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e682570f TL |
1 | #include <stdio.h> |
2 | #include <string.h> | |
3 | #include <stdint.h> | |
4 | ||
5 | #include <openssl/opensslv.h> | |
6 | #include <openssl/err.h> | |
7 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> | |
8 | #include <openssl/safestack.h> | |
9 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
10 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
11 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | |
12 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
13 | ||
14 | #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1000000fL | |
880a1e77 JH |
15 | # error "OpenSSL 1.0.0 or higher required" |
16 | #else /* remainder of file */ | |
e682570f TL |
17 | |
18 | #include "danessl.h" | |
19 | ||
20 | #define DANE_F_ADD_SKID 100 | |
21 | #define DANE_F_CHECK_END_ENTITY 101 | |
22 | #define DANE_F_GROW_CHAIN 102 | |
23 | #define DANE_F_LIST_ALLOC 103 | |
24 | #define DANE_F_MATCH 104 | |
25 | #define DANE_F_PUSH_EXT 105 | |
26 | #define DANE_F_SET_TRUST_ANCHOR 106 | |
27 | #define DANE_F_SSL_CTX_DANE_INIT 107 | |
28 | #define DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA 108 | |
29 | #define DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT 109 | |
30 | #define DANE_F_SSL_DANE_LIBRARY_INIT 110 | |
31 | #define DANE_F_VERIFY_CERT 111 | |
32 | #define DANE_F_WRAP_CERT 112 | |
33 | ||
34 | #define DANE_R_BAD_CERT 100 | |
35 | #define DANE_R_BAD_CERT_PKEY 101 | |
36 | #define DANE_R_BAD_DATA_LENGTH 102 | |
37 | #define DANE_R_BAD_DIGEST 103 | |
38 | #define DANE_R_BAD_NULL_DATA 104 | |
39 | #define DANE_R_BAD_PKEY 105 | |
40 | #define DANE_R_BAD_SELECTOR 106 | |
41 | #define DANE_R_BAD_USAGE 107 | |
42 | #define DANE_R_DANE_INIT 108 | |
43 | #define DANE_R_DANE_SUPPORT 109 | |
44 | #define DANE_R_LIBRARY_INIT 110 | |
45 | #define DANE_R_NOSIGN_KEY 111 | |
46 | #define DANE_R_SCTX_INIT 112 | |
47 | ||
48 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR | |
880a1e77 JH |
49 | # define DANE_F_PLACEHOLDER 0 /* FIRST! Value TBD */ |
50 | static ERR_STRING_DATA dane_str_functs[] = | |
51 | { | |
e682570f TL |
52 | {DANE_F_PLACEHOLDER, "DANE library"}, /* FIRST!!! */ |
53 | {DANE_F_ADD_SKID, "add_skid"}, | |
54 | {DANE_F_CHECK_END_ENTITY, "check_end_entity"}, | |
55 | {DANE_F_GROW_CHAIN, "grow_chain"}, | |
56 | {DANE_F_LIST_ALLOC, "list_alloc"}, | |
57 | {DANE_F_MATCH, "match"}, | |
58 | {DANE_F_PUSH_EXT, "push_ext"}, | |
59 | {DANE_F_SET_TRUST_ANCHOR, "set_trust_anchor"}, | |
60 | {DANE_F_SSL_CTX_DANE_INIT, "SSL_CTX_dane_init"}, | |
61 | {DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, "SSL_dane_add_tlsa"}, | |
62 | {DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, "SSL_dane_init"}, | |
63 | {DANE_F_SSL_DANE_LIBRARY_INIT, "SSL_dane_library_init"}, | |
64 | {DANE_F_VERIFY_CERT, "verify_cert"}, | |
65 | {DANE_F_WRAP_CERT, "wrap_cert"}, | |
66 | {0, NULL} | |
67 | }; | |
880a1e77 JH |
68 | static ERR_STRING_DATA dane_str_reasons[] = |
69 | { | |
e682570f TL |
70 | {DANE_R_BAD_CERT, "Bad TLSA record certificate"}, |
71 | {DANE_R_BAD_CERT_PKEY, "Bad TLSA record certificate public key"}, | |
72 | {DANE_R_BAD_DATA_LENGTH, "Bad TLSA record digest length"}, | |
73 | {DANE_R_BAD_DIGEST, "Bad TLSA record digest"}, | |
74 | {DANE_R_BAD_NULL_DATA, "Bad TLSA record null data"}, | |
75 | {DANE_R_BAD_PKEY, "Bad TLSA record public key"}, | |
76 | {DANE_R_BAD_SELECTOR, "Bad TLSA record selector"}, | |
77 | {DANE_R_BAD_USAGE, "Bad TLSA record usage"}, | |
78 | {DANE_R_DANE_INIT, "SSL_dane_init() required"}, | |
79 | {DANE_R_DANE_SUPPORT, "DANE library features not supported"}, | |
80 | {DANE_R_LIBRARY_INIT, "SSL_dane_library_init() required"}, | |
81 | {DANE_R_SCTX_INIT, "SSL_CTX_dane_init() required"}, | |
82 | {DANE_R_NOSIGN_KEY, "Certificate usage 2 requires EC support"}, | |
83 | {0, NULL} | |
84 | }; | |
880a1e77 | 85 | #endif /*OPENSSL_NO_ERR*/ |
e682570f TL |
86 | |
87 | #define DANEerr(f, r) ERR_PUT_error(err_lib_dane, (f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__) | |
88 | ||
89 | static int err_lib_dane = -1; | |
90 | static int dane_idx = -1; | |
91 | ||
92 | #ifdef X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN /* OpenSSL >= 1.0.2 */ | |
93 | static int wrap_to_root = 0; | |
94 | #else | |
95 | static int wrap_to_root = 1; | |
96 | #endif | |
97 | ||
98 | static void (*cert_free)(void *) = (void (*)(void *)) X509_free; | |
99 | static void (*pkey_free)(void *) = (void (*)(void *)) EVP_PKEY_free; | |
100 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
101 | typedef struct dane_list |
102 | { | |
e682570f TL |
103 | struct dane_list *next; |
104 | void *value; | |
105 | } *dane_list; | |
106 | ||
107 | #define LINSERT(h, e) do { (e)->next = (h); (h) = (e); } while (0) | |
108 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
109 | typedef struct dane_host_list |
110 | { | |
111 | struct dane_host_list *next; | |
e682570f | 112 | char *value; |
880a1e77 | 113 | } *dane_host_list; |
e682570f | 114 | |
880a1e77 JH |
115 | typedef struct dane_data |
116 | { | |
e682570f TL |
117 | size_t datalen; |
118 | unsigned char data[0]; | |
119 | } *dane_data; | |
120 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
121 | typedef struct dane_data_list |
122 | { | |
123 | struct dane_data_list *next; | |
e682570f | 124 | dane_data value; |
880a1e77 | 125 | } *dane_data_list; |
e682570f | 126 | |
880a1e77 JH |
127 | typedef struct dane_mtype |
128 | { | |
e682570f TL |
129 | int mdlen; |
130 | const EVP_MD *md; | |
880a1e77 | 131 | dane_data_list data; |
e682570f TL |
132 | } *dane_mtype; |
133 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
134 | typedef struct dane_mtype_list |
135 | { | |
136 | struct dane_mtype_list *next; | |
e682570f | 137 | dane_mtype value; |
880a1e77 | 138 | } *dane_mtype_list; |
e682570f | 139 | |
880a1e77 JH |
140 | typedef struct dane_selector |
141 | { | |
e682570f | 142 | uint8_t selector; |
880a1e77 | 143 | dane_mtype_list mtype; |
e682570f TL |
144 | } *dane_selector; |
145 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
146 | typedef struct dane_selector_list |
147 | { | |
148 | struct dane_selector_list *next; | |
e682570f | 149 | dane_selector value; |
880a1e77 | 150 | } *dane_selector_list; |
e682570f | 151 | |
880a1e77 JH |
152 | typedef struct dane_pkey_list |
153 | { | |
154 | struct dane_pkey_list *next; | |
e682570f | 155 | EVP_PKEY *value; |
880a1e77 | 156 | } *dane_pkey_list; |
e682570f | 157 | |
880a1e77 JH |
158 | typedef struct dane_cert_list |
159 | { | |
160 | struct dane_cert_list *next; | |
e682570f | 161 | X509 *value; |
880a1e77 | 162 | } *dane_cert_list; |
e682570f | 163 | |
880a1e77 JH |
164 | typedef struct ssl_dane |
165 | { | |
e682570f TL |
166 | int (*verify)(X509_STORE_CTX *); |
167 | STACK_OF(X509) *roots; | |
168 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain; | |
169 | const char *thost; /* TLSA base domain */ | |
170 | char *mhost; /* Matched, peer name */ | |
880a1e77 JH |
171 | dane_pkey_list pkeys; |
172 | dane_cert_list certs; | |
173 | dane_host_list hosts; | |
174 | dane_selector_list selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_LAST + 1]; | |
e682570f TL |
175 | int depth; |
176 | int multi; /* Multi-label wildcards? */ | |
177 | int count; /* Number of TLSA records */ | |
880a1e77 | 178 | } ssl_dane; |
e682570f TL |
179 | |
180 | #ifndef X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH | |
880a1e77 | 181 | # define X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION |
e682570f TL |
182 | #endif |
183 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
184 | static int |
185 | match(dane_selector_list slist, X509 *cert, int depth) | |
e682570f | 186 | { |
880a1e77 | 187 | int matched; |
e682570f | 188 | |
880a1e77 JH |
189 | /* |
190 | * Note, set_trust_anchor() needs to know whether the match was for a | |
191 | * pkey digest or a certificate digest. We return MATCHED_PKEY or | |
192 | * MATCHED_CERT accordingly. | |
193 | */ | |
e682570f TL |
194 | #define MATCHED_CERT (SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_CERT + 1) |
195 | #define MATCHED_PKEY (SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_SPKI + 1) | |
196 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
197 | /* |
198 | * Loop over each selector, mtype, and associated data element looking | |
199 | * for a match. | |
200 | */ | |
201 | for(matched = 0; !matched && slist; slist = slist->next) | |
202 | { | |
203 | dane_mtype_list m; | |
204 | unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
205 | unsigned char *buf; | |
206 | unsigned char *buf2; | |
207 | unsigned int len; | |
208 | ||
209 | /* | |
210 | * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key. | |
211 | */ | |
212 | switch(slist->value->selector) | |
213 | { | |
214 | case SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_CERT: | |
215 | len = i2d_X509(cert, NULL); | |
216 | buf2 = buf = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(len); | |
217 | if(buf) i2d_X509(cert, &buf2); | |
218 | break; | |
219 | case SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_SPKI: | |
220 | len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), NULL); | |
221 | buf2 = buf = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(len); | |
222 | if(buf) i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf2); | |
223 | break; | |
224 | } | |
225 | ||
226 | if(!buf) | |
227 | { | |
228 | DANEerr(DANE_F_MATCH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
229 | return 0; | |
230 | } | |
231 | OPENSSL_assert(buf2 - buf == len); | |
232 | ||
233 | /* | |
234 | * Loop over each mtype and data element | |
235 | */ | |
236 | for(m = slist->value->mtype; !matched && m; m = m->next) | |
237 | { | |
238 | dane_data_list d; | |
239 | unsigned char *cmpbuf = buf; | |
240 | unsigned int cmplen = len; | |
241 | ||
e682570f | 242 | /* |
880a1e77 JH |
243 | * If it is a digest, compute the corresponding digest of the |
244 | * DER data for comparison, otherwise, use the full object. | |
e682570f | 245 | */ |
880a1e77 JH |
246 | if(m->value->md) |
247 | { | |
248 | cmpbuf = mdbuf; | |
249 | if(!EVP_Digest(buf, len, cmpbuf, &cmplen, m->value->md, 0)) | |
250 | matched = -1; | |
251 | } | |
252 | for(d = m->value->data; !matched && d; d = d->next) | |
253 | if( cmplen == d->value->datalen | |
254 | && memcmp(cmpbuf, d->value->data, cmplen) == 0) | |
255 | matched = slist->value->selector + 1; | |
e682570f TL |
256 | } |
257 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
258 | OPENSSL_free(buf); |
259 | } | |
e682570f | 260 | |
880a1e77 | 261 | return matched; |
e682570f TL |
262 | } |
263 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
264 | static int |
265 | push_ext(X509 *cert, X509_EXTENSION *ext) | |
e682570f | 266 | { |
880a1e77 | 267 | X509_EXTENSIONS *exts; |
e682570f | 268 | |
880a1e77 JH |
269 | if(ext) |
270 | { | |
271 | if(!(exts = cert->cert_info->extensions)) | |
272 | exts = cert->cert_info->extensions = sk_X509_EXTENSION_new_null(); | |
273 | if (exts && sk_X509_EXTENSION_push(exts, ext)) | |
274 | return 1; | |
275 | X509_EXTENSION_free(ext); | |
276 | } | |
277 | DANEerr(DANE_F_PUSH_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
278 | return 0; | |
e682570f TL |
279 | } |
280 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
281 | static int |
282 | add_ext(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject, int ext_nid, char *ext_val) | |
e682570f | 283 | { |
880a1e77 | 284 | X509V3_CTX v3ctx; |
e682570f | 285 | |
880a1e77 JH |
286 | X509V3_set_ctx(&v3ctx, issuer, subject, 0, 0, 0); |
287 | return push_ext(subject, X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(0, &v3ctx, ext_nid, ext_val)); | |
e682570f TL |
288 | } |
289 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
290 | static int |
291 | set_serial(X509 *cert, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid, X509 *subject) | |
e682570f | 292 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
293 | int ret = 0; |
294 | BIGNUM *bn; | |
295 | ||
296 | if(akid && akid->serial) | |
297 | return (X509_set_serialNumber(cert, akid->serial)); | |
298 | ||
299 | /* | |
300 | * Add one to subject's serial to avoid collisions between TA serial and | |
301 | * serial of signing root. | |
302 | */ | |
303 | if( (bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(X509_get_serialNumber(subject), 0)) != 0 | |
304 | && BN_add_word(bn, 1) | |
305 | && BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, X509_get_serialNumber(cert))) | |
306 | ret = 1; | |
307 | ||
308 | if(bn) | |
309 | BN_free(bn); | |
310 | return ret; | |
311 | } | |
e682570f | 312 | |
880a1e77 JH |
313 | static int |
314 | add_akid(X509 *cert, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) | |
315 | { | |
316 | int nid = NID_authority_key_identifier; | |
317 | ASN1_STRING *id; | |
318 | unsigned char c = 0; | |
319 | int ret = 0; | |
320 | ||
321 | /* | |
322 | * 0 will never be our subject keyid from a SHA-1 hash, but it could be | |
323 | * our subject keyid if forced from child's akid. If so, set our | |
324 | * authority keyid to 1. This way we are never self-signed, and thus | |
325 | * exempt from any potential (off by default for now in OpenSSL) | |
326 | * self-signature checks! | |
327 | */ | |
328 | id = (ASN1_STRING *) ((akid && akid->keyid) ? akid->keyid : 0); | |
329 | if(id && M_ASN1_STRING_length(id) == 1 && *M_ASN1_STRING_data(id) == c) | |
330 | c = 1; | |
331 | ||
332 | if( (akid = AUTHORITY_KEYID_new()) != 0 | |
333 | && (akid->keyid = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) != 0 | |
334 | && M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(akid->keyid, (void *) &c, 1) | |
335 | && X509_add1_ext_i2d(cert, nid, akid, 0, X509V3_ADD_APPEND)) | |
336 | ret = 1; | |
337 | if(akid) | |
338 | AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(akid); | |
339 | return ret; | |
e682570f TL |
340 | } |
341 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
342 | static int |
343 | add_skid(X509 *cert, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) | |
e682570f | 344 | { |
880a1e77 | 345 | int nid = NID_subject_key_identifier; |
e682570f | 346 | |
880a1e77 JH |
347 | if(!akid || !akid->keyid) |
348 | return add_ext(0, cert, nid, "hash"); | |
349 | return X509_add1_ext_i2d(cert, nid, akid->keyid, 0, X509V3_ADD_APPEND) > 0; | |
e682570f TL |
350 | } |
351 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
352 | static X509_NAME * |
353 | akid_issuer_name(AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) | |
e682570f | 354 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
355 | if(akid && akid->issuer) |
356 | { | |
357 | int i; | |
358 | GENERAL_NAMES *gens = akid->issuer; | |
e682570f | 359 | |
880a1e77 JH |
360 | for(i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); ++i) |
361 | { | |
362 | GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | |
e682570f | 363 | |
880a1e77 JH |
364 | if(gn->type == GEN_DIRNAME) |
365 | return (gn->d.dirn); | |
e682570f | 366 | } |
880a1e77 JH |
367 | } |
368 | return 0; | |
e682570f TL |
369 | } |
370 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
371 | static int |
372 | set_issuer_name(X509 *cert, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) | |
e682570f | 373 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
374 | X509_NAME *name = akid_issuer_name(akid); |
375 | ||
376 | /* | |
377 | * If subject's akid specifies an authority key identifer issuer name, we | |
378 | * must use that. | |
379 | */ | |
380 | return X509_set_issuer_name(cert, | |
381 | name ? name : X509_get_subject_name(cert)); | |
e682570f TL |
382 | } |
383 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
384 | static int |
385 | grow_chain(ssl_dane *dane, int trusted, X509 *cert) | |
e682570f | 386 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
387 | STACK_OF(X509) **xs = trusted ? &dane->roots : &dane->chain; |
388 | static ASN1_OBJECT *serverAuth = 0; | |
e682570f TL |
389 | |
390 | #define UNTRUSTED 0 | |
391 | #define TRUSTED 1 | |
392 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
393 | if( trusted && !serverAuth |
394 | && !(serverAuth = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_server_auth))) | |
395 | { | |
396 | DANEerr(DANE_F_GROW_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
397 | return 0; | |
398 | } | |
399 | if(!*xs && !(*xs = sk_X509_new_null())) | |
400 | { | |
401 | DANEerr(DANE_F_GROW_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
402 | return 0; | |
403 | } | |
404 | ||
405 | if(cert) | |
406 | { | |
407 | if(trusted && !X509_add1_trust_object(cert, serverAuth)) | |
408 | return 0; | |
409 | CRYPTO_add(&cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
410 | if (!sk_X509_push(*xs, cert)) | |
411 | { | |
412 | X509_free(cert); | |
413 | DANEerr(DANE_F_GROW_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
414 | return 0; | |
e682570f | 415 | } |
880a1e77 JH |
416 | } |
417 | return 1; | |
e682570f TL |
418 | } |
419 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
420 | static int |
421 | wrap_issuer(ssl_dane *dane, EVP_PKEY *key, X509 *subject, int depth, int top) | |
e682570f | 422 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
423 | int ret = 1; |
424 | X509 *cert = 0; | |
425 | AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid; | |
426 | X509_NAME *name = X509_get_issuer_name(subject); | |
427 | EVP_PKEY *newkey = key ? key : X509_get_pubkey(subject); | |
e682570f TL |
428 | |
429 | #define WRAP_MID 0 /* Ensure intermediate. */ | |
430 | #define WRAP_TOP 1 /* Ensure self-signed. */ | |
431 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
432 | if(!name || !newkey || !(cert = X509_new())) |
433 | return 0; | |
434 | ||
435 | /* | |
436 | * Record the depth of the trust-anchor certificate. | |
437 | */ | |
438 | if(dane->depth < 0) | |
439 | dane->depth = depth + 1; | |
440 | ||
441 | /* | |
442 | * XXX: Uncaught error condition: | |
443 | * | |
444 | * The return value is NULL both when the extension is missing, and when | |
445 | * OpenSSL rans out of memory while parsing the extension. | |
446 | */ | |
447 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
448 | akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(subject, NID_authority_key_identifier, 0, 0); | |
449 | /* XXX: Should we peek at the error stack here??? */ | |
450 | ||
451 | /* | |
452 | * If top is true generate a self-issued root CA, otherwise an | |
453 | * intermediate CA and possibly its self-signed issuer. | |
454 | * | |
455 | * CA cert valid for +/- 30 days | |
456 | */ | |
457 | if( !X509_set_version(cert, 2) | |
458 | || !set_serial(cert, akid, subject) | |
459 | || !X509_set_subject_name(cert, name) | |
460 | || !set_issuer_name(cert, akid) | |
461 | || !X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notBefore(cert), -30 * 86400L) | |
462 | || !X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notAfter(cert), 30 * 86400L) | |
463 | || !X509_set_pubkey(cert, newkey) | |
464 | || !add_ext(0, cert, NID_basic_constraints, "CA:TRUE") | |
465 | || (!top && !add_akid(cert, akid)) | |
466 | || !add_skid(cert, akid) | |
467 | || ( !top && wrap_to_root | |
468 | && !wrap_issuer(dane, newkey, cert, depth, WRAP_TOP))) | |
469 | ret = 0; | |
470 | ||
471 | if(akid) | |
472 | AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(akid); | |
473 | if(!key) | |
474 | EVP_PKEY_free(newkey); | |
475 | if(ret) | |
476 | ret = grow_chain(dane, !top && wrap_to_root ? UNTRUSTED : TRUSTED, cert); | |
477 | if(cert) | |
478 | X509_free(cert); | |
479 | return ret; | |
e682570f TL |
480 | } |
481 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
482 | static int |
483 | wrap_cert(ssl_dane *dane, X509 *tacert, int depth) | |
e682570f | 484 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
485 | if(dane->depth < 0) |
486 | dane->depth = depth + 1; | |
487 | ||
488 | /* | |
489 | * If the TA certificate is self-issued, or need not be, use it directly. | |
490 | * Otherwise, synthesize requisuite ancestors. | |
491 | */ | |
492 | if( !wrap_to_root | |
493 | || X509_check_issued(tacert, tacert) == X509_V_OK) | |
494 | return grow_chain(dane, TRUSTED, tacert); | |
495 | ||
496 | if(wrap_issuer(dane, 0, tacert, depth, WRAP_MID)) | |
497 | return grow_chain(dane, UNTRUSTED, tacert); | |
498 | return 0; | |
e682570f TL |
499 | } |
500 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
501 | static int |
502 | ta_signed(ssl_dane *dane, X509 *cert, int depth) | |
e682570f | 503 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
504 | dane_cert_list x; |
505 | dane_pkey_list k; | |
506 | EVP_PKEY *pk; | |
507 | int done = 0; | |
508 | ||
509 | /* | |
510 | * First check whether issued and signed by a TA cert, this is cheaper | |
511 | * than the bare-public key checks below, since we can determine whether | |
512 | * the candidate TA certificate issued the certificate to be checked | |
513 | * first (name comparisons), before we bother with signature checks | |
514 | * (public key operations). | |
515 | */ | |
516 | for (x = dane->certs; !done && x; x = x->next) | |
517 | { | |
518 | if(X509_check_issued(x->value, cert) == X509_V_OK) | |
519 | { | |
520 | if(!(pk = X509_get_pubkey(x->value))) | |
521 | { | |
522 | /* | |
523 | * The cert originally contained a valid pkey, which does | |
524 | * not just vanish, so this is most likely a memory error. | |
525 | */ | |
526 | done = -1; | |
527 | break; | |
528 | } | |
529 | /* Check signature, since some other TA may work if not this. */ | |
530 | if(X509_verify(cert, pk) > 0) | |
531 | done = wrap_cert(dane, x->value, depth) ? 1 : -1; | |
532 | EVP_PKEY_free(pk); | |
e682570f | 533 | } |
880a1e77 JH |
534 | } |
535 | ||
536 | /* | |
537 | * With bare TA public keys, we can't check whether the trust chain is | |
538 | * issued by the key, but we can determine whether it is signed by the | |
539 | * key, so we go with that. | |
540 | * | |
541 | * Ideally, the corresponding certificate was presented in the chain, and we | |
542 | * matched it by its public key digest one level up. This code is here | |
543 | * to handle adverse conditions imposed by sloppy administrators of | |
544 | * receiving systems with poorly constructed chains. | |
545 | * | |
546 | * We'd like to optimize out keys that should not match when the cert's | |
547 | * authority key id does not match the key id of this key computed via | |
548 | * the RFC keyid algorithm (SHA-1 digest of public key bit-string sans | |
549 | * ASN1 tag and length thus also excluding the unused bits field that is | |
550 | * logically part of the length). However, some CAs have a non-standard | |
551 | * authority keyid, so we lose. Too bad. | |
552 | * | |
553 | * This may push errors onto the stack when the certificate signature is | |
554 | * not of the right type or length, throw these away, | |
555 | */ | |
556 | for(k = dane->pkeys; !done && k; k = k->next) | |
557 | if(X509_verify(cert, k->value) > 0) | |
558 | done = wrap_issuer(dane, k->value, cert, depth, WRAP_MID) ? 1 : -1; | |
559 | else | |
560 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
e682570f | 561 | |
880a1e77 | 562 | return done; |
e682570f TL |
563 | } |
564 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
565 | static int |
566 | set_trust_anchor(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, ssl_dane *dane, X509 *cert) | |
e682570f | 567 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
568 | int matched = 0; |
569 | int n; | |
570 | int i; | |
571 | int depth = 0; | |
572 | EVP_PKEY *takey; | |
573 | X509 *ca; | |
574 | STACK_OF(X509) *in = ctx->untrusted; /* XXX: Accessor? */ | |
575 | ||
576 | if(!grow_chain(dane, UNTRUSTED, 0)) | |
577 | return -1; | |
578 | ||
579 | /* | |
580 | * Accept a degenerate case: depth 0 self-signed trust-anchor. | |
581 | */ | |
582 | if(X509_check_issued(cert, cert) == X509_V_OK) | |
583 | { | |
584 | dane->depth = 0; | |
585 | matched = match(dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA], cert, 0); | |
586 | if(matched > 0 && !grow_chain(dane, TRUSTED, cert)) | |
587 | matched = -1; | |
588 | return matched; | |
589 | } | |
590 | ||
591 | /* Make a shallow copy of the input untrusted chain. */ | |
592 | if(!(in = sk_X509_dup(in))) | |
593 | { | |
594 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SET_TRUST_ANCHOR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
595 | return -1; | |
596 | } | |
597 | ||
598 | /* | |
599 | * At each iteration we consume the issuer of the current cert. This | |
600 | * reduces the length of the "in" chain by one. If no issuer is found, | |
601 | * we are done. We also stop when a certificate matches a TA in the | |
602 | * peer's TLSA RRset. | |
603 | * | |
604 | * Caller ensures that the initial certificate is not self-signed. | |
605 | */ | |
606 | for(n = sk_X509_num(in); n > 0; --n, ++depth) | |
607 | { | |
608 | for(i = 0; i < n; ++i) | |
609 | if(X509_check_issued(sk_X509_value(in, i), cert) == X509_V_OK) | |
610 | break; | |
611 | ||
612 | /* | |
613 | * Final untrusted element with no issuer in the peer's chain, it may | |
614 | * however be signed by a pkey or cert obtained via a TLSA RR. | |
615 | */ | |
616 | if(i == n) | |
617 | break; | |
618 | ||
619 | /* Peer's chain contains an issuer ca. */ | |
620 | ca = sk_X509_delete(in, i); | |
621 | ||
622 | /* If not a trust anchor, record untrusted ca and continue. */ | |
623 | if((matched = match(dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA], ca, depth+1)) | |
624 | == 0) | |
625 | { | |
626 | if(grow_chain(dane, UNTRUSTED, ca)) | |
627 | { | |
628 | if(!X509_check_issued(ca, ca) == X509_V_OK) | |
629 | { | |
630 | /* Restart with issuer as subject */ | |
631 | cert = ca; | |
632 | continue; | |
633 | } | |
634 | /* Final self-signed element, skip ta_signed() check. */ | |
635 | cert = 0; | |
636 | } | |
637 | else | |
638 | matched = -1; | |
e682570f | 639 | } |
880a1e77 JH |
640 | else if(matched == MATCHED_CERT) |
641 | { | |
642 | if(!wrap_cert(dane, ca, depth)) | |
643 | matched = -1; | |
e682570f | 644 | } |
880a1e77 JH |
645 | else if(matched == MATCHED_PKEY) |
646 | { | |
647 | if( !(takey = X509_get_pubkey(ca)) | |
648 | || !wrap_issuer(dane, takey, cert, depth, WRAP_MID)) | |
649 | { | |
650 | if(takey) | |
651 | EVP_PKEY_free(takey); | |
652 | else | |
653 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SET_TRUST_ANCHOR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
654 | matched = -1; | |
655 | } | |
e682570f | 656 | } |
880a1e77 JH |
657 | break; |
658 | } | |
e682570f | 659 | |
880a1e77 JH |
660 | /* Shallow free the duplicated input untrusted chain. */ |
661 | sk_X509_free(in); | |
e682570f | 662 | |
880a1e77 JH |
663 | /* |
664 | * When the loop exits, if "cert" is set, it is not self-signed and has | |
665 | * no issuer in the chain, we check for a possible signature via a DNS | |
666 | * obtained TA cert or public key. | |
667 | */ | |
668 | if(matched == 0 && cert) | |
669 | matched = ta_signed(dane, cert, depth); | |
e682570f | 670 | |
880a1e77 | 671 | return matched; |
e682570f TL |
672 | } |
673 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
674 | static int |
675 | check_end_entity(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, ssl_dane *dane, X509 *cert) | |
e682570f | 676 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
677 | int matched; |
678 | ||
679 | matched = match(dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_FIXED_LEAF], cert, 0); | |
680 | if(matched > 0) | |
681 | if(!ctx->chain) | |
682 | if( (ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) | |
683 | && sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, cert)) | |
684 | CRYPTO_add(&cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
685 | else | |
686 | { | |
687 | DANEerr(DANE_F_CHECK_END_ENTITY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
688 | return -1; | |
689 | } | |
690 | return matched; | |
e682570f TL |
691 | } |
692 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
693 | static int |
694 | match_name(const char *certid, ssl_dane *dane) | |
e682570f | 695 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
696 | int multi = dane->multi; |
697 | dane_host_list hosts; | |
698 | ||
699 | for(hosts = dane->hosts; hosts; hosts = hosts->next) | |
700 | { | |
701 | int match_subdomain = 0; | |
702 | const char *domain = hosts->value; | |
703 | const char *parent; | |
704 | int idlen; | |
705 | int domlen; | |
706 | ||
707 | if(*domain == '.' && domain[1] != '\0') | |
708 | { | |
709 | ++domain; | |
710 | match_subdomain = 1; | |
e682570f | 711 | } |
880a1e77 JH |
712 | |
713 | /* | |
714 | * Sub-domain match: certid is any sub-domain of hostname. | |
715 | */ | |
716 | if(match_subdomain) | |
717 | if( (idlen = strlen(certid)) > (domlen = strlen(domain)) + 1 | |
718 | && certid[idlen - domlen - 1] == '.' | |
719 | && !strcasecmp(certid + (idlen - domlen), domain)) | |
720 | return 1; | |
721 | else | |
722 | continue; | |
723 | ||
724 | /* | |
725 | * Exact match and initial "*" match. The initial "*" in a certid | |
726 | * matches one (if multi is false) or more hostname components under | |
727 | * the condition that the certid contains multiple hostname components. | |
728 | */ | |
729 | if( !strcasecmp(certid, domain) | |
730 | || ( certid[0] == '*' && certid[1] == '.' && certid[2] != 0 | |
731 | && (parent = strchr(domain, '.')) != 0 | |
732 | && (idlen = strlen(certid + 1)) <= (domlen = strlen(parent)) | |
733 | && strcasecmp(multi ? parent + domlen - idlen : parent, certid+1) == 0)) | |
734 | return 1; | |
735 | } | |
736 | return 0; | |
e682570f TL |
737 | } |
738 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
739 | static char * |
740 | check_name(char *name, int len) | |
e682570f | 741 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
742 | char *cp = name + len; |
743 | ||
744 | while(len > 0 && !*--cp) | |
745 | --len; /* Ignore trailing NULs */ | |
746 | if(len <= 0) | |
747 | return 0; | |
748 | for(cp = name; *cp; cp++) | |
749 | { | |
750 | char c = *cp; | |
751 | if (!((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || | |
752 | (c >= '0' && c <= '9') || | |
753 | (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || | |
754 | (c == '.' || c == '-') || | |
755 | (c == '*'))) | |
756 | return 0; /* Only LDH, '.' and '*' */ | |
757 | } | |
758 | if(cp - name != len) /* Guard against internal NULs */ | |
759 | return 0; | |
760 | return name; | |
e682570f TL |
761 | } |
762 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
763 | static char * |
764 | parse_dns_name(const GENERAL_NAME *gn) | |
e682570f | 765 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
766 | if(gn->type != GEN_DNS) |
767 | return 0; | |
768 | if(ASN1_STRING_type(gn->d.ia5) != V_ASN1_IA5STRING) | |
769 | return 0; | |
770 | return check_name((char *) ASN1_STRING_data(gn->d.ia5), | |
771 | ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.ia5)); | |
e682570f TL |
772 | } |
773 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
774 | static char * |
775 | parse_subject_name(X509 *cert) | |
e682570f | 776 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
777 | X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(cert); |
778 | X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry; | |
779 | ASN1_STRING *entry_str; | |
780 | unsigned char *namebuf; | |
781 | int nid = NID_commonName; | |
782 | int len; | |
783 | int i; | |
784 | ||
785 | if(!name || (i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, nid, -1)) < 0) | |
786 | return 0; | |
787 | if(!(entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i))) | |
788 | return 0; | |
789 | if(!(entry_str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry))) | |
790 | return 0; | |
791 | ||
792 | if((len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&namebuf, entry_str)) < 0) | |
793 | return 0; | |
794 | if(len <= 0 || check_name((char *) namebuf, len) == 0) | |
795 | { | |
796 | OPENSSL_free(namebuf); | |
797 | return 0; | |
798 | } | |
799 | return (char *) namebuf; | |
e682570f TL |
800 | } |
801 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
802 | static int |
803 | name_check(ssl_dane *dane, X509 *cert) | |
e682570f | 804 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
805 | int matched = 0; |
806 | BOOL got_altname = FALSE; | |
807 | GENERAL_NAMES *gens; | |
808 | ||
809 | gens = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, 0, 0); | |
810 | if(gens) | |
811 | { | |
812 | int n = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); | |
813 | int i; | |
814 | ||
815 | for(i = 0; i < n; ++i) | |
816 | { | |
817 | const GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | |
818 | const char *certid; | |
819 | ||
820 | if(gn->type != GEN_DNS) | |
821 | continue; | |
822 | got_altname = TRUE; | |
823 | certid = parse_dns_name(gn); | |
824 | if(certid && *certid) | |
825 | { | |
826 | if((matched = match_name(certid, dane)) == 0) | |
827 | continue; | |
828 | if(!(dane->mhost = OPENSSL_strdup(certid))) | |
829 | matched = -1; | |
830 | break; | |
831 | } | |
e682570f | 832 | } |
880a1e77 JH |
833 | GENERAL_NAMES_free(gens); |
834 | } | |
835 | ||
836 | /* | |
837 | * XXX: Should the subjectName be skipped when *any* altnames are present, | |
838 | * or only when DNS altnames are present? | |
839 | */ | |
840 | if(got_altname) | |
841 | { | |
842 | char *certid = parse_subject_name(cert); | |
843 | if(certid != 0 && *certid && (matched = match_name(certid, dane)) != 0) | |
844 | dane->mhost = certid; /* Already a copy */ | |
845 | } | |
846 | return matched; | |
e682570f TL |
847 | } |
848 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
849 | static int |
850 | verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
e682570f | 851 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
852 | dane_selector_list issuer_rrs; |
853 | dane_selector_list leaf_rrs; | |
854 | int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) = ctx->verify_cb; | |
855 | int ssl_idx = SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(); | |
856 | SSL *ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, ssl_idx); | |
857 | ssl_dane *dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx); | |
858 | X509 *cert = ctx->cert; /* XXX: accessor? */ | |
859 | int matched = 0; | |
860 | int chain_length = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
861 | ||
6634ac8d JH |
862 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane library verify_chain fn called\n"); |
863 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
864 | issuer_rrs = dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_LIMIT_ISSUER]; |
865 | leaf_rrs = dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_LIMIT_LEAF]; | |
866 | ctx->verify = dane->verify; | |
867 | ||
868 | if((matched = name_check(dane, cert)) < 0) | |
869 | { | |
870 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM); | |
871 | return 0; | |
872 | } | |
873 | ||
874 | if(!matched) | |
875 | { | |
876 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
877 | ctx->current_cert = cert; | |
878 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH); | |
879 | if(!cb(0, ctx)) | |
880 | return 0; | |
881 | } | |
882 | matched = 0; | |
883 | ||
884 | /* | |
885 | * Satisfy at least one usage 0 or 1 constraint, unless we've already | |
886 | * matched a usage 2 trust anchor. | |
887 | * | |
888 | * XXX: internal_verify() doesn't callback with top certs that are not | |
889 | * self-issued. This should be fixed in a future OpenSSL. | |
890 | */ | |
891 | if(dane->roots && sk_X509_num(dane->roots)) | |
892 | { | |
893 | #ifndef NO_CALLBACK_WORKAROUND | |
894 | X509 *top = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, dane->depth); | |
895 | ||
896 | if(X509_check_issued(top, top) != X509_V_OK) | |
897 | { | |
898 | ctx->error_depth = dane->depth; | |
899 | ctx->current_cert = top; | |
900 | if(!cb(1, ctx)) | |
901 | return 0; | |
902 | } | |
903 | #endif | |
904 | /* Pop synthetic trust-anchor ancestors off the chain! */ | |
905 | while (--chain_length > dane->depth) | |
906 | X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain)); | |
907 | } | |
908 | else if(issuer_rrs || leaf_rrs) | |
909 | { | |
910 | int n = chain_length; | |
911 | ||
912 | /* | |
913 | * Check for an EE match, then a CA match at depths > 0, and | |
914 | * finally, if the EE cert is self-issued, for a depth 0 CA match. | |
915 | */ | |
916 | if(leaf_rrs) | |
917 | matched = match(leaf_rrs, cert, 0); | |
918 | while(!matched && issuer_rrs && --n >= 0) | |
919 | { | |
920 | X509 *xn = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
921 | ||
922 | if(n > 0 || X509_check_issued(xn, xn) == X509_V_OK) | |
923 | matched = match(issuer_rrs, xn, n); | |
e682570f TL |
924 | } |
925 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
926 | if(matched < 0) |
927 | { | |
928 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM); | |
929 | return 0; | |
e682570f | 930 | } |
e682570f | 931 | |
880a1e77 JH |
932 | if(!matched) |
933 | { | |
934 | ctx->current_cert = cert; | |
935 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
936 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED); | |
937 | if(!cb(0, ctx)) | |
938 | return 0; | |
e682570f | 939 | } |
880a1e77 | 940 | } |
e682570f | 941 | |
880a1e77 | 942 | return ctx->verify(ctx); |
e682570f TL |
943 | } |
944 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
945 | static int |
946 | verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *unused_ctx) | |
e682570f | 947 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
948 | static int ssl_idx = -1; |
949 | SSL *ssl; | |
950 | ssl_dane *dane; | |
951 | int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) = ctx->verify_cb; | |
952 | int matched; | |
953 | X509 *cert = ctx->cert; /* XXX: accessor? */ | |
954 | ||
6634ac8d JH |
955 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane library verify_cert fn called\n"); |
956 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
957 | if(ssl_idx < 0) |
958 | ssl_idx = SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(); | |
959 | if(dane_idx < 0) | |
960 | { | |
961 | DANEerr(DANE_F_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
962 | return -1; | |
963 | } | |
964 | ||
965 | ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, ssl_idx); | |
966 | if(!(dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx)) || !cert) | |
967 | return X509_verify_cert(ctx); | |
968 | ||
969 | if(dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_FIXED_LEAF]) | |
970 | { | |
971 | if((matched = check_end_entity(ctx, dane, cert)) > 0) | |
972 | { | |
973 | ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
974 | ctx->current_cert = cert; | |
975 | return cb(1, ctx); | |
e682570f | 976 | } |
880a1e77 JH |
977 | if(matched < 0) |
978 | { | |
979 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM); | |
980 | return -1; | |
e682570f | 981 | } |
880a1e77 | 982 | } |
e682570f | 983 | |
880a1e77 JH |
984 | if(dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA]) |
985 | { | |
986 | if((matched = set_trust_anchor(ctx, dane, cert)) < 0) | |
987 | { | |
988 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM); | |
989 | return -1; | |
e682570f | 990 | } |
880a1e77 JH |
991 | if(matched) |
992 | { | |
e682570f | 993 | /* |
880a1e77 JH |
994 | * Check that setting the untrusted chain updates the expected |
995 | * structure member at the expected offset. | |
e682570f | 996 | */ |
880a1e77 JH |
997 | X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(ctx, dane->roots); |
998 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(ctx, dane->chain); | |
999 | OPENSSL_assert(ctx->untrusted == dane->chain); | |
1000 | } | |
1001 | } | |
e682570f | 1002 | |
880a1e77 JH |
1003 | /* |
1004 | * Name checks and usage 0/1 constraint enforcement are delayed until | |
1005 | * X509_verify_cert() builds the full chain and calls our verify_chain() | |
1006 | * wrapper. | |
1007 | */ | |
1008 | dane->verify = ctx->verify; | |
1009 | ctx->verify = verify_chain; | |
1010 | ||
1011 | return X509_verify_cert(ctx); | |
e682570f TL |
1012 | } |
1013 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
1014 | static dane_list |
1015 | list_alloc(size_t vsize) | |
e682570f | 1016 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
1017 | void *value = (void *) OPENSSL_malloc(vsize); |
1018 | dane_list l; | |
1019 | ||
1020 | if(!value) | |
1021 | { | |
1022 | DANEerr(DANE_F_LIST_ALLOC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1023 | return 0; | |
1024 | } | |
1025 | if(!(l = (dane_list) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*l)))) | |
1026 | { | |
1027 | OPENSSL_free(value); | |
1028 | DANEerr(DANE_F_LIST_ALLOC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1029 | return 0; | |
1030 | } | |
1031 | l->next = 0; | |
1032 | l->value = value; | |
1033 | return l; | |
e682570f TL |
1034 | } |
1035 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
1036 | static void |
1037 | list_free(void *list, void (*f)(void *)) | |
e682570f | 1038 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
1039 | dane_list head; |
1040 | dane_list next; | |
1041 | ||
1042 | for(head = (dane_list) list; head; head = next) | |
1043 | { | |
1044 | next = head->next; | |
1045 | if (f && head->value) | |
1046 | f(head->value); | |
1047 | OPENSSL_free(head); | |
1048 | } | |
e682570f TL |
1049 | } |
1050 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
1051 | static void |
1052 | dane_mtype_free(void *p) | |
e682570f | 1053 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
1054 | list_free(((dane_mtype) p)->data, OPENSSL_freeFunc); |
1055 | OPENSSL_free(p); | |
e682570f TL |
1056 | } |
1057 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
1058 | static void |
1059 | dane_selector_free(void *p) | |
e682570f | 1060 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
1061 | list_free(((dane_selector) p)->mtype, dane_mtype_free); |
1062 | OPENSSL_free(p); | |
e682570f TL |
1063 | } |
1064 | ||
946ecbe0 JH |
1065 | |
1066 | ||
1067 | /* | |
1068 | ||
1069 | Tidy up once the connection is finished with. | |
1070 | ||
1071 | Arguments | |
1072 | ssl The ssl connection handle | |
1073 | ||
1074 | => Before calling SSL_free() | |
1075 | tls_close() and tls_getc() [the error path] are the obvious places. | |
1076 | Could we do it earlier - right after verification? In tls_client_start() | |
1077 | right after SSL_connect() returns, in that case. | |
1078 | ||
1079 | */ | |
1080 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
1081 | void |
1082 | DANESSL_cleanup(SSL *ssl) | |
e682570f | 1083 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
1084 | ssl_dane *dane; |
1085 | int u; | |
1086 | ||
6634ac8d JH |
1087 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane library cleanup fn called\n"); |
1088 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
1089 | if(dane_idx < 0 || !(dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx))) |
1090 | return; | |
1091 | (void) SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx, 0); | |
1092 | ||
1093 | if(dane->hosts) | |
1094 | list_free(dane->hosts, OPENSSL_freeFunc); | |
1095 | if(dane->mhost) | |
1096 | OPENSSL_free(dane->mhost); | |
1097 | for(u = 0; u <= SSL_DANE_USAGE_LAST; ++u) | |
1098 | if(dane->selectors[u]) | |
1099 | list_free(dane->selectors[u], dane_selector_free); | |
1100 | if(dane->pkeys) | |
1101 | list_free(dane->pkeys, pkey_free); | |
1102 | if(dane->certs) | |
1103 | list_free(dane->certs, cert_free); | |
1104 | if(dane->roots) | |
1105 | sk_X509_pop_free(dane->roots, X509_free); | |
1106 | if(dane->chain) | |
1107 | sk_X509_pop_free(dane->chain, X509_free); | |
1108 | OPENSSL_free(dane); | |
6634ac8d | 1109 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane library cleanup fn return\n"); |
e682570f TL |
1110 | } |
1111 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
1112 | static dane_host_list |
1113 | host_list_init(const char **src) | |
e682570f | 1114 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
1115 | dane_host_list head = NULL; |
1116 | ||
1117 | while(*src) | |
1118 | { | |
1119 | dane_host_list elem = (dane_host_list) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*elem)); | |
1120 | if(!elem) | |
1121 | { | |
1122 | list_free(head, OPENSSL_freeFunc); | |
1123 | return 0; | |
e682570f | 1124 | } |
880a1e77 JH |
1125 | elem->value = OPENSSL_strdup(*src++); |
1126 | LINSERT(head, elem); | |
1127 | } | |
1128 | return head; | |
e682570f TL |
1129 | } |
1130 | ||
946ecbe0 JH |
1131 | |
1132 | ||
1133 | ||
1134 | /* | |
1135 | ||
1136 | Call this for each TLSA record found for the target, after the | |
1137 | DANE setup has been done on the ssl connection handle. | |
1138 | ||
1139 | Arguments: | |
1140 | ssl Connection handle | |
1141 | usage TLSA record field | |
1142 | selector TLSA record field | |
1143 | mdname ??? message digest name? | |
1144 | data ??? TLSA record megalump? | |
1145 | dlen length of data | |
1146 | ||
1147 | Return | |
1148 | -1 on error | |
1149 | 0 action not taken | |
1150 | 1 record accepted | |
1151 | */ | |
1152 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
1153 | int |
1154 | DANESSL_add_tlsa(SSL *ssl, uint8_t usage, uint8_t selector, const char *mdname, | |
1155 | unsigned const char *data, size_t dlen) | |
e682570f | 1156 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
1157 | ssl_dane *dane; |
1158 | dane_selector_list s = 0; | |
1159 | dane_mtype_list m = 0; | |
1160 | dane_data_list d = 0; | |
1161 | dane_cert_list xlist = 0; | |
1162 | dane_pkey_list klist = 0; | |
1163 | const EVP_MD *md = 0; | |
1164 | ||
6634ac8d JH |
1165 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane add_tlsa\n"); |
1166 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
1167 | if(dane_idx < 0 || !(dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx))) |
1168 | { | |
1169 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_DANE_INIT); | |
1170 | return -1; | |
1171 | } | |
1172 | ||
1173 | if(usage > SSL_DANE_USAGE_LAST) | |
1174 | { | |
1175 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_USAGE); | |
1176 | return 0; | |
1177 | } | |
1178 | if(selector > SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_LAST) | |
1179 | { | |
1180 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_SELECTOR); | |
1181 | return 0; | |
1182 | } | |
1183 | if(mdname && !(md = EVP_get_digestbyname(mdname))) | |
1184 | { | |
1185 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_DIGEST); | |
1186 | return 0; | |
1187 | } | |
1188 | if(!data) | |
1189 | { | |
1190 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_NULL_DATA); | |
1191 | return 0; | |
1192 | } | |
1193 | if(mdname && dlen != EVP_MD_size(md)) | |
1194 | { | |
1195 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_DATA_LENGTH); | |
1196 | return 0; | |
1197 | } | |
1198 | ||
1199 | if(!mdname) | |
1200 | { | |
1201 | X509 *x = 0; | |
1202 | EVP_PKEY *k = 0; | |
1203 | const unsigned char *p = data; | |
e682570f TL |
1204 | |
1205 | #define xklistinit(lvar, ltype, var, freeFunc) do { \ | |
880a1e77 JH |
1206 | (lvar) = (ltype) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*(lvar))); \ |
1207 | if (!(lvar)) { \ | |
1208 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); \ | |
1209 | freeFunc((var)); \ | |
1210 | return 0; \ | |
1211 | } \ | |
1212 | (lvar)->next = 0; \ | |
1213 | lvar->value = var; \ | |
1214 | } while (0) | |
e682570f | 1215 | #define xkfreeret(ret) do { \ |
880a1e77 JH |
1216 | if (xlist) list_free(xlist, cert_free); \ |
1217 | if (klist) list_free(klist, pkey_free); \ | |
1218 | return (ret); \ | |
1219 | } while (0) | |
1220 | ||
1221 | switch(selector) | |
1222 | { | |
1223 | case SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_CERT: | |
1224 | if(!d2i_X509(&x, &p, dlen) || dlen != p - data) | |
1225 | { | |
1226 | if (x) | |
1227 | X509_free(x); | |
1228 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_CERT); | |
1229 | return 0; | |
1230 | } | |
1231 | k = X509_get_pubkey(x); | |
1232 | EVP_PKEY_free(k); | |
1233 | if(!k) | |
1234 | { | |
1235 | X509_free(x); | |
1236 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_CERT_PKEY); | |
1237 | return 0; | |
1238 | } | |
1239 | if(usage == SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA) | |
1240 | xklistinit(xlist, dane_cert_list, x, X509_free); | |
1241 | break; | |
1242 | ||
1243 | case SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_SPKI: | |
1244 | if(!d2i_PUBKEY(&k, &p, dlen) || dlen != p - data) | |
1245 | { | |
1246 | if(k) | |
1247 | EVP_PKEY_free(k); | |
1248 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_PKEY); | |
1249 | return 0; | |
1250 | } | |
1251 | if(usage == SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA) | |
1252 | xklistinit(klist, dane_pkey_list, k, EVP_PKEY_free); | |
1253 | break; | |
e682570f | 1254 | } |
880a1e77 JH |
1255 | } |
1256 | ||
1257 | /* Find insertion point and don't add duplicate elements. */ | |
1258 | for(s = dane->selectors[usage]; s; s = s->next) | |
1259 | if(s->value->selector == selector) | |
1260 | for(m = s->value->mtype; m; m = m->next) | |
1261 | if(m->value->md == md) | |
1262 | for(d = m->value->data; d; d = d->next) | |
1263 | if( d->value->datalen == dlen | |
1264 | && memcmp(d->value->data, data, dlen) == 0) | |
1265 | xkfreeret(1); | |
1266 | ||
1267 | if(!(d = (dane_data_list) list_alloc(sizeof(*d->value) + dlen))) | |
1268 | xkfreeret(0); | |
1269 | d->value->datalen = dlen; | |
1270 | memcpy(d->value->data, data, dlen); | |
1271 | if(!m) | |
1272 | { | |
1273 | if(!(m = (dane_mtype_list) list_alloc(sizeof(*m->value)))) | |
1274 | { | |
1275 | list_free(d, OPENSSL_freeFunc); | |
1276 | xkfreeret(0); | |
e682570f | 1277 | } |
880a1e77 JH |
1278 | m->value->data = 0; |
1279 | if((m->value->md = md) != 0) | |
1280 | m->value->mdlen = dlen; | |
1281 | if(!s) | |
1282 | { | |
1283 | if(!(s = (dane_selector_list) list_alloc(sizeof(*s->value)))) | |
1284 | { | |
1285 | list_free(m, dane_mtype_free); | |
1286 | xkfreeret(0); | |
1287 | } | |
1288 | s->value->mtype = 0; | |
1289 | s->value->selector = selector; | |
1290 | LINSERT(dane->selectors[usage], s); | |
1291 | } | |
1292 | LINSERT(s->value->mtype, m); | |
1293 | } | |
1294 | LINSERT(m->value->data, d); | |
1295 | ||
1296 | if(xlist) | |
1297 | LINSERT(dane->certs, xlist); | |
1298 | else if(klist) | |
1299 | LINSERT(dane->pkeys, klist); | |
1300 | ++dane->count; | |
1301 | return 1; | |
e682570f TL |
1302 | } |
1303 | ||
946ecbe0 JH |
1304 | |
1305 | ||
1306 | ||
1307 | /* | |
1308 | Call this once we have an ssl connection handle but before | |
1309 | making the TLS connection. | |
1310 | ||
1311 | => In tls_client_start() after the call to SSL_new() | |
1312 | and before the call to SSL_connect(). Exactly where | |
1313 | probably does not matter. | |
1314 | We probably want to keep our existing SNI handling; | |
1315 | call this with NULL. | |
1316 | ||
1317 | Arguments: | |
1318 | ssl Connection handle | |
1319 | sni_domain Optional peer server name | |
1320 | hostnames ?? list of names - but what names? | |
1321 | ||
1322 | Return | |
1323 | -1 on fatal error | |
1324 | 0 nonfatal error | |
1325 | 1 success | |
1326 | */ | |
1327 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
1328 | int |
1329 | DANESSL_init(SSL *ssl, const char *sni_domain, const char **hostnames) | |
e682570f | 1330 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
1331 | ssl_dane *dane; |
1332 | int i; | |
e682570f | 1333 | #ifdef OPENSSL_INTERNAL |
880a1e77 | 1334 | SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl); |
e682570f | 1335 | |
6634ac8d | 1336 | |
880a1e77 JH |
1337 | if(sctx->app_verify_callback != verify_cert) |
1338 | { | |
1339 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, DANE_R_SCTX_INIT); | |
1340 | return -1; | |
1341 | } | |
e682570f | 1342 | #else |
6634ac8d | 1343 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane ssl_init\n"); |
880a1e77 JH |
1344 | if(dane_idx < 0) |
1345 | { | |
1346 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, DANE_R_LIBRARY_INIT); | |
1347 | return -1; | |
1348 | } | |
e682570f TL |
1349 | #endif |
1350 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
1351 | if(sni_domain && !SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(ssl, sni_domain)) |
1352 | return 0; | |
e682570f | 1353 | |
880a1e77 JH |
1354 | if(!(dane = (ssl_dane *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(ssl_dane)))) |
1355 | { | |
1356 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1357 | return 0; | |
1358 | } | |
1359 | if(!SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx, dane)) | |
1360 | { | |
1361 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1362 | OPENSSL_free(dane); | |
1363 | return 0; | |
1364 | } | |
6634ac8d | 1365 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane ssl-init: new dane struct: %p\n", dane); |
880a1e77 | 1366 | |
6634ac8d JH |
1367 | dane->verify = 0; |
1368 | dane->hosts = 0; | |
1369 | dane->thost = 0; | |
880a1e77 JH |
1370 | dane->pkeys = 0; |
1371 | dane->certs = 0; | |
1372 | dane->chain = 0; | |
1373 | dane->roots = 0; | |
1374 | dane->depth = -1; | |
1375 | dane->mhost = 0; /* Future SSL control interface */ | |
1376 | dane->multi = 0; /* Future SSL control interface */ | |
1377 | dane->count = 0; | |
1378 | ||
1379 | for(i = 0; i <= SSL_DANE_USAGE_LAST; ++i) | |
1380 | dane->selectors[i] = 0; | |
1381 | ||
1382 | if(hostnames && !(dane->hosts = host_list_init(hostnames))) | |
1383 | { | |
1384 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1385 | DANESSL_cleanup(ssl); | |
1386 | return 0; | |
1387 | } | |
1388 | ||
1389 | return 1; | |
e682570f TL |
1390 | } |
1391 | ||
946ecbe0 JH |
1392 | |
1393 | /* | |
1394 | ||
1395 | Call this once we have a context to work with, but | |
1396 | before DANESSL_init() | |
1397 | ||
1398 | => in tls_client_start(), after tls_init() call gives us the ctx, | |
1399 | if we decide we want to (policy) and can (TLSA records available) | |
1400 | replacing (? what about fallback) everything from testing tls_verify_hosts | |
1401 | down to just before calling SSL_new() for the conn handle. | |
1402 | ||
1403 | Arguments | |
1404 | ctx SSL context | |
1405 | ||
1406 | Return | |
1407 | -1 Error | |
1408 | 1 Success | |
1409 | */ | |
1410 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
1411 | int |
1412 | DANESSL_CTX_init(SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
e682570f | 1413 | { |
6634ac8d | 1414 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane ctx-init\n"); |
880a1e77 JH |
1415 | if(dane_idx >= 0) |
1416 | { | |
1417 | SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(ctx, verify_cert, 0); | |
1418 | return 1; | |
1419 | } | |
1420 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_CTX_DANE_INIT, DANE_R_LIBRARY_INIT); | |
1421 | return -1; | |
e682570f TL |
1422 | } |
1423 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
1424 | static int |
1425 | init_once(volatile int *value, int (*init)(void), void (*postinit)(void)) | |
e682570f | 1426 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
1427 | int wlock = 0; |
1428 | ||
1429 | CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | |
1430 | if(*value < 0) | |
1431 | { | |
1432 | CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | |
1433 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | |
1434 | wlock = 1; | |
1435 | if(*value < 0) | |
1436 | { | |
1437 | *value = init(); | |
1438 | if(postinit) | |
1439 | postinit(); | |
e682570f | 1440 | } |
880a1e77 JH |
1441 | } |
1442 | if (wlock) | |
1443 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | |
1444 | else | |
1445 | CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | |
1446 | return *value; | |
e682570f TL |
1447 | } |
1448 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
1449 | static void |
1450 | dane_init(void) | |
e682570f | 1451 | { |
880a1e77 JH |
1452 | /* |
1453 | * Store library id in zeroth function slot, used to locate the library | |
1454 | * name. This must be done before we load the error strings. | |
1455 | */ | |
e682570f | 1456 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR |
880a1e77 JH |
1457 | dane_str_functs[0].error |= ERR_PACK(err_lib_dane, 0, 0); |
1458 | ERR_load_strings(err_lib_dane, dane_str_functs); | |
1459 | ERR_load_strings(err_lib_dane, dane_str_reasons); | |
e682570f TL |
1460 | #endif |
1461 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
1462 | /* |
1463 | * Register SHA-2 digests, if implemented and not already registered. | |
1464 | */ | |
e682570f | 1465 | #if defined(LN_sha256) && defined(NID_sha256) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256) |
880a1e77 JH |
1466 | if(!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha224)) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha224()); |
1467 | if(!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha256)) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256()); | |
e682570f TL |
1468 | #endif |
1469 | #if defined(LN_sha512) && defined(NID_sha512) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA512) | |
880a1e77 JH |
1470 | if(!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha384)) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha384()); |
1471 | if(!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha512)) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha512()); | |
e682570f TL |
1472 | #endif |
1473 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
1474 | /* |
1475 | * Register an SSL index for the connection-specific ssl_dane structure. | |
1476 | * Using a separate index makes it possible to add DANE support to | |
1477 | * existing OpenSSL releases that don't have a suitable pointer in the | |
1478 | * SSL structure. | |
1479 | */ | |
1480 | dane_idx = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, 0, 0, 0, 0); | |
e682570f TL |
1481 | } |
1482 | ||
946ecbe0 JH |
1483 | |
1484 | ||
1485 | /* | |
1486 | ||
1487 | Call this once. Probably early in startup will do; may need | |
1488 | to be after SSL library init. | |
1489 | ||
043b1248 JH |
1490 | => put after call to tls_init() for now |
1491 | ||
1492 | Return | |
1493 | 1 Success | |
1494 | 0 Fail | |
946ecbe0 JH |
1495 | */ |
1496 | ||
880a1e77 JH |
1497 | int |
1498 | DANESSL_library_init(void) | |
e682570f | 1499 | { |
6634ac8d | 1500 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane lib-init\n"); |
880a1e77 JH |
1501 | if(err_lib_dane < 0) |
1502 | init_once(&err_lib_dane, ERR_get_next_error_library, dane_init); | |
e682570f TL |
1503 | |
1504 | #if defined(LN_sha256) | |
880a1e77 JH |
1505 | /* No DANE without SHA256 support */ |
1506 | if(dane_idx >= 0 && EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha256) != 0) | |
1507 | return 1; | |
e682570f | 1508 | #endif |
880a1e77 JH |
1509 | |
1510 | DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_LIBRARY_INIT, DANE_R_DANE_SUPPORT); | |
1511 | return 0; | |
e682570f TL |
1512 | } |
1513 | ||
946ecbe0 | 1514 | |
e682570f | 1515 | #endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */ |
880a1e77 JH |
1516 | /* vi: aw ai sw=2 |
1517 | */ |