n", \ |
| 419 | (Label), gnutls_strerror(rc)); \ |
| 420 | return rc; \ |
| 421 | } \ |
| 422 | } while (0) |
| 423 | |
| 424 | static int |
| 425 | import_cert(const gnutls_datum_t * cert, gnutls_x509_crt_t * crtp) |
| 426 | { |
| 427 | int rc; |
| 428 | |
| 429 | rc = gnutls_x509_crt_init(crtp); |
| 430 | exim_gnutls_cert_err(US"gnutls_x509_crt_init (crt)"); |
| 431 | |
| 432 | rc = gnutls_x509_crt_import(*crtp, cert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER); |
| 433 | exim_gnutls_cert_err(US"failed to import certificate [gnutls_x509_crt_import(cert)]"); |
| 434 | |
| 435 | return rc; |
| 436 | } |
| 437 | |
| 438 | #undef exim_gnutls_cert_err |
| 439 | |
| 440 | |
| 441 | /* We set various Exim global variables from the state, once a session has |
| 442 | been established. With TLS callouts, may need to change this to stack |
| 443 | variables, or just re-call it with the server state after client callout |
| 444 | has finished. |
| 445 | |
| 446 | Make sure anything set here is unset in tls_getc(). |
| 447 | |
| 448 | Sets: |
| 449 | tls_active fd |
| 450 | tls_bits strength indicator |
| 451 | tls_certificate_verified bool indicator |
| 452 | tls_channelbinding_b64 for some SASL mechanisms |
| 453 | tls_cipher a string |
| 454 | tls_peercert pointer to library internal |
| 455 | tls_peerdn a string |
| 456 | tls_sni a (UTF-8) string |
| 457 | tls_ourcert pointer to library internal |
| 458 | |
| 459 | Argument: |
| 460 | state the relevant exim_gnutls_state_st * |
| 461 | */ |
| 462 | |
| 463 | static void |
| 464 | extract_exim_vars_from_tls_state(exim_gnutls_state_st * state) |
| 465 | { |
| 466 | gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t cipher; |
| 467 | #ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_SESSION_CHANNEL_BINDING |
| 468 | int old_pool; |
| 469 | int rc; |
| 470 | gnutls_datum_t channel; |
| 471 | #endif |
| 472 | tls_support * tlsp = state->tlsp; |
| 473 | |
| 474 | tlsp->active.sock = state->fd_out; |
| 475 | tlsp->active.tls_ctx = state; |
| 476 | |
| 477 | cipher = gnutls_cipher_get(state->session); |
| 478 | /* returns size in "bytes" */ |
| 479 | tlsp->bits = gnutls_cipher_get_key_size(cipher) * 8; |
| 480 | |
| 481 | tlsp->cipher = state->ciphersuite; |
| 482 | |
| 483 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("cipher: %s\n", state->ciphersuite); |
| 484 | |
| 485 | tlsp->certificate_verified = state->peer_cert_verified; |
| 486 | #ifdef SUPPORT_DANE |
| 487 | tlsp->dane_verified = state->peer_dane_verified; |
| 488 | #endif |
| 489 | |
| 490 | /* note that tls_channelbinding_b64 is not saved to the spool file, since it's |
| 491 | only available for use for authenticators while this TLS session is running. */ |
| 492 | |
| 493 | tls_channelbinding_b64 = NULL; |
| 494 | #ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_SESSION_CHANNEL_BINDING |
| 495 | channel.data = NULL; |
| 496 | channel.size = 0; |
| 497 | if ((rc = gnutls_session_channel_binding(state->session, GNUTLS_CB_TLS_UNIQUE, &channel))) |
| 498 | { DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Channel binding error: %s\n", gnutls_strerror(rc)); } |
| 499 | else |
| 500 | { |
| 501 | old_pool = store_pool; |
| 502 | store_pool = POOL_PERM; |
| 503 | tls_channelbinding_b64 = b64encode(CUS channel.data, (int)channel.size); |
| 504 | store_pool = old_pool; |
| 505 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Have channel bindings cached for possible auth usage.\n"); |
| 506 | } |
| 507 | #endif |
| 508 | |
| 509 | /* peercert is set in peer_status() */ |
| 510 | tlsp->peerdn = state->peerdn; |
| 511 | tlsp->sni = state->received_sni; |
| 512 | |
| 513 | /* record our certificate */ |
| 514 | { |
| 515 | const gnutls_datum_t * cert = gnutls_certificate_get_ours(state->session); |
| 516 | gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; |
| 517 | |
| 518 | tlsp->ourcert = cert && import_cert(cert, &crt)==0 ? crt : NULL; |
| 519 | } |
| 520 | } |
| 521 | |
| 522 | |
| 523 | |
| 524 | |
| 525 | /************************************************* |
| 526 | * Setup up DH parameters * |
| 527 | *************************************************/ |
| 528 | |
| 529 | /* Generating the D-H parameters may take a long time. They only need to |
| 530 | be re-generated every so often, depending on security policy. What we do is to |
| 531 | keep these parameters in a file in the spool directory. If the file does not |
| 532 | exist, we generate them. This means that it is easy to cause a regeneration. |
| 533 | |
| 534 | The new file is written as a temporary file and renamed, so that an incomplete |
| 535 | file is never present. If two processes both compute some new parameters, you |
| 536 | waste a bit of effort, but it doesn't seem worth messing around with locking to |
| 537 | prevent this. |
| 538 | |
| 539 | Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL |
| 540 | */ |
| 541 | |
| 542 | static int |
| 543 | init_server_dh(uschar ** errstr) |
| 544 | { |
| 545 | int fd, rc; |
| 546 | unsigned int dh_bits; |
| 547 | gnutls_datum_t m; |
| 548 | uschar filename_buf[PATH_MAX]; |
| 549 | uschar *filename = NULL; |
| 550 | size_t sz; |
| 551 | uschar *exp_tls_dhparam; |
| 552 | BOOL use_file_in_spool = FALSE; |
| 553 | host_item *host = NULL; /* dummy for macros */ |
| 554 | |
| 555 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Initialising GnuTLS server params.\n"); |
| 556 | |
| 557 | if ((rc = gnutls_dh_params_init(&dh_server_params))) |
| 558 | return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_dh_params_init", rc, host, errstr); |
| 559 | |
| 560 | m.data = NULL; |
| 561 | m.size = 0; |
| 562 | |
| 563 | if (!expand_check(tls_dhparam, US"tls_dhparam", &exp_tls_dhparam, errstr)) |
| 564 | return DEFER; |
| 565 | |
| 566 | if (!exp_tls_dhparam) |
| 567 | { |
| 568 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Loading default hard-coded DH params\n"); |
| 569 | m.data = US std_dh_prime_default(); |
| 570 | m.size = Ustrlen(m.data); |
| 571 | } |
| 572 | else if (Ustrcmp(exp_tls_dhparam, "historic") == 0) |
| 573 | use_file_in_spool = TRUE; |
| 574 | else if (Ustrcmp(exp_tls_dhparam, "none") == 0) |
| 575 | { |
| 576 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Requested no DH parameters.\n"); |
| 577 | return OK; |
| 578 | } |
| 579 | else if (exp_tls_dhparam[0] != '/') |
| 580 | { |
| 581 | if (!(m.data = US std_dh_prime_named(exp_tls_dhparam))) |
| 582 | return tls_error(US"No standard prime named", exp_tls_dhparam, NULL, errstr); |
| 583 | m.size = Ustrlen(m.data); |
| 584 | } |
| 585 | else |
| 586 | filename = exp_tls_dhparam; |
| 587 | |
| 588 | if (m.data) |
| 589 | { |
| 590 | if ((rc = gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3(dh_server_params, &m, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM))) |
| 591 | return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3", rc, host, errstr); |
| 592 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Loaded fixed standard D-H parameters\n"); |
| 593 | return OK; |
| 594 | } |
| 595 | |
| 596 | #ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_CONSTANTS |
| 597 | /* If you change this constant, also change dh_param_fn_ext so that we can use a |
| 598 | different filename and ensure we have sufficient bits. */ |
| 599 | |
| 600 | if (!(dh_bits = gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits(GNUTLS_PK_DH, GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_NORMAL))) |
| 601 | return tls_error(US"gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits() failed", NULL, NULL, errstr); |
| 602 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 603 | debug_printf("GnuTLS tells us that for D-H PK, NORMAL is %d bits.\n", |
| 604 | dh_bits); |
| 605 | #else |
| 606 | dh_bits = EXIM_SERVER_DH_BITS_PRE2_12; |
| 607 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 608 | debug_printf("GnuTLS lacks gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits(), using %d bits.\n", |
| 609 | dh_bits); |
| 610 | #endif |
| 611 | |
| 612 | /* Some clients have hard-coded limits. */ |
| 613 | if (dh_bits > tls_dh_max_bits) |
| 614 | { |
| 615 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 616 | debug_printf("tls_dh_max_bits clamping override, using %d bits instead.\n", |
| 617 | tls_dh_max_bits); |
| 618 | dh_bits = tls_dh_max_bits; |
| 619 | } |
| 620 | |
| 621 | if (use_file_in_spool) |
| 622 | { |
| 623 | if (!string_format(filename_buf, sizeof(filename_buf), |
| 624 | "%s/gnutls-params-%d", spool_directory, dh_bits)) |
| 625 | return tls_error(US"overlong filename", NULL, NULL, errstr); |
| 626 | filename = filename_buf; |
| 627 | } |
| 628 | |
| 629 | /* Open the cache file for reading and if successful, read it and set up the |
| 630 | parameters. */ |
| 631 | |
| 632 | if ((fd = Uopen(filename, O_RDONLY, 0)) >= 0) |
| 633 | { |
| 634 | struct stat statbuf; |
| 635 | FILE *fp; |
| 636 | int saved_errno; |
| 637 | |
| 638 | if (fstat(fd, &statbuf) < 0) /* EIO */ |
| 639 | { |
| 640 | saved_errno = errno; |
| 641 | (void)close(fd); |
| 642 | return tls_error_sys(US"TLS cache stat failed", saved_errno, NULL, errstr); |
| 643 | } |
| 644 | if (!S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode)) |
| 645 | { |
| 646 | (void)close(fd); |
| 647 | return tls_error(US"TLS cache not a file", NULL, NULL, errstr); |
| 648 | } |
| 649 | if (!(fp = fdopen(fd, "rb"))) |
| 650 | { |
| 651 | saved_errno = errno; |
| 652 | (void)close(fd); |
| 653 | return tls_error_sys(US"fdopen(TLS cache stat fd) failed", |
| 654 | saved_errno, NULL, errstr); |
| 655 | } |
| 656 | |
| 657 | m.size = statbuf.st_size; |
| 658 | if (!(m.data = malloc(m.size))) |
| 659 | { |
| 660 | fclose(fp); |
| 661 | return tls_error_sys(US"malloc failed", errno, NULL, errstr); |
| 662 | } |
| 663 | if (!(sz = fread(m.data, m.size, 1, fp))) |
| 664 | { |
| 665 | saved_errno = errno; |
| 666 | fclose(fp); |
| 667 | free(m.data); |
| 668 | return tls_error_sys(US"fread failed", saved_errno, NULL, errstr); |
| 669 | } |
| 670 | fclose(fp); |
| 671 | |
| 672 | rc = gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3(dh_server_params, &m, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM); |
| 673 | free(m.data); |
| 674 | if (rc) |
| 675 | return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3", rc, host, errstr); |
| 676 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("read D-H parameters from file \"%s\"\n", filename); |
| 677 | } |
| 678 | |
| 679 | /* If the file does not exist, fall through to compute new data and cache it. |
| 680 | If there was any other opening error, it is serious. */ |
| 681 | |
| 682 | else if (errno == ENOENT) |
| 683 | { |
| 684 | rc = -1; |
| 685 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 686 | debug_printf("D-H parameter cache file \"%s\" does not exist\n", filename); |
| 687 | } |
| 688 | else |
| 689 | return tls_error(string_open_failed(errno, "\"%s\" for reading", filename), |
| 690 | NULL, NULL, errstr); |
| 691 | |
| 692 | /* If ret < 0, either the cache file does not exist, or the data it contains |
| 693 | is not useful. One particular case of this is when upgrading from an older |
| 694 | release of Exim in which the data was stored in a different format. We don't |
| 695 | try to be clever and support both formats; we just regenerate new data in this |
| 696 | case. */ |
| 697 | |
| 698 | if (rc < 0) |
| 699 | { |
| 700 | uschar *temp_fn; |
| 701 | unsigned int dh_bits_gen = dh_bits; |
| 702 | |
| 703 | if ((PATH_MAX - Ustrlen(filename)) < 10) |
| 704 | return tls_error(US"Filename too long to generate replacement", |
| 705 | filename, NULL, errstr); |
| 706 | |
| 707 | temp_fn = string_copy(US"%s.XXXXXXX"); |
| 708 | if ((fd = mkstemp(CS temp_fn)) < 0) /* modifies temp_fn */ |
| 709 | return tls_error_sys(US"Unable to open temp file", errno, NULL, errstr); |
| 710 | (void)exim_chown(temp_fn, exim_uid, exim_gid); /* Probably not necessary */ |
| 711 | |
| 712 | /* GnuTLS overshoots! |
| 713 | * If we ask for 2236, we might get 2237 or more. |
| 714 | * But there's no way to ask GnuTLS how many bits there really are. |
| 715 | * We can ask how many bits were used in a TLS session, but that's it! |
| 716 | * The prime itself is hidden behind too much abstraction. |
| 717 | * So we ask for less, and proceed on a wing and a prayer. |
| 718 | * First attempt, subtracted 3 for 2233 and got 2240. |
| 719 | */ |
| 720 | if (dh_bits >= EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_BITS + 10) |
| 721 | { |
| 722 | dh_bits_gen = dh_bits - 10; |
| 723 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 724 | debug_printf("being paranoid about DH generation, make it '%d' bits'\n", |
| 725 | dh_bits_gen); |
| 726 | } |
| 727 | |
| 728 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 729 | debug_printf("requesting generation of %d bit Diffie-Hellman prime ...\n", |
| 730 | dh_bits_gen); |
| 731 | if ((rc = gnutls_dh_params_generate2(dh_server_params, dh_bits_gen))) |
| 732 | return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_dh_params_generate2", rc, host, errstr); |
| 733 | |
| 734 | /* gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3() will tell us the exact size, every time, |
| 735 | and I confirmed that a NULL call to get the size first is how the GnuTLS |
| 736 | sample apps handle this. */ |
| 737 | |
| 738 | sz = 0; |
| 739 | m.data = NULL; |
| 740 | if ( (rc = gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3(dh_server_params, |
| 741 | GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM, m.data, &sz)) |
| 742 | && rc != GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER) |
| 743 | return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3(NULL) sizing", |
| 744 | rc, host, errstr); |
| 745 | m.size = sz; |
| 746 | if (!(m.data = malloc(m.size))) |
| 747 | return tls_error_sys(US"memory allocation failed", errno, NULL, errstr); |
| 748 | |
| 749 | /* this will return a size 1 less than the allocation size above */ |
| 750 | if ((rc = gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3(dh_server_params, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM, |
| 751 | m.data, &sz))) |
| 752 | { |
| 753 | free(m.data); |
| 754 | return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_dh_params_export_pkcs3() real", rc, host, errstr); |
| 755 | } |
| 756 | m.size = sz; /* shrink by 1, probably */ |
| 757 | |
| 758 | if ((sz = write_to_fd_buf(fd, m.data, (size_t) m.size)) != m.size) |
| 759 | { |
| 760 | free(m.data); |
| 761 | return tls_error_sys(US"TLS cache write D-H params failed", |
| 762 | errno, NULL, errstr); |
| 763 | } |
| 764 | free(m.data); |
| 765 | if ((sz = write_to_fd_buf(fd, US"\n", 1)) != 1) |
| 766 | return tls_error_sys(US"TLS cache write D-H params final newline failed", |
| 767 | errno, NULL, errstr); |
| 768 | |
| 769 | if ((rc = close(fd))) |
| 770 | return tls_error_sys(US"TLS cache write close() failed", errno, NULL, errstr); |
| 771 | |
| 772 | if (Urename(temp_fn, filename) < 0) |
| 773 | return tls_error_sys(string_sprintf("failed to rename \"%s\" as \"%s\"", |
| 774 | temp_fn, filename), errno, NULL, errstr); |
| 775 | |
| 776 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("wrote D-H parameters to file \"%s\"\n", filename); |
| 777 | } |
| 778 | |
| 779 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialized server D-H parameters\n"); |
| 780 | return OK; |
| 781 | } |
| 782 | |
| 783 | |
| 784 | |
| 785 | |
| 786 | /* Create and install a selfsigned certificate, for use in server mode */ |
| 787 | |
| 788 | static int |
| 789 | tls_install_selfsign(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, uschar ** errstr) |
| 790 | { |
| 791 | gnutls_x509_crt_t cert = NULL; |
| 792 | time_t now; |
| 793 | gnutls_x509_privkey_t pkey = NULL; |
| 794 | const uschar * where; |
| 795 | int rc; |
| 796 | |
| 797 | where = US"initialising pkey"; |
| 798 | if ((rc = gnutls_x509_privkey_init(&pkey))) goto err; |
| 799 | |
| 800 | where = US"initialising cert"; |
| 801 | if ((rc = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&cert))) goto err; |
| 802 | |
| 803 | where = US"generating pkey"; |
| 804 | if ((rc = gnutls_x509_privkey_generate(pkey, GNUTLS_PK_RSA, |
| 805 | #ifdef SUPPORT_PARAM_TO_PK_BITS |
| 806 | # ifndef GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_MEDIUM |
| 807 | # define GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_MEDIUM GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_HIGH |
| 808 | # endif |
| 809 | gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits(GNUTLS_PK_RSA, GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_MEDIUM), |
| 810 | #else |
| 811 | 2048, |
| 812 | #endif |
| 813 | 0))) |
| 814 | goto err; |
| 815 | |
| 816 | where = US"configuring cert"; |
| 817 | now = 1; |
| 818 | if ( (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_version(cert, 3)) |
| 819 | || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_serial(cert, &now, sizeof(now))) |
| 820 | || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_activation_time(cert, now = time(NULL))) |
| 821 | || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_expiration_time(cert, now + 60 * 60)) /* 1 hr */ |
| 822 | || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_key(cert, pkey)) |
| 823 | |
| 824 | || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_dn_by_oid(cert, |
| 825 | GNUTLS_OID_X520_COUNTRY_NAME, 0, "UK", 2)) |
| 826 | || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_dn_by_oid(cert, |
| 827 | GNUTLS_OID_X520_ORGANIZATION_NAME, 0, "Exim Developers", 15)) |
| 828 | || (rc = gnutls_x509_crt_set_dn_by_oid(cert, |
| 829 | GNUTLS_OID_X520_COMMON_NAME, 0, |
| 830 | smtp_active_hostname, Ustrlen(smtp_active_hostname))) |
| 831 | ) |
| 832 | goto err; |
| 833 | |
| 834 | where = US"signing cert"; |
| 835 | if ((rc = gnutls_x509_crt_sign(cert, cert, pkey))) goto err; |
| 836 | |
| 837 | where = US"installing selfsign cert"; |
| 838 | /* Since: 2.4.0 */ |
| 839 | if ((rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key(state->x509_cred, &cert, 1, pkey))) |
| 840 | goto err; |
| 841 | |
| 842 | rc = OK; |
| 843 | |
| 844 | out: |
| 845 | if (cert) gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(cert); |
| 846 | if (pkey) gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit(pkey); |
| 847 | return rc; |
| 848 | |
| 849 | err: |
| 850 | rc = tls_error_gnu(where, rc, NULL, errstr); |
| 851 | goto out; |
| 852 | } |
| 853 | |
| 854 | |
| 855 | |
| 856 | |
| 857 | /* Add certificate and key, from files. |
| 858 | |
| 859 | Return: |
| 860 | Zero or negative: good. Negate value for certificate index if < 0. |
| 861 | Greater than zero: FAIL or DEFER code. |
| 862 | */ |
| 863 | |
| 864 | static int |
| 865 | tls_add_certfile(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, const host_item * host, |
| 866 | uschar * certfile, uschar * keyfile, uschar ** errstr) |
| 867 | { |
| 868 | int rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_file(state->x509_cred, |
| 869 | CS certfile, CS keyfile, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM); |
| 870 | if (rc < 0) |
| 871 | return tls_error_gnu( |
| 872 | string_sprintf("cert/key setup: cert=%s key=%s", certfile, keyfile), |
| 873 | rc, host, errstr); |
| 874 | return -rc; |
| 875 | } |
| 876 | |
| 877 | |
| 878 | /************************************************* |
| 879 | * Variables re-expanded post-SNI * |
| 880 | *************************************************/ |
| 881 | |
| 882 | /* Called from both server and client code, via tls_init(), and also from |
| 883 | the SNI callback after receiving an SNI, if tls_certificate includes "tls_sni". |
| 884 | |
| 885 | We can tell the two apart by state->received_sni being non-NULL in callback. |
| 886 | |
| 887 | The callback should not call us unless state->trigger_sni_changes is true, |
| 888 | which we are responsible for setting on the first pass through. |
| 889 | |
| 890 | Arguments: |
| 891 | state exim_gnutls_state_st * |
| 892 | errstr error string pointer |
| 893 | |
| 894 | Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL |
| 895 | */ |
| 896 | |
| 897 | static int |
| 898 | tls_expand_session_files(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, uschar ** errstr) |
| 899 | { |
| 900 | struct stat statbuf; |
| 901 | int rc; |
| 902 | const host_item *host = state->host; /* macro should be reconsidered? */ |
| 903 | uschar *saved_tls_certificate = NULL; |
| 904 | uschar *saved_tls_privatekey = NULL; |
| 905 | uschar *saved_tls_verify_certificates = NULL; |
| 906 | uschar *saved_tls_crl = NULL; |
| 907 | int cert_count; |
| 908 | |
| 909 | /* We check for tls_sni *before* expansion. */ |
| 910 | if (!host) /* server */ |
| 911 | if (!state->received_sni) |
| 912 | { |
| 913 | if ( state->tls_certificate |
| 914 | && ( Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_sni") |
| 915 | || Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_in_sni") |
| 916 | || Ustrstr(state->tls_certificate, US"tls_out_sni") |
| 917 | ) ) |
| 918 | { |
| 919 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("We will re-expand TLS session files if we receive SNI.\n"); |
| 920 | state->trigger_sni_changes = TRUE; |
| 921 | } |
| 922 | } |
| 923 | else |
| 924 | { |
| 925 | /* useful for debugging */ |
| 926 | saved_tls_certificate = state->exp_tls_certificate; |
| 927 | saved_tls_privatekey = state->exp_tls_privatekey; |
| 928 | saved_tls_verify_certificates = state->exp_tls_verify_certificates; |
| 929 | saved_tls_crl = state->exp_tls_crl; |
| 930 | } |
| 931 | |
| 932 | if ((rc = gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials(&state->x509_cred))) |
| 933 | return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials", |
| 934 | rc, host, errstr); |
| 935 | |
| 936 | #ifdef SUPPORT_SRV_OCSP_STACK |
| 937 | gnutls_certificate_set_flags(state->x509_cred, GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_API_V2); |
| 938 | #endif |
| 939 | |
| 940 | /* remember: expand_check_tlsvar() is expand_check() but fiddling with |
| 941 | state members, assuming consistent naming; and expand_check() returns |
| 942 | false if expansion failed, unless expansion was forced to fail. */ |
| 943 | |
| 944 | /* check if we at least have a certificate, before doing expensive |
| 945 | D-H generation. */ |
| 946 | |
| 947 | if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_certificate, errstr)) |
| 948 | return DEFER; |
| 949 | |
| 950 | /* certificate is mandatory in server, optional in client */ |
| 951 | |
| 952 | if ( !state->exp_tls_certificate |
| 953 | || !*state->exp_tls_certificate |
| 954 | ) |
| 955 | if (!host) |
| 956 | return tls_install_selfsign(state, errstr); |
| 957 | else |
| 958 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: no client certificate specified; okay\n"); |
| 959 | |
| 960 | if (state->tls_privatekey && !expand_check_tlsvar(tls_privatekey, errstr)) |
| 961 | return DEFER; |
| 962 | |
| 963 | /* tls_privatekey is optional, defaulting to same file as certificate */ |
| 964 | |
| 965 | if (state->tls_privatekey == NULL || *state->tls_privatekey == '\0') |
| 966 | { |
| 967 | state->tls_privatekey = state->tls_certificate; |
| 968 | state->exp_tls_privatekey = state->exp_tls_certificate; |
| 969 | } |
| 970 | |
| 971 | |
| 972 | if (state->exp_tls_certificate && *state->exp_tls_certificate) |
| 973 | { |
| 974 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("certificate file = %s\nkey file = %s\n", |
| 975 | state->exp_tls_certificate, state->exp_tls_privatekey); |
| 976 | |
| 977 | if (state->received_sni) |
| 978 | if ( Ustrcmp(state->exp_tls_certificate, saved_tls_certificate) == 0 |
| 979 | && Ustrcmp(state->exp_tls_privatekey, saved_tls_privatekey) == 0 |
| 980 | ) |
| 981 | { |
| 982 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS SNI: cert and key unchanged\n"); |
| 983 | } |
| 984 | else |
| 985 | { |
| 986 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS SNI: have a changed cert/key pair.\n"); |
| 987 | } |
| 988 | |
| 989 | if (!host) /* server */ |
| 990 | { |
| 991 | const uschar * clist = state->exp_tls_certificate; |
| 992 | const uschar * klist = state->exp_tls_privatekey; |
| 993 | const uschar * olist; |
| 994 | int csep = 0, ksep = 0, osep = 0, cnt = 0; |
| 995 | uschar * cfile, * kfile, * ofile; |
| 996 | |
| 997 | #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP |
| 998 | if (!expand_check(tls_ocsp_file, US"tls_ocsp_file", &ofile, errstr)) |
| 999 | return DEFER; |
| 1000 | olist = ofile; |
| 1001 | #endif |
| 1002 | |
| 1003 | while (cfile = string_nextinlist(&clist, &csep, NULL, 0)) |
| 1004 | |
| 1005 | if (!(kfile = string_nextinlist(&klist, &ksep, NULL, 0))) |
| 1006 | return tls_error(US"cert/key setup: out of keys", NULL, host, errstr); |
| 1007 | else if (0 < (rc = tls_add_certfile(state, host, cfile, kfile, errstr))) |
| 1008 | return rc; |
| 1009 | else |
| 1010 | { |
| 1011 | int gnutls_cert_index = -rc; |
| 1012 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: cert/key %s registered\n", cfile); |
| 1013 | |
| 1014 | /* Set the OCSP stapling server info */ |
| 1015 | |
| 1016 | #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP |
| 1017 | if (tls_ocsp_file) |
| 1018 | if (gnutls_buggy_ocsp) |
| 1019 | { |
| 1020 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 1021 | debug_printf("GnuTLS library is buggy for OCSP; avoiding\n"); |
| 1022 | } |
| 1023 | else if ((ofile = string_nextinlist(&olist, &osep, NULL, 0))) |
| 1024 | { |
| 1025 | /* Use the full callback method for stapling just to get |
| 1026 | observability. More efficient would be to read the file once only, |
| 1027 | if it never changed (due to SNI). Would need restart on file update, |
| 1028 | or watch datestamp. */ |
| 1029 | |
| 1030 | # ifdef SUPPORT_SRV_OCSP_STACK |
| 1031 | if ((rc = gnutls_certificate_set_ocsp_status_request_function2( |
| 1032 | state->x509_cred, gnutls_cert_index, |
| 1033 | server_ocsp_stapling_cb, ofile))) |
| 1034 | return tls_error_gnu( |
| 1035 | US"gnutls_certificate_set_ocsp_status_request_function2", |
| 1036 | rc, host, errstr); |
| 1037 | # else |
| 1038 | if (cnt++ > 0) |
| 1039 | { |
| 1040 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 1041 | debug_printf("oops; multiple OCSP files not supported\n"); |
| 1042 | break; |
| 1043 | } |
| 1044 | gnutls_certificate_set_ocsp_status_request_function( |
| 1045 | state->x509_cred, server_ocsp_stapling_cb, ofile); |
| 1046 | # endif |
| 1047 | |
| 1048 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP response file = %s\n", ofile); |
| 1049 | } |
| 1050 | else |
| 1051 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("ran out of OCSP response files in list\n"); |
| 1052 | #endif |
| 1053 | } |
| 1054 | } |
| 1055 | else |
| 1056 | { |
| 1057 | if (0 < (rc = tls_add_certfile(state, host, |
| 1058 | state->exp_tls_certificate, state->exp_tls_privatekey, errstr))) |
| 1059 | return rc; |
| 1060 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: cert/key registered\n"); |
| 1061 | } |
| 1062 | |
| 1063 | } /* tls_certificate */ |
| 1064 | |
| 1065 | |
| 1066 | /* Set the trusted CAs file if one is provided, and then add the CRL if one is |
| 1067 | provided. Experiment shows that, if the certificate file is empty, an unhelpful |
| 1068 | error message is provided. However, if we just refrain from setting anything up |
| 1069 | in that case, certificate verification fails, which seems to be the correct |
| 1070 | behaviour. */ |
| 1071 | |
| 1072 | if (state->tls_verify_certificates && *state->tls_verify_certificates) |
| 1073 | { |
| 1074 | if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_verify_certificates, errstr)) |
| 1075 | return DEFER; |
| 1076 | #ifndef SUPPORT_SYSDEFAULT_CABUNDLE |
| 1077 | if (Ustrcmp(state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, "system") == 0) |
| 1078 | state->exp_tls_verify_certificates = NULL; |
| 1079 | #endif |
| 1080 | if (state->tls_crl && *state->tls_crl) |
| 1081 | if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_crl, errstr)) |
| 1082 | return DEFER; |
| 1083 | |
| 1084 | if (!(state->exp_tls_verify_certificates && |
| 1085 | *state->exp_tls_verify_certificates)) |
| 1086 | { |
| 1087 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 1088 | debug_printf("TLS: tls_verify_certificates expanded empty, ignoring\n"); |
| 1089 | /* With no tls_verify_certificates, we ignore tls_crl too */ |
| 1090 | return OK; |
| 1091 | } |
| 1092 | } |
| 1093 | else |
| 1094 | { |
| 1095 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 1096 | debug_printf("TLS: tls_verify_certificates not set or empty, ignoring\n"); |
| 1097 | return OK; |
| 1098 | } |
| 1099 | |
| 1100 | #ifdef SUPPORT_SYSDEFAULT_CABUNDLE |
| 1101 | if (Ustrcmp(state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, "system") == 0) |
| 1102 | cert_count = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_system_trust(state->x509_cred); |
| 1103 | else |
| 1104 | #endif |
| 1105 | { |
| 1106 | if (Ustat(state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, &statbuf) < 0) |
| 1107 | { |
| 1108 | log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, "could not stat %s " |
| 1109 | "(tls_verify_certificates): %s", state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, |
| 1110 | strerror(errno)); |
| 1111 | return DEFER; |
| 1112 | } |
| 1113 | |
| 1114 | #ifndef SUPPORT_CA_DIR |
| 1115 | /* The test suite passes in /dev/null; we could check for that path explicitly, |
| 1116 | but who knows if someone has some weird FIFO which always dumps some certs, or |
| 1117 | other weirdness. The thing we really want to check is that it's not a |
| 1118 | directory, since while OpenSSL supports that, GnuTLS does not. |
| 1119 | So s/!S_ISREG/S_ISDIR/ and change some messaging ... */ |
| 1120 | if (S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode)) |
| 1121 | { |
| 1122 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 1123 | debug_printf("verify certificates path is a dir: \"%s\"\n", |
| 1124 | state->exp_tls_verify_certificates); |
| 1125 | log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, |
| 1126 | "tls_verify_certificates \"%s\" is a directory", |
| 1127 | state->exp_tls_verify_certificates); |
| 1128 | return DEFER; |
| 1129 | } |
| 1130 | #endif |
| 1131 | |
| 1132 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("verify certificates = %s size=" OFF_T_FMT "\n", |
| 1133 | state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, statbuf.st_size); |
| 1134 | |
| 1135 | if (statbuf.st_size == 0) |
| 1136 | { |
| 1137 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 1138 | debug_printf("cert file empty, no certs, no verification, ignoring any CRL\n"); |
| 1139 | return OK; |
| 1140 | } |
| 1141 | |
| 1142 | cert_count = |
| 1143 | |
| 1144 | #ifdef SUPPORT_CA_DIR |
| 1145 | (statbuf.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR |
| 1146 | ? |
| 1147 | gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_dir(state->x509_cred, |
| 1148 | CS state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM) |
| 1149 | : |
| 1150 | #endif |
| 1151 | gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_file(state->x509_cred, |
| 1152 | CS state->exp_tls_verify_certificates, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM); |
| 1153 | } |
| 1154 | |
| 1155 | if (cert_count < 0) |
| 1156 | return tls_error_gnu(US"setting certificate trust", cert_count, host, errstr); |
| 1157 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 1158 | debug_printf("Added %d certificate authorities.\n", cert_count); |
| 1159 | |
| 1160 | if (state->tls_crl && *state->tls_crl && |
| 1161 | state->exp_tls_crl && *state->exp_tls_crl) |
| 1162 | { |
| 1163 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("loading CRL file = %s\n", state->exp_tls_crl); |
| 1164 | if ((cert_count = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_crl_file(state->x509_cred, |
| 1165 | CS state->exp_tls_crl, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM)) < 0) |
| 1166 | return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_certificate_set_x509_crl_file", |
| 1167 | cert_count, host, errstr); |
| 1168 | |
| 1169 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Processed %d CRLs.\n", cert_count); |
| 1170 | } |
| 1171 | |
| 1172 | return OK; |
| 1173 | } |
| 1174 | |
| 1175 | |
| 1176 | |
| 1177 | |
| 1178 | /************************************************* |
| 1179 | * Set X.509 state variables * |
| 1180 | *************************************************/ |
| 1181 | |
| 1182 | /* In GnuTLS, the registered cert/key are not replaced by a later |
| 1183 | set of a cert/key, so for SNI support we need a whole new x509_cred |
| 1184 | structure. Which means various other non-re-expanded pieces of state |
| 1185 | need to be re-set in the new struct, so the setting logic is pulled |
| 1186 | out to this. |
| 1187 | |
| 1188 | Arguments: |
| 1189 | state exim_gnutls_state_st * |
| 1190 | errstr error string pointer |
| 1191 | |
| 1192 | Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL |
| 1193 | */ |
| 1194 | |
| 1195 | static int |
| 1196 | tls_set_remaining_x509(exim_gnutls_state_st *state, uschar ** errstr) |
| 1197 | { |
| 1198 | int rc; |
| 1199 | const host_item *host = state->host; /* macro should be reconsidered? */ |
| 1200 | |
| 1201 | /* Create D-H parameters, or read them from the cache file. This function does |
| 1202 | its own SMTP error messaging. This only happens for the server, TLS D-H ignores |
| 1203 | client-side params. */ |
| 1204 | |
| 1205 | if (!state->host) |
| 1206 | { |
| 1207 | if (!dh_server_params) |
| 1208 | if ((rc = init_server_dh(errstr)) != OK) return rc; |
| 1209 | gnutls_certificate_set_dh_params(state->x509_cred, dh_server_params); |
| 1210 | } |
| 1211 | |
| 1212 | /* Link the credentials to the session. */ |
| 1213 | |
| 1214 | if ((rc = gnutls_credentials_set(state->session, |
| 1215 | GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, state->x509_cred))) |
| 1216 | return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_credentials_set", rc, host, errstr); |
| 1217 | |
| 1218 | return OK; |
| 1219 | } |
| 1220 | |
| 1221 | /************************************************* |
| 1222 | * Initialize for GnuTLS * |
| 1223 | *************************************************/ |
| 1224 | |
| 1225 | |
| 1226 | #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP |
| 1227 | |
| 1228 | static BOOL |
| 1229 | tls_is_buggy_ocsp(void) |
| 1230 | { |
| 1231 | const uschar * s; |
| 1232 | uschar maj, mid, mic; |
| 1233 | |
| 1234 | s = CUS gnutls_check_version(NULL); |
| 1235 | maj = atoi(CCS s); |
| 1236 | if (maj == 3) |
| 1237 | { |
| 1238 | while (*s && *s != '.') s++; |
| 1239 | mid = atoi(CCS ++s); |
| 1240 | if (mid <= 2) |
| 1241 | return TRUE; |
| 1242 | else if (mid >= 5) |
| 1243 | return FALSE; |
| 1244 | else |
| 1245 | { |
| 1246 | while (*s && *s != '.') s++; |
| 1247 | mic = atoi(CCS ++s); |
| 1248 | return mic <= (mid == 3 ? 16 : 3); |
| 1249 | } |
| 1250 | } |
| 1251 | return FALSE; |
| 1252 | } |
| 1253 | |
| 1254 | #endif |
| 1255 | |
| 1256 | |
| 1257 | /* Called from both server and client code. In the case of a server, errors |
| 1258 | before actual TLS negotiation return DEFER. |
| 1259 | |
| 1260 | Arguments: |
| 1261 | host connected host, if client; NULL if server |
| 1262 | certificate certificate file |
| 1263 | privatekey private key file |
| 1264 | sni TLS SNI to send, sometimes when client; else NULL |
| 1265 | cas CA certs file |
| 1266 | crl CRL file |
| 1267 | require_ciphers tls_require_ciphers setting |
| 1268 | caller_state returned state-info structure |
| 1269 | errstr error string pointer |
| 1270 | |
| 1271 | Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL |
| 1272 | */ |
| 1273 | |
| 1274 | static int |
| 1275 | tls_init( |
| 1276 | const host_item *host, |
| 1277 | const uschar *certificate, |
| 1278 | const uschar *privatekey, |
| 1279 | const uschar *sni, |
| 1280 | const uschar *cas, |
| 1281 | const uschar *crl, |
| 1282 | const uschar *require_ciphers, |
| 1283 | exim_gnutls_state_st **caller_state, |
| 1284 | tls_support * tlsp, |
| 1285 | uschar ** errstr) |
| 1286 | { |
| 1287 | exim_gnutls_state_st * state; |
| 1288 | int rc; |
| 1289 | size_t sz; |
| 1290 | const char * errpos; |
| 1291 | const uschar * p; |
| 1292 | |
| 1293 | if (!exim_gnutls_base_init_done) |
| 1294 | { |
| 1295 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("GnuTLS global init required.\n"); |
| 1296 | |
| 1297 | #ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_PKCS11 |
| 1298 | /* By default, gnutls_global_init will init PKCS11 support in auto mode, |
| 1299 | which loads modules from a config file, which sounds good and may be wanted |
| 1300 | by some sysadmin, but also means in common configurations that GNOME keyring |
| 1301 | environment variables are used and so breaks for users calling mailq. |
| 1302 | To prevent this, we init PKCS11 first, which is the documented approach. */ |
| 1303 | if (!gnutls_allow_auto_pkcs11) |
| 1304 | if ((rc = gnutls_pkcs11_init(GNUTLS_PKCS11_FLAG_MANUAL, NULL))) |
| 1305 | return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_pkcs11_init", rc, host, errstr); |
| 1306 | #endif |
| 1307 | |
| 1308 | if ((rc = gnutls_global_init())) |
| 1309 | return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_global_init", rc, host, errstr); |
| 1310 | |
| 1311 | #if EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL >= 0 |
| 1312 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 1313 | { |
| 1314 | gnutls_global_set_log_function(exim_gnutls_logger_cb); |
| 1315 | /* arbitrarily chosen level; bump up to 9 for more */ |
| 1316 | gnutls_global_set_log_level(EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL); |
| 1317 | } |
| 1318 | #endif |
| 1319 | |
| 1320 | #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP |
| 1321 | if (tls_ocsp_file && (gnutls_buggy_ocsp = tls_is_buggy_ocsp())) |
| 1322 | log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "OCSP unusable with this GnuTLS library version"); |
| 1323 | #endif |
| 1324 | |
| 1325 | exim_gnutls_base_init_done = TRUE; |
| 1326 | } |
| 1327 | |
| 1328 | if (host) |
| 1329 | { |
| 1330 | /* For client-side sessions we allocate a context. This lets us run |
| 1331 | several in parallel. */ |
| 1332 | int old_pool = store_pool; |
| 1333 | store_pool = POOL_PERM; |
| 1334 | state = store_get(sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_st)); |
| 1335 | store_pool = old_pool; |
| 1336 | |
| 1337 | memcpy(state, &exim_gnutls_state_init, sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_init)); |
| 1338 | state->tlsp = tlsp; |
| 1339 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS client session\n"); |
| 1340 | rc = gnutls_init(&state->session, GNUTLS_CLIENT); |
| 1341 | } |
| 1342 | else |
| 1343 | { |
| 1344 | state = &state_server; |
| 1345 | memcpy(state, &exim_gnutls_state_init, sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_init)); |
| 1346 | state->tlsp = tlsp; |
| 1347 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS server session\n"); |
| 1348 | rc = gnutls_init(&state->session, GNUTLS_SERVER); |
| 1349 | } |
| 1350 | if (rc) |
| 1351 | return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_init", rc, host, errstr); |
| 1352 | |
| 1353 | state->host = host; |
| 1354 | |
| 1355 | state->tls_certificate = certificate; |
| 1356 | state->tls_privatekey = privatekey; |
| 1357 | state->tls_require_ciphers = require_ciphers; |
| 1358 | state->tls_sni = sni; |
| 1359 | state->tls_verify_certificates = cas; |
| 1360 | state->tls_crl = crl; |
| 1361 | |
| 1362 | /* This handles the variables that might get re-expanded after TLS SNI; |
| 1363 | that's tls_certificate, tls_privatekey, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl */ |
| 1364 | |
| 1365 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 1366 | debug_printf("Expanding various TLS configuration options for session credentials.\n"); |
| 1367 | if ((rc = tls_expand_session_files(state, errstr)) != OK) return rc; |
| 1368 | |
| 1369 | /* These are all other parts of the x509_cred handling, since SNI in GnuTLS |
| 1370 | requires a new structure afterwards. */ |
| 1371 | |
| 1372 | if ((rc = tls_set_remaining_x509(state, errstr)) != OK) return rc; |
| 1373 | |
| 1374 | /* set SNI in client, only */ |
| 1375 | if (host) |
| 1376 | { |
| 1377 | if (!expand_check(sni, US"tls_out_sni", &state->tlsp->sni, errstr)) |
| 1378 | return DEFER; |
| 1379 | if (state->tlsp->sni && *state->tlsp->sni) |
| 1380 | { |
| 1381 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 1382 | debug_printf("Setting TLS client SNI to \"%s\"\n", state->tlsp->sni); |
| 1383 | sz = Ustrlen(state->tlsp->sni); |
| 1384 | if ((rc = gnutls_server_name_set(state->session, |
| 1385 | GNUTLS_NAME_DNS, state->tlsp->sni, sz))) |
| 1386 | return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_server_name_set", rc, host, errstr); |
| 1387 | } |
| 1388 | } |
| 1389 | else if (state->tls_sni) |
| 1390 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("*** PROBABLY A BUG *** " \ |
| 1391 | "have an SNI set for a server [%s]\n", state->tls_sni); |
| 1392 | |
| 1393 | /* This is the priority string support, |
| 1394 | http://www.gnutls.org/manual/html_node/Priority-Strings.html |
| 1395 | and replaces gnutls_require_kx, gnutls_require_mac & gnutls_require_protocols. |
| 1396 | This was backwards incompatible, but means Exim no longer needs to track |
| 1397 | all algorithms and provide string forms for them. */ |
| 1398 | |
| 1399 | p = NULL; |
| 1400 | if (state->tls_require_ciphers && *state->tls_require_ciphers) |
| 1401 | { |
| 1402 | if (!expand_check_tlsvar(tls_require_ciphers, errstr)) |
| 1403 | return DEFER; |
| 1404 | if (state->exp_tls_require_ciphers && *state->exp_tls_require_ciphers) |
| 1405 | { |
| 1406 | p = state->exp_tls_require_ciphers; |
| 1407 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("GnuTLS session cipher/priority \"%s\"\n", p); |
| 1408 | } |
| 1409 | } |
| 1410 | if (!p) |
| 1411 | { |
| 1412 | p = exim_default_gnutls_priority; |
| 1413 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 1414 | debug_printf("GnuTLS using default session cipher/priority \"%s\"\n", p); |
| 1415 | } |
| 1416 | |
| 1417 | if ((rc = gnutls_priority_init(&state->priority_cache, CCS p, &errpos))) |
| 1418 | return tls_error_gnu(string_sprintf( |
| 1419 | "gnutls_priority_init(%s) failed at offset %ld, \"%.6s..\"", |
| 1420 | p, errpos - CS p, errpos), |
| 1421 | rc, host, errstr); |
| 1422 | |
| 1423 | if ((rc = gnutls_priority_set(state->session, state->priority_cache))) |
| 1424 | return tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_priority_set", rc, host, errstr); |
| 1425 | |
| 1426 | gnutls_db_set_cache_expiration(state->session, ssl_session_timeout); |
| 1427 | |
| 1428 | /* Reduce security in favour of increased compatibility, if the admin |
| 1429 | decides to make that trade-off. */ |
| 1430 | if (gnutls_compat_mode) |
| 1431 | { |
| 1432 | #if LIBGNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x020104 |
| 1433 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("lowering GnuTLS security, compatibility mode\n"); |
| 1434 | gnutls_session_enable_compatibility_mode(state->session); |
| 1435 | #else |
| 1436 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Unable to set gnutls_compat_mode - GnuTLS version too old\n"); |
| 1437 | #endif |
| 1438 | } |
| 1439 | |
| 1440 | *caller_state = state; |
| 1441 | return OK; |
| 1442 | } |
| 1443 | |
| 1444 | |
| 1445 | |
| 1446 | /************************************************* |
| 1447 | * Extract peer information * |
| 1448 | *************************************************/ |
| 1449 | |
| 1450 | static const uschar * |
| 1451 | cipher_stdname_kcm(gnutls_kx_algorithm_t kx, gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t cipher, |
| 1452 | gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac) |
| 1453 | { |
| 1454 | uschar cs_id[2]; |
| 1455 | gnutls_kx_algorithm_t kx_i; |
| 1456 | gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t cipher_i; |
| 1457 | gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac_i; |
| 1458 | |
| 1459 | for (size_t i = 0; |
| 1460 | gnutls_cipher_suite_info(i, cs_id, &kx_i, &cipher_i, &mac_i, NULL); |
| 1461 | i++) |
| 1462 | if (kx_i == kx && cipher_i == cipher && mac_i == mac) |
| 1463 | return cipher_stdname(cs_id[0], cs_id[1]); |
| 1464 | return NULL; |
| 1465 | } |
| 1466 | |
| 1467 | |
| 1468 | |
| 1469 | /* Called from both server and client code. |
| 1470 | Only this is allowed to set state->peerdn and state->have_set_peerdn |
| 1471 | and we use that to detect double-calls. |
| 1472 | |
| 1473 | NOTE: the state blocks last while the TLS connection is up, which is fine |
| 1474 | for logging in the server side, but for the client side, we log after teardown |
| 1475 | in src/deliver.c. While the session is up, we can twist about states and |
| 1476 | repoint tls_* globals, but those variables used for logging or other variable |
| 1477 | expansion that happens _after_ delivery need to have a longer life-time. |
| 1478 | |
| 1479 | So for those, we get the data from POOL_PERM; the re-invoke guard keeps us from |
| 1480 | doing this more than once per generation of a state context. We set them in |
| 1481 | the state context, and repoint tls_* to them. After the state goes away, the |
| 1482 | tls_* copies of the pointers remain valid and client delivery logging is happy. |
| 1483 | |
| 1484 | tls_certificate_verified is a BOOL, so the tls_peerdn and tls_cipher issues |
| 1485 | don't apply. |
| 1486 | |
| 1487 | Arguments: |
| 1488 | state exim_gnutls_state_st * |
| 1489 | errstr pointer to error string |
| 1490 | |
| 1491 | Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL |
| 1492 | */ |
| 1493 | |
| 1494 | static int |
| 1495 | peer_status(exim_gnutls_state_st *state, uschar ** errstr) |
| 1496 | { |
| 1497 | const gnutls_datum_t *cert_list; |
| 1498 | int old_pool, rc; |
| 1499 | unsigned int cert_list_size = 0; |
| 1500 | gnutls_protocol_t protocol; |
| 1501 | gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t cipher; |
| 1502 | gnutls_kx_algorithm_t kx; |
| 1503 | gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac; |
| 1504 | gnutls_certificate_type_t ct; |
| 1505 | gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; |
| 1506 | uschar *dn_buf; |
| 1507 | size_t sz; |
| 1508 | |
| 1509 | if (state->have_set_peerdn) |
| 1510 | return OK; |
| 1511 | state->have_set_peerdn = TRUE; |
| 1512 | |
| 1513 | state->peerdn = NULL; |
| 1514 | |
| 1515 | /* tls_cipher */ |
| 1516 | cipher = gnutls_cipher_get(state->session); |
| 1517 | protocol = gnutls_protocol_get_version(state->session); |
| 1518 | mac = gnutls_mac_get(state->session); |
| 1519 | kx = protocol < GNUTLS_TLS1_3 ? gnutls_kx_get(state->session) : 0; |
| 1520 | |
| 1521 | old_pool = store_pool; |
| 1522 | { |
| 1523 | store_pool = POOL_PERM; |
| 1524 | |
| 1525 | #ifdef SUPPORT_GNUTLS_SESS_DESC |
| 1526 | { |
| 1527 | gstring * g = NULL; |
| 1528 | uschar * s = US gnutls_session_get_desc(state->session), c; |
| 1529 | |
| 1530 | /* Nikos M suggests we use this by preference. It returns like: |
| 1531 | (TLS1.3)-(ECDHE-SECP256R1)-(RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA256)-(AES-256-GCM) |
| 1532 | |
| 1533 | For partial back-compat, put a colon after the TLS version, replace the |
| 1534 | )-( grouping with __, replace in-group - with _ and append the :keysize. */ |
| 1535 | |
| 1536 | /* debug_printf("peer_status: gnutls_session_get_desc %s\n", s); */ |
| 1537 | |
| 1538 | for (s++; (c = *s) && c != ')'; s++) g = string_catn(g, s, 1); |
| 1539 | g = string_catn(g, US":", 1); |
| 1540 | if (*s) s++; /* now on _ between groups */ |
| 1541 | while ((c = *s)) |
| 1542 | { |
| 1543 | for (*++s && ++s; (c = *s) && c != ')'; s++) g = string_catn(g, c == '-' ? US"_" : s, 1); |
| 1544 | /* now on ) closing group */ |
| 1545 | if ((c = *s) && *++s == '-') g = string_catn(g, US"__", 2); |
| 1546 | /* now on _ between groups */ |
| 1547 | } |
| 1548 | g = string_catn(g, US":", 1); |
| 1549 | g = string_cat(g, string_sprintf("%d", (int) gnutls_cipher_get_key_size(cipher) * 8)); |
| 1550 | state->ciphersuite = string_from_gstring(g); |
| 1551 | } |
| 1552 | #else |
| 1553 | state->ciphersuite = string_sprintf("%s:%s:%d", |
| 1554 | gnutls_protocol_get_name(protocol), |
| 1555 | gnutls_cipher_suite_get_name(kx, cipher, mac), |
| 1556 | (int) gnutls_cipher_get_key_size(cipher) * 8); |
| 1557 | |
| 1558 | /* I don't see a way that spaces could occur, in the current GnuTLS |
| 1559 | code base, but it was a concern in the old code and perhaps older GnuTLS |
| 1560 | releases did return "TLS 1.0"; play it safe, just in case. */ |
| 1561 | |
| 1562 | for (uschar * p = state->ciphersuite; *p; p++) if (isspace(*p)) *p = '-'; |
| 1563 | #endif |
| 1564 | |
| 1565 | /* debug_printf("peer_status: ciphersuite %s\n", state->ciphersuite); */ |
| 1566 | |
| 1567 | state->tlsp->cipher = state->ciphersuite; |
| 1568 | state->tlsp->bits = gnutls_cipher_get_key_size(cipher) * 8; |
| 1569 | |
| 1570 | state->tlsp->cipher_stdname = cipher_stdname_kcm(kx, cipher, mac); |
| 1571 | } |
| 1572 | store_pool = old_pool; |
| 1573 | |
| 1574 | /* tls_peerdn */ |
| 1575 | cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(state->session, &cert_list_size); |
| 1576 | |
| 1577 | if (!cert_list || cert_list_size == 0) |
| 1578 | { |
| 1579 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: no certificate from peer (%p & %d)\n", |
| 1580 | cert_list, cert_list_size); |
| 1581 | if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED) |
| 1582 | return tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", |
| 1583 | US"no certificate received from peer", state->host, errstr); |
| 1584 | return OK; |
| 1585 | } |
| 1586 | |
| 1587 | if ((ct = gnutls_certificate_type_get(state->session)) != GNUTLS_CRT_X509) |
| 1588 | { |
| 1589 | const uschar * ctn = US gnutls_certificate_type_get_name(ct); |
| 1590 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 1591 | debug_printf("TLS: peer cert not X.509 but instead \"%s\"\n", ctn); |
| 1592 | if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED) |
| 1593 | return tls_error(US"certificate verification not possible, unhandled type", |
| 1594 | ctn, state->host, errstr); |
| 1595 | return OK; |
| 1596 | } |
| 1597 | |
| 1598 | #define exim_gnutls_peer_err(Label) \ |
| 1599 | do { \ |
| 1600 | if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) \ |
| 1601 | { \ |
| 1602 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: peer cert problem: %s: %s\n", \ |
| 1603 | (Label), gnutls_strerror(rc)); \ |
| 1604 | if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED) \ |
| 1605 | return tls_error_gnu((Label), rc, state->host, errstr); \ |
| 1606 | return OK; \ |
| 1607 | } \ |
| 1608 | } while (0) |
| 1609 | |
| 1610 | rc = import_cert(&cert_list[0], &crt); |
| 1611 | exim_gnutls_peer_err(US"cert 0"); |
| 1612 | |
| 1613 | state->tlsp->peercert = state->peercert = crt; |
| 1614 | |
| 1615 | sz = 0; |
| 1616 | rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(crt, NULL, &sz); |
| 1617 | if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER) |
| 1618 | { |
| 1619 | exim_gnutls_peer_err(US"getting size for cert DN failed"); |
| 1620 | return FAIL; /* should not happen */ |
| 1621 | } |
| 1622 | dn_buf = store_get_perm(sz); |
| 1623 | rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(crt, CS dn_buf, &sz); |
| 1624 | exim_gnutls_peer_err(US"failed to extract certificate DN [gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(cert 0)]"); |
| 1625 | |
| 1626 | state->peerdn = dn_buf; |
| 1627 | |
| 1628 | return OK; |
| 1629 | #undef exim_gnutls_peer_err |
| 1630 | } |
| 1631 | |
| 1632 | |
| 1633 | |
| 1634 | |
| 1635 | /************************************************* |
| 1636 | * Verify peer certificate * |
| 1637 | *************************************************/ |
| 1638 | |
| 1639 | /* Called from both server and client code. |
| 1640 | *Should* be using a callback registered with |
| 1641 | gnutls_certificate_set_verify_function() to fail the handshake if we dislike |
| 1642 | the peer information, but that's too new for some OSes. |
| 1643 | |
| 1644 | Arguments: |
| 1645 | state exim_gnutls_state_st * |
| 1646 | errstr where to put an error message |
| 1647 | |
| 1648 | Returns: |
| 1649 | FALSE if the session should be rejected |
| 1650 | TRUE if the cert is okay or we just don't care |
| 1651 | */ |
| 1652 | |
| 1653 | static BOOL |
| 1654 | verify_certificate(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, uschar ** errstr) |
| 1655 | { |
| 1656 | int rc; |
| 1657 | uint verify; |
| 1658 | |
| 1659 | if (state->verify_requirement == VERIFY_NONE) |
| 1660 | return TRUE; |
| 1661 | |
| 1662 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: checking peer certificate\n"); |
| 1663 | *errstr = NULL; |
| 1664 | |
| 1665 | if ((rc = peer_status(state, errstr)) != OK || !state->peerdn) |
| 1666 | { |
| 1667 | verify = GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID; |
| 1668 | *errstr = US"certificate not supplied"; |
| 1669 | } |
| 1670 | else |
| 1671 | |
| 1672 | { |
| 1673 | #ifdef SUPPORT_DANE |
| 1674 | if (state->verify_requirement == VERIFY_DANE && state->host) |
| 1675 | { |
| 1676 | /* Using dane_verify_session_crt() would be easy, as it does it all for us |
| 1677 | including talking to a DNS resolver. But we want to do that bit ourselves |
| 1678 | as the testsuite intercepts and fakes its own DNS environment. */ |
| 1679 | |
| 1680 | dane_state_t s; |
| 1681 | dane_query_t r; |
| 1682 | uint lsize; |
| 1683 | const gnutls_datum_t * certlist = |
| 1684 | gnutls_certificate_get_peers(state->session, &lsize); |
| 1685 | int usage = tls_out.tlsa_usage; |
| 1686 | |
| 1687 | # ifdef GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION |
| 1688 | /* Split the TLSA records into two sets, TA and EE selectors. Run the |
| 1689 | dane-verification separately so that we know which selector verified; |
| 1690 | then we know whether to do name-verification (needed for TA but not EE). */ |
| 1691 | |
| 1692 | if (usage == ((1<<DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA) | (1<<DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE))) |
| 1693 | { /* a mixed-usage bundle */ |
| 1694 | int i, j, nrec; |
| 1695 | const char ** dd; |
| 1696 | int * ddl; |
| 1697 | |
| 1698 | for(nrec = 0; state->dane_data_len[nrec]; ) nrec++; |
| 1699 | nrec++; |
| 1700 | |
| 1701 | dd = store_get(nrec * sizeof(uschar *)); |
| 1702 | ddl = store_get(nrec * sizeof(int)); |
| 1703 | nrec--; |
| 1704 | |
| 1705 | if ((rc = dane_state_init(&s, 0))) |
| 1706 | goto tlsa_prob; |
| 1707 | |
| 1708 | for (usage = DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE; |
| 1709 | usage >= DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA; usage--) |
| 1710 | { /* take records with this usage */ |
| 1711 | for (j = i = 0; i < nrec; i++) |
| 1712 | if (state->dane_data[i][0] == usage) |
| 1713 | { |
| 1714 | dd[j] = state->dane_data[i]; |
| 1715 | ddl[j++] = state->dane_data_len[i]; |
| 1716 | } |
| 1717 | if (j) |
| 1718 | { |
| 1719 | dd[j] = NULL; |
| 1720 | ddl[j] = 0; |
| 1721 | |
| 1722 | if ((rc = dane_raw_tlsa(s, &r, (char * const *)dd, ddl, 1, 0))) |
| 1723 | goto tlsa_prob; |
| 1724 | |
| 1725 | if ((rc = dane_verify_crt_raw(s, certlist, lsize, |
| 1726 | gnutls_certificate_type_get(state->session), |
| 1727 | r, 0, |
| 1728 | usage == DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE |
| 1729 | ? DANE_VFLAG_ONLY_CHECK_EE_USAGE : 0, |
| 1730 | &verify))) |
| 1731 | { |
| 1732 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 1733 | debug_printf("TLSA record problem: %s\n", dane_strerror(rc)); |
| 1734 | } |
| 1735 | else if (verify == 0) /* verification passed */ |
| 1736 | { |
| 1737 | usage = 1 << usage; |
| 1738 | break; |
| 1739 | } |
| 1740 | } |
| 1741 | } |
| 1742 | |
| 1743 | if (rc) goto tlsa_prob; |
| 1744 | } |
| 1745 | else |
| 1746 | # endif |
| 1747 | { |
| 1748 | if ( (rc = dane_state_init(&s, 0)) |
| 1749 | || (rc = dane_raw_tlsa(s, &r, state->dane_data, state->dane_data_len, |
| 1750 | 1, 0)) |
| 1751 | || (rc = dane_verify_crt_raw(s, certlist, lsize, |
| 1752 | gnutls_certificate_type_get(state->session), |
| 1753 | r, 0, |
| 1754 | # ifdef GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION |
| 1755 | usage == (1 << DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE) |
| 1756 | ? DANE_VFLAG_ONLY_CHECK_EE_USAGE : 0, |
| 1757 | # else |
| 1758 | 0, |
| 1759 | # endif |
| 1760 | &verify)) |
| 1761 | ) |
| 1762 | goto tlsa_prob; |
| 1763 | } |
| 1764 | |
| 1765 | if (verify != 0) /* verification failed */ |
| 1766 | { |
| 1767 | gnutls_datum_t str; |
| 1768 | (void) dane_verification_status_print(verify, &str, 0); |
| 1769 | *errstr = US str.data; /* don't bother to free */ |
| 1770 | goto badcert; |
| 1771 | } |
| 1772 | |
| 1773 | # ifdef GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION |
| 1774 | /* If a TA-mode TLSA record was used for verification we must additionally |
| 1775 | verify the cert name (but not the CA chain). For EE-mode, skip it. */ |
| 1776 | |
| 1777 | if (usage & (1 << DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE)) |
| 1778 | # endif |
| 1779 | { |
| 1780 | state->peer_dane_verified = state->peer_cert_verified = TRUE; |
| 1781 | goto goodcert; |
| 1782 | } |
| 1783 | # ifdef GNUTLS_BROKEN_DANE_VALIDATION |
| 1784 | /* Assume that the name on the A-record is the one that should be matching |
| 1785 | the cert. An alternate view is that the domain part of the email address |
| 1786 | is also permissible. */ |
| 1787 | |
| 1788 | if (gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(state->tlsp->peercert, |
| 1789 | CS state->host->name)) |
| 1790 | { |
| 1791 | state->peer_dane_verified = state->peer_cert_verified = TRUE; |
| 1792 | goto goodcert; |
| 1793 | } |
| 1794 | # endif |
| 1795 | } |
| 1796 | #endif /*SUPPORT_DANE*/ |
| 1797 | |
| 1798 | rc = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(state->session, &verify); |
| 1799 | } |
| 1800 | |
| 1801 | /* Handle the result of verification. INVALID is set if any others are. */ |
| 1802 | |
| 1803 | if (rc < 0 || verify & (GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID|GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED)) |
| 1804 | { |
| 1805 | state->peer_cert_verified = FALSE; |
| 1806 | if (!*errstr) |
| 1807 | { |
| 1808 | #ifdef GNUTLS_CERT_VFY_STATUS_PRINT |
| 1809 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 1810 | { |
| 1811 | gnutls_datum_t txt; |
| 1812 | |
| 1813 | if (gnutls_certificate_verification_status_print(verify, |
| 1814 | gnutls_certificate_type_get(state->session), &txt, 0) |
| 1815 | == GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) |
| 1816 | { |
| 1817 | debug_printf("%s\n", txt.data); |
| 1818 | gnutls_free(txt.data); |
| 1819 | } |
| 1820 | } |
| 1821 | #endif |
| 1822 | *errstr = verify & GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED |
| 1823 | ? US"certificate revoked" : US"certificate invalid"; |
| 1824 | } |
| 1825 | |
| 1826 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 1827 | debug_printf("TLS certificate verification failed (%s): peerdn=\"%s\"\n", |
| 1828 | *errstr, state->peerdn ? state->peerdn : US"<unset>"); |
| 1829 | |
| 1830 | if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED) |
| 1831 | goto badcert; |
| 1832 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 1833 | debug_printf("TLS verify failure overridden (host in tls_try_verify_hosts)\n"); |
| 1834 | } |
| 1835 | |
| 1836 | else |
| 1837 | { |
| 1838 | /* Client side, check the server's certificate name versus the name on the |
| 1839 | A-record for the connection we made. What to do for server side - what name |
| 1840 | to use for client? We document that there is no such checking for server |
| 1841 | side. */ |
| 1842 | |
| 1843 | if ( state->exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames |
| 1844 | && !gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(state->tlsp->peercert, |
| 1845 | CS state->exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames) |
| 1846 | ) |
| 1847 | { |
| 1848 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 1849 | debug_printf("TLS certificate verification failed: cert name mismatch\n"); |
| 1850 | if (state->verify_requirement >= VERIFY_REQUIRED) |
| 1851 | goto badcert; |
| 1852 | return TRUE; |
| 1853 | } |
| 1854 | |
| 1855 | state->peer_cert_verified = TRUE; |
| 1856 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS certificate verified: peerdn=\"%s\"\n", |
| 1857 | state->peerdn ? state->peerdn : US"<unset>"); |
| 1858 | } |
| 1859 | |
| 1860 | goodcert: |
| 1861 | state->tlsp->peerdn = state->peerdn; |
| 1862 | return TRUE; |
| 1863 | |
| 1864 | #ifdef SUPPORT_DANE |
| 1865 | tlsa_prob: |
| 1866 | *errstr = string_sprintf("TLSA record problem: %s", |
| 1867 | rc == DANE_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE ? "none usable" : dane_strerror(rc)); |
| 1868 | #endif |
| 1869 | |
| 1870 | badcert: |
| 1871 | gnutls_alert_send(state->session, GNUTLS_AL_FATAL, GNUTLS_A_BAD_CERTIFICATE); |
| 1872 | return FALSE; |
| 1873 | } |
| 1874 | |
| 1875 | |
| 1876 | |
| 1877 | |
| 1878 | /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */ |
| 1879 | /* Callbacks */ |
| 1880 | |
| 1881 | /* Logging function which can be registered with |
| 1882 | * gnutls_global_set_log_function() |
| 1883 | * gnutls_global_set_log_level() 0..9 |
| 1884 | */ |
| 1885 | #if EXIM_GNUTLS_LIBRARY_LOG_LEVEL >= 0 |
| 1886 | static void |
| 1887 | exim_gnutls_logger_cb(int level, const char *message) |
| 1888 | { |
| 1889 | size_t len = strlen(message); |
| 1890 | if (len < 1) |
| 1891 | { |
| 1892 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("GnuTLS<%d> empty debug message\n", level); |
| 1893 | return; |
| 1894 | } |
| 1895 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("GnuTLS<%d>: %s%s", level, message, |
| 1896 | message[len-1] == '\n' ? "" : "\n"); |
| 1897 | } |
| 1898 | #endif |
| 1899 | |
| 1900 | |
| 1901 | /* Called after client hello, should handle SNI work. |
| 1902 | This will always set tls_sni (state->received_sni) if available, |
| 1903 | and may trigger presenting different certificates, |
| 1904 | if state->trigger_sni_changes is TRUE. |
| 1905 | |
| 1906 | Should be registered with |
| 1907 | gnutls_handshake_set_post_client_hello_function() |
| 1908 | |
| 1909 | "This callback must return 0 on success or a gnutls error code to terminate the |
| 1910 | handshake.". |
| 1911 | |
| 1912 | For inability to get SNI information, we return 0. |
| 1913 | We only return non-zero if re-setup failed. |
| 1914 | Only used for server-side TLS. |
| 1915 | */ |
| 1916 | |
| 1917 | static int |
| 1918 | exim_sni_handling_cb(gnutls_session_t session) |
| 1919 | { |
| 1920 | char sni_name[MAX_HOST_LEN]; |
| 1921 | size_t data_len = MAX_HOST_LEN; |
| 1922 | exim_gnutls_state_st *state = &state_server; |
| 1923 | unsigned int sni_type; |
| 1924 | int rc, old_pool; |
| 1925 | uschar * dummy_errstr; |
| 1926 | |
| 1927 | rc = gnutls_server_name_get(session, sni_name, &data_len, &sni_type, 0); |
| 1928 | if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) |
| 1929 | { |
| 1930 | DEBUG(D_tls) { |
| 1931 | if (rc == GNUTLS_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE) |
| 1932 | debug_printf("TLS: no SNI presented in handshake.\n"); |
| 1933 | else |
| 1934 | debug_printf("TLS failure: gnutls_server_name_get(): %s [%d]\n", |
| 1935 | gnutls_strerror(rc), rc); |
| 1936 | } |
| 1937 | return 0; |
| 1938 | } |
| 1939 | |
| 1940 | if (sni_type != GNUTLS_NAME_DNS) |
| 1941 | { |
| 1942 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: ignoring SNI of unhandled type %u\n", sni_type); |
| 1943 | return 0; |
| 1944 | } |
| 1945 | |
| 1946 | /* We now have a UTF-8 string in sni_name */ |
| 1947 | old_pool = store_pool; |
| 1948 | store_pool = POOL_PERM; |
| 1949 | state->received_sni = string_copyn(US sni_name, data_len); |
| 1950 | store_pool = old_pool; |
| 1951 | |
| 1952 | /* We set this one now so that variable expansions below will work */ |
| 1953 | state->tlsp->sni = state->received_sni; |
| 1954 | |
| 1955 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Received TLS SNI \"%s\"%s\n", sni_name, |
| 1956 | state->trigger_sni_changes ? "" : " (unused for certificate selection)"); |
| 1957 | |
| 1958 | if (!state->trigger_sni_changes) |
| 1959 | return 0; |
| 1960 | |
| 1961 | if ((rc = tls_expand_session_files(state, &dummy_errstr)) != OK) |
| 1962 | { |
| 1963 | /* If the setup of certs/etc failed before handshake, TLS would not have |
| 1964 | been offered. The best we can do now is abort. */ |
| 1965 | return GNUTLS_E_APPLICATION_ERROR_MIN; |
| 1966 | } |
| 1967 | |
| 1968 | rc = tls_set_remaining_x509(state, &dummy_errstr); |
| 1969 | if (rc != OK) return GNUTLS_E_APPLICATION_ERROR_MIN; |
| 1970 | |
| 1971 | return 0; |
| 1972 | } |
| 1973 | |
| 1974 | |
| 1975 | |
| 1976 | #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP |
| 1977 | |
| 1978 | static int |
| 1979 | server_ocsp_stapling_cb(gnutls_session_t session, void * ptr, |
| 1980 | gnutls_datum_t * ocsp_response) |
| 1981 | { |
| 1982 | int ret; |
| 1983 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("OCSP stapling callback: %s\n", US ptr); |
| 1984 | |
| 1985 | if ((ret = gnutls_load_file(ptr, ocsp_response)) < 0) |
| 1986 | { |
| 1987 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Failed to load ocsp stapling file %s\n", |
| 1988 | CS ptr); |
| 1989 | tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP; |
| 1990 | return GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; |
| 1991 | } |
| 1992 | |
| 1993 | tls_in.ocsp = OCSP_VFY_NOT_TRIED; |
| 1994 | return 0; |
| 1995 | } |
| 1996 | |
| 1997 | #endif |
| 1998 | |
| 1999 | |
| 2000 | #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT |
| 2001 | /* |
| 2002 | We use this callback to get observability and detail-level control |
| 2003 | for an exim TLS connection (either direction), raising a tls:cert event |
| 2004 | for each cert in the chain presented by the peer. Any event |
| 2005 | can deny verification. |
| 2006 | |
| 2007 | Return 0 for the handshake to continue or non-zero to terminate. |
| 2008 | */ |
| 2009 | |
| 2010 | static int |
| 2011 | verify_cb(gnutls_session_t session) |
| 2012 | { |
| 2013 | const gnutls_datum_t * cert_list; |
| 2014 | unsigned int cert_list_size = 0; |
| 2015 | gnutls_x509_crt_t crt; |
| 2016 | int rc; |
| 2017 | uschar * yield; |
| 2018 | exim_gnutls_state_st * state = gnutls_session_get_ptr(session); |
| 2019 | |
| 2020 | if ((cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session, &cert_list_size))) |
| 2021 | while (cert_list_size--) |
| 2022 | { |
| 2023 | if ((rc = import_cert(&cert_list[cert_list_size], &crt)) != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) |
| 2024 | { |
| 2025 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: peer cert problem: depth %d: %s\n", |
| 2026 | cert_list_size, gnutls_strerror(rc)); |
| 2027 | break; |
| 2028 | } |
| 2029 | |
| 2030 | state->tlsp->peercert = crt; |
| 2031 | if ((yield = event_raise(state->event_action, |
| 2032 | US"tls:cert", string_sprintf("%d", cert_list_size)))) |
| 2033 | { |
| 2034 | log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, |
| 2035 | "SSL verify denied by event-action: depth=%d: %s", |
| 2036 | cert_list_size, yield); |
| 2037 | return 1; /* reject */ |
| 2038 | } |
| 2039 | state->tlsp->peercert = NULL; |
| 2040 | } |
| 2041 | |
| 2042 | return 0; |
| 2043 | } |
| 2044 | |
| 2045 | #endif |
| 2046 | |
| 2047 | |
| 2048 | static gstring * |
| 2049 | ddump(gnutls_datum_t * d) |
| 2050 | { |
| 2051 | gstring * g = string_get((d->size+1) * 2); |
| 2052 | uschar * s = d->data; |
| 2053 | for (unsigned i = d->size; i > 0; i--, s++) |
| 2054 | { |
| 2055 | g = string_catn(g, US "0123456789abcdef" + (*s >> 4), 1); |
| 2056 | g = string_catn(g, US "0123456789abcdef" + (*s & 0xf), 1); |
| 2057 | } |
| 2058 | return g; |
| 2059 | } |
| 2060 | |
| 2061 | static void |
| 2062 | post_handshake_debug(exim_gnutls_state_st * state) |
| 2063 | { |
| 2064 | debug_printf("gnutls_handshake was successful\n"); |
| 2065 | #ifdef SUPPORT_GNUTLS_SESS_DESC |
| 2066 | debug_printf("%s\n", gnutls_session_get_desc(state->session)); |
| 2067 | #endif |
| 2068 | #ifdef SUPPORT_GNUTLS_KEYLOG |
| 2069 | if (gnutls_protocol_get_version(state->session) < GNUTLS_TLS1_3) |
| 2070 | { |
| 2071 | gnutls_datum_t c, s; |
| 2072 | gstring * gc, * gs; |
| 2073 | /* we only want the client random and the master secret */ |
| 2074 | gnutls_session_get_random(state->session, &c, &s); |
| 2075 | gnutls_session_get_master_secret(state->session, &s); |
| 2076 | gc = ddump(&c); |
| 2077 | gs = ddump(&s); |
| 2078 | debug_printf("CLIENT_RANDOM %.*s %.*s\n", (int)gc->ptr, gc->s, (int)gs->ptr, gs->s); |
| 2079 | } |
| 2080 | else |
| 2081 | debug_printf("To get keying info for TLS1.3 is hard:\n" |
| 2082 | " set environment variable SSLKEYLOGFILE to a filename writable by uid exim\n" |
| 2083 | " add SSLKEYLOGFILE to keep_environment in the exim config\n" |
| 2084 | " run exim as root\n" |
| 2085 | " if using sudo, add SSLKEYLOGFILE to env_keep in /etc/sudoers\n"); |
| 2086 | #endif |
| 2087 | } |
| 2088 | |
| 2089 | /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ */ |
| 2090 | /* Exported functions */ |
| 2091 | |
| 2092 | |
| 2093 | |
| 2094 | |
| 2095 | /************************************************* |
| 2096 | * Start a TLS session in a server * |
| 2097 | *************************************************/ |
| 2098 | |
| 2099 | /* This is called when Exim is running as a server, after having received |
| 2100 | the STARTTLS command. It must respond to that command, and then negotiate |
| 2101 | a TLS session. |
| 2102 | |
| 2103 | Arguments: |
| 2104 | require_ciphers list of allowed ciphers or NULL |
| 2105 | errstr pointer to error string |
| 2106 | |
| 2107 | Returns: OK on success |
| 2108 | DEFER for errors before the start of the negotiation |
| 2109 | FAIL for errors during the negotiation; the server can't |
| 2110 | continue running. |
| 2111 | */ |
| 2112 | |
| 2113 | int |
| 2114 | tls_server_start(const uschar * require_ciphers, uschar ** errstr) |
| 2115 | { |
| 2116 | int rc; |
| 2117 | exim_gnutls_state_st * state = NULL; |
| 2118 | |
| 2119 | /* Check for previous activation */ |
| 2120 | if (tls_in.active.sock >= 0) |
| 2121 | { |
| 2122 | tls_error(US"STARTTLS received after TLS started", US "", NULL, errstr); |
| 2123 | smtp_printf("554 Already in TLS\r\n", FALSE); |
| 2124 | return FAIL; |
| 2125 | } |
| 2126 | |
| 2127 | /* Initialize the library. If it fails, it will already have logged the error |
| 2128 | and sent an SMTP response. */ |
| 2129 | |
| 2130 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS as a server\n"); |
| 2131 | |
| 2132 | if ((rc = tls_init(NULL, tls_certificate, tls_privatekey, |
| 2133 | NULL, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, |
| 2134 | require_ciphers, &state, &tls_in, errstr)) != OK) return rc; |
| 2135 | |
| 2136 | /* If this is a host for which certificate verification is mandatory or |
| 2137 | optional, set up appropriately. */ |
| 2138 | |
| 2139 | if (verify_check_host(&tls_verify_hosts) == OK) |
| 2140 | { |
| 2141 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 2142 | debug_printf("TLS: a client certificate will be required.\n"); |
| 2143 | state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_REQUIRED; |
| 2144 | gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUIRE); |
| 2145 | } |
| 2146 | else if (verify_check_host(&tls_try_verify_hosts) == OK) |
| 2147 | { |
| 2148 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 2149 | debug_printf("TLS: a client certificate will be requested but not required.\n"); |
| 2150 | state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_OPTIONAL; |
| 2151 | gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUEST); |
| 2152 | } |
| 2153 | else |
| 2154 | { |
| 2155 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 2156 | debug_printf("TLS: a client certificate will not be requested.\n"); |
| 2157 | state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_NONE; |
| 2158 | gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_IGNORE); |
| 2159 | } |
| 2160 | |
| 2161 | #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT |
| 2162 | if (event_action) |
| 2163 | { |
| 2164 | state->event_action = event_action; |
| 2165 | gnutls_session_set_ptr(state->session, state); |
| 2166 | gnutls_certificate_set_verify_function(state->x509_cred, verify_cb); |
| 2167 | } |
| 2168 | #endif |
| 2169 | |
| 2170 | /* Register SNI handling; always, even if not in tls_certificate, so that the |
| 2171 | expansion variable $tls_sni is always available. */ |
| 2172 | |
| 2173 | gnutls_handshake_set_post_client_hello_function(state->session, |
| 2174 | exim_sni_handling_cb); |
| 2175 | |
| 2176 | /* Set context and tell client to go ahead, except in the case of TLS startup |
| 2177 | on connection, where outputting anything now upsets the clients and tends to |
| 2178 | make them disconnect. We need to have an explicit fflush() here, to force out |
| 2179 | the response. Other smtp_printf() calls do not need it, because in non-TLS |
| 2180 | mode, the fflush() happens when smtp_getc() is called. */ |
| 2181 | |
| 2182 | if (!state->tlsp->on_connect) |
| 2183 | { |
| 2184 | smtp_printf("220 TLS go ahead\r\n", FALSE); |
| 2185 | fflush(smtp_out); |
| 2186 | } |
| 2187 | |
| 2188 | /* Now negotiate the TLS session. We put our own timer on it, since it seems |
| 2189 | that the GnuTLS library doesn't. |
| 2190 | From 3.1.0 there is gnutls_handshake_set_timeout() - but it requires you |
| 2191 | to set (and clear down afterwards) up a pull-timeout callback function that does |
| 2192 | a select, so we're no better off unless avoiding signals becomes an issue. */ |
| 2193 | |
| 2194 | gnutls_transport_set_ptr2(state->session, |
| 2195 | (gnutls_transport_ptr_t)(long) fileno(smtp_in), |
| 2196 | (gnutls_transport_ptr_t)(long) fileno(smtp_out)); |
| 2197 | state->fd_in = fileno(smtp_in); |
| 2198 | state->fd_out = fileno(smtp_out); |
| 2199 | |
| 2200 | sigalrm_seen = FALSE; |
| 2201 | if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) ALARM(smtp_receive_timeout); |
| 2202 | do |
| 2203 | rc = gnutls_handshake(state->session); |
| 2204 | while (rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN || rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED && !sigalrm_seen); |
| 2205 | ALARM_CLR(0); |
| 2206 | |
| 2207 | if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) |
| 2208 | { |
| 2209 | /* It seems that, except in the case of a timeout, we have to close the |
| 2210 | connection right here; otherwise if the other end is running OpenSSL it hangs |
| 2211 | until the server times out. */ |
| 2212 | |
| 2213 | if (sigalrm_seen) |
| 2214 | { |
| 2215 | tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake", US"timed out", NULL, errstr); |
| 2216 | gnutls_db_remove_session(state->session); |
| 2217 | } |
| 2218 | else |
| 2219 | { |
| 2220 | tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_handshake", rc, NULL, errstr); |
| 2221 | (void) gnutls_alert_send_appropriate(state->session, rc); |
| 2222 | gnutls_deinit(state->session); |
| 2223 | gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(state->x509_cred); |
| 2224 | millisleep(500); |
| 2225 | shutdown(state->fd_out, SHUT_WR); |
| 2226 | for (int i = 1024; fgetc(smtp_in) != EOF && i > 0; ) i--; /* drain skt */ |
| 2227 | (void)fclose(smtp_out); |
| 2228 | (void)fclose(smtp_in); |
| 2229 | smtp_out = smtp_in = NULL; |
| 2230 | } |
| 2231 | |
| 2232 | return FAIL; |
| 2233 | } |
| 2234 | |
| 2235 | DEBUG(D_tls) post_handshake_debug(state); |
| 2236 | |
| 2237 | /* Verify after the fact */ |
| 2238 | |
| 2239 | if (!verify_certificate(state, errstr)) |
| 2240 | { |
| 2241 | if (state->verify_requirement != VERIFY_OPTIONAL) |
| 2242 | { |
| 2243 | (void) tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", *errstr, NULL, errstr); |
| 2244 | return FAIL; |
| 2245 | } |
| 2246 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 2247 | debug_printf("TLS: continuing on only because verification was optional, after: %s\n", |
| 2248 | *errstr); |
| 2249 | } |
| 2250 | |
| 2251 | /* Figure out peer DN, and if authenticated, etc. */ |
| 2252 | |
| 2253 | if ((rc = peer_status(state, NULL)) != OK) return rc; |
| 2254 | |
| 2255 | /* Sets various Exim expansion variables; always safe within server */ |
| 2256 | |
| 2257 | extract_exim_vars_from_tls_state(state); |
| 2258 | |
| 2259 | /* TLS has been set up. Adjust the input functions to read via TLS, |
| 2260 | and initialize appropriately. */ |
| 2261 | |
| 2262 | state->xfer_buffer = store_malloc(ssl_xfer_buffer_size); |
| 2263 | |
| 2264 | receive_getc = tls_getc; |
| 2265 | receive_getbuf = tls_getbuf; |
| 2266 | receive_get_cache = tls_get_cache; |
| 2267 | receive_ungetc = tls_ungetc; |
| 2268 | receive_feof = tls_feof; |
| 2269 | receive_ferror = tls_ferror; |
| 2270 | receive_smtp_buffered = tls_smtp_buffered; |
| 2271 | |
| 2272 | return OK; |
| 2273 | } |
| 2274 | |
| 2275 | |
| 2276 | |
| 2277 | |
| 2278 | static void |
| 2279 | tls_client_setup_hostname_checks(host_item * host, exim_gnutls_state_st * state, |
| 2280 | smtp_transport_options_block * ob) |
| 2281 | { |
| 2282 | if (verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_verify_cert_hostnames, host) == OK) |
| 2283 | { |
| 2284 | state->exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames = |
| 2285 | #ifdef SUPPORT_I18N |
| 2286 | string_domain_utf8_to_alabel(host->name, NULL); |
| 2287 | #else |
| 2288 | host->name; |
| 2289 | #endif |
| 2290 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 2291 | debug_printf("TLS: server cert verification includes hostname: \"%s\".\n", |
| 2292 | state->exp_tls_verify_cert_hostnames); |
| 2293 | } |
| 2294 | } |
| 2295 | |
| 2296 | |
| 2297 | |
| 2298 | |
| 2299 | #ifdef SUPPORT_DANE |
| 2300 | /* Given our list of RRs from the TLSA lookup, build a lookup block in |
| 2301 | GnuTLS-DANE's preferred format. Hang it on the state str for later |
| 2302 | use in DANE verification. |
| 2303 | |
| 2304 | We point at the dnsa data not copy it, so it must remain valid until |
| 2305 | after verification is done.*/ |
| 2306 | |
| 2307 | static BOOL |
| 2308 | dane_tlsa_load(exim_gnutls_state_st * state, dns_answer * dnsa) |
| 2309 | { |
| 2310 | dns_scan dnss; |
| 2311 | int i; |
| 2312 | const char ** dane_data; |
| 2313 | int * dane_data_len; |
| 2314 | |
| 2315 | i = 1; |
| 2316 | for (dns_record * rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS); rr; |
| 2317 | rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT) |
| 2318 | ) if (rr->type == T_TLSA) i++; |
| 2319 | |
| 2320 | dane_data = store_get(i * sizeof(uschar *)); |
| 2321 | dane_data_len = store_get(i * sizeof(int)); |
| 2322 | |
| 2323 | i = 0; |
| 2324 | for (dns_record * rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_ANSWERS); rr; |
| 2325 | rr = dns_next_rr(dnsa, &dnss, RESET_NEXT) |
| 2326 | ) if (rr->type == T_TLSA && rr->size > 3) |
| 2327 | { |
| 2328 | const uschar * p = rr->data; |
| 2329 | uint8_t usage = p[0], sel = p[1], type = p[2]; |
| 2330 | |
| 2331 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 2332 | debug_printf("TLSA: %d %d %d size %d\n", usage, sel, type, rr->size); |
| 2333 | |
| 2334 | if ( (usage != DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA && usage != DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE) |
| 2335 | || (sel != 0 && sel != 1) |
| 2336 | ) |
| 2337 | continue; |
| 2338 | switch(type) |
| 2339 | { |
| 2340 | case 0: /* Full: cannot check at present */ |
| 2341 | break; |
| 2342 | case 1: if (rr->size != 3 + 256/8) continue; /* sha2-256 */ |
| 2343 | break; |
| 2344 | case 2: if (rr->size != 3 + 512/8) continue; /* sha2-512 */ |
| 2345 | break; |
| 2346 | default: continue; |
| 2347 | } |
| 2348 | |
| 2349 | tls_out.tlsa_usage |= 1<<usage; |
| 2350 | dane_data[i] = CS p; |
| 2351 | dane_data_len[i++] = rr->size; |
| 2352 | } |
| 2353 | |
| 2354 | if (!i) return FALSE; |
| 2355 | |
| 2356 | dane_data[i] = NULL; |
| 2357 | dane_data_len[i] = 0; |
| 2358 | |
| 2359 | state->dane_data = (char * const *)dane_data; |
| 2360 | state->dane_data_len = dane_data_len; |
| 2361 | return TRUE; |
| 2362 | } |
| 2363 | #endif |
| 2364 | |
| 2365 | |
| 2366 | |
| 2367 | /************************************************* |
| 2368 | * Start a TLS session in a client * |
| 2369 | *************************************************/ |
| 2370 | |
| 2371 | /* Called from the smtp transport after STARTTLS has been accepted. |
| 2372 | |
| 2373 | Arguments: |
| 2374 | cctx connection context |
| 2375 | conn_args connection details |
| 2376 | cookie datum for randomness (not used) |
| 2377 | tlsp record details of channel configuration here; must be non-NULL |
| 2378 | errstr error string pointer |
| 2379 | |
| 2380 | Returns: TRUE for success with TLS session context set in smtp context, |
| 2381 | FALSE on error |
| 2382 | */ |
| 2383 | |
| 2384 | BOOL |
| 2385 | tls_client_start(client_conn_ctx * cctx, smtp_connect_args * conn_args, |
| 2386 | void * cookie ARG_UNUSED, |
| 2387 | tls_support * tlsp, uschar ** errstr) |
| 2388 | { |
| 2389 | host_item * host = conn_args->host; /* for msgs and option-tests */ |
| 2390 | transport_instance * tb = conn_args->tblock; /* always smtp or NULL */ |
| 2391 | smtp_transport_options_block * ob = tb |
| 2392 | ? (smtp_transport_options_block *)tb->options_block |
| 2393 | : &smtp_transport_option_defaults; |
| 2394 | int rc; |
| 2395 | exim_gnutls_state_st * state = NULL; |
| 2396 | uschar * cipher_list = NULL; |
| 2397 | |
| 2398 | #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP |
| 2399 | BOOL require_ocsp = |
| 2400 | verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->hosts_require_ocsp, host) == OK; |
| 2401 | BOOL request_ocsp = require_ocsp ? TRUE |
| 2402 | : verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->hosts_request_ocsp, host) == OK; |
| 2403 | #endif |
| 2404 | |
| 2405 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("initialising GnuTLS as a client on fd %d\n", cctx->sock); |
| 2406 | |
| 2407 | #ifdef SUPPORT_DANE |
| 2408 | /* If dane is flagged, have either request or require dane for this host, and |
| 2409 | a TLSA record found. Therefore, dane verify required. Which implies cert must |
| 2410 | be requested and supplied, dane verify must pass, and cert verify irrelevant |
| 2411 | (incl. hostnames), and (caller handled) require_tls */ |
| 2412 | |
| 2413 | if (conn_args->dane && ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers) |
| 2414 | { |
| 2415 | /* not using expand_check_tlsvar because not yet in state */ |
| 2416 | if (!expand_check(ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers, US"dane_require_tls_ciphers", |
| 2417 | &cipher_list, errstr)) |
| 2418 | return FALSE; |
| 2419 | cipher_list = cipher_list && *cipher_list |
| 2420 | ? ob->dane_require_tls_ciphers : ob->tls_require_ciphers; |
| 2421 | } |
| 2422 | #endif |
| 2423 | |
| 2424 | if (!cipher_list) |
| 2425 | cipher_list = ob->tls_require_ciphers; |
| 2426 | |
| 2427 | if (tls_init(host, ob->tls_certificate, ob->tls_privatekey, |
| 2428 | ob->tls_sni, ob->tls_verify_certificates, ob->tls_crl, |
| 2429 | cipher_list, &state, tlsp, errstr) != OK) |
| 2430 | return FALSE; |
| 2431 | |
| 2432 | { |
| 2433 | int dh_min_bits = ob->tls_dh_min_bits; |
| 2434 | if (dh_min_bits < EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_MIN_BITS) |
| 2435 | { |
| 2436 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 2437 | debug_printf("WARNING: tls_dh_min_bits far too low," |
| 2438 | " clamping %d up to %d\n", |
| 2439 | dh_min_bits, EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_MIN_BITS); |
| 2440 | dh_min_bits = EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_MIN_BITS; |
| 2441 | } |
| 2442 | |
| 2443 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Setting D-H prime minimum" |
| 2444 | " acceptable bits to %d\n", |
| 2445 | dh_min_bits); |
| 2446 | gnutls_dh_set_prime_bits(state->session, dh_min_bits); |
| 2447 | } |
| 2448 | |
| 2449 | /* Stick to the old behaviour for compatibility if tls_verify_certificates is |
| 2450 | set but both tls_verify_hosts and tls_try_verify_hosts are unset. Check only |
| 2451 | the specified host patterns if one of them is defined */ |
| 2452 | |
| 2453 | #ifdef SUPPORT_DANE |
| 2454 | if (conn_args->dane && dane_tlsa_load(state, &conn_args->tlsa_dnsa)) |
| 2455 | { |
| 2456 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 2457 | debug_printf("TLS: server certificate DANE required.\n"); |
| 2458 | state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_DANE; |
| 2459 | gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUIRE); |
| 2460 | } |
| 2461 | else |
| 2462 | #endif |
| 2463 | if ( ( state->exp_tls_verify_certificates |
| 2464 | && !ob->tls_verify_hosts |
| 2465 | && (!ob->tls_try_verify_hosts || !*ob->tls_try_verify_hosts) |
| 2466 | ) |
| 2467 | || verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_verify_hosts, host) == OK |
| 2468 | ) |
| 2469 | { |
| 2470 | tls_client_setup_hostname_checks(host, state, ob); |
| 2471 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 2472 | debug_printf("TLS: server certificate verification required.\n"); |
| 2473 | state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_REQUIRED; |
| 2474 | gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUIRE); |
| 2475 | } |
| 2476 | else if (verify_check_given_host(CUSS &ob->tls_try_verify_hosts, host) == OK) |
| 2477 | { |
| 2478 | tls_client_setup_hostname_checks(host, state, ob); |
| 2479 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 2480 | debug_printf("TLS: server certificate verification optional.\n"); |
| 2481 | state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_OPTIONAL; |
| 2482 | gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_REQUEST); |
| 2483 | } |
| 2484 | else |
| 2485 | { |
| 2486 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 2487 | debug_printf("TLS: server certificate verification not required.\n"); |
| 2488 | state->verify_requirement = VERIFY_NONE; |
| 2489 | gnutls_certificate_server_set_request(state->session, GNUTLS_CERT_IGNORE); |
| 2490 | } |
| 2491 | |
| 2492 | #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP |
| 2493 | /* supported since GnuTLS 3.1.3 */ |
| 2494 | if (request_ocsp) |
| 2495 | { |
| 2496 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("TLS: will request OCSP stapling\n"); |
| 2497 | if ((rc = gnutls_ocsp_status_request_enable_client(state->session, |
| 2498 | NULL, 0, NULL)) != OK) |
| 2499 | { |
| 2500 | tls_error_gnu(US"cert-status-req", rc, state->host, errstr); |
| 2501 | return FALSE; |
| 2502 | } |
| 2503 | tlsp->ocsp = OCSP_NOT_RESP; |
| 2504 | } |
| 2505 | #endif |
| 2506 | |
| 2507 | #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT |
| 2508 | if (tb && tb->event_action) |
| 2509 | { |
| 2510 | state->event_action = tb->event_action; |
| 2511 | gnutls_session_set_ptr(state->session, state); |
| 2512 | gnutls_certificate_set_verify_function(state->x509_cred, verify_cb); |
| 2513 | } |
| 2514 | #endif |
| 2515 | |
| 2516 | gnutls_transport_set_ptr(state->session, (gnutls_transport_ptr_t)(long) cctx->sock); |
| 2517 | state->fd_in = cctx->sock; |
| 2518 | state->fd_out = cctx->sock; |
| 2519 | |
| 2520 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("about to gnutls_handshake\n"); |
| 2521 | /* There doesn't seem to be a built-in timeout on connection. */ |
| 2522 | |
| 2523 | sigalrm_seen = FALSE; |
| 2524 | ALARM(ob->command_timeout); |
| 2525 | do |
| 2526 | rc = gnutls_handshake(state->session); |
| 2527 | while (rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN || rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED && !sigalrm_seen); |
| 2528 | ALARM_CLR(0); |
| 2529 | |
| 2530 | if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) |
| 2531 | { |
| 2532 | if (sigalrm_seen) |
| 2533 | { |
| 2534 | gnutls_alert_send(state->session, GNUTLS_AL_FATAL, GNUTLS_A_USER_CANCELED); |
| 2535 | tls_error(US"gnutls_handshake", US"timed out", state->host, errstr); |
| 2536 | } |
| 2537 | else |
| 2538 | tls_error_gnu(US"gnutls_handshake", rc, state->host, errstr); |
| 2539 | return FALSE; |
| 2540 | } |
| 2541 | |
| 2542 | DEBUG(D_tls) post_handshake_debug(state); |
| 2543 | |
| 2544 | /* Verify late */ |
| 2545 | |
| 2546 | if (!verify_certificate(state, errstr)) |
| 2547 | { |
| 2548 | tls_error(US"certificate verification failed", *errstr, state->host, errstr); |
| 2549 | return FALSE; |
| 2550 | } |
| 2551 | |
| 2552 | #ifndef DISABLE_OCSP |
| 2553 | if (require_ocsp) |
| 2554 | { |
| 2555 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 2556 | { |
| 2557 | gnutls_datum_t stapling; |
| 2558 | gnutls_ocsp_resp_t resp; |
| 2559 | gnutls_datum_t printed; |
| 2560 | if ( (rc= gnutls_ocsp_status_request_get(state->session, &stapling)) == 0 |
| 2561 | && (rc= gnutls_ocsp_resp_init(&resp)) == 0 |
| 2562 | && (rc= gnutls_ocsp_resp_import(resp, &stapling)) == 0 |
| 2563 | && (rc= gnutls_ocsp_resp_print(resp, GNUTLS_OCSP_PRINT_FULL, &printed)) == 0 |
| 2564 | ) |
| 2565 | { |
| 2566 | debug_printf("%.4096s", printed.data); |
| 2567 | gnutls_free(printed.data); |
| 2568 | } |
| 2569 | else |
| 2570 | (void) tls_error_gnu(US"ocsp decode", rc, state->host, errstr); |
| 2571 | } |
| 2572 | |
| 2573 | if (gnutls_ocsp_status_request_is_checked(state->session, 0) == 0) |
| 2574 | { |
| 2575 | tlsp->ocsp = OCSP_FAILED; |
| 2576 | tls_error(US"certificate status check failed", NULL, state->host, errstr); |
| 2577 | return FALSE; |
| 2578 | } |
| 2579 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Passed OCSP checking\n"); |
| 2580 | tlsp->ocsp = OCSP_VFIED; |
| 2581 | } |
| 2582 | #endif |
| 2583 | |
| 2584 | /* Figure out peer DN, and if authenticated, etc. */ |
| 2585 | |
| 2586 | if (peer_status(state, errstr) != OK) |
| 2587 | return FALSE; |
| 2588 | |
| 2589 | /* Sets various Exim expansion variables; may need to adjust for ACL callouts */ |
| 2590 | |
| 2591 | extract_exim_vars_from_tls_state(state); |
| 2592 | |
| 2593 | cctx->tls_ctx = state; |
| 2594 | return TRUE; |
| 2595 | } |
| 2596 | |
| 2597 | |
| 2598 | |
| 2599 | |
| 2600 | /************************************************* |
| 2601 | * Close down a TLS session * |
| 2602 | *************************************************/ |
| 2603 | |
| 2604 | /* This is also called from within a delivery subprocess forked from the |
| 2605 | daemon, to shut down the TLS library, without actually doing a shutdown (which |
| 2606 | would tamper with the TLS session in the parent process). |
| 2607 | |
| 2608 | Arguments: |
| 2609 | ct_ctx client context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context |
| 2610 | shutdown 1 if TLS close-alert is to be sent, |
| 2611 | 2 if also response to be waited for |
| 2612 | |
| 2613 | Returns: nothing |
| 2614 | */ |
| 2615 | |
| 2616 | void |
| 2617 | tls_close(void * ct_ctx, int shutdown) |
| 2618 | { |
| 2619 | exim_gnutls_state_st * state = ct_ctx ? ct_ctx : &state_server; |
| 2620 | |
| 2621 | if (!state->tlsp || state->tlsp->active.sock < 0) return; /* TLS was not active */ |
| 2622 | |
| 2623 | if (shutdown) |
| 2624 | { |
| 2625 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("tls_close(): shutting down TLS%s\n", |
| 2626 | shutdown > 1 ? " (with response-wait)" : ""); |
| 2627 | |
| 2628 | ALARM(2); |
| 2629 | gnutls_bye(state->session, shutdown > 1 ? GNUTLS_SHUT_RDWR : GNUTLS_SHUT_WR); |
| 2630 | ALARM_CLR(0); |
| 2631 | } |
| 2632 | |
| 2633 | gnutls_deinit(state->session); |
| 2634 | gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(state->x509_cred); |
| 2635 | |
| 2636 | |
| 2637 | state->tlsp->active.sock = -1; |
| 2638 | state->tlsp->active.tls_ctx = NULL; |
| 2639 | if (state->xfer_buffer) store_free(state->xfer_buffer); |
| 2640 | memcpy(state, &exim_gnutls_state_init, sizeof(exim_gnutls_state_init)); |
| 2641 | } |
| 2642 | |
| 2643 | |
| 2644 | |
| 2645 | |
| 2646 | static BOOL |
| 2647 | tls_refill(unsigned lim) |
| 2648 | { |
| 2649 | exim_gnutls_state_st * state = &state_server; |
| 2650 | ssize_t inbytes; |
| 2651 | |
| 2652 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Calling gnutls_record_recv(%p, %p, %u)\n", |
| 2653 | state->session, state->xfer_buffer, ssl_xfer_buffer_size); |
| 2654 | |
| 2655 | sigalrm_seen = FALSE; |
| 2656 | if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) ALARM(smtp_receive_timeout); |
| 2657 | |
| 2658 | do |
| 2659 | inbytes = gnutls_record_recv(state->session, state->xfer_buffer, |
| 2660 | MIN(ssl_xfer_buffer_size, lim)); |
| 2661 | while (inbytes == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN); |
| 2662 | |
| 2663 | if (smtp_receive_timeout > 0) ALARM_CLR(0); |
| 2664 | |
| 2665 | if (had_command_timeout) /* set by signal handler */ |
| 2666 | smtp_command_timeout_exit(); /* does not return */ |
| 2667 | if (had_command_sigterm) |
| 2668 | smtp_command_sigterm_exit(); |
| 2669 | if (had_data_timeout) |
| 2670 | smtp_data_timeout_exit(); |
| 2671 | if (had_data_sigint) |
| 2672 | smtp_data_sigint_exit(); |
| 2673 | |
| 2674 | /* Timeouts do not get this far. A zero-byte return appears to mean that the |
| 2675 | TLS session has been closed down, not that the socket itself has been closed |
| 2676 | down. Revert to non-TLS handling. */ |
| 2677 | |
| 2678 | if (sigalrm_seen) |
| 2679 | { |
| 2680 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got tls read timeout\n"); |
| 2681 | state->xfer_error = TRUE; |
| 2682 | return FALSE; |
| 2683 | } |
| 2684 | |
| 2685 | else if (inbytes == 0) |
| 2686 | { |
| 2687 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got TLS_EOF\n"); |
| 2688 | |
| 2689 | receive_getc = smtp_getc; |
| 2690 | receive_getbuf = smtp_getbuf; |
| 2691 | receive_get_cache = smtp_get_cache; |
| 2692 | receive_ungetc = smtp_ungetc; |
| 2693 | receive_feof = smtp_feof; |
| 2694 | receive_ferror = smtp_ferror; |
| 2695 | receive_smtp_buffered = smtp_buffered; |
| 2696 | |
| 2697 | gnutls_deinit(state->session); |
| 2698 | gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(state->x509_cred); |
| 2699 | |
| 2700 | state->session = NULL; |
| 2701 | state->tlsp->active.sock = -1; |
| 2702 | state->tlsp->active.tls_ctx = NULL; |
| 2703 | state->tlsp->bits = 0; |
| 2704 | state->tlsp->certificate_verified = FALSE; |
| 2705 | tls_channelbinding_b64 = NULL; |
| 2706 | state->tlsp->cipher = NULL; |
| 2707 | state->tlsp->peercert = NULL; |
| 2708 | state->tlsp->peerdn = NULL; |
| 2709 | |
| 2710 | return FALSE; |
| 2711 | } |
| 2712 | |
| 2713 | /* Handle genuine errors */ |
| 2714 | |
| 2715 | else if (inbytes < 0) |
| 2716 | { |
| 2717 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("%s: err from gnutls_record_recv\n", __FUNCTION__); |
| 2718 | record_io_error(state, (int) inbytes, US"recv", NULL); |
| 2719 | state->xfer_error = TRUE; |
| 2720 | return FALSE; |
| 2721 | } |
| 2722 | #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM |
| 2723 | dkim_exim_verify_feed(state->xfer_buffer, inbytes); |
| 2724 | #endif |
| 2725 | state->xfer_buffer_hwm = (int) inbytes; |
| 2726 | state->xfer_buffer_lwm = 0; |
| 2727 | return TRUE; |
| 2728 | } |
| 2729 | |
| 2730 | /************************************************* |
| 2731 | * TLS version of getc * |
| 2732 | *************************************************/ |
| 2733 | |
| 2734 | /* This gets the next byte from the TLS input buffer. If the buffer is empty, |
| 2735 | it refills the buffer via the GnuTLS reading function. |
| 2736 | Only used by the server-side TLS. |
| 2737 | |
| 2738 | This feeds DKIM and should be used for all message-body reads. |
| 2739 | |
| 2740 | Arguments: lim Maximum amount to read/buffer |
| 2741 | Returns: the next character or EOF |
| 2742 | */ |
| 2743 | |
| 2744 | int |
| 2745 | tls_getc(unsigned lim) |
| 2746 | { |
| 2747 | exim_gnutls_state_st * state = &state_server; |
| 2748 | |
| 2749 | if (state->xfer_buffer_lwm >= state->xfer_buffer_hwm) |
| 2750 | if (!tls_refill(lim)) |
| 2751 | return state->xfer_error ? EOF : smtp_getc(lim); |
| 2752 | |
| 2753 | /* Something in the buffer; return next uschar */ |
| 2754 | |
| 2755 | return state->xfer_buffer[state->xfer_buffer_lwm++]; |
| 2756 | } |
| 2757 | |
| 2758 | uschar * |
| 2759 | tls_getbuf(unsigned * len) |
| 2760 | { |
| 2761 | exim_gnutls_state_st * state = &state_server; |
| 2762 | unsigned size; |
| 2763 | uschar * buf; |
| 2764 | |
| 2765 | if (state->xfer_buffer_lwm >= state->xfer_buffer_hwm) |
| 2766 | if (!tls_refill(*len)) |
| 2767 | { |
| 2768 | if (!state->xfer_error) return smtp_getbuf(len); |
| 2769 | *len = 0; |
| 2770 | return NULL; |
| 2771 | } |
| 2772 | |
| 2773 | if ((size = state->xfer_buffer_hwm - state->xfer_buffer_lwm) > *len) |
| 2774 | size = *len; |
| 2775 | buf = &state->xfer_buffer[state->xfer_buffer_lwm]; |
| 2776 | state->xfer_buffer_lwm += size; |
| 2777 | *len = size; |
| 2778 | return buf; |
| 2779 | } |
| 2780 | |
| 2781 | |
| 2782 | void |
| 2783 | tls_get_cache() |
| 2784 | { |
| 2785 | #ifndef DISABLE_DKIM |
| 2786 | exim_gnutls_state_st * state = &state_server; |
| 2787 | int n = state->xfer_buffer_hwm - state->xfer_buffer_lwm; |
| 2788 | if (n > 0) |
| 2789 | dkim_exim_verify_feed(state->xfer_buffer+state->xfer_buffer_lwm, n); |
| 2790 | #endif |
| 2791 | } |
| 2792 | |
| 2793 | |
| 2794 | BOOL |
| 2795 | tls_could_read(void) |
| 2796 | { |
| 2797 | return state_server.xfer_buffer_lwm < state_server.xfer_buffer_hwm |
| 2798 | || gnutls_record_check_pending(state_server.session) > 0; |
| 2799 | } |
| 2800 | |
| 2801 | |
| 2802 | |
| 2803 | |
| 2804 | /************************************************* |
| 2805 | * Read bytes from TLS channel * |
| 2806 | *************************************************/ |
| 2807 | |
| 2808 | /* This does not feed DKIM, so if the caller uses this for reading message body, |
| 2809 | then the caller must feed DKIM. |
| 2810 | |
| 2811 | Arguments: |
| 2812 | ct_ctx client context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context |
| 2813 | buff buffer of data |
| 2814 | len size of buffer |
| 2815 | |
| 2816 | Returns: the number of bytes read |
| 2817 | -1 after a failed read, including EOF |
| 2818 | */ |
| 2819 | |
| 2820 | int |
| 2821 | tls_read(void * ct_ctx, uschar *buff, size_t len) |
| 2822 | { |
| 2823 | exim_gnutls_state_st * state = ct_ctx ? ct_ctx : &state_server; |
| 2824 | ssize_t inbytes; |
| 2825 | |
| 2826 | if (len > INT_MAX) |
| 2827 | len = INT_MAX; |
| 2828 | |
| 2829 | if (state->xfer_buffer_lwm < state->xfer_buffer_hwm) |
| 2830 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 2831 | debug_printf("*** PROBABLY A BUG *** " \ |
| 2832 | "tls_read() called with data in the tls_getc() buffer, %d ignored\n", |
| 2833 | state->xfer_buffer_hwm - state->xfer_buffer_lwm); |
| 2834 | |
| 2835 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 2836 | debug_printf("Calling gnutls_record_recv(%p, %p, " SIZE_T_FMT ")\n", |
| 2837 | state->session, buff, len); |
| 2838 | |
| 2839 | do |
| 2840 | inbytes = gnutls_record_recv(state->session, buff, len); |
| 2841 | while (inbytes == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN); |
| 2842 | |
| 2843 | if (inbytes > 0) return inbytes; |
| 2844 | if (inbytes == 0) |
| 2845 | { |
| 2846 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Got TLS_EOF\n"); |
| 2847 | } |
| 2848 | else |
| 2849 | { |
| 2850 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("%s: err from gnutls_record_recv\n", __FUNCTION__); |
| 2851 | record_io_error(state, (int)inbytes, US"recv", NULL); |
| 2852 | } |
| 2853 | |
| 2854 | return -1; |
| 2855 | } |
| 2856 | |
| 2857 | |
| 2858 | |
| 2859 | |
| 2860 | /************************************************* |
| 2861 | * Write bytes down TLS channel * |
| 2862 | *************************************************/ |
| 2863 | |
| 2864 | /* |
| 2865 | Arguments: |
| 2866 | ct_ctx client context pointer, or NULL for the one global server context |
| 2867 | buff buffer of data |
| 2868 | len number of bytes |
| 2869 | more more data expected soon |
| 2870 | |
| 2871 | Returns: the number of bytes after a successful write, |
| 2872 | -1 after a failed write |
| 2873 | */ |
| 2874 | |
| 2875 | int |
| 2876 | tls_write(void * ct_ctx, const uschar * buff, size_t len, BOOL more) |
| 2877 | { |
| 2878 | ssize_t outbytes; |
| 2879 | size_t left = len; |
| 2880 | exim_gnutls_state_st * state = ct_ctx ? ct_ctx : &state_server; |
| 2881 | #ifdef SUPPORT_CORK |
| 2882 | static BOOL corked = FALSE; |
| 2883 | |
| 2884 | if (more && !corked) gnutls_record_cork(state->session); |
| 2885 | #endif |
| 2886 | |
| 2887 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("%s(%p, " SIZE_T_FMT "%s)\n", __FUNCTION__, |
| 2888 | buff, left, more ? ", more" : ""); |
| 2889 | |
| 2890 | while (left > 0) |
| 2891 | { |
| 2892 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("gnutls_record_send(SSL, %p, " SIZE_T_FMT ")\n", |
| 2893 | buff, left); |
| 2894 | |
| 2895 | do |
| 2896 | outbytes = gnutls_record_send(state->session, buff, left); |
| 2897 | while (outbytes == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN); |
| 2898 | |
| 2899 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("outbytes=" SSIZE_T_FMT "\n", outbytes); |
| 2900 | if (outbytes < 0) |
| 2901 | { |
| 2902 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("%s: gnutls_record_send err\n", __FUNCTION__); |
| 2903 | record_io_error(state, outbytes, US"send", NULL); |
| 2904 | return -1; |
| 2905 | } |
| 2906 | if (outbytes == 0) |
| 2907 | { |
| 2908 | record_io_error(state, 0, US"send", US"TLS channel closed on write"); |
| 2909 | return -1; |
| 2910 | } |
| 2911 | |
| 2912 | left -= outbytes; |
| 2913 | buff += outbytes; |
| 2914 | } |
| 2915 | |
| 2916 | if (len > INT_MAX) |
| 2917 | { |
| 2918 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 2919 | debug_printf("Whoops! Wrote more bytes (" SIZE_T_FMT ") than INT_MAX\n", |
| 2920 | len); |
| 2921 | len = INT_MAX; |
| 2922 | } |
| 2923 | |
| 2924 | #ifdef SUPPORT_CORK |
| 2925 | if (more != corked) |
| 2926 | { |
| 2927 | if (!more) (void) gnutls_record_uncork(state->session, 0); |
| 2928 | corked = more; |
| 2929 | } |
| 2930 | #endif |
| 2931 | |
| 2932 | return (int) len; |
| 2933 | } |
| 2934 | |
| 2935 | |
| 2936 | |
| 2937 | |
| 2938 | /************************************************* |
| 2939 | * Random number generation * |
| 2940 | *************************************************/ |
| 2941 | |
| 2942 | /* Pseudo-random number generation. The result is not expected to be |
| 2943 | cryptographically strong but not so weak that someone will shoot themselves |
| 2944 | in the foot using it as a nonce in input in some email header scheme or |
| 2945 | whatever weirdness they'll twist this into. The result should handle fork() |
| 2946 | and avoid repeating sequences. OpenSSL handles that for us. |
| 2947 | |
| 2948 | Arguments: |
| 2949 | max range maximum |
| 2950 | Returns a random number in range [0, max-1] |
| 2951 | */ |
| 2952 | |
| 2953 | #ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_RND |
| 2954 | int |
| 2955 | vaguely_random_number(int max) |
| 2956 | { |
| 2957 | unsigned int r; |
| 2958 | int i, needed_len; |
| 2959 | uschar smallbuf[sizeof(r)]; |
| 2960 | |
| 2961 | if (max <= 1) |
| 2962 | return 0; |
| 2963 | |
| 2964 | needed_len = sizeof(r); |
| 2965 | /* Don't take 8 times more entropy than needed if int is 8 octets and we were |
| 2966 | asked for a number less than 10. */ |
| 2967 | |
| 2968 | for (r = max, i = 0; r; ++i) |
| 2969 | r >>= 1; |
| 2970 | i = (i + 7) / 8; |
| 2971 | if (i < needed_len) |
| 2972 | needed_len = i; |
| 2973 | |
| 2974 | i = gnutls_rnd(GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, smallbuf, needed_len); |
| 2975 | if (i < 0) |
| 2976 | { |
| 2977 | DEBUG(D_all) debug_printf("gnutls_rnd() failed, using fallback.\n"); |
| 2978 | return vaguely_random_number_fallback(max); |
| 2979 | } |
| 2980 | r = 0; |
| 2981 | for (uschar * p = smallbuf; needed_len; --needed_len, ++p) |
| 2982 | r = r * 256 + *p; |
| 2983 | |
| 2984 | /* We don't particularly care about weighted results; if someone wants |
| 2985 | * smooth distribution and cares enough then they should submit a patch then. */ |
| 2986 | return r % max; |
| 2987 | } |
| 2988 | #else /* HAVE_GNUTLS_RND */ |
| 2989 | int |
| 2990 | vaguely_random_number(int max) |
| 2991 | { |
| 2992 | return vaguely_random_number_fallback(max); |
| 2993 | } |
| 2994 | #endif /* HAVE_GNUTLS_RND */ |
| 2995 | |
| 2996 | |
| 2997 | |
| 2998 | |
| 2999 | /************************************************* |
| 3000 | * Let tls_require_ciphers be checked at startup * |
| 3001 | *************************************************/ |
| 3002 | |
| 3003 | /* The tls_require_ciphers option, if set, must be something which the |
| 3004 | library can parse. |
| 3005 | |
| 3006 | Returns: NULL on success, or error message |
| 3007 | */ |
| 3008 | |
| 3009 | uschar * |
| 3010 | tls_validate_require_cipher(void) |
| 3011 | { |
| 3012 | int rc; |
| 3013 | uschar *expciphers = NULL; |
| 3014 | gnutls_priority_t priority_cache; |
| 3015 | const char *errpos; |
| 3016 | uschar * dummy_errstr; |
| 3017 | |
| 3018 | #define validate_check_rc(Label) do { \ |
| 3019 | if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { if (exim_gnutls_base_init_done) gnutls_global_deinit(); \ |
| 3020 | return string_sprintf("%s failed: %s", (Label), gnutls_strerror(rc)); } } while (0) |
| 3021 | #define return_deinit(Label) do { gnutls_global_deinit(); return (Label); } while (0) |
| 3022 | |
| 3023 | if (exim_gnutls_base_init_done) |
| 3024 | log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC, |
| 3025 | "already initialised GnuTLS, Exim developer bug"); |
| 3026 | |
| 3027 | #ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_PKCS11 |
| 3028 | if (!gnutls_allow_auto_pkcs11) |
| 3029 | { |
| 3030 | rc = gnutls_pkcs11_init(GNUTLS_PKCS11_FLAG_MANUAL, NULL); |
| 3031 | validate_check_rc(US"gnutls_pkcs11_init"); |
| 3032 | } |
| 3033 | #endif |
| 3034 | rc = gnutls_global_init(); |
| 3035 | validate_check_rc(US"gnutls_global_init()"); |
| 3036 | exim_gnutls_base_init_done = TRUE; |
| 3037 | |
| 3038 | if (!(tls_require_ciphers && *tls_require_ciphers)) |
| 3039 | return_deinit(NULL); |
| 3040 | |
| 3041 | if (!expand_check(tls_require_ciphers, US"tls_require_ciphers", &expciphers, |
| 3042 | &dummy_errstr)) |
| 3043 | return_deinit(US"failed to expand tls_require_ciphers"); |
| 3044 | |
| 3045 | if (!(expciphers && *expciphers)) |
| 3046 | return_deinit(NULL); |
| 3047 | |
| 3048 | DEBUG(D_tls) |
| 3049 | debug_printf("tls_require_ciphers expands to \"%s\"\n", expciphers); |
| 3050 | |
| 3051 | rc = gnutls_priority_init(&priority_cache, CS expciphers, &errpos); |
| 3052 | validate_check_rc(string_sprintf( |
| 3053 | "gnutls_priority_init(%s) failed at offset %ld, \"%.8s..\"", |
| 3054 | expciphers, errpos - CS expciphers, errpos)); |
| 3055 | |
| 3056 | #undef return_deinit |
| 3057 | #undef validate_check_rc |
| 3058 | gnutls_global_deinit(); |
| 3059 | |
| 3060 | return NULL; |
| 3061 | } |
| 3062 | |
| 3063 | |
| 3064 | |
| 3065 | |
| 3066 | /************************************************* |
| 3067 | * Report the library versions. * |
| 3068 | *************************************************/ |
| 3069 | |
| 3070 | /* See a description in tls-openssl.c for an explanation of why this exists. |
| 3071 | |
| 3072 | Arguments: a FILE* to print the results to |
| 3073 | Returns: nothing |
| 3074 | */ |
| 3075 | |
| 3076 | void |
| 3077 | tls_version_report(FILE *f) |
| 3078 | { |
| 3079 | fprintf(f, "Library version: GnuTLS: Compile: %s\n" |
| 3080 | " Runtime: %s\n", |
| 3081 | LIBGNUTLS_VERSION, |
| 3082 | gnutls_check_version(NULL)); |
| 3083 | } |
| 3084 | |
| 3085 | /* vi: aw ai sw=2 |
| 3086 | */ |
| 3087 | /* End of tls-gnu.c */ |