tidying

[exim.git] / doc / doc-txt / cve-2019-15846 / qualys.mbx

From qsa@qualys.com Wed Aug 14 01:29:25 CEST 2019
Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2019 23:29:25 +0000
From: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
To: Heiko Schlittermann <hs@schlittermann.de>
Subject: Re: Help evaluating a Bug in Exim MTA
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Hi Heiko,

On Mon, Aug 12, 2019 at 11:56:12PM +0200, Heiko Schlittermann wrote:
> So I'd say, you do not need to rush, but I'd like to close it sooner or
> later in either manner.

OK, below is our preliminary analysis. First:

- From an attacker's point of view, most calls to
  string_interpret_escape() are uninteresting. For example, nextitem()
  in src/filter.c checks for buffer overflows, and string_dequote()
  seems to process trusted strings only (strings from configuration
  files).

- On the other hand, string_unprinting() is very interesting:

  - It is used in tls_import_cert() (for peercert, for example); but
    certificates are in PEM format (i.e., base64) and hence unlikely to
    contain the problematic backslash-null-byte sequence.

  - It is used for peerdn and sni in src/spool_in.c; but peerdn is used
    only if client certificates are processed by Exim, and this is not
    the default (and although some sites use client-certificate
    authentication, this is not very common, and hence not very
    interesting for an attacker).

  - In any case, as long as Exim supports and accepts tls connections,
    an attacker can send an sni, and hence reach the problematic
    string_unprinting() and string_interpret_escape() functions.

Next question: is it possible to send an sni that is written to the
spool header file and that ends with the problematic backslash-null-byte
sequence? The answer is yes, because of what we believe is another bug,
in string_printing(): the sni is written to the spool header file via
string_printing(tls_in.sni), which escapes characters with backslash,
but does *not* escape the escaping character itself (backslash),
although it definitely should.

This bug is what makes it possible to reach and trigger the bug in
string_unprinting() and string_interpret_escape(), with an sni that ends
in an unescaped backslash (followed by the terminating null byte).

Last question: is this exploitable? The answer is, almost certainly, yes
(and, because spool_read_header() runs as root, this means remote root).

The sni is read from the spool via string_unprinting(string_copy()), and
both string_unprinting() and string_copy() use store_get(): as a result,
the destination buffer is allocated right after the source buffer, and
the characters that are read out-of-bounds after the end of the source
buffer are the first characters of the destination buffer, which are
fully under the attacker's control. This results in a heap overflow
whose length and contents are both under the attacker's control (we
verified this). This is almost certainly exploitable.

Our advice is to start the security-release process as soon as possible.
We know it is very painful, but we are really confident that this bug is
exploitable; we will try to confirm this in the next few days. We also
believe that an Exim server must support and accept tls connections to
be remotely exploitable (via sni).

During our analysis of this bug, we probably spotted three other bugs:

- The unescaped backslash in string_printing() that we mentioned above.

- A bug in spool_read_header(): before the for (;;) loop, p is set to
  big_buffer + 2; and inside the loop, big_buffer may be re-allocated;
  but p is never updated. This can lead to a use-after-free (we did not
  assess the security impact of this bug, though).

- A bug in spool_write_header(): the return value of tls_export_cert()
  is not checked (for ourcert, but more importantly, for peercert). If
  this function fails (maybe because big_buffer is not big enough), then
  big_buffer may be uninitialized or unterminated, and garbage may be
  written to the spool file (we did not assess the security impact of
  this bug, either).

We are at your disposal for questions, comments, and further
discussions. Thank you very much for reaching out! With best regards,

--
the Qualys Security Advisory team
From qsa@qualys.com Mon Aug 19 00:23:03 CEST 2019
Date: Sun, 18 Aug 2019 22:23:03 +0000
From: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
To: Heiko Schlittermann <hs@schlittermann.de>
Subject: Re: Help evaluating a Bug in Exim MTA
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Hi Heiko,

On Tue, Aug 13, 2019 at 11:29:25PM +0000, Qualys Security Advisory wrote:
> we are really confident that this bug is exploitable

We can confirm that this bug is indeed exploitable: we wrote a
rudimentary exploit that remotely obtains root privileges (because
deliver_message() runs as root).

Some general notes on this exploit:

- To the best of our knowledge, the string_interpret_escape() bug
  (backslash-null) is remotely exploitable if and only if Exim supports
  and accepts TLS connections (because the only attack vector that we
  know of is the string_unprinting() of SNI).

- Both OpenSSL and GnuTLS installations are exploitable.

- Our exploit is Linux-specific (because our heap-overflow exploitation
  is specific to glibc's malloc implementation), but works on both i386
  and amd64.

Some detailed notes on this exploit:

- First, we connect to Exim with TLS and send an SNI that ends with
  backslash-null (this SNI is written unmodified to the spool because of
  the unescaped-backslash bug in string_printing2()).

- Second, we exploit the backslash-null bug in string_interpret_escape()
  (our SNI is read from the spool and unescaped by string_unprinting()),
  and we transform this out-of-bounds read into an out-of-bounds write
  (a heap overflow).

- Next, we use this heap overflow to overwrite the header of a free
  malloc chunk, and increase its size to make it overlap with other,
  already-allocated malloc chunks.

- Last, we allocate this enlarged malloc chunk, and use it to overwrite
  large parts of the heap (the already-allocated malloc chunks) with
  arbitrary data:

  . we overwrite the "id" string: it is used to build the message-log
    file name, and therefore allows us to write to "/etc/passwd" (by
    overwriting "id" with "/../../../../../../../../etc/passwd");

  . we overwrite the "sender_address" string: it is written to the
    message-log file, and therefore allows us to add a new user to
    "/etc/passwd".

Other exploitation methods may exist. We will not publish our exploit:
it is a quick and dirty proof of concept, and we will not have the time
to clean it anytime soon. However, please feel free to quote us on the
exploitability of this bug (we do have a working exploit), and please
feel free to quote all or parts of this email in your announcements.

We are at your disposal for questions, comments, and further
discussions. Thank you very much! With best regards,

--
the Qualys Security Advisory team