Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
e682570f TL |
1 | #include <stdio.h> |
2 | #include <string.h> | |
3 | #include <stdint.h> | |
4 | ||
5 | #include <openssl/opensslv.h> | |
6 | #include <openssl/err.h> | |
7 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> | |
8 | #include <openssl/safestack.h> | |
9 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
10 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
11 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | |
12 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
13 | ||
14 | #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1000000fL | |
15 | #error "OpenSSL 1.0.0 or higher required" | |
16 | #else | |
17 | ||
18 | #include "danessl.h" | |
19 | ||
20 | #define DANE_F_ADD_SKID 100 | |
21 | #define DANE_F_CHECK_END_ENTITY 101 | |
22 | #define DANE_F_GROW_CHAIN 102 | |
23 | #define DANE_F_LIST_ALLOC 103 | |
24 | #define DANE_F_MATCH 104 | |
25 | #define DANE_F_PUSH_EXT 105 | |
26 | #define DANE_F_SET_TRUST_ANCHOR 106 | |
27 | #define DANE_F_SSL_CTX_DANE_INIT 107 | |
28 | #define DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA 108 | |
29 | #define DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT 109 | |
30 | #define DANE_F_SSL_DANE_LIBRARY_INIT 110 | |
31 | #define DANE_F_VERIFY_CERT 111 | |
32 | #define DANE_F_WRAP_CERT 112 | |
33 | ||
34 | #define DANE_R_BAD_CERT 100 | |
35 | #define DANE_R_BAD_CERT_PKEY 101 | |
36 | #define DANE_R_BAD_DATA_LENGTH 102 | |
37 | #define DANE_R_BAD_DIGEST 103 | |
38 | #define DANE_R_BAD_NULL_DATA 104 | |
39 | #define DANE_R_BAD_PKEY 105 | |
40 | #define DANE_R_BAD_SELECTOR 106 | |
41 | #define DANE_R_BAD_USAGE 107 | |
42 | #define DANE_R_DANE_INIT 108 | |
43 | #define DANE_R_DANE_SUPPORT 109 | |
44 | #define DANE_R_LIBRARY_INIT 110 | |
45 | #define DANE_R_NOSIGN_KEY 111 | |
46 | #define DANE_R_SCTX_INIT 112 | |
47 | ||
48 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR | |
49 | #define DANE_F_PLACEHOLDER 0 /* FIRST! Value TBD */ | |
50 | static ERR_STRING_DATA dane_str_functs[] = { | |
51 | {DANE_F_PLACEHOLDER, "DANE library"}, /* FIRST!!! */ | |
52 | {DANE_F_ADD_SKID, "add_skid"}, | |
53 | {DANE_F_CHECK_END_ENTITY, "check_end_entity"}, | |
54 | {DANE_F_GROW_CHAIN, "grow_chain"}, | |
55 | {DANE_F_LIST_ALLOC, "list_alloc"}, | |
56 | {DANE_F_MATCH, "match"}, | |
57 | {DANE_F_PUSH_EXT, "push_ext"}, | |
58 | {DANE_F_SET_TRUST_ANCHOR, "set_trust_anchor"}, | |
59 | {DANE_F_SSL_CTX_DANE_INIT, "SSL_CTX_dane_init"}, | |
60 | {DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, "SSL_dane_add_tlsa"}, | |
61 | {DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, "SSL_dane_init"}, | |
62 | {DANE_F_SSL_DANE_LIBRARY_INIT, "SSL_dane_library_init"}, | |
63 | {DANE_F_VERIFY_CERT, "verify_cert"}, | |
64 | {DANE_F_WRAP_CERT, "wrap_cert"}, | |
65 | {0, NULL} | |
66 | }; | |
67 | static ERR_STRING_DATA dane_str_reasons[] = { | |
68 | {DANE_R_BAD_CERT, "Bad TLSA record certificate"}, | |
69 | {DANE_R_BAD_CERT_PKEY, "Bad TLSA record certificate public key"}, | |
70 | {DANE_R_BAD_DATA_LENGTH, "Bad TLSA record digest length"}, | |
71 | {DANE_R_BAD_DIGEST, "Bad TLSA record digest"}, | |
72 | {DANE_R_BAD_NULL_DATA, "Bad TLSA record null data"}, | |
73 | {DANE_R_BAD_PKEY, "Bad TLSA record public key"}, | |
74 | {DANE_R_BAD_SELECTOR, "Bad TLSA record selector"}, | |
75 | {DANE_R_BAD_USAGE, "Bad TLSA record usage"}, | |
76 | {DANE_R_DANE_INIT, "SSL_dane_init() required"}, | |
77 | {DANE_R_DANE_SUPPORT, "DANE library features not supported"}, | |
78 | {DANE_R_LIBRARY_INIT, "SSL_dane_library_init() required"}, | |
79 | {DANE_R_SCTX_INIT, "SSL_CTX_dane_init() required"}, | |
80 | {DANE_R_NOSIGN_KEY, "Certificate usage 2 requires EC support"}, | |
81 | {0, NULL} | |
82 | }; | |
83 | #endif | |
84 | ||
85 | #define DANEerr(f, r) ERR_PUT_error(err_lib_dane, (f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__) | |
86 | ||
87 | static int err_lib_dane = -1; | |
88 | static int dane_idx = -1; | |
89 | ||
90 | #ifdef X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN /* OpenSSL >= 1.0.2 */ | |
91 | static int wrap_to_root = 0; | |
92 | #else | |
93 | static int wrap_to_root = 1; | |
94 | #endif | |
95 | ||
96 | static void (*cert_free)(void *) = (void (*)(void *)) X509_free; | |
97 | static void (*pkey_free)(void *) = (void (*)(void *)) EVP_PKEY_free; | |
98 | ||
99 | typedef struct dane_list { | |
100 | struct dane_list *next; | |
101 | void *value; | |
102 | } *dane_list; | |
103 | ||
104 | #define LINSERT(h, e) do { (e)->next = (h); (h) = (e); } while (0) | |
105 | ||
106 | typedef struct DANE_HOST_LIST { | |
107 | struct DANE_HOST_LIST *next; | |
108 | char *value; | |
109 | } *DANE_HOST_LIST; | |
110 | ||
111 | typedef struct dane_data { | |
112 | size_t datalen; | |
113 | unsigned char data[0]; | |
114 | } *dane_data; | |
115 | ||
116 | typedef struct DANE_DATA_LIST { | |
117 | struct DANE_DATA_LIST *next; | |
118 | dane_data value; | |
119 | } *DANE_DATA_LIST; | |
120 | ||
121 | typedef struct dane_mtype { | |
122 | int mdlen; | |
123 | const EVP_MD *md; | |
124 | DANE_DATA_LIST data; | |
125 | } *dane_mtype; | |
126 | ||
127 | typedef struct DANE_MTYPE_LIST { | |
128 | struct DANE_MTYPE_LIST *next; | |
129 | dane_mtype value; | |
130 | } *DANE_MTYPE_LIST; | |
131 | ||
132 | typedef struct dane_selector { | |
133 | uint8_t selector; | |
134 | DANE_MTYPE_LIST mtype; | |
135 | } *dane_selector; | |
136 | ||
137 | typedef struct DANE_SELECTOR_LIST { | |
138 | struct DANE_SELECTOR_LIST *next; | |
139 | dane_selector value; | |
140 | } *DANE_SELECTOR_LIST; | |
141 | ||
142 | typedef struct DANE_PKEY_LIST { | |
143 | struct DANE_PKEY_LIST *next; | |
144 | EVP_PKEY *value; | |
145 | } *DANE_PKEY_LIST; | |
146 | ||
147 | typedef struct DANE_CERT_LIST { | |
148 | struct DANE_CERT_LIST *next; | |
149 | X509 *value; | |
150 | } *DANE_CERT_LIST; | |
151 | ||
152 | typedef struct SSL_DANE { | |
153 | int (*verify)(X509_STORE_CTX *); | |
154 | STACK_OF(X509) *roots; | |
155 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain; | |
156 | const char *thost; /* TLSA base domain */ | |
157 | char *mhost; /* Matched, peer name */ | |
158 | DANE_PKEY_LIST pkeys; | |
159 | DANE_CERT_LIST certs; | |
160 | DANE_HOST_LIST hosts; | |
161 | DANE_SELECTOR_LIST selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_LAST + 1]; | |
162 | int depth; | |
163 | int multi; /* Multi-label wildcards? */ | |
164 | int count; /* Number of TLSA records */ | |
165 | } SSL_DANE; | |
166 | ||
167 | #ifndef X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH | |
168 | #define X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION | |
169 | #endif | |
170 | ||
171 | static int match(DANE_SELECTOR_LIST slist, X509 *cert, int depth) | |
172 | { | |
173 | int matched; | |
174 | ||
175 | /* | |
176 | * Note, set_trust_anchor() needs to know whether the match was for a | |
177 | * pkey digest or a certificate digest. We return MATCHED_PKEY or | |
178 | * MATCHED_CERT accordingly. | |
179 | */ | |
180 | #define MATCHED_CERT (SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_CERT + 1) | |
181 | #define MATCHED_PKEY (SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_SPKI + 1) | |
182 | ||
183 | /* | |
184 | * Loop over each selector, mtype, and associated data element looking | |
185 | * for a match. | |
186 | */ | |
187 | for (matched = 0; !matched && slist; slist = slist->next) { | |
188 | DANE_MTYPE_LIST m; | |
189 | unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
190 | unsigned char *buf; | |
191 | unsigned char *buf2; | |
192 | unsigned int len; | |
193 | ||
194 | /* | |
195 | * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key. | |
196 | */ | |
197 | switch (slist->value->selector) { | |
198 | case SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_CERT: | |
199 | len = i2d_X509(cert, NULL); | |
200 | buf2 = buf = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(len); | |
201 | if (buf) | |
202 | i2d_X509(cert, &buf2); | |
203 | break; | |
204 | case SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_SPKI: | |
205 | len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), NULL); | |
206 | buf2 = buf = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(len); | |
207 | if (buf) | |
208 | i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf2); | |
209 | break; | |
210 | } | |
211 | ||
212 | if (buf == NULL) { | |
213 | DANEerr(DANE_F_MATCH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
214 | return 0; | |
215 | } | |
216 | OPENSSL_assert(buf2 - buf == len); | |
217 | ||
218 | /* | |
219 | * Loop over each mtype and data element | |
220 | */ | |
221 | for (m = slist->value->mtype; !matched && m; m = m->next) { | |
222 | DANE_DATA_LIST d; | |
223 | unsigned char *cmpbuf = buf; | |
224 | unsigned int cmplen = len; | |
225 | ||
226 | /* | |
227 | * If it is a digest, compute the corresponding digest of the | |
228 | * DER data for comparison, otherwise, use the full object. | |
229 | */ | |
230 | if (m->value->md) { | |
231 | cmpbuf = mdbuf; | |
232 | if (!EVP_Digest(buf, len, cmpbuf, &cmplen, m->value->md, 0)) | |
233 | matched = -1; | |
234 | } | |
235 | for (d = m->value->data; !matched && d; d = d->next) | |
236 | if (cmplen == d->value->datalen && | |
237 | memcmp(cmpbuf, d->value->data, cmplen) == 0) | |
238 | matched = slist->value->selector + 1; | |
239 | } | |
240 | ||
241 | OPENSSL_free(buf); | |
242 | } | |
243 | ||
244 | return matched; | |
245 | } | |
246 | ||
247 | static int push_ext(X509 *cert, X509_EXTENSION *ext) | |
248 | { | |
249 | X509_EXTENSIONS *exts; | |
250 | ||
251 | if (ext) { | |
252 | if ((exts = cert->cert_info->extensions) == 0) | |
253 | exts = cert->cert_info->extensions = sk_X509_EXTENSION_new_null(); | |
254 | if (exts && sk_X509_EXTENSION_push(exts, ext)) | |
255 | return 1; | |
256 | X509_EXTENSION_free(ext); | |
257 | } | |
258 | DANEerr(DANE_F_PUSH_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
259 | return 0; | |
260 | } | |
261 | ||
262 | static int add_ext(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject, int ext_nid, char *ext_val) | |
263 | { | |
264 | X509V3_CTX v3ctx; | |
265 | ||
266 | X509V3_set_ctx(&v3ctx, issuer, subject, 0, 0, 0); | |
267 | return push_ext(subject, X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(0, &v3ctx, ext_nid, ext_val)); | |
268 | } | |
269 | ||
270 | static int set_serial(X509 *cert, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid, X509 *subject) | |
271 | { | |
272 | int ret = 0; | |
273 | BIGNUM *bn; | |
274 | ||
275 | if (akid && akid->serial) | |
276 | return (X509_set_serialNumber(cert, akid->serial)); | |
277 | ||
278 | /* | |
279 | * Add one to subject's serial to avoid collisions between TA serial and | |
280 | * serial of signing root. | |
281 | */ | |
282 | if ((bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(X509_get_serialNumber(subject), 0)) != 0 | |
283 | && BN_add_word(bn, 1) | |
284 | && BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, X509_get_serialNumber(cert))) | |
285 | ret = 1; | |
286 | ||
287 | if (bn) | |
288 | BN_free(bn); | |
289 | return ret; | |
290 | } | |
291 | ||
292 | static int add_akid(X509 *cert, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) | |
293 | { | |
294 | int nid = NID_authority_key_identifier; | |
295 | ASN1_STRING *id; | |
296 | unsigned char c = 0; | |
297 | int ret = 0; | |
298 | ||
299 | /* | |
300 | * 0 will never be our subject keyid from a SHA-1 hash, but it could be | |
301 | * our subject keyid if forced from child's akid. If so, set our | |
302 | * authority keyid to 1. This way we are never self-signed, and thus | |
303 | * exempt from any potential (off by default for now in OpenSSL) | |
304 | * self-signature checks! | |
305 | */ | |
306 | id = (ASN1_STRING *) ((akid && akid->keyid) ? akid->keyid : 0); | |
307 | if (id && M_ASN1_STRING_length(id) == 1 && *M_ASN1_STRING_data(id) == c) | |
308 | c = 1; | |
309 | ||
310 | if ((akid = AUTHORITY_KEYID_new()) != 0 | |
311 | && (akid->keyid = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) != 0 | |
312 | && M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(akid->keyid, (void *) &c, 1) | |
313 | && X509_add1_ext_i2d(cert, nid, akid, 0, X509V3_ADD_APPEND)) | |
314 | ret = 1; | |
315 | if (akid) | |
316 | AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(akid); | |
317 | return ret; | |
318 | } | |
319 | ||
320 | static int add_skid(X509 *cert, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) | |
321 | { | |
322 | int nid = NID_subject_key_identifier; | |
323 | ||
324 | if (!akid || !akid->keyid) | |
325 | return add_ext(0, cert, nid, "hash"); | |
326 | return X509_add1_ext_i2d(cert, nid, akid->keyid, 0, X509V3_ADD_APPEND) > 0; | |
327 | } | |
328 | ||
329 | static X509_NAME *akid_issuer_name(AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) | |
330 | { | |
331 | if (akid && akid->issuer) { | |
332 | int i; | |
333 | GENERAL_NAMES *gens = akid->issuer; | |
334 | ||
335 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); ++i) { | |
336 | GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | |
337 | ||
338 | if (gn->type == GEN_DIRNAME) | |
339 | return (gn->d.dirn); | |
340 | } | |
341 | } | |
342 | return 0; | |
343 | } | |
344 | ||
345 | static int set_issuer_name(X509 *cert, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) | |
346 | { | |
347 | X509_NAME *name = akid_issuer_name(akid); | |
348 | ||
349 | /* | |
350 | * If subject's akid specifies an authority key identifer issuer name, we | |
351 | * must use that. | |
352 | */ | |
353 | if (name) | |
354 | return X509_set_issuer_name(cert, name); | |
355 | return X509_set_issuer_name(cert, X509_get_subject_name(cert)); | |
356 | } | |
357 | ||
358 | static int grow_chain(SSL_DANE *dane, int trusted, X509 *cert) | |
359 | { | |
360 | STACK_OF(X509) **xs = trusted ? &dane->roots : &dane->chain; | |
361 | static ASN1_OBJECT *serverAuth = 0; | |
362 | ||
363 | #define UNTRUSTED 0 | |
364 | #define TRUSTED 1 | |
365 | ||
366 | if (trusted && serverAuth == 0 && | |
367 | (serverAuth = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_server_auth)) == 0) { | |
368 | DANEerr(DANE_F_GROW_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
369 | return 0; | |
370 | } | |
371 | if (!*xs && (*xs = sk_X509_new_null()) == 0) { | |
372 | DANEerr(DANE_F_GROW_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
373 | return 0; | |
374 | } | |
375 | ||
376 | if (cert) { | |
377 | if (trusted && !X509_add1_trust_object(cert, serverAuth)) | |
378 | return 0; | |
379 | CRYPTO_add(&cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
380 | if (!sk_X509_push(*xs, cert)) { | |
381 | X509_free(cert); | |
382 | DANEerr(DANE_F_GROW_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
383 | return 0; | |
384 | } | |
385 | } | |
386 | return 1; | |
387 | } | |
388 | ||
389 | static int wrap_issuer( | |
390 | SSL_DANE *dane, | |
391 | EVP_PKEY *key, | |
392 | X509 *subject, | |
393 | int depth, | |
394 | int top | |
395 | ) | |
396 | { | |
397 | int ret = 1; | |
398 | X509 *cert = 0; | |
399 | AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid; | |
400 | X509_NAME *name = X509_get_issuer_name(subject); | |
401 | EVP_PKEY *newkey = key ? key : X509_get_pubkey(subject); | |
402 | ||
403 | #define WRAP_MID 0 /* Ensure intermediate. */ | |
404 | #define WRAP_TOP 1 /* Ensure self-signed. */ | |
405 | ||
406 | if (name == 0 || newkey == 0 || (cert = X509_new()) == 0) | |
407 | return 0; | |
408 | ||
409 | /* | |
410 | * Record the depth of the trust-anchor certificate. | |
411 | */ | |
412 | if (dane->depth < 0) | |
413 | dane->depth = depth + 1; | |
414 | ||
415 | /* | |
416 | * XXX: Uncaught error condition: | |
417 | * | |
418 | * The return value is NULL both when the extension is missing, and when | |
419 | * OpenSSL rans out of memory while parsing the extension. | |
420 | */ | |
421 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
422 | akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(subject, NID_authority_key_identifier, 0, 0); | |
423 | /* XXX: Should we peek at the error stack here??? */ | |
424 | ||
425 | /* | |
426 | * If top is true generate a self-issued root CA, otherwise an | |
427 | * intermediate CA and possibly its self-signed issuer. | |
428 | * | |
429 | * CA cert valid for +/- 30 days | |
430 | */ | |
431 | if (!X509_set_version(cert, 2) | |
432 | || !set_serial(cert, akid, subject) | |
433 | || !X509_set_subject_name(cert, name) | |
434 | || !set_issuer_name(cert, akid) | |
435 | || !X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notBefore(cert), -30 * 86400L) | |
436 | || !X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notAfter(cert), 30 * 86400L) | |
437 | || !X509_set_pubkey(cert, newkey) | |
438 | || !add_ext(0, cert, NID_basic_constraints, "CA:TRUE") | |
439 | || (!top && !add_akid(cert, akid)) | |
440 | || !add_skid(cert, akid) | |
441 | || (!top && wrap_to_root && | |
442 | !wrap_issuer(dane, newkey, cert, depth, WRAP_TOP))) { | |
443 | ret = 0; | |
444 | } | |
445 | if (akid) | |
446 | AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(akid); | |
447 | if (!key) | |
448 | EVP_PKEY_free(newkey); | |
449 | if (ret) { | |
450 | if (!top && wrap_to_root) | |
451 | ret = grow_chain(dane, UNTRUSTED, cert); | |
452 | else | |
453 | ret = grow_chain(dane, TRUSTED, cert); | |
454 | } | |
455 | if (cert) | |
456 | X509_free(cert); | |
457 | return ret; | |
458 | } | |
459 | ||
460 | static int wrap_cert(SSL_DANE *dane, X509 *tacert, int depth) | |
461 | { | |
462 | if (dane->depth < 0) | |
463 | dane->depth = depth + 1; | |
464 | ||
465 | /* | |
466 | * If the TA certificate is self-issued, or need not be, use it directly. | |
467 | * Otherwise, synthesize requisuite ancestors. | |
468 | */ | |
469 | if (!wrap_to_root | |
470 | || X509_check_issued(tacert, tacert) == X509_V_OK) | |
471 | return grow_chain(dane, TRUSTED, tacert); | |
472 | ||
473 | if (wrap_issuer(dane, 0, tacert, depth, WRAP_MID)) | |
474 | return grow_chain(dane, UNTRUSTED, tacert); | |
475 | return 0; | |
476 | } | |
477 | ||
478 | static int ta_signed(SSL_DANE *dane, X509 *cert, int depth) | |
479 | { | |
480 | DANE_CERT_LIST x; | |
481 | DANE_PKEY_LIST k; | |
482 | EVP_PKEY *pk; | |
483 | int done = 0; | |
484 | ||
485 | /* | |
486 | * First check whether issued and signed by a TA cert, this is cheaper | |
487 | * than the bare-public key checks below, since we can determine whether | |
488 | * the candidate TA certificate issued the certificate to be checked | |
489 | * first (name comparisons), before we bother with signature checks | |
490 | * (public key operations). | |
491 | */ | |
492 | for (x = dane->certs; !done && x; x = x->next) { | |
493 | if (X509_check_issued(x->value, cert) == X509_V_OK) { | |
494 | if ((pk = X509_get_pubkey(x->value)) == 0) { | |
495 | /* | |
496 | * The cert originally contained a valid pkey, which does | |
497 | * not just vanish, so this is most likely a memory error. | |
498 | */ | |
499 | done = -1; | |
500 | break; | |
501 | } | |
502 | /* Check signature, since some other TA may work if not this. */ | |
503 | if (X509_verify(cert, pk) > 0) | |
504 | done = wrap_cert(dane, x->value, depth) ? 1 : -1; | |
505 | EVP_PKEY_free(pk); | |
506 | } | |
507 | } | |
508 | ||
509 | /* | |
510 | * With bare TA public keys, we can't check whether the trust chain is | |
511 | * issued by the key, but we can determine whether it is signed by the | |
512 | * key, so we go with that. | |
513 | * | |
514 | * Ideally, the corresponding certificate was presented in the chain, and we | |
515 | * matched it by its public key digest one level up. This code is here | |
516 | * to handle adverse conditions imposed by sloppy administrators of | |
517 | * receiving systems with poorly constructed chains. | |
518 | * | |
519 | * We'd like to optimize out keys that should not match when the cert's | |
520 | * authority key id does not match the key id of this key computed via | |
521 | * the RFC keyid algorithm (SHA-1 digest of public key bit-string sans | |
522 | * ASN1 tag and length thus also excluding the unused bits field that is | |
523 | * logically part of the length). However, some CAs have a non-standard | |
524 | * authority keyid, so we lose. Too bad. | |
525 | * | |
526 | * This may push errors onto the stack when the certificate signature is | |
527 | * not of the right type or length, throw these away, | |
528 | */ | |
529 | for (k = dane->pkeys; !done && k; k = k->next) | |
530 | if (X509_verify(cert, k->value) > 0) | |
531 | done = wrap_issuer(dane, k->value, cert, depth, WRAP_MID) ? 1 : -1; | |
532 | else | |
533 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
534 | ||
535 | return done; | |
536 | } | |
537 | ||
538 | static int set_trust_anchor(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane, X509 *cert) | |
539 | { | |
540 | int matched = 0; | |
541 | int n; | |
542 | int i; | |
543 | int depth = 0; | |
544 | EVP_PKEY *takey; | |
545 | X509 *ca; | |
546 | STACK_OF(X509) *in = ctx->untrusted; /* XXX: Accessor? */ | |
547 | ||
548 | if (!grow_chain(dane, UNTRUSTED, 0)) | |
549 | return -1; | |
550 | ||
551 | /* | |
552 | * Accept a degenerate case: depth 0 self-signed trust-anchor. | |
553 | */ | |
554 | if (X509_check_issued(cert, cert) == X509_V_OK) { | |
555 | dane->depth = 0; | |
556 | matched = match(dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA], cert, 0); | |
557 | if (matched > 0 && !grow_chain(dane, TRUSTED, cert)) | |
558 | matched = -1; | |
559 | return matched; | |
560 | } | |
561 | ||
562 | /* Make a shallow copy of the input untrusted chain. */ | |
563 | if ((in = sk_X509_dup(in)) == 0) { | |
564 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SET_TRUST_ANCHOR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
565 | return -1; | |
566 | } | |
567 | ||
568 | /* | |
569 | * At each iteration we consume the issuer of the current cert. This | |
570 | * reduces the length of the "in" chain by one. If no issuer is found, | |
571 | * we are done. We also stop when a certificate matches a TA in the | |
572 | * peer's TLSA RRset. | |
573 | * | |
574 | * Caller ensures that the initial certificate is not self-signed. | |
575 | */ | |
576 | for (n = sk_X509_num(in); n > 0; --n, ++depth) { | |
577 | for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) | |
578 | if (X509_check_issued(sk_X509_value(in, i), cert) == X509_V_OK) | |
579 | break; | |
580 | ||
581 | /* | |
582 | * Final untrusted element with no issuer in the peer's chain, it may | |
583 | * however be signed by a pkey or cert obtained via a TLSA RR. | |
584 | */ | |
585 | if (i == n) | |
586 | break; | |
587 | ||
588 | /* Peer's chain contains an issuer ca. */ | |
589 | ca = sk_X509_delete(in, i); | |
590 | ||
591 | /* If not a trust anchor, record untrusted ca and continue. */ | |
592 | if ((matched = match(dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA], ca, | |
593 | depth + 1)) == 0) { | |
594 | if (grow_chain(dane, UNTRUSTED, ca)) { | |
595 | if (!X509_check_issued(ca, ca) == X509_V_OK) { | |
596 | /* Restart with issuer as subject */ | |
597 | cert = ca; | |
598 | continue; | |
599 | } | |
600 | /* Final self-signed element, skip ta_signed() check. */ | |
601 | cert = 0; | |
602 | } else | |
603 | matched = -1; | |
604 | } else if (matched == MATCHED_CERT) { | |
605 | if (!wrap_cert(dane, ca, depth)) | |
606 | matched = -1; | |
607 | } else if (matched == MATCHED_PKEY) { | |
608 | if ((takey = X509_get_pubkey(ca)) == 0 || | |
609 | !wrap_issuer(dane, takey, cert, depth, WRAP_MID)) { | |
610 | if (takey) | |
611 | EVP_PKEY_free(takey); | |
612 | else | |
613 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SET_TRUST_ANCHOR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
614 | matched = -1; | |
615 | } | |
616 | } | |
617 | break; | |
618 | } | |
619 | ||
620 | /* Shallow free the duplicated input untrusted chain. */ | |
621 | sk_X509_free(in); | |
622 | ||
623 | /* | |
624 | * When the loop exits, if "cert" is set, it is not self-signed and has | |
625 | * no issuer in the chain, we check for a possible signature via a DNS | |
626 | * obtained TA cert or public key. | |
627 | */ | |
628 | if (matched == 0 && cert) | |
629 | matched = ta_signed(dane, cert, depth); | |
630 | ||
631 | return matched; | |
632 | } | |
633 | ||
634 | static int check_end_entity(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane, X509 *cert) | |
635 | { | |
636 | int matched; | |
637 | ||
638 | matched = match(dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_FIXED_LEAF], cert, 0); | |
639 | if (matched > 0) { | |
640 | if (ctx->chain == 0) { | |
641 | if ((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) != 0 && | |
642 | sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, cert)) { | |
643 | CRYPTO_add(&cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
644 | } else { | |
645 | DANEerr(DANE_F_CHECK_END_ENTITY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
646 | return -1; | |
647 | } | |
648 | } | |
649 | } | |
650 | return matched; | |
651 | } | |
652 | ||
653 | static int match_name(const char *certid, SSL_DANE *dane) | |
654 | { | |
655 | int multi = dane->multi; | |
656 | DANE_HOST_LIST hosts = dane->hosts; | |
657 | ||
658 | for (/* NOP */; hosts; hosts = hosts->next) { | |
659 | int match_subdomain = 0; | |
660 | const char *domain = hosts->value; | |
661 | const char *parent; | |
662 | int idlen; | |
663 | int domlen; | |
664 | ||
665 | if (*domain == '.' && domain[1] != '\0') { | |
666 | ++domain; | |
667 | match_subdomain = 1; | |
668 | } | |
669 | ||
670 | /* | |
671 | * Sub-domain match: certid is any sub-domain of hostname. | |
672 | */ | |
673 | if (match_subdomain) { | |
674 | if ((idlen = strlen(certid)) > (domlen = strlen(domain)) + 1 | |
675 | && certid[idlen - domlen - 1] == '.' | |
676 | && !strcasecmp(certid + (idlen - domlen), domain)) | |
677 | return 1; | |
678 | else | |
679 | continue; | |
680 | } | |
681 | ||
682 | /* | |
683 | * Exact match and initial "*" match. The initial "*" in a certid | |
684 | * matches one (if multi is false) or more hostname components under | |
685 | * the condition that the certid contains multiple hostname components. | |
686 | */ | |
687 | if (!strcasecmp(certid, domain) | |
688 | || (certid[0] == '*' && certid[1] == '.' && certid[2] != 0 | |
689 | && (parent = strchr(domain, '.')) != 0 | |
690 | && (idlen = strlen(certid + 1)) <= (domlen = strlen(parent)) | |
691 | && strcasecmp(multi ? parent + domlen - idlen : parent, | |
692 | certid + 1) == 0)) | |
693 | return 1; | |
694 | } | |
695 | return 0; | |
696 | } | |
697 | ||
698 | static char *check_name(char *name, int len) | |
699 | { | |
700 | register char *cp = name + len; | |
701 | ||
702 | while (len > 0 && *--cp == 0) | |
703 | --len; /* Ignore trailing NULs */ | |
704 | if (len <= 0) | |
705 | return 0; | |
706 | for (cp = name; *cp; cp++) { | |
707 | register char c = *cp; | |
708 | if (!((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || | |
709 | (c >= '0' && c <= '9') || | |
710 | (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || | |
711 | (c == '.' || c == '-') || | |
712 | (c == '*'))) | |
713 | return 0; /* Only LDH, '.' and '*' */ | |
714 | } | |
715 | if (cp - name != len) /* Guard against internal NULs */ | |
716 | return 0; | |
717 | return name; | |
718 | } | |
719 | ||
720 | static char *parse_dns_name(const GENERAL_NAME *gn) | |
721 | { | |
722 | if (gn->type != GEN_DNS) | |
723 | return 0; | |
724 | if (ASN1_STRING_type(gn->d.ia5) != V_ASN1_IA5STRING) | |
725 | return 0; | |
726 | return check_name((char *) ASN1_STRING_data(gn->d.ia5), | |
727 | ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.ia5)); | |
728 | } | |
729 | ||
730 | static char *parse_subject_name(X509 *cert) | |
731 | { | |
732 | X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(cert); | |
733 | X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry; | |
734 | ASN1_STRING *entry_str; | |
735 | unsigned char *namebuf; | |
736 | int nid = NID_commonName; | |
737 | int len; | |
738 | int i; | |
739 | ||
740 | if (name == 0 || (i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, nid, -1)) < 0) | |
741 | return 0; | |
742 | if ((entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i)) == 0) | |
743 | return 0; | |
744 | if ((entry_str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry)) == 0) | |
745 | return 0; | |
746 | ||
747 | if ((len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&namebuf, entry_str)) < 0) | |
748 | return 0; | |
749 | if (len <= 0 || check_name((char *) namebuf, len) == 0) { | |
750 | OPENSSL_free(namebuf); | |
751 | return 0; | |
752 | } | |
753 | return (char *) namebuf; | |
754 | } | |
755 | ||
756 | static int name_check(SSL_DANE *dane, X509 *cert) | |
757 | { | |
758 | int matched = 0; | |
759 | int got_altname = 0; | |
760 | GENERAL_NAMES *gens; | |
761 | ||
762 | gens = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, 0, 0); | |
763 | if (gens) { | |
764 | int n = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); | |
765 | int i; | |
766 | ||
767 | for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { | |
768 | const GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | |
769 | const char *certid; | |
770 | ||
771 | if (gn->type != GEN_DNS) | |
772 | continue; | |
773 | got_altname = 1; | |
774 | certid = parse_dns_name(gn); | |
775 | if (certid && *certid) { | |
776 | if ((matched = match_name(certid, dane)) == 0) | |
777 | continue; | |
778 | if ((dane->mhost = OPENSSL_strdup(certid)) == 0) | |
779 | matched = -1; | |
780 | break; | |
781 | } | |
782 | } | |
783 | GENERAL_NAMES_free(gens); | |
784 | } | |
785 | ||
786 | /* | |
787 | * XXX: Should the subjectName be skipped when *any* altnames are present, | |
788 | * or only when DNS altnames are present? | |
789 | */ | |
790 | if (got_altname == 0) { | |
791 | char *certid = parse_subject_name(cert); | |
792 | if (certid != 0 && *certid && (matched = match_name(certid, dane)) != 0) | |
793 | dane->mhost = certid; /* Already a copy */ | |
794 | } | |
795 | return matched; | |
796 | } | |
797 | ||
798 | static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
799 | { | |
800 | DANE_SELECTOR_LIST issuer_rrs; | |
801 | DANE_SELECTOR_LIST leaf_rrs; | |
802 | int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) = ctx->verify_cb; | |
803 | int ssl_idx = SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(); | |
804 | SSL *ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, ssl_idx); | |
805 | SSL_DANE *dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx); | |
806 | X509 *cert = ctx->cert; /* XXX: accessor? */ | |
807 | int matched = 0; | |
808 | int chain_length = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
809 | ||
810 | issuer_rrs = dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_LIMIT_ISSUER]; | |
811 | leaf_rrs = dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_LIMIT_LEAF]; | |
812 | ctx->verify = dane->verify; | |
813 | ||
814 | if ((matched = name_check(dane, cert)) < 0) { | |
815 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM); | |
816 | return 0; | |
817 | } | |
818 | ||
819 | if (!matched) { | |
820 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
821 | ctx->current_cert = cert; | |
822 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH); | |
823 | if (!cb(0, ctx)) | |
824 | return 0; | |
825 | } | |
826 | matched = 0; | |
827 | ||
828 | /* | |
829 | * Satisfy at least one usage 0 or 1 constraint, unless we've already | |
830 | * matched a usage 2 trust anchor. | |
831 | * | |
832 | * XXX: internal_verify() doesn't callback with top certs that are not | |
833 | * self-issued. This should be fixed in a future OpenSSL. | |
834 | */ | |
835 | if (dane->roots && sk_X509_num(dane->roots)) { | |
836 | #ifndef NO_CALLBACK_WORKAROUND | |
837 | X509 *top = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, dane->depth); | |
838 | ||
839 | if (X509_check_issued(top, top) != X509_V_OK) { | |
840 | ctx->error_depth = dane->depth; | |
841 | ctx->current_cert = top; | |
842 | if (!cb(1, ctx)) | |
843 | return 0; | |
844 | } | |
845 | #endif | |
846 | /* Pop synthetic trust-anchor ancestors off the chain! */ | |
847 | while (--chain_length > dane->depth) | |
848 | X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain)); | |
849 | } else if (issuer_rrs || leaf_rrs) { | |
850 | int n = chain_length; | |
851 | ||
852 | /* | |
853 | * Check for an EE match, then a CA match at depths > 0, and | |
854 | * finally, if the EE cert is self-issued, for a depth 0 CA match. | |
855 | */ | |
856 | if (leaf_rrs) | |
857 | matched = match(leaf_rrs, cert, 0); | |
858 | while (!matched && issuer_rrs && --n >= 0) { | |
859 | X509 *xn = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
860 | ||
861 | if (n > 0 || X509_check_issued(xn, xn) == X509_V_OK) | |
862 | matched = match(issuer_rrs, xn, n); | |
863 | } | |
864 | ||
865 | if (matched < 0) { | |
866 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM); | |
867 | return 0; | |
868 | } | |
869 | ||
870 | if (!matched) { | |
871 | ctx->current_cert = cert; | |
872 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
873 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED); | |
874 | if (!cb(0, ctx)) | |
875 | return 0; | |
876 | } | |
877 | } | |
878 | ||
879 | return ctx->verify(ctx); | |
880 | } | |
881 | ||
882 | static int verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *unused_ctx) | |
883 | { | |
884 | static int ssl_idx = -1; | |
885 | SSL *ssl; | |
886 | SSL_DANE *dane; | |
887 | int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) = ctx->verify_cb; | |
888 | int matched; | |
889 | X509 *cert = ctx->cert; /* XXX: accessor? */ | |
890 | ||
891 | if (ssl_idx < 0) | |
892 | ssl_idx = SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(); | |
893 | if (dane_idx < 0) { | |
894 | DANEerr(DANE_F_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
895 | return -1; | |
896 | } | |
897 | ||
898 | ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, ssl_idx); | |
899 | if ((dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx)) == 0 || cert == 0) | |
900 | return X509_verify_cert(ctx); | |
901 | ||
902 | if (dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_FIXED_LEAF]) { | |
903 | if ((matched = check_end_entity(ctx, dane, cert)) > 0) { | |
904 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
905 | ctx->current_cert = cert; | |
906 | return cb(1, ctx); | |
907 | } | |
908 | if (matched < 0) { | |
909 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM); | |
910 | return -1; | |
911 | } | |
912 | } | |
913 | ||
914 | if (dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA]) { | |
915 | if ((matched = set_trust_anchor(ctx, dane, cert)) < 0) { | |
916 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM); | |
917 | return -1; | |
918 | } | |
919 | if (matched) { | |
920 | /* | |
921 | * Check that setting the untrusted chain updates the expected | |
922 | * structure member at the expected offset. | |
923 | */ | |
924 | X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(ctx, dane->roots); | |
925 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(ctx, dane->chain); | |
926 | OPENSSL_assert(ctx->untrusted == dane->chain); | |
927 | } | |
928 | } | |
929 | ||
930 | /* | |
931 | * Name checks and usage 0/1 constraint enforcement are delayed until | |
932 | * X509_verify_cert() builds the full chain and calls our verify_chain() | |
933 | * wrapper. | |
934 | */ | |
935 | dane->verify = ctx->verify; | |
936 | ctx->verify = verify_chain; | |
937 | ||
938 | return X509_verify_cert(ctx); | |
939 | } | |
940 | ||
941 | static dane_list list_alloc(size_t vsize) | |
942 | { | |
943 | void *value = (void *) OPENSSL_malloc(vsize); | |
944 | dane_list l; | |
945 | ||
946 | if (value == 0) { | |
947 | DANEerr(DANE_F_LIST_ALLOC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
948 | return 0; | |
949 | } | |
950 | if ((l = (dane_list) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*l))) == 0) { | |
951 | OPENSSL_free(value); | |
952 | DANEerr(DANE_F_LIST_ALLOC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
953 | return 0; | |
954 | } | |
955 | l->next = 0; | |
956 | l->value = value; | |
957 | return l; | |
958 | } | |
959 | ||
960 | static void list_free(void *list, void (*f)(void *)) | |
961 | { | |
962 | dane_list head = (dane_list) list; | |
963 | dane_list next; | |
964 | ||
965 | for (/* NOP */; head; head = next) { | |
966 | next = head->next; | |
967 | if (f && head->value) | |
968 | f(head->value); | |
969 | OPENSSL_free(head); | |
970 | } | |
971 | } | |
972 | ||
973 | static void dane_mtype_free(void *p) | |
974 | { | |
975 | list_free(((dane_mtype) p)->data, OPENSSL_freeFunc); | |
976 | OPENSSL_free(p); | |
977 | } | |
978 | ||
979 | static void dane_selector_free(void *p) | |
980 | { | |
981 | list_free(((dane_selector) p)->mtype, dane_mtype_free); | |
982 | OPENSSL_free(p); | |
983 | } | |
984 | ||
985 | void DANESSL_cleanup(SSL *ssl) | |
986 | { | |
987 | SSL_DANE *dane; | |
988 | int u; | |
989 | ||
990 | if (dane_idx < 0 || (dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx)) == 0) | |
991 | return; | |
992 | (void) SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx, 0); | |
993 | ||
994 | if (dane->hosts) | |
995 | list_free(dane->hosts, OPENSSL_freeFunc); | |
996 | if (dane->mhost) | |
997 | OPENSSL_free(dane->mhost); | |
998 | for (u = 0; u <= SSL_DANE_USAGE_LAST; ++u) | |
999 | if (dane->selectors[u]) | |
1000 | list_free(dane->selectors[u], dane_selector_free); | |
1001 | if (dane->pkeys) | |
1002 | list_free(dane->pkeys, pkey_free); | |
1003 | if (dane->certs) | |
1004 | list_free(dane->certs, cert_free); | |
1005 | if (dane->roots) | |
1006 | sk_X509_pop_free(dane->roots, X509_free); | |
1007 | if (dane->chain) | |
1008 | sk_X509_pop_free(dane->chain, X509_free); | |
1009 | OPENSSL_free(dane); | |
1010 | } | |
1011 | ||
1012 | static DANE_HOST_LIST host_list_init(const char **src) | |
1013 | { | |
1014 | DANE_HOST_LIST head = 0; | |
1015 | ||
1016 | while (*src) { | |
1017 | DANE_HOST_LIST elem = (DANE_HOST_LIST) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*elem)); | |
1018 | if (elem == 0) { | |
1019 | list_free(head, OPENSSL_freeFunc); | |
1020 | return 0; | |
1021 | } | |
1022 | elem->value = OPENSSL_strdup(*src++); | |
1023 | LINSERT(head, elem); | |
1024 | } | |
1025 | return head; | |
1026 | } | |
1027 | ||
1028 | int DANESSL_add_tlsa( | |
1029 | SSL *ssl, | |
1030 | uint8_t usage, | |
1031 | uint8_t selector, | |
1032 | const char *mdname, | |
1033 | unsigned const char *data, | |
1034 | size_t dlen | |
1035 | ) | |
1036 | { | |
1037 | SSL_DANE *dane; | |
1038 | DANE_SELECTOR_LIST s = 0; | |
1039 | DANE_MTYPE_LIST m = 0; | |
1040 | DANE_DATA_LIST d = 0; | |
1041 | DANE_CERT_LIST xlist = 0; | |
1042 | DANE_PKEY_LIST klist = 0; | |
1043 | const EVP_MD *md = 0; | |
1044 | ||
1045 | if (dane_idx < 0 || (dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx)) == 0) { | |
1046 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_DANE_INIT); | |
1047 | return -1; | |
1048 | } | |
1049 | ||
1050 | if (usage > SSL_DANE_USAGE_LAST) { | |
1051 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_USAGE); | |
1052 | return 0; | |
1053 | } | |
1054 | if (selector > SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_LAST) { | |
1055 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_SELECTOR); | |
1056 | return 0; | |
1057 | } | |
1058 | if (mdname && (md = EVP_get_digestbyname(mdname)) == 0) { | |
1059 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_DIGEST); | |
1060 | return 0; | |
1061 | } | |
1062 | if (!data) { | |
1063 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_NULL_DATA); | |
1064 | return 0; | |
1065 | } | |
1066 | if (mdname && dlen != EVP_MD_size(md)) { | |
1067 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_DATA_LENGTH); | |
1068 | return 0; | |
1069 | } | |
1070 | ||
1071 | if (mdname == 0) { | |
1072 | X509 *x = 0; | |
1073 | EVP_PKEY *k = 0; | |
1074 | const unsigned char *p = data; | |
1075 | ||
1076 | #define xklistinit(lvar, ltype, var, freeFunc) do { \ | |
1077 | (lvar) = (ltype) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*(lvar))); \ | |
1078 | if ((lvar) == 0) { \ | |
1079 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); \ | |
1080 | freeFunc((var)); \ | |
1081 | return 0; \ | |
1082 | } \ | |
1083 | (lvar)->next = 0; \ | |
1084 | lvar->value = var; \ | |
1085 | } while (0) | |
1086 | #define xkfreeret(ret) do { \ | |
1087 | if (xlist) list_free(xlist, cert_free); \ | |
1088 | if (klist) list_free(klist, pkey_free); \ | |
1089 | return (ret); \ | |
1090 | } while (0) | |
1091 | ||
1092 | switch (selector) { | |
1093 | case SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_CERT: | |
1094 | if (!d2i_X509(&x, &p, dlen) || dlen != p - data) { | |
1095 | if (x) | |
1096 | X509_free(x); | |
1097 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_CERT); | |
1098 | return 0; | |
1099 | } | |
1100 | k = X509_get_pubkey(x); | |
1101 | EVP_PKEY_free(k); | |
1102 | if (k == 0) { | |
1103 | X509_free(x); | |
1104 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_CERT_PKEY); | |
1105 | return 0; | |
1106 | } | |
1107 | if (usage == SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA) | |
1108 | xklistinit(xlist, DANE_CERT_LIST, x, X509_free); | |
1109 | break; | |
1110 | ||
1111 | case SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_SPKI: | |
1112 | if (!d2i_PUBKEY(&k, &p, dlen) || dlen != p - data) { | |
1113 | if (k) | |
1114 | EVP_PKEY_free(k); | |
1115 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_PKEY); | |
1116 | return 0; | |
1117 | } | |
1118 | if (usage == SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA) | |
1119 | xklistinit(klist, DANE_PKEY_LIST, k, EVP_PKEY_free); | |
1120 | break; | |
1121 | } | |
1122 | } | |
1123 | ||
1124 | /* Find insertion point and don't add duplicate elements. */ | |
1125 | for (s = dane->selectors[usage]; s; s = s->next) | |
1126 | if (s->value->selector == selector) | |
1127 | for (m = s->value->mtype; m; m = m->next) | |
1128 | if (m->value->md == md) | |
1129 | for (d = m->value->data; d; d = d->next) | |
1130 | if (d->value->datalen == dlen && | |
1131 | memcmp(d->value->data, data, dlen) == 0) | |
1132 | xkfreeret(1); | |
1133 | ||
1134 | if ((d = (DANE_DATA_LIST) list_alloc(sizeof(*d->value) + dlen)) == 0) | |
1135 | xkfreeret(0); | |
1136 | d->value->datalen = dlen; | |
1137 | memcpy(d->value->data, data, dlen); | |
1138 | if (!m) { | |
1139 | if ((m = (DANE_MTYPE_LIST) list_alloc(sizeof(*m->value))) == 0) { | |
1140 | list_free(d, OPENSSL_freeFunc); | |
1141 | xkfreeret(0); | |
1142 | } | |
1143 | m->value->data = 0; | |
1144 | if ((m->value->md = md) != 0) | |
1145 | m->value->mdlen = dlen; | |
1146 | if (!s) { | |
1147 | if ((s = (DANE_SELECTOR_LIST) list_alloc(sizeof(*s->value))) == 0) { | |
1148 | list_free(m, dane_mtype_free); | |
1149 | xkfreeret(0); | |
1150 | } | |
1151 | s->value->mtype = 0; | |
1152 | s->value->selector = selector; | |
1153 | LINSERT(dane->selectors[usage], s); | |
1154 | } | |
1155 | LINSERT(s->value->mtype, m); | |
1156 | } | |
1157 | LINSERT(m->value->data, d); | |
1158 | ||
1159 | if (xlist) | |
1160 | LINSERT(dane->certs, xlist); | |
1161 | else if (klist) | |
1162 | LINSERT(dane->pkeys, klist); | |
1163 | ++dane->count; | |
1164 | return 1; | |
1165 | } | |
1166 | ||
1167 | int DANESSL_init(SSL *ssl, const char *sni_domain, const char **hostnames) | |
1168 | { | |
1169 | SSL_DANE *dane; | |
1170 | int i; | |
1171 | #ifdef OPENSSL_INTERNAL | |
1172 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl); | |
1173 | ||
1174 | if (sctx->app_verify_callback != verify_cert) { | |
1175 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, DANE_R_SCTX_INIT); | |
1176 | return -1; | |
1177 | } | |
1178 | #else | |
1179 | if (dane_idx < 0) { | |
1180 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, DANE_R_LIBRARY_INIT); | |
1181 | return -1; | |
1182 | } | |
1183 | #endif | |
1184 | ||
1185 | if (sni_domain && !SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(ssl, sni_domain)) | |
1186 | return 0; | |
1187 | ||
1188 | if ((dane = (SSL_DANE *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_DANE))) == 0) { | |
1189 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1190 | return 0; | |
1191 | } | |
1192 | if (!SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx, dane)) { | |
1193 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1194 | OPENSSL_free(dane); | |
1195 | return 0; | |
1196 | } | |
1197 | ||
1198 | dane->pkeys = 0; | |
1199 | dane->certs = 0; | |
1200 | dane->chain = 0; | |
1201 | dane->roots = 0; | |
1202 | dane->depth = -1; | |
1203 | dane->mhost = 0; /* Future SSL control interface */ | |
1204 | dane->multi = 0; /* Future SSL control interface */ | |
1205 | dane->count = 0; | |
1206 | ||
1207 | for (i = 0; i <= SSL_DANE_USAGE_LAST; ++i) | |
1208 | dane->selectors[i] = 0; | |
1209 | ||
1210 | if (hostnames && (dane->hosts = host_list_init(hostnames)) == 0) { | |
1211 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1212 | DANESSL_cleanup(ssl); | |
1213 | return 0; | |
1214 | } | |
1215 | ||
1216 | return 1; | |
1217 | } | |
1218 | ||
1219 | int DANESSL_CTX_init(SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
1220 | { | |
1221 | if (dane_idx >= 0) { | |
1222 | SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(ctx, verify_cert, 0); | |
1223 | return 1; | |
1224 | } | |
1225 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_CTX_DANE_INIT, DANE_R_LIBRARY_INIT); | |
1226 | return -1; | |
1227 | } | |
1228 | ||
1229 | static int init_once( | |
1230 | volatile int *value, | |
1231 | int (*init)(void), | |
1232 | void (*postinit)(void) | |
1233 | ) | |
1234 | { | |
1235 | int wlock = 0; | |
1236 | ||
1237 | CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | |
1238 | if (*value < 0) { | |
1239 | CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | |
1240 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | |
1241 | wlock = 1; | |
1242 | if (*value < 0) { | |
1243 | *value = init(); | |
1244 | if (postinit) | |
1245 | postinit(); | |
1246 | } | |
1247 | } | |
1248 | if (wlock) | |
1249 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | |
1250 | else | |
1251 | CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | |
1252 | return *value; | |
1253 | } | |
1254 | ||
1255 | static void dane_init(void) | |
1256 | { | |
1257 | /* | |
1258 | * Store library id in zeroth function slot, used to locate the library | |
1259 | * name. This must be done before we load the error strings. | |
1260 | */ | |
1261 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR | |
1262 | dane_str_functs[0].error |= ERR_PACK(err_lib_dane, 0, 0); | |
1263 | ERR_load_strings(err_lib_dane, dane_str_functs); | |
1264 | ERR_load_strings(err_lib_dane, dane_str_reasons); | |
1265 | #endif | |
1266 | ||
1267 | /* | |
1268 | * Register SHA-2 digests, if implemented and not already registered. | |
1269 | */ | |
1270 | #if defined(LN_sha256) && defined(NID_sha256) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256) | |
1271 | if (!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha224)) | |
1272 | EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha224()); | |
1273 | if (!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha256)) | |
1274 | EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256()); | |
1275 | #endif | |
1276 | #if defined(LN_sha512) && defined(NID_sha512) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA512) | |
1277 | if (!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha384)) | |
1278 | EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha384()); | |
1279 | if (!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha512)) | |
1280 | EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha512()); | |
1281 | #endif | |
1282 | ||
1283 | /* | |
1284 | * Register an SSL index for the connection-specific SSL_DANE structure. | |
1285 | * Using a separate index makes it possible to add DANE support to | |
1286 | * existing OpenSSL releases that don't have a suitable pointer in the | |
1287 | * SSL structure. | |
1288 | */ | |
1289 | dane_idx = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, 0, 0, 0, 0); | |
1290 | } | |
1291 | ||
1292 | int DANESSL_library_init(void) | |
1293 | { | |
1294 | if (err_lib_dane < 0) | |
1295 | init_once(&err_lib_dane, ERR_get_next_error_library, dane_init); | |
1296 | ||
1297 | #if defined(LN_sha256) | |
1298 | /* No DANE without SHA256 support */ | |
1299 | if (dane_idx >= 0 && EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha256) != 0) | |
1300 | return 1; | |
1301 | #endif | |
1302 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_LIBRARY_INIT, DANE_R_DANE_SUPPORT); | |
1303 | return 0; | |
1304 | } | |
1305 | ||
1306 | #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */ |